CHAPTER XIX.

CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864

The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position before

Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, and

provisions. The troops had become habituated to the slow and

steady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up

to the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a

continuous clatter of musketry. The mainlines were held farther

back, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded and

stacked for instant use. The field-batteries were in select

positions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots from

them gave life and animation to the scene. The men loitered about

the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructing

ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug,

comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home. General

Schofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the centre, and

Howard on the right. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps

(Baird's and Jeff. C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear,

and held in reserve.

I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against the

railroad about Jonesboro, and had heard from General Garrard that

Stoneman had gone on to Mason; during that day (August 1st) Colonel

Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came in to Marietta from

General McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had been

overwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan. Of course, I was

disturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but made

all possible preparations to strengthen our guards along the

railroad to the rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which

had defeated McCook would at once be on the railroad about

Marietta. At the same time Garrard was ordered to occupy the

trenches on our left, while Schofield's whole army moved to the

extreme right, and extended the line toward East Point. Thomas was

also ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set free

the other division (Johnson's) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's),

which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held in reserve

ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure a footing on

the Mason Railroad at or below East Point.

These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August,

when General McCook came in and reported the actual results of his

cavalry expedition. He had crossed the Chattahoochee River below

Campbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly across

to the Mason Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason to

expect General Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work,

tore up two miles of track, burned two trains of cars, and cut away

five miles of telegraph-wire. He also found the wagon-train

belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons,

killed eight hundred mules; and captured seventy-two officers and

three hundred and fifty men. Finding his progress eastward, toward

McDonough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan,

where he found himself completely surrounded by infantry and

cavalry. He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out,

losing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and then

returned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry.

This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by Colonel

Brownlow. Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was down

about Mason, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee. On the 4th of

August Colonel Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of nine

hundred men belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual,

all the rest lost, and this was partially confirmed by a report

which came to me all the way round by General Grant's headquarters

before Richmond. A few days afterward Colonel Capron also got in,

with another small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the

report that General Stoneman had covered the escape of these two

small brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundred

men, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson. Thus another

of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out of the fragments

we hastily reorganized three small divisions under

Brigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick.

Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad first

before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed the

Ocmulgee River high up near Covington, and had gone down that river

on the east bank. He reached Clinton, and sent out detachments

which struck the railroad leading from Macon to Savannah at

Griswold Station, where they found and destroyed seventeen

locomotives and over a hundred cars; then went on and burned the

bridge across the Oconee, and reunited the division before Macon.

Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but could not cross

over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found his

retreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force. There he

became bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of his

command. He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small force

of seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, with

their brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta. The former

reached us entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at some

place farther north, and came in by detachments. Stoneman

surrendered, and remained a prisoner until he was exchanged some

time after, late in September, at Rough and Ready.

I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a

sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing

would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army. Therefore

the most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, on

the right, was committed the charge of this special object. He had

his own corps (the Twenty-third), composed of eleven thousand and

seventy-five infantry and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery,

with McCook's broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and

fifty-four men and horses. For this purpose I also placed the

Fourteenth Corps (Palmer) under his orders. This corps numbered at

the time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantry

and eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmer

claimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission as

major-general, and denied the latter's right to exercise command

over him. General Palmer was a man of ability, but was not

enterprising. His three divisions were compact and strong, well

commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act

on the offensive. His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to

that time, fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the whole

army, and I was anxious to give it a chance. I always expected to

have a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, which

was then the vital objective of the campaign. Its possession by us

would, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and give

us the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood's army

was the real object to be desired. Yet Atlanta was known as the

"Gate-City of the South," was full of founderies, arsenals, and

machine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell

of the Southern Confederacy.

On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a bold

attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered

General Palmer to report to him for duty. He at once denied

General Schofield's right to command him; but, after examining the

dates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments,

I wrote to General Palmer.

August 4th.-10.45 p.m.

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day,

my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general, being of the

same date of present commission, by reason of his previous superior

rank as brigadier-general. The movements of to-morrow are so

important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be

regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation.

I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making this

decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no

question of rank should occur in actual battle. The Sandtown road,

and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it

costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon

as equal to the loss of two thousand men.

I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to

whose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:

I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I

know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can

properly do so. I recommend that his application be granted.

