It had been hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer army, the capture
of its guns and the expulsion of many both of the burghers and of
the foreign mercenaries, would have marked the end of the war. These
expectations were, however, disappointed, and South Africa was destined
to be afflicted and the British Empire disturbed by a useless guerilla
campaign. After the great and dramatic events which characterised the
earlier phases of the struggle between the Briton and the Boer for the
mastery of South Africa it is somewhat of the nature of an anticlimax to
turn one's attention to those scattered operations which prolonged the
resistance for a turbulent year at the expense of the lives of many
brave men on either side. These raids and skirmishes, which had their
origin rather in the hope of vengeance than of victory, inflicted much
loss and misery upon the country, but, although we may deplore the
desperate resolution which bids brave men prefer death to subjugation,
it is not for us, the countrymen of Hereward or Wallace, to condemn it.
In one important respect these numerous, though trivial, conflicts
differed from the battles in the earlier stages of the war. The British
had learned their lesson so thoroughly that they often turned the tables
upon their instructors. Again and again the surprise was effected, not
by the nation of hunters, but by those rooineks whose want of cunning
and of veld-craft had for so long been a subject of derision and
merriment. A year of the kopje and the donga had altered all that. And
in the proportion of casualties another very marked change had occurred.
Time was when in battle after battle a tenth would have been a liberal
estimate for the losses of the Boers compared with those of the Briton.
So it was at Stormberg; so it was at Colenso; so it may have been at
Magersfontein. But in this last stage of the war the balance was
rather in favour of the British. It may have been because they were
now frequently acting on the defensive, or it may have been from an
improvement in their fire, or it may have come from the more desperate
mood of the burghers, but in any case the fact remains that every
encounter diminished the small reserves of the Boers rather than the
ample forces of their opponents.
One other change had come over the war, which caused more distress and
searchings of conscience among some of the people of Great Britain
than the darkest hours of their misfortunes. This lay in the increased
bitterness of the struggle, and in those more strenuous measures which
the British commanders felt themselves entitled and compelled to adopt.
Nothing could exceed the lenity of Lord Roberts's early proclamations
in the Free State. But, as the months went on and the struggle still
continued, the war assumed a harsher aspect. Every farmhouse represented
a possible fort, and a probable depot for the enemy. The extreme measure
of burning them down was only carried out after a definite offence, such
as affording cover for snipers, or as a deterrent to railway wreckers,
but in either case it is evident that the women or children who were
usually the sole occupants of the farm could not by their own unaided
exertions prevent the line from being cut or the riflemen from firing.
It is even probable that the Boers may have committed these deeds in
the vicinity of houses the destruction of which they would least regret.
Thus, on humanitarian grounds there were strong arguments against this
policy of destruction being pushed too far, and the political reasons
were even stronger, since a homeless man is necessarily the last man
to settle down, and a burned-out family the last to become contented
British citizens. On the other hand, the impatience of the army towards
what they regarded as the abuses of lenity was very great, and they
argued that the war would be endless if the women in the farm were
allowed always to supply the sniper on the kopje. The irregular
and brigand-like fashion in which the struggle was carried out had
exasperated the soldiers, and though there were few cases of individual
outrage or unauthorised destruction, the general orders were applied
with some harshness, and repressive measures were taken which warfare
may justify but which civilisation must deplore.
