The problem which I have just been considering—the causes of greater or

less intensity or distinctness of individual elements of the dream—is

one which I should like to guard against being confused with another

problem, which has to do with the varying distinctness of whole dreams

or sections of dreams. In the first case, the opposite of distinctness

is blurredness; in the second, confusion. It is of course unmistakable

that the intensities rise and fall in the two scales in unison. A

portion of the dream which seems clear to us usually contains vivid

elements; an obscure dream is composed of less intense elements. But the

problem with which we are confronted by the scale, ranging from the

apparently clear to the indistinct or confused, is far more complicated

than that formed by variations in the vividness of the dream elements;

indeed the former will be dropped from the discussion for reasons which

will be given later. In isolated cases we are astonished to find that

the impression of clearness or indistinctness produced by the dream is

altogether without significance for its structure, and that it

originates in the dream material as one of its constituents. Thus I

remember a dream which seemed particularly well constructed, flawless,

and clear, so that I made up my mind, while I was still in the somnolent

state, to recognise a new class of dreams—those which had not been

subject to the mechanism of condensation and displacement, and which

might thus be designated “Fancies while asleep.” A closer examination

proved that this rare dream had the same breaches and flaws in its

construction as every other; for this reason I abandoned the category of

dream fancies. The content of the dream, reduced to its lowest terms,

was that I was reciting to a friend a difficult and long-sought theory

of bisexuality, and the wish-fulfilling power of the dream was

responsible for the fact that this theory (which, by the way, was not

stated in the dream) appeared so clear and flawless. What I considered a

judgment upon the finished dream was thus a part of the dream content,

and the essential one at that. The dream activity had extended its

operations, as it were, into waking thought, and had presented to me in

the form of a judgment that part of the dream material which it had not

succeeded in reproducing with exactness. The exact opposite of this once

came to my attention in the case of a female patient who was at first

altogether unwilling to tell a dream which was necessary for the

analysis, “because it was so obscure and confused,” and who declared,

after repeatedly denying the accuracy of her description, that several

persons, herself, her husband, and her father, had occurred in the

dream, and that it seemed as though she did not know whether her husband

was her father, or who her father was anyway, or something of that sort.

Upon considering this dream in connection with the ideas that occurred

to the dreamer in the course of the sitting, it was found unquestionably

to be concerned with the story of a servant girl who had to confess that

she was expecting a child, and who was now confronted with doubts as to

“who was really the father.”[DX] The obscurity manifested by the dream,

therefore, is again in this case a portion of the material which excited

it. A part of this material was represented in the form of the dream.

The form of the dream or of dreaming is used with astonishing frequency

to represent the concealed content.

Comments on the dream and seemingly harmless observations about it often

serve in the most subtle manner to conceal—although they usually

betray—a part of what is dreamed. Thus, for example, when the dreamer

says: _Here the dream is vague_, and the analysis gives an infantile

reminiscence of listening to a person cleaning himself after defecation.

Another example deserves to be recorded in detail. A young man has a

very distinct dream which recalls to him phantasies from his infancy

which have remained conscious to him: he was in a summer hotel one

evening, he mistook the number of his room, and entered a room in which

an elderly lady and her two daughters were undressing to go to bed. He

continues: “_Then there are some gaps in the dream; then something is

missing_; and at the end there was a man in the room who wished to throw

me out with whom I had to wrestle.” He endeavoured in vain to recall the

content and purpose of the boyish fancy to which the dream apparently

alludes. But we finally become aware that the required content had

already been given in his utterances concerning the indistinct part of

the dream. The “gaps” were the openings in the genitals of the women who

were retiring: “Here something is missing” described the chief character

of the female genitals. In those early years he burned with curiosity to

see a female genital, and was still inclined to adhere to the infantile

sexual theory which attributes a male genital to the woman.

All the dreams which have been dreamed in the same night belong to the

same whole when considered with respect to their content; their

separation into several portions, their grouping and number, all these

details are full of meaning, and may be considered as information coming

from the latent dream content. In the interpretation of dreams

consisting of many principal sections, or of dreams belonging to the

same night, one must not fail to think of the possibility that these

different and succeeding dreams bring to expression the same feelings in

different material. The one that comes first in time of these homologous

dreams is usually the most disfigured and most bashful, while the

succeeding is bolder and more distinct.