And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point

with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis

lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage

his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it

my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the

4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory--not imputing to him,

however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that "the

events did not keep pace with my desires." General Schofield had

reported to me that night:

I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make

any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps. I have ordered

General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this

evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops

(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been

lost by two days' delay. The force may likely be too small.

I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers divisions

--Davis's and Baird's--to follow en echelon in support of Schofield,

and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He came on the

6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation being

accepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas.

He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where he made a written

resignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, and

was granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home in

Illinois, there to await further orders. General Thomas

recommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the

senior division commander of the corps, should be ordered back to

Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson

C. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted major general, and

assigned to command the corps. These changes had to be referred to

the President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved and

executed; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the

slowness or inactivity of that splendid corps. It had been

originally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded

by him in person, and had imbibed some what his personal character,

viz., steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty or

rash, but always safe, "slow, and sure." On August 7th I

telegraphed to General Halleck:

Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and of

General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away

all the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta.

To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted

yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained the

ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of all

our dead and wounded. He continued to press on that flank, and

brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He drove the enemy

behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta

to East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who are

of his best troops--for the militia hug the breastworks close. I

do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will

push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too

hot to be endured. I have sent back to Chattanooga for two

thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in

town. I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is as

good a place to fight it out on, as farther inland. One thing is

certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a

used-up community when we are done with it.

In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade had

struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, got

entangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lost

about five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as above

reported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and we

could see from it that the rebels were extending their lines,

parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to our

line of investment. On the 10th of August the Parrott

thirty-pounders were received and placed in Position; for a couple

of days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries converging

on Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced our

infantry-lines, thereby shortening and strengthening the

investment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unless

some accident or positive neglect on the part of our antagonist

should reveal an opening. However, it was manifest that no such

opening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strong

defenses. He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, and

had damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he would

attempt the same game against our rear. Therefore I made

extraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, which

were so essential, both for defense and offense. Kilpatrick was

given that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposed

flank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook's

division was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and the

railroad. On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to General

Grant, then in Washington, I used this language:

Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his

parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his

communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad-bridge,

well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of

desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works,

which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches. I have

lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expiration

of service; and this is the only reason why I want reenforcements.

We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we

have lost by his acts.

On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut in

entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable

auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had been

commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was

unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of

Atlanta. These did not change the fact that we were held in check

by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forced

on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every house

in the town should be battered down by our artillery. It was

evident that we most decoy him out to fight us on something like

equal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege and

attack his communications. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, I

gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the

railroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains,

hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad-depot, while the rest

of the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroad

below East Point.

Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under

General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, and

had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca,

captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strong

enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander,

Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place. General John E. Smith,

who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men,

and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton when Wheeler

retreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th another

detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoona

and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood had

sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads. For some days

our communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destruction

of the telegraph-lines, as well as railroad. I at once ordered

strong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left by

Garrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick. The former moved with so

much caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the

contrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attracted

to him at once. He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point

road, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our right

flank. I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit

and confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement of

the main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalry

to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes that it

would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby not

only secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catch

Hood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase the

chances of success.

I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's

division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a

reserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, the

utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantry

and artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th,

and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit of

Atlanta. He reported that he had destroyed three miles of the

railroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned would take ten days to

repair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a

brigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he had captured a battery and

destroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he

also brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners. On the

23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south,

when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or

would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and

therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my

original plan. Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad and

telegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired,

and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to his

own army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz., up about

the Hiawaesee. On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee

bridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by the

single corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found

that the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resist

us, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returning

to my camp, at that same evening, I telegraphed to General

Halleck as follows:

Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be

all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the

south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of

us. I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee

bridge, by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps will hold the

railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army,

provisioned for twenty days.

Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had been

wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two

divisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps.

The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night. The Twentieth

Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the

Fourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with the

Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time

Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied the

vacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change at

all. The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,

composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard), drew out of their

trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland

(Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed to

suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely;

but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. An

artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded

another, and the next morning some of his infantry came out of

Atlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward related

that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankees were

gone;" the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several

trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the

celebration of their grand victory.