After the dispersal of the main army at Komatipoort there remained
a considerable number of men in arms, some of them irreconcilable
burghers, some of them foreign adventurers, and some of them Cape
rebels, to whom British arms were less terrible than British law. These
men, who were still well armed and well mounted, spread themselves over
the country, and acted with such energy that they gave the impression
of a large force. They made their way into the settled districts, and
brought fresh hope and fresh disaster to many who had imagined that
the war had passed for ever away from them. Under compulsion from their
irreconcilable countrymen, a large number of the farmers broke their
parole, mounted the horses which British leniency had left with them,
and threw themselves once more into the struggle, adding their honour
to the other sacrifices which they had made for their country. In any
account of the continual brushes between these scattered bands and the
British forces, there must be such a similarity in procedure and result,
that it would be hard for the writer and intolerable for the reader if
they were set forth in detail. As a general statement it may be said
that during the months to come there was no British garrison in any
one of the numerous posts in the Transvaal, and in that portion of
the Orange River Colony which lies east of the railway, which was not
surrounded by prowling riflemen, there was no convoy sent to supply
those garrisons which was not liable to be attacked upon the road, and
there was no train upon any one of the three lines which might not find
a rail up and a hundred raiders covering it with their Mausers. With
some two thousand miles of railroad to guard, so many garrisons to
provide, and an escort to be furnished to every convoy, there remained
out of the large body of British troops in the country only a moderate
force who were available for actual operations. This force was
distributed in different districts scattered over a wide extent of
country, and it was evident that while each was strong enough to
suppress local resistance, still at any moment a concentration of the
Boer scattered forces upon a single British column might place the
latter in a serious position. The distribution of the British in October
and November was roughly as follows. Methuen was in the Rustenburg
district, Barton at Krugersdorp and operating down the line to
Klerksdorp, Settle was in the West, Paget at Pienaar's River, Clements
in the Magaliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom, Lyttelton at Middelburg,
Smith-Dorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at Lydenburg, French in the
Eastern Transvaal, Hunter, Rundle, Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton in the
Orange River Colony. Each of these forces was occupied in the same
sort of work, breaking up small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms,
bringing in refugees, collecting supplies, and rounding up cattle. Some,
however, were confronted with organised resistance and some were not. A
short account may be given in turn of each separate column.
I would treat first the operations of General Barton, because they form
the best introduction to that narrative of the doings of Christian De
Wet to which this chapter will be devoted.
The most severe operations during the month of October fell to the lot
of this British General, who, with some of the faithful fusiliers whom
he had led from the first days in Natal, was covering the line from
Krugersdorp to Klerksdorp. It is a long stretch, and one which, as the
result shows, is as much within striking distance of the Orange Free
Staters as of the men of the Transvaal. Upon October 5th Barton
left Krugersdorp with a force which consisted of the Scots and Welsh
Fusiliers, five hundred mounted men, the 78th R.F.A., three pom-poms,
and a 4.7 naval gun. For a fortnight, as the small army moved slowly
down the line of the railroad, their progress was one continual
skirmish. On October 6th they brushed the enemy aside in an action in
which the volunteer company of the Scots Fusiliers gained the
applause of their veteran comrades. On the 8th and 9th there was sharp
skirmishing, the brunt of which on the latter date fell upon the Welsh
Fusiliers, who had three officers and eleven men injured. The commandos
of Douthwaite, Liebenberg, and Van der Merwe seem to have been occupied
in harassing the column during their progress through the Gatsrand
range. On the 15th the desultory sniping freshened again into a skirmish
in which the honours and the victory belonged mainly to the Welshmen and
to that very keen and efficient body, the Scottish Yeomanry. Six Boers
were left dead upon the ground. On October 17th the column reached
Frederickstad, where it halted. On that date six of Marshall's Horse
were cut off while collecting supplies. The same evening three hundred
of the Imperial Light Horse came in from Krugersdorp.
Up to this date the Boer forces which dogged the column had been
annoying but not seriously aggressive. On the 19th, however, affairs
took an unexpected turn. The British scouts rode in to report a huge
dust cloud whirling swiftly northwards from the direction of the Vaal
River--soon plainly visible to all, and showing as it drew nearer the
hazy outline of a long column of mounted men. The dark coats of the
riders, and possibly the speed of their advance, showed that they were
Boers, and soon it was rumoured that it was no other than Christian De
Wet with his merry men, who, with characteristic audacity, had ridden
back into the Transvaal in the hope of overwhelming Barton's column.
It is some time since we have seen anything of this energetic gentleman
with the tinted glasses, but as the narrative will be much occupied with
him in the future a few words are needed to connect him with the past.