Even Pharaoh’s dream in the Bible of the ears and the kine, which Joseph

interpreted, was of this kind. It is reported by Josephus (_Antiquities

of the Jews_, bk. ii. chap, iii.) in greater detail than in the Bible.

After relating the first dream, the King said: “When I had seen this

vision I awaked out of my sleep, and being in disorder, and considering

with myself what this appearance should be, I fell asleep again, and saw

another dream much more wonderful than the first, which did still more

affright and disturb me.” After listening to the report of the dream,

Joseph said, “This dream, O King, although seen under two forms,

signifies one and the same issue of things.”

Jung,[99] who, in his _Beitrag zur Psychologie des Gerüchtes_ relates

how the veiled erotic dream of a school-girl was understood by her

friends without interpretation and continued by them with variations,

remarks in connection with reports of this dream, “that the last of a

long series of dream pictures contained precisely the same thought whose

representation had been attempted in the first picture of the series.

The censor pushed the complex out of the way as long as possible,

through constantly renewed symbolic concealments, displacements,

deviations into the harmless, &c.” (_l.c._ p. 87). Scherner[58] was well

acquainted with the peculiarities of dream disfigurement and describes

them at the end of his theory of organic stimulation as a special law,

p. 166: “But, finally, the phantasy observes the general law in all

nerve stimuli emanating from symbolic dream formations, by representing

at the beginning of the dream only the remotest and freest allusions to

the stimulating object; but towards the end, when the power of

representation becomes exhausted, it presents the stimulus or its

concerned organ or its function in unconcealed form, and in the way this

dream designates its organic motive and reaches its end.”

A new confirmation of Scherner’s law has been furnished by Otto

Rank[106] in his work, _A Self Interpretation Dream_. This dream of a

girl reported by him consisted of two dreams, separated in time of the

same night, the second of which ended with pollution. This pollution

dream could be interpreted in all its details by disregarding a great

many of the ideas contributed by the dreamer, and the profuse relations

between the two dream contents indicated that the first dream expressed

in bashful language the same thing as the second, so that the latter—the

pollution dream—helped to a full explanation of the former. From this

example, Rank, with perfect justice, draws conclusions concerning the

significance of pollution dreams in general.

But in my experience it is only in rare cases that one is in a position

to interpret clearness or confusion in the dream as certainty or doubt

in the dream material. Later I shall try to discover the factor in the

formation of dreams upon whose influence this scale of qualities

essentially depends.

In some dreams, which adhere for a time to a certain situation and

scenery, there occur interruptions described in the following words:

“But then it seemed as though it were at the same time another place,

and there such and such a thing happened.” What thus interrupts the main

trend of the dream, which after a while may be continued again, turns

out to be a subordinate idea, an interpolated thought in the dream

material. A conditional relation in the dream-thoughts is represented by

simultaneousness in the dream (wenn—wann; if—when).

What is signified by the sensation of impeded movement, which so often

occurs in the dream, and which is so closely allied to anxiety? One

wants to move, and is unable to stir from the spot; or one wants to

accomplish something, and meets one obstacle after another. The train is

about to start, and one cannot reach it; one’s hand is raised to avenge

an insult, and its strength fails, &c. We have already encountered this

sensation in exhibition dreams, but have as yet made no serious attempt

to interpret it. It is convenient, but inadequate, to answer that there

is motor paralysis in sleep, which manifests itself by means of the

sensation alluded to. We may ask: “Why is it, then, that we do not dream

continually of these impeded motions?” And we are justified in supposing

that this sensation, constantly appearing in sleep, serves some purpose

or other in representation, and is brought about by a need occurring in

the dream material for this sort of representation.