On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield)

both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extending

from East Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburn, where we spent the

next day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly. The track was heaved

up in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail by

rail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence-rails on which

the rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph-poles, wrapped

around and left to cool. Such rails could not be used again; and,

to be still more certain, we filled up many deep cuts with trees,

brush, and earth, and commingled with them loaded shells, so

arranged that they would explode on an attempt to haul out the

bushes. The explosion of one such shell would have demoralized a

gang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even the attempt to

clear the road.

Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a bold

front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally out

to attack him in position. His first movement was on the 30th, to

Mount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough and

Ready. Thomas was on his right, within easy support, moving by

cross-roads from Red Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending from

Couch's to Renfrew's; and Howard was aiming for Jonesboro.

I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwise

very pleasant. We stopped for a short noon-rest near a little

church (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood back

about a hundred yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks.

The infantry column had halted in the road, stacked their arms, and

the men were scattered about--some lying in the shade of the trees,

and others were bringing corn-stalks from a large corn-field across

the road to feed our horses, while still others had arms full of

the roasting-ears, then in their prime. Hundreds of fires were

soon started with the fence-rails, and the men were busy roasting

the ears. Thomas and I were walking up and down the road which led

to the church, discussing the chances of the movement, which he

thought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fire at

which a soldier was roasting his corn. The fire was built

artistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks,

standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, and

turning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely. He

was down on his knees intent on his business, paying little heed to

the stately and serious deliberations of his leaders. Thomas's

mind was running on the fact that we had cut loose from our base of

supplies, and that seventy thousand men were then dependent for

their food on the chance supplies of the country (already

impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy), and on the contents

of our wagons. Between Thomas and his men there existed a most

kindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the most

familiar way. Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of this

man roasting his corn, he said, "What are you doing?" The man

looked up smilingly "Why, general, I am laying in a supply of

provisions." "That is right, my man, but don't waste your

provisions." As we resumed our walk, the man remarked, in a sort

of musing way, but loud enough for me to hear: "There he goes,

there goes the old man, economizing as usual." "Economizing" with

corn, which cost only the labor of gathering and roasting!

As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals,

away off to our right front, but an ominous silence continued

toward our left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear the

sound of battle. That night we reached Renfrew's, and had reports

from left to right (from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills,

to General Howard, within a couple of miles of Jonesboro). The

next morning (August 31st) all moved straight for the railroad.

Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points

between there and Jonesboro. Howard found an intrenched foe

(Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once to

dig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to Generals

Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up the

railroad-track as they advanced. About 3.00 p.m. the enemy

sallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily

repulsed, and driven back within his lines. All hands were kept

busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening

of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis)

closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his

right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which

General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield. General Davis

formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some

old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet

handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with two

field-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked Davis's

movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of

the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below

Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in

that direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry

forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping

thus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps. I sent first Captain

Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and

lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the

campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a

gallop). Night was approaching, and the country on the farther

side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley had come

up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not

have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved

straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he

would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's corps,

and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and

Hardee did escape.

Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth),

stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S.

Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel

forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we

had reached the railroad. That night I was so restless and

impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose

toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like

that of musketry. I walked to the house of a farmer close by my

bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came

from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us),

and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He said he had,

and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An

interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose

other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the

enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether

General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real

battle.

The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forward

along the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up against

his lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station. While bringing

forward troops and feeling the new position of our adversary,

rumors came from the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and

that General Slocum was in the city. Later in the day I received a

note in Slocum's own handwriting, stating that he had heard during

the night the very sounds that I have referred to; that he had

moved rapidly up from the bridge about daylight, and had entered

Atlanta unopposed. His letter was dated inside the city, so there

was no doubt of the fact. General Thomas's bivouac was but a short

distance from mine, and, before giving notice to the army in

general orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him the

note. In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed by

Thomas himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectly

certain that it was genuine. The news seemed to him too good to be

true. He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, as

the news spread to the army, the shouts that arose from our men,

the wild hallooing and glorious laughter, were to us a full

recompense for the labor and toils and hardships through which we

had passed in the previous three months.