It has been already told how he escaped through the net which caught so
many of his countrymen at the time of the surrender of Prinsloo, and how
he was chased at furious speed from the Vaal River to the mountains of
Magaliesberg. Here he eluded his pursuers, separated from Steyn, who
desired to go east to confer with Kruger, and by the end of August was
back again in his favourite recruiting ground in the north of the
Orange River Colony. Here for nearly two months he had lain very quiet,
refitting and reassembling his scattered force, until now, ready for
action once more, and fired by the hope of cutting off an isolated
British force, he rode swiftly northwards with two thousand men
under that rolling cloud which had been spied by the watchers of
Frederickstad.
The problem before him was a more serious one, however, than any which
he had ever undertaken, for this was no isolated regiment or ill-manned
post, but a complete little field force very ready to do battle with
him. De Wet's burghers, as they arrived, sprang from their ponies and
went into action in their usual invisible but effective fashion,
covered by the fire of several guns. The soldiers had thrown up lines
of sangars, however, and were able, though exposed to a very heavy fire
coming from several directions, to hold their own until nightfall, when
the defences were made more secure. On the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and
24th the cordon of the attack was drawn gradually closer, the Boers
entirely surrounding the British force, and it was evident that they
were feeling round for a point at which an assault might be delivered.
The position of the defenders upon the morning of October 25th was as
follows. The Scots Fusiliers were holding a ridge to the south. General
Barton with the rest of his forces occupied a hill some distance off.
Between the two was a valley down which ran the line, and also the
spruit upon which the British depended for their water supply. On each
side of the line were ditches, and at dawn on this seventh day of the
investment it was found that these had been occupied by snipers during
the night, and that it was impossible to water the animals. One of two
things must follow. Either the force must shift its position or it must
drive these men out of their cover. No fire could do it, as they lay in
perfect safety. They must be turned out at the point of the bayonet.
About noon several companies of Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced from
different directions in very extended order upon the ditches. Captain
Baillie's company of the former regiment first attracted the fire of
the burghers. Wounded twice the brave officer staggered on until a third
bullet struck him dead. Six of his men were found lying beside him. The
other companies were exposed in their turn to a severe fire, but rushing
onwards they closed rapidly in upon the ditches. There have been few
finer infantry advances during the war, for the veld was perfectly flat
and the fire terrific. A mile of ground was crossed by the fusiliers.
Three gallant officers--Dick, Elliot, and Best--went down; but the rush
of the men was irresistible. At the edge of the ditches the supports
overtook the firing line, and they all surged into the trenches
together. Then it was seen how perilous was the situation of the Boer
snipers. They had placed themselves between the upper and the nether
millstone. There was no escape for them save across the open. It says
much for their courage that they took that perilous choice rather than
wave the white flag, which would have ensured their safety.
The scene which followed has not often been paralleled. About a hundred
and fifty burghers rushed out of the ditches, streaming across the veld
upon foot to the spot where their horses had been secreted. Rifles,
pom-poms, and shrapnel played upon them during this terrible race. 'A
black running mob carrying coats, blankets, boots, rifles, &c., was seen
to rise as if from nowhere and rush as fast as they could, dropping the
various things they carried as they ran.' One of their survivors has
described how awful was that wild blind flight, through a dust-cloud
thrown up by the shells. For a mile the veld was dotted with those who
had fallen. Thirty-six were found dead, thirty were wounded, and thirty
more gave themselves up as prisoners. Some were so demoralised that
they rushed into the hospital and surrendered to the British doctor. The
Imperial Light Horse were for some reason slow to charge. Had they done
so at once, many eye-witnesses agree that not a fugitive should have
escaped. On the other hand, the officer in command may have feared that
in doing so he might mask the fire of the British guns.
One incident in the action caused some comment at the time. A small
party of Imperial Light Horse, gallantly led by Captain Yockney of B
Squadron, came to close quarters with a group of Boers. Five of the
enemy having held up their hands Yockney passed them and pushed on
against their comrades. On this the prisoners seized their rifles once
more and fired upon their captors. A fierce fight ensued with only a few
feet between the muzzles of the rifles. Three Boers were shot dead, five
wounded, and eight taken. Of these eight three were shot next day by
order of court-martial for having resumed their weapons after surrender,
while two others were acquitted. The death of these men in cold blood
is to be deplored, but it is difficult to see how any rules of civilised
warfare can be maintained if a flagrant breach of them is not promptly
and sternly punished.