Failure to accomplish does not always appear in the dream as a

sensation, but also simply as a part of the dream content. I believe

that a case of this sort is particularly well suited to enlighten us

about the significance of this characteristic of the dream. I shall give

an abridged report of a dream in which I seem to be accused of

dishonesty. _The scene is a mixture, consisting of a private sanatorium

and several other buildings. A lackey appears to call me to an

examination. I know in the dream that something has been missed, and

that the examination is taking place because I am suspected of having

appropriated the lost article. Analysis shows that examination is to be

taken in two senses, and also means medical examination. Being conscious

of my innocence, and of the fact that I have been called in for

consultation, I calmly follow the lackey. We are received at the door by

another lackey, who says, pointing to me, “Is that the person whom you

have brought? Why, he is a respectable man.” Thereupon, without any

lackey, I enter a great hall in which machines are standing, and which

reminds me of an Inferno with its hellish modes of punishment. I see a

colleague strapped on to one apparatus who has every reason to be

concerned about me; but he takes no notice of me. Then I am given to

understand that I may now go. Then I cannot find my hat, and cannot go

after all._

The wish which the dream fulfils is obviously that I may be acknowledged

to be an honest man, and may go; all kinds of subject-matter containing

a contradiction of this idea must therefore be present in the

dream-thoughts. The fact that I may go is the sign of my absolution; if,

then, the dream furnishes at its close an event which prevents me from

going, we may readily conclude that the suppressed subject-matter of the

contradiction asserts itself in this feature. The circumstance that I

cannot find my hat therefore means: “You are not an honest man after

all.” Failure to accomplish in the dream is the expression of a

contradiction, a “No”; and therefore the earlier assertion, to the

effect that the dream is not capable of expressing a negation, must be

revised accordingly.[DY]

In other dreams which involve failure to accomplish a thing not only as

a situation but also as a sensation, the same contradiction is more

emphatically expressed in the form of a volition, to which a counter

volition opposes itself. Thus the sensation of impeded motion represents

a _conflict of will_. We shall hear later that this very motor paralysis

belongs to the fundamental conditions of the psychic process in

dreaming. Now the impulse which is transferred to motor channels is

nothing else than the will, and the fact that we are sure to find this

impulse impeded in the dream makes the whole process extraordinarily

well suited to represent volition and the “No” which opposes itself

thereto. From my explanation of anxiety, it is easy to understand why

the sensation of thwarted will is so closely allied to anxiety, and why

it is so often connected with it in the dream. Anxiety is a libidinous

impulse which emanates from the unconscious, and is inhibited by the

foreconscious. Therefore, when a sensation of inhibition in the dream is

accompanied by anxiety, there must also be present a volition which has

at one time been capable of arousing a _libido_; there must be a sexual

impulse.

What significance and what psychic force is to be ascribed to such

manifestations of judgment as “For that is only a dream,” which

frequently comes to the surface in dreams, I shall discuss in another

place (_vide infra_, p. 390). For the present I shall merely say that

they serve to depreciate the value of the thing dreamed. An interesting

problem allied to this, namely, the meaning of the fact that sometimes a

certain content is designated in the dream itself as “dreamed”—the

riddle of the “dream within the dream”—has been solved in a similar

sense by W. Stekel[114] through the analysis of some convincing

examples. The part of the dream “dreamed” is again to be depreciated in

value and robbed of its reality; that which the dreamer continues to

dream after awakening from the dream within the dream, is what the

dream-wish desires to put in place of the extinguished reality. It may

therefore be assumed that the part “dreamed” contains the representation

of the reality and the real reminiscence, while, on the other hand, the

continued dream contains the representation of what the dreamer wished.

The inclusion of a certain content in a “dream within the dream” is

therefore equivalent to the wish that what has just been designated as a

dream should not have occurred. The dream-work utilises the dream itself

as a form of deflection.