A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back and

forth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to our

telegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge. Of course, the glad

tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North,

where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons,

and brothers, away down in "Dixie Land;" and congratulations came

pouring back full of good-will and patriotism. This victory was most

opportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he had

previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that

General Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg,

and my army seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier,

when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta was

ours, and fairly won." On this text many a fine speech was made, but

none more eloquent than that by Edward Everett, in Boston. A

presidential election then agitated the North. Mr. Lincoln

represented the national cause, and General McClellan had accepted

the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was that the

war was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to go

free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be

slavery. Success to our arms at that instant was therefore a

political necessity; and it was all-important that something

startling in our interest should occur before the election in

November. The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement,

and made the election of Mr. Lincoln certain. Among the many letters

of congratulation received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant

seem most important:

EXECUTIVE MANSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. September 3, 1864.

The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General

W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command

before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverance

displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor,

has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The marches, battles,

sieges, and other military operations, that have signalized the

campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have

entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and

thanks of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

President of the United States

CITY POINT VIRGINIA, September 4, 1864-9 P.M.

Major-General SHERMAN:

I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of

Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute

to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the

enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great

rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders,

and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of those

competent to bestow it.

The army still remained where the news of success had first found

us, viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due refection, I resolved not to

attempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowly

and deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period

of rest, and to think well over the next step required in the

progress of events. Orders for this movement were made on the 5th

September, and three days were given for each army to reach the

place assigned it, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland in and about

Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army of

the Ohio at Decatur.

Personally I rode back to Jonesboro on the 6th, and there inspected

the rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardee

in his retreat. The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, and

on the 8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by the

Twentieth Corps (General Slocum). In the Court-House Square was

encamped a brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second and

Thirty-third Regiments, which had two of the finest bands of the

army, and their music was to us all a source of infinite pleasure

during our sojourn in that city. I took up my headquarters in the

house of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one corner of the

Court-House Square, and at once set about a measure already ordered,

of which I had thought much and long, viz., to remove the entire

civil population, and to deny to all civilians from the rear the

expected profits of civil trade. Hundreds of sutlers and traders

were waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach Atlanta

with their wares and goods, with, which to drive a profitable trade

with the inhabitants. I gave positive orders that none of these

traders, except three (one for each separate army), should be

permitted to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, I

peremptorily required that all the citizens and families resident in

Atlanta should go away, giving to each the option to go south or

north, as their interests or feelings dictated. I was resolved to

make Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civil

population to influence military measures. I had seen Memphis,

Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, and

each at once was garrisoned by a full division of troops, if not

more; so that success was actually crippling our armies in the field

by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile

population.

I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, to

General Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:

If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will

answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want

peace, they and their relatives most stop the war.

I knew, of course, that such a measure would be strongly

criticised, but made up my mind to do it with the absolute

certainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom.

I knew that the people of the South would read in this measure two

important conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other,

if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor "to die in

the last ditch," that the opportunity would soon come.

Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in by a flag

of truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners,

saying that he was authorized to make such an exchange by the

Richmond authorities, out of the vast number of our men then held

captive at Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hoped

to rescue at the time of his raid. Some of these prisoners had

already escaped and got in, had described the pitiable condition of

the remainder, and, although I felt a sympathy for their hardships

and sufferings as deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all the

prisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had been

sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were then

beyond my control. There were still about two thousand, mostly

captured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars, but had not

passed Chattanooga. These I ordered back, and offered General Hood

to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army as

would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his

prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to

their own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give

him could at once be put to duty in his immediate army. Quite an

angry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at the

time in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book of

which I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, as

illustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of the

actors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together with

certain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, never

hitherto published.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi

GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my staff, with

this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of

affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter.

Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations,

I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits and

convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are

necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of the

James, across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James,

and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road. This line is very

strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men;

but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in the

aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to

control what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg

road; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road out. At the

same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to

ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this

is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At

the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the

iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will

give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now

have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces

at your command, I do not exactly see. The difficulties of

supplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond

where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's

movement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.

From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have

been taken. With these forces, my idea would have been to divide

them, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to Savannah.

You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten

Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should be abandoned by

the enemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies. My

object now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much to

suggest operations for you as to get your views, and to have plans

matured by the time every thing can be got ready. It would

probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans here

indicated will be executed. If you have any promotions to

recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you

have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any

general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be

acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives

me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it world in

favor of any living man, myself included.