On receiving this severe blow De Wet promptly raised the investment and
hastened to regain his favourite haunts. Considerable reinforcements
had reached Barton upon the same day, including the Dublins, the Essex,
Strathcona's Horse, and the Elswick Battery, with some very welcome
supplies of ammunition. As Barton had now more than a thousand mounted
men of most excellent quality it is difficult to imagine why he did not
pursue his defeated enemy. He seems to have underrated the effect which
he had produced, for instead of instantly assuming the offensive he
busied himself in strengthening his defences. Yet the British losses in
the whole operations had not exceeded one hundred, so that there does
not appear to have been any reason why the force should be crippled.
As Barton was in direct and constant telegraphic communication with
Pretoria, it is possible that he was acting under superior orders in the
course which he adopted.
It was not destined, however, that De Wet should be allowed to escape
with his usual impunity. On the 27th, two days after his retreat
from Frederickstad he was overtaken--stumbled upon by pure chance
apparently--by the mounted infantry and cavalry of Charles Knox and De
Lisle. The Boers, a great disorganised cloud of horsemen, swept swiftly
along the northern bank of the Vaal, seeking for a place to cross, while
the British rode furiously after them, spraying them with shrapnel
at every opportunity. Darkness and a violent storm gave De Wet his
opportunity to cross, but the closeness of the pursuit compelled him to
abandon two of his guns, one of them a Krupp and the other one of the
British twelve-pounders of Sanna's Post, which, to the delight of the
gunners, was regained by that very U battery to which it belonged.
Once across the river and back in his own country De Wet, having placed
seventy miles between himself and his pursuers, took it for granted that
he was out of their reach, and halted near the village of Bothaville to
refit. But the British were hard upon his track, and for once they were
able to catch this indefatigable man unawares. Yet their knowledge of
his position seems to have been most hazy, and on the very day before
that on which they found him, General Charles Knox, with the main body
of the force, turned north, and was out of the subsequent action. De
Lisle's mounted troops also turned north, but fortunately not entirely
out of call. To the third and smallest body of mounted men, that under
Le Gallais, fell the honour of the action which I am about to describe.
It is possible that the move northwards of Charles Knox and of De Lisle
had the effect of a most elaborate stratagem, since it persuaded the
Boer scouts that the British were retiring. So indeed they were, save
only the small force of Le Gallais, which seems to have taken one last
cast round to the south before giving up the pursuit. In the grey of the
morning of November 6th, Major Lean with forty men of the 5th Mounted
Infantry came upon three weary Boers sleeping upon the veld. Having
secured the men, and realising that they were an outpost, Lean pushed
on, and topping a rise some hundreds of yards further, he and his men
saw a remarkable scene. There before them stretched the camp of the
Boers, the men sleeping, the horses grazing, the guns parked, and the
wagons outspanned.
There was little time for consideration. The Kaffir drivers were already
afoot and strolling out for their horses, or lighting the fires for
their masters' coffee. With splendid decision, although he had but forty
men to oppose to over a thousand, Lean sent back for reinforcements
and opened fire upon the camp. In an instant it was buzzing like an
overturned hive. Up sprang the sleepers, rushed for their horses, and
galloped away across the veld, leaving their guns and wagons behind.
A few stalwarts remained, however, and their numbers were increased by
those whose horses had stampeded, and who were, therefore, unable to get
away. They occupied an enclosed kraal and a farmhouse in front of the
British, whence they opened a sharp fire. At the same time a number of
the Boers who had ridden away came back again, having realised how weak
their assailants were, and worked round the British flanks upon either
side.