(_d_) _Regard for Presentability_

So far we have been attempting to ascertain how the dream represents the

relations among the dream-thoughts, but we have several times extended

our consideration to the further question of what alterations the dream

material undergoes for the purposes of dream formation. We now know that

the dream material, after being stripped of the greater parts of its

relations, is subjected to compression, while at the same time

displacements of intensity among its elements force a psychic

revaluation of this material. The displacements which we have considered

were shown to be substitutions of one idea for another, the substitute

being in some way connected with the original by associations, and the

displacements were put to the service of condensation by virtue of the

fact that in this manner a common mean between two elements took the

place of these two elements in the formation of the dream. We have not

yet mentioned any other kind of displacement. But we learn from the

analyses that another exists, and that it manifests itself in a change

of the verbal expression employed for the thought in question. In both

cases we have displacement following a chain of associations, but the

same process takes place in different psychic spheres, and the result of

this displacement in the one case is that one element is substituted for

another, while in the other case an element exchanges its verbal

expression for another.

This second kind of displacement occurring in dream formation not only

possesses great theoretical interest, but is also peculiarly well fitted

to explain the semblance of phantastic absurdity in which the dream

disguises itself. Displacement usually occurs in such a way that a

colourless and abstract expression in the dream-thought is exchanged for

one that is visual and concrete. The advantage, and consequently the

purpose, of this substitution is obvious. Whatever is visual is _capable

of representation_ in the dream, and can be wrought into situations

where the abstract expression would confront dream representation with

difficulties similar to those which would arise if a political editorial

were to be represented in an illustrated journal. But not only the

possibility of representation, but also the interests of condensation

and of the censor, can be furthered by this change. If the abstractly

expressed and unwieldy dream-thought is recast into figurative language,

this new expression and the rest of the dream material are more easily

furnished with those identities and cross references, which are

essential to the dream activity and which it creates whenever they are

not at hand, for the reason that in every language concrete terms, owing

to their evolution, are more abundant in associations than conceptual

ones. It may be imagined that in dream formation a good part of the

intermediary activity, which tries to reduce the separate dream-thoughts

to the tersest and simplest possible expression in the dream, takes

place in the manner above described—that is to say, in providing

suitable paraphrase for the individual thoughts. One thought whose

expression has already been determined on other grounds will thus exert

a separating and selective influence upon the means available for

expressing the other, and perhaps it will do this constantly throughout,

somewhat after the manner of the poet. If a poem in rhyme is to be

composed, the second rhyming line is bound by two conditions; it must

express the proper meaning, and it must express it in such a way as to

secure the rhyme. The best poems are probably those in which the poet’s

effort to find a rhyme is unconscious, and in which both thoughts have

from the beginning exercised a mutual influence in the selection of

their verbal expressions, which can then be made to rhyme by a means of

slight remodification.

In some cases change of expression serves the purposes of dream

condensation more directly, in making possible the invention of a verbal

construction which is ambiguous and therefore suited to the expression

of more than one dream-thought. The whole range of word-play is thus put

at the service of the dream activity. The part played by words in the

formation of dreams ought not to surprise us. A word being a point of

junction for a number of conceptions, it possesses, so to speak, a

predestined ambiguity, and neuroses (obsessions, phobias) take advantage

of the conveniences which words offer for the purposes of condensation

and disguise quite as readily as the dream.[DZ] That dream conception

also profits by this displacement of expression is easily demonstrated.

It is naturally confusing if an ambiguous word is put in the place of

two ambiguous ones; and the employment of a figurative expression

instead of the sober everyday one thwarts our understanding, especially

since the dream never tells us whether the elements which it shows are

to be interpreted literally or figuratively, or whether they refer to

the dream material directly or only through the agency of interpolated

forms of speech.[EA] Several examples of representations in the dream

which are held together only by ambiguity have already been cited (“her

mouth opens without difficulty,” in the dream of Irma’s injection; “I

cannot go yet,” in the last dream reported, p. 312), &c. I shall now

cite a dream in the analysis of which the figurative expression of

abstract thought plays a greater part. The difference between such dream

interpretation and interpretation by symbolism may again be sharply

distinguished; in the symbolic interpretation of dreams the key to the

symbolism is arbitrarily chosen by the interpreter, while in our own

cases of verbal disguise all these keys are universally known and are

taken from established customs of speech. If the correct notion occurs

at the right opportunity, it is possible to solve dreams of this sort

completely or in part, independently of any statements made by the

dreamer.