Truly yours,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,

Virgina.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of

Lieutenant Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September

12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention

of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all

engaged.

I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed,

and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed

worthy of promotion.

I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task

of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have

ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care,

and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actual

capacity and services rendered.

These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if

mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best

contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not

exist equal in number to that of the officers who really deserve

promotion.

As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being

steadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go

on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your

antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the

other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside

Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on

your own terms.

We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that

can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a

great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls

for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city

can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the

railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a

magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but,

until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can more

thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I

suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama

River and Columbus, Georgia.

The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of

importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off all

foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across

the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed. From my

knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate more

difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than in

reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings of

the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of

his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, or

else it would not be attempted. If successful, I suppose that Fort

Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the

Savannah River. Then the reduction of that city is the next

question. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I

would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty

thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for

the balance. Where a million of people find subsistence, my army

won't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few

roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay an

army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; but

if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River I

could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of

corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the

enemy world doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move

so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to

give us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining

in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River. Either

horn of the dilemma will be worth a battle. I would prefer his

holding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with the

Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a

mere matter of time. This campaign can be made in the winter.

But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it

would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an

objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can

start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to

the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by mere

threatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not

over-loyal to the South. I will therefore give it as my opinion

that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum;

that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and

its river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River,

and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the

Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employed

and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and

Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce,

and the city of Savannah is in our possession.

I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby,

west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions. They cannot hope to

enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that General

Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose.

If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your

centre, and let General Canby leave command over the Mississippi

River and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama

and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of the

drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day

to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a

point on the river below Augusta. The possession of the Savannah

River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern

independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all

Georgia.

I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him every

thing that may occur to me of interest to you.

In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and

pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to the

Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of

absence to see the young folks.

Yours as ever,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just

received. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I have

not written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta,

the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that

I have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza," or

hay-cold. It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see to

write. As you suppose, I have watched your movements most

attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that your

campaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its results are

less striking and less complete than those of General Grant at

Vicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter,

a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and more

continuous strain upon yourself and upon your army.

You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro

recruiting-agents. Your letter was a capital one, and did much

good. The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War

Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern

manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way. They

were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well afford

to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees at home.

I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent

draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, and

I fear it will not amount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn,

again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the rebellion would

be crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be no

draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc., has done

much harm, in a military point of view. I have seen enough of

politics here to last me for life. You are right in avoiding them.

McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose the

respect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation

with such traitors and Copperheads as B---, V---, W---, S---, & Co.

He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he had

not the manliness to oppose it. A major-general in the United

States Army, and yet not one word to utter against rebels or the

rebellion! I had much respect for McClellan before he became a

politician, but very little after reading his letter accepting the

nomination.

Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of

Atlanta. I understand that, when here, he said that you would

fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc. He is

most unmeasured in his abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen of

what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes. They are

dictated by himself and written by W. B. and such worthies. The

funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to do

with his being relieved on either occasion. Moreover, I have never

said any thing to the President or Secretary of War to injure him

in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well. His

animosity arises from another source. He is aware that I know some

things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing

that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off

its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, am

jealous of him, etc. I know of no other reason for his hostility

to me. He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don't

think it will do him much good, or me much harm. I know very

little of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorable

man. Thomas is also a noble old war-horse. It is true, as you

say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.

I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do not

know what instructions he has sent you. I fear that Canby has not

the means to do much by way of Mobile. The military effects of

Banks's disaster are now showing themselves by the threatened

operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus keeping in check

our armies west of the Mississippi.

With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future

success, yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D.C.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a

correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the

Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the

inhabitants of Atlanta.

In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I

will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had

announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to

question my motives. I could not tamely submit to such

impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all

official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such parts

of the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could have had

no other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people;

but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meet

him there too.

It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of the

inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has

been attended with no force, and that no women or children have

suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors

and friends.

My real reasons for this step were:

We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and

occupation.

We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the

garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital

parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs.

This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and

redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by

families as residences.

Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly

captured. As captors, we have a right to it.

The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or

later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a

temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and

hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards,

and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting

complaints and special grievances that are not military.