Le Gallais, with his men, had come up, but the British force was still
far inferior to that which it was attacking. A section of U battery
was able to unlimber, and open fire at four hundred yards from the
Boer position. The British made no attempt to attack, but contented
themselves with holding on to the position from which they could prevent
the Boer guns from being removed. The burghers tried desperately to
drive off the stubborn fringe of riflemen. A small stone shed in the
possession of the British was the centre of the Boer fire, and it was
within its walls that Ross of the Durhams was horribly wounded by an
explosive ball, and that the brave Jerseyman, Le Gallais, was killed.
Before his fall he had despatched his staff officer, Major Hickie, to
hurry up men from the rear.
On the fall of Ross and Le Gallais the command fell upon Major Taylor
of U battery. The position at that time was sufficiently alarming. The
Boers were working round each flank in considerable numbers, and they
maintained a heavy fire from a stone enclosure in the centre. The
British forces actually engaged were insignificant, consisting of forty
men of the 5th Mounted Infantry, and two guns in the centre, forty-six
men of the 17th and 18th Imperial Yeomanry upon the right, and 105 of
the 8th Mounted Infantry on the left or 191 rifles in all. The flanks of
this tiny force had to extend to half a mile to hold off the Boer flank
attack, but they were heartened in their resistance by the knowledge
that their comrades were hastening to their assistance. Taylor,
realising that a great effort must be made to tide over the crisis, sent
a messenger back with orders that the convoy should be parked, and
every available man sent up to strengthen the right flank, which was the
weakest. The enemy got close on to one of the guns, and swept down the
whole detachment, but a handful of the Suffolk Mounted Infantry under
Lieutenant Peebles most gallantly held them off from it. For an hour
the pressure was extreme. Then two companies of the 7th Mounted Infantry
came up, and were thrown on to each flank. Shortly afterwards Major
Welch, with two more companies of the same corps, arrived, and the
tide began slowly to turn. The Boers were themselves outflanked by the
extension of the British line and were forced to fall back. At half-past
eight De Lisle, whose force had trotted and galloped for twelve miles,
arrived with several companies of Australians, and the success of the
day was assured. The smoke of the Prussian guns at Waterloo was not
a more welcome sight than the dust of De Lisle's horsemen. But the
question now was whether the Boers, who were in the walled inclosure and
farm which formed their centre, would manage to escape. The place was
shelled, but here, as often before, it was found how useless a weapon
is shrapnel against buildings. There was nothing for it but to storm
it, and a grim little storming party of fifty men, half British, half
Australian, was actually waiting with fixed bayonets for the whistle
which was to be their signal, when the white flag flew out from the
farm, and all was over. Warned by many a tragic experience the British
still lay low in spite of the flag. 'Come out! come out!' they shouted.
Eighty-two unwounded Boers filed out of the enclosure, and the total
number of prisoners came to 114, while between twenty and thirty Boers
were killed. Six guns, a pom-pom, and 1000 head of cattle were the
prizes of the victors.
This excellent little action showed that the British mounted infantry
had reached a point of efficiency at which they were quite able to match
the Boers at their own game. For hours they held them with an inferior
force, and finally, when the numbers became equal, were able to drive
them off and capture their guns. The credit is largely due to Major
Lean for his prompt initiative on discovering their laager, and to Major
Taylor for his handling of the force during a very critical time. Above
all, it was due to the dead leader, Le Gallais, who had infected every
man under him with his own spirit of reckless daring. 'If I die, tell my
mother that I die happy, as we got the guns,' said he, with his failing
breath. The British total losses were twelve killed (four officers) and
thirty-three wounded (seven officers). Major Welch, a soldier of great
promise, much beloved by his men, was one of the slain. Following
closely after the repulse at Frederickstad this action was a heavy blow
to De Wet. At last, the British were beginning to take something off the
score which they owed the bold raider, but there was to be many an item
on either side before the long reckoning should be closed. The Boers,
with De Wet, fled south, where it was not long before they showed that
they were still a military force with which we had to reckon.