A lady, a friend of mine, dreams: _She is in the opera-house. It is a

Wagnerian performance which has lasted till 7.45 in the morning. In the

parquette and parterre there are tables, around which people dine and

drink. Her cousin and his young wife, who have just returned from their

honeymoon, sit next to her at one of these tables, and next to them sits

one of the aristocracy. Concerning the latter the idea is that the young

wife has brought him back with her from the wedding journey. It is quite

above board, just as if she were bringing back a hat from her trip. In

the midst of the parquette there is a high tower, on the top of which is

a platform surrounded by an iron grating. There, high up, stands the

conductor with the features of Hans Richter; he is continually running

around behind the grating, perspiring awfully, and from this position

conducting the orchestra, which is arranged around the base of the

tower. She herself sits in a box with a lady friend (known to me). Her

youngest sister tries to hand her from the parquette a big piece of coal

with the idea that she did not know that it would last so long and that

she must by this time be terribly cold. (It was a little as if the boxes

had to be heated during the long performance.)_

The dream is senseless enough, though the situation is well developed

too—the tower in the midst of the parquette from which the conductor

leads the orchestra; but, above all, the coal which her sister hands

her! I purposely asked for no analysis of this dream. With the knowledge

I have of the personal relations of the dreamer, I was able to interpret

parts of it independently. I knew that she had entertained warm feelings

for a musician whose career had been prematurely blasted by insanity. I

therefore decided to take the tower in the parquette verbally. It was

apparent, then, that the man whom she wished to see in the place of Hans

Richter _towered_ above all the other members of the orchestra. This

tower must, therefore, be designated as a composite picture formed by an

apposition; with its pedestal it represents the greatness of the man,

but with its gratings on top, behind which he runs around like a

prisoner or an animal in a cage (an allusion to the name of the

unfortunate man), it represents his later fate. “Lunatic-tower” is

perhaps the word in which both thoughts might have met.

Now that we have discovered the dream’s method of representation, we may

try with the same key to open the second apparent absurdity,—that of the

coal which her sister hands her. “Coal” must mean “secret love.”

“No _coal_, no _fire_ so hotly glows

As the _secret love_ which no one knows.”

She and her friend remain seated while her younger sister, who still has

opportunities to marry, hands her up the coal “because she did not know

it would last so long.” What would last so long is not told in the

dream. In relating it we would supply “the performance”; but in the

dream we must take the sentence as it is, declare it ambiguous, and add

“until she marries.” The interpretation “secret love” is then confirmed

by the mention of the cousin who sits with his wife in the parquette,

and by the open love-affair attributed to the latter. The contrasts

between secret and open love, between her fire and the coldness of the

young wife, dominate the dream. Moreover, here again there is a person

“in high position” as a middle term between the aristocrat and the

musician entitled to high hopes.

By means of the above discussion we have at last brought to light a

third factor, whose part in the transformation of the dream thoughts

into the dream content is not to be considered trivial; _it is the

regard for presentability_ (_German: Darstellbarkeit_) _in the peculiar

psychic material which the dream makes use of_,—that is fitness for

representation, for the most part by means of visual images. Among the

various subordinate ideas associated with the essential dream thoughts,

that one will be preferred which permits of a visual representation, and

the dream-activity does not hesitate promptly to recast the inflexible

thought into another verbal form, even if it is the more unusual one, as

long as this form makes dramatisation possible, and thus puts an end to

the psychological distress caused by cramped thinking. This pouring of

the thought content into another mould may at the same time be put at

the service of the condensation work, and may establish relations with

another thought which would otherwise not be present. This other thought

itself may perhaps have previously changed its original expression for

the purpose of meeting these relations half-way.

In view of the part played by puns, quotations, songs, and proverbs in

the intellectual life of educated persons, it would be entirely in

accordance with our expectation to find disguises of this sort used with

extraordinary frequency. For a few kinds of material a universally

applicable dream symbolism has been established on a basis of generally

known allusions and equivalents. A good part of this symbolism,

moreover, is possessed by the dream in common with the psychoneuroses,

and with legends and popular customs.

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