These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the

United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General

Hood and his people or not. I am, with respect, your obedient

servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.

General HOOD, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that

the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who

prefer it to go south, and the rest north. For the latter I can

provide food and transportation to points of their election in

Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the former I can

provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and also

wagons; but, that their removal may be made with as little

discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the

families from Rough and Ready to the care at Lovejoy's. If you

consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who

prefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movable

effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding,

etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that

no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other. If

they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so;

otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may

be employed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families

or non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you

will assist in conveying them south. If this proposition meets

your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough

and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or persons

sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner be

harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any care,

wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point,

shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of,

say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to,

say, two days after a certain time appointed.

I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you

this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in

explanation, and shall await your reply. I have the honor to be

your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in

Georgia

GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball

and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You say

therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that

the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove," etc. I do not

consider that I have any alternative in this matter. I therefore

accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such

time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and

shall render all assistance in my power to expedite the

transportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a

staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from

the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer to

control their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundred

men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order at

that place, and that the removal begin on Monday next.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you

propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever

before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will

find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the

wives and children of a brave people. I am, general, very

respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter

of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to

the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of

the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I

inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied,

accomplish my purpose perfectly.

You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the

dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and

ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented; for General Johnston

himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way

from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be

excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of

war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourself

burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day

fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they

stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a

line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots

from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into

the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same

at Jonesboro, and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at

Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty,

but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and

could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any

fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the

families of a "brave people."

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove

them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not

be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their

wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say,

violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark

history.

In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God

in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and

prosperity, have plunged a nation into war--dark and cruel war--who

dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our

arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of

peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the

very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and

Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you)

hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into

rebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana;

turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled

Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared,

by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due

Northern men for goods had and received! Talk thus to the marines,

but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day

make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the

best-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be

men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in arch

hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due

time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with

a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back

or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own

friends and people.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T, SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter

of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women,

children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from

their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the

matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close

this correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words,

would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests of

the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of

barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have

dropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements

which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my

dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as

acquiescence.

I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify the

language of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It

but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in the

dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty." Your

original order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced the

edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the

United States." This alone you offered to us and the civilized

world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God

and man. You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely and

properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is

due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his

distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded

aspersions upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nor

towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered and

extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who

desired to flee from your fraternal embraces. You are equally

unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of

cruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, or

of Atlanta, by myself. General Hardee defended his position in

front of Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; an

ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta

at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case,

it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of

Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war

among civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his home

and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and

therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of

either of us. I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading

that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling

Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upon

a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many

musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark,

went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaint

of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I make

none now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you fired

into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far

above and miles beyond my line of defense. I have too good an

opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill

of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for several

weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and

slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide

field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are

committed to me. I am only a general of one of the armies of the

Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field,

under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called

upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or the

political questions which led to or resulted from it. These grave

and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than

mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust

conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge my

country with "daring and badgering you to battle." The truth is,

we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful

separation, before the first gun was fired on either aide. You say

we insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired upon it, and those

who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of

subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and

made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes

and Indians. The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out

insolent intruders and took possession of our own forts and

arsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves,

and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimity

unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your

attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force

Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The

truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to

this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to

leave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to

determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with

your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this

fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and

labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny

upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsified

the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separated

herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her

people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from

Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to

her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every

man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for

heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your

unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the

navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our

country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around the

whole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Union

families by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has been

expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, on

the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has

been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies and

well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by acts

of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods

sold and delivered." The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample

time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with

their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property

of our enemies in retaliation for their acts--declaring us

traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power

extended, either in their country or our own. Such are your

accusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men,

women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet,

under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and

on the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these families of

Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered

enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a

punishment. You issue a sweeping edict, covering all the

inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the

defenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness. This

you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice

for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner."

And, because I characterize what you call as kindness as being real

cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and

you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save

our women and children from what you call kindness, is a

"sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purpose

of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only

intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and

desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from

barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever

attained by that race, in any country, in all time. I must,

therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your

kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to

sacrifice every thing for the peace and honor of the South, and

refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between

myself, my country, and my God.