In defiance of chronology it may perhaps make a clearer narrative if I
continue at once with the movements of De Wet from the time that he lost
his guns at Bothaville, and then come back to the consideration of the
campaign in the Transvaal, and to a short account of those scattered
and disconnected actions which break the continuity of the story. Before
following De Wet, however, it is necessary to say something of
the general state of the Orange River Colony and of some military
developments which had occurred there. Under the wise and conciliatory
rule of General Pretyman the farmers in the south and west were settling
down, and for the time it looked as if a large district was finally
pacified. The mild taxation was cheerfully paid, schools were reopened,
and a peace party made itself apparent, with Fraser and Piet de Wet, the
brother of Christian, among its strongest advocates.
Apart from the operations of De Wet there appeared to be no large force
in the field in the Orange River Colony, but early in October of 1900
a small but very mobile and efficient Boer force skirted the eastern
outposts of the British, struck the southern line of communications, and
then came up the western flank, attacking, where an attack was possible,
each of the isolated and weakly garrisoned townlets to which it came,
and recruiting its strength from a district which had been hardly
touched by the ravages of war, and which by its prosperity alone might
have proved the amenity of British military rule. This force seems to
have skirted Wepener without attacking a place of such evil omen to
their cause. Their subsequent movements are readily traced by a sequence
of military events.
On October 1st Rouxville was threatened. On the 9th an outpost of the
Cheshire Militia was taken and the railway cut for a few hours in the
neighbourhood of Bethulie. A week later the Boer riders were dotting the
country round Phillipolis, Springfontein and Jagersfontein, the latter
town being occupied upon October 16th, while the garrison held out upon
the nearest kopje. The town was retaken from the enemy by King Hall
and his men, who were Seaforth Highlanders and police. There was fierce
fighting in the streets, and from twenty to thirty of each side were
killed or wounded. Fauresmith was attacked on October 19th, but was also
in the very safe hands of the Seaforths, who held it against a severe
assault. Phillipolis was continually attacked between the 18th and the
24th, but made a most notable defence, which was conducted by Gostling,
the resident magistrate, with forty civilians. For a week this band of
stalwarts held their own against 600 Boers, and were finally relieved
by a force from the railway. All the operations were not, however, as
successful as these three defences. On October 24th a party of cavalry
details belonging to many regiments were snapped up in an ambuscade.
On the next day Jacobsdal was attacked, with considerable loss to the
British. The place was entered in the night, and the enemy occupied the
houses which surrounded the square. The garrison, consisting of about
sixty men of the Capetown Highlanders, had encamped in the square, and
were helpless when fire was opened upon them in the morning. There was
practically no resistance, and yet for hours a murderous fire was kept
up upon the tents in which they cowered, so that the affair seems not to
have been far removed from murder. Two-thirds of the little force were
killed or wounded. The number of the assailants does not appear to have
been great, and they vanished upon the appearance of a relieving force
from Modder River.
After the disaster at Jacobsdal the enemy appeared on November 1st near
Kimberley and captured a small convoy. The country round was disturbed,
and Settle was sent south with a column to pacify it. In this way we can
trace this small cyclone from its origin in the old storm centre in the
north-east of the Orange River Colony, sweeping round the whole
country, striking one post after another, and finally blowing out at the
corresponding point upon the other side of the seat of war.
We have last seen De Wet upon November 6th, when he fled south from
Bothaville, leaving his guns but not his courage behind him. Trekking
across the line, and for a wonder gathering up no train as he passed,
he made for that part of the eastern Orange River Colony which had been
reoccupied by his countrymen. Here, in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu,
he was able to join other forces, probably the commandos of Haasbroek
and Fourie, which still retained some guns. At the head of a
considerable force he attacked the British garrison of Dewetsdorp, a
town some forty miles to the south-east of Bloemfontein.