You say, "Let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is--for

myself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women and

children, in my country--we will fight you to the death! Better

die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your

Government and your negro allies!

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th

of September, I close this correspondence with you; and,

notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of

humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid in

defense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city

of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people

of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most

earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order

requiring them to leave Atlanta.

At first view, it struck us that the measure world involve

extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the

practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the

individual condition of the people, and heard their statements as

to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are

satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate

consequences appalling and heart-rending.

Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now

having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are

either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such a

one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?"

Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and no

means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or

friends, to go to." Another says: "I will try and take this or

that article of property, but such and such things I must leave

behind, though I need them much." We reply to them: "General

Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General

Hood will take it thence on." And they will reply to that: "But I

want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get

conveyance from there on."

We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this

measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people

north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a large

portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south

of this is already crowded, and without houses enough to

accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now

staying in churches and other out-buildings.

This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly

women and children) to find any shelter? And how can they live

through the winter in the woods--no shelter or subsistence, in the

midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to

assist them much, if they were willing to do so?

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure.

You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering, cannot be

described by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask

you to take these things into consideration.

We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties

of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention

to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered

this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more

reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to

all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred

--surely never in the United States--and what has this helpless

people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander

strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those who

are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to

remain at home, could subsist for several months without

assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and

who might not need assistance at any time.

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to

reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate

people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

E. E. RAWSON, Councilman.

S. C. Warns, Councilman.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representing

City Council of Atlanta.

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a

petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from

Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your

statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall

not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet the

humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in

which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep

interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all

America. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates

our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeat

the rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws and

Constitution that all must respect and obey. To defeat those

armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses,

provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to

accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of our

enemy, that we may have many years of military operations from this

quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in

time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with

its character as a home for families. There will be no

manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of

families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to

go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for

the transfer,--instead of waiting till the plunging shot of

contending armies will renew the scenes of the past months. Of

course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you

do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over. I

cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot

impart to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our military

plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can

only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any

direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is

cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into

our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can

pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I

will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace.

But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the

United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will

go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The

United States does and must assert its authority, wherever it once

had power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and

I believe that such is the national feeling. This feeling assumes

various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit

the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national

Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and

roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your

protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come

from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot

resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into

rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who

desire a government, and those who insist on war and its

desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these

terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way

the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet

at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting

that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your

lands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have a just

obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have,

and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot

help it.

You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that

live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek for

truth in other quarters, the better. I repeat then that, by the

original compact of Government, the United States had certain

rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never

will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals,

mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was

installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of

provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee,

and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children

fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding

feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands

upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands,

and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you;

you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did not

feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and

moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee,

to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who

only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the

Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle.

I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union and

war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early

success.

But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for any

thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with

you to shield your homes and families against danger from every

quarter.

Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and

nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper

habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad

passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more

to settle over your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate

Army.

GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been

carefully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by two

soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit that

you began the controversy by characterizing an official act of mine

in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former answer, and to

the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no

"negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier left

Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now. There are a few

guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time to

drive Wheeler out of Dalton.

I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling

of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals,

founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice. See

the books.

This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not

begin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your

obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal

of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also

the official report of your campaign, are just received. I have

not had time as yet to examine your report. The course which you

have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in the

exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department.

Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in

removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own

army to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of

your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy

(and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which

we have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you in

gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may

require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your

march farther into the enemy's country. Let the disloyal families

of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and

natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years

of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the

contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in

our rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a

proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply

to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly are

not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better

than they themselves treat each other. Even herein Virginia,

within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of

provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or

to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people long

enough. Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel

ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and

natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory within

reach which I did not want for my own use. This the rebels have

done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia

and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our

armies. In many sections of the country they have not left a mill

to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use

them to supply our armies. We most do the same.

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for

the last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly

applied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in

burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property.

That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying whatever

may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff

In order to effect the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate the

exodus of the people of Atlanta, and to keep open communication

with the South, we established a neutral camp, at and about the

railroad-station next south of Atlanta, known as "Rough and Ready,"

to which point I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, of

my staff, with a guard of one hundred men, and General Hood sent

Colonel Clare, of his staff, with a similar guard; these officers

and men harmonized perfectly, and parted good friends when their

work was done. In the mean time I also had reconnoitred the entire

rebel lines about Atlanta, which were well built, but were entirely

too extensive to be held by a single corps or division of troops,

so I instructed Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, on my staff,

to lay off an inner and shorter line, susceptible of defense by a

smaller garrison.

By the middle of September all these matters were in progress, the

reports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched to

Washington, and our thoughts began to turn toward the future.

Admiral Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at the

entrance to Mobile Bay, which resulted in the capture of Fort

Morgan, so that General Canby was enabled to begin his regular

operations against Mobile City, with a view to open the Alabama

River to navigation. My first thoughts were to concert operations

with him, either by way of Montgomery, Alabama, or by the

Appalachicula; but so long a line, to be used as a base for further

operations eastward, was not advisable, and I concluded to await

the initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would be forced to

resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at the South

on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta.

General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had a

veranda with high pillars. We were sitting there one evening,

talking about things generally, when General Thomas asked leave to

send his trains back to Chattanooga, for the convenience and

economy of forage. I inquired of him if he supposed we would be

allowed much rest at Atlanta, and he said he thought we would, or

that at all events it would not be prudent for us to go much

farther into Georgia because of our already long line of

communication, viz., three hundred miles from Nashville. This was

true; but there we were, and we could not afford to remain on the

defensive, simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety of

its railroad. I insisted on his retaining all trains, and on

keeping all his divisions ready to move at a moment's warning. All

the army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink

into a condition of idleness. General Schofield was permitted to

go to Knoxville, to look after matters in his Department of the

Ohio; and Generals Blair and Logan went home to look after

politics. Many of the regiments were entitled to, and claimed,

their discharge, by reason of the expiration of their term of

service; so that with victory and success came also many causes of

disintegration.

The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee,

threatening our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on his

way from Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose of

breaking up our railroads and compelling us to fall back from our

conquest. To prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered

Newton's division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and

Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed

General Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at

Chattanooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect and

insure the safety of our roads.

Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the 15th of

September, had given no signs of his future plans; so that with

this date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with the following

review of our relative losses during the months of August and

September, with a summary of those for the whole campaign,

beginning May 6 and ending September 15, 1864. The losses for

August and September are added together, so as to include those

about Jonesboro:

Killed and Missing Wounded Total

Grand Aggregate..... 1,408 3,731 5,139

Hood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577,

Johnston's "Narrative:"

Killed Wounded Total

482 3,223 3,705

To which should be added:

Prisoners captured by us:............ 3,738

Giving his total loss ............... 7,440

On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entire

campaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Union

army, as per table appended:

Killed ........................ 4,423

Wounded ....................... 22,822

Missing........................ 4,442

Aggregate Loss ......... 31,627

In the Southern army, according to the reports of Surgeon Foard

(pp. 576, 577, Johnston's "Narrative ")

Total killed ................ 3,044

Total killed and wounded..... 21,996

Prisoners captured by us .... 12,983

Aggregate loss to the

Southern Army .......... 34,979

The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly correct. I

see no room for error save in the cavalry, which was very much

scattered, and whose reports are much less reliable than of the

infantry and artillery; but as Surgeon Foard's tables do not

embrace Wheeler's, Jackson's, and Martin's divisions of cavalry, I

infer that the comparison, as to cavalry losses, is a "stand-off."

I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered themselves

that they had filled and crippled of us two and even six to one, as

stated by Johnston; but they were simply mistaken, and I herewith

submit official tabular statements made up from the archives of the

War Department, in proof thereof.

I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled from official

records in the adjutant-general's office, giving the "effective

strength" of the army under my command for each of the months of

May, June, July, August, and September, 1864, which enumerate every

man (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) for duty. The

recapitulation clearly exhibits the actual truth. We opened the

campaign with 98,797 (ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and

ninety-seven) men. Blair's two divisions joined us early in June,

giving 112,819 (one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and

nineteen), which number gradually became reduced to 106,070 (one

hundred and six thousand and seventy men), 91,675 (ninety-one

thousand six hundred and seventy-five), and 81,758 (eighty-one

thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of the campaign.

This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death and

wounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachments sent to

points at the rear.