It was on November 18th that De Wet assailed the place, and it fell upon
the 24th, after a defence which appears to have been a very creditable
one. Several small British columns were moving in the south-east of the
Colony, but none of them arrived in time to avert the disaster, which
is the more inexplicable as the town is within one day's ride of
Bloemfontein. The place is a village hemmed in upon its western side by
a semicircle of steep rocky hills broken in the centre by a gully. The
position was a very extended one, and had the fatal weakness that
the loss of any portion of it meant the loss of it all. The garrison
consisted of one company of Highland Light Infantry on the southern horn
of the semicircle, three companies of the 2nd Gloucester Regiment on the
northern and central part, with two guns of the 68th battery. Some of
the Royal Irish Mounted Infantry and a handful of police made up the
total of the defenders to something over four hundred, Major Massy in
command.
The attack developed at that end of the ridge which was held by the
company of Highlanders. Every night the Boer riflemen drew in closer,
and every morning found the position more desperate. On the 20th the
water supply of the garrison was cut, though a little was still brought
up by volunteers during the night. The thirst in the sultry trenches was
terrible, but the garrison still, with black lips and parched tongues,
held on to their lines. On the 22nd the attack had made such progress
that the post had by the Highlanders became untenable, and had to be
withdrawn. It was occupied next morning by the Boers, and the whole
ridge was at their mercy. Out of eighteen men who served one of the
British guns sixteen were killed or wounded, and the last rounds were
fired by the sergeant-farrier, who carried, loaded, and fired all by
himself. All day the soldiers held out, but the thirst was in itself
enough to justify if not to compel a surrender. At half-past five
the garrison laid down their arms, having lost about sixty killed or
wounded. There does not, as far as one can learn, seem to have been any
attempt to injure the two guns which fell into the hands of the enemy.
De Wet himself was one of the first to ride into the British trenches,
and the prisoners gazed with interest at the short strong figure, with
the dark tail coat and the square-topped bowler hat, of the most famous
of the Boer leaders.
British columns were converging, however, from several quarters, and De
Wet had to be at once on the move. On the 26th Dewetsdorp was reoccupied
by General Charles Knox with fifteen hundred men. De Wet had two days'
start, but so swift was Knox that on the 27th he had run him down at
Vaalbank, where he shelled his camp. De Wet broke away, however, and
trekking south for eighteen hours without a halt, shook off the pursuit.
He had with him at this time nearly 8000 men with several guns under
Haasbroek, Fourie, Philip Botha, and Steyn. It was his declared
intention to invade Cape Colony with his train of weary footsore
prisoners, and the laurels of Dewetsdorp still green upon him. He was
much aided in all his plans by that mistaken leniency which had refused
to recognise that a horse is in that country as much a weapon as a
rifle, and had left great numbers upon the farms with which he could
replace his useless animals. So numerous were they that many of the
Boers had two or three for their own use. It is not too much to say that
our weak treatment of the question of horses will come to be recognised
as the one great blot upon the conduct of the war, and that our undue
and fantastic scruples have prolonged hostilities for months, and cost
the country many lives and many millions of pounds.
De Wet's plan for the invasion of the Colony was not yet destined to be
realised, for a tenacious man had set himself to frustrate it. Several
small but mobile British columns, those of Pilcher, of Barker, and
of Herbert, under the supreme direction of Charles Knox, were working
desperately to head him off. In torrents of rain which turned every
spruit into a river and every road into a quagmire, the British horsemen
stuck manfully to their work. De Wet had hurried south, crossed the
Caledon River, and made for Odendaal's Drift. But Knox, after the
skirmish at Vaalbank, had trekked swiftly south to Bethulie, and was now
ready with three mobile columns and a network of scouts and patrols
to strike in any direction. For a few days he had lost touch, but his
arrangements were such that he must recover it if the Boers either
crossed the railroad or approached the river. On December 2nd he had
authentic information that De Wet was crossing the Caledon, and in an
instant the British columns were all off at full cry once more, sweeping
over the country with a front of fifteen miles. On the 3rd and 4th, in
spite of frightful weather, the two little armies of horsemen struggled
on, fetlock-deep in mud, with the rain lashing their faces. At night
without cover, drenched and bitterly cold, the troopers threw themselves
down on the sodden veld to snatch a few hours' sleep before renewing the
interminable pursuit. The drift over the Caledon flowed deep and strong,
but the Boer had passed and the Briton must pass also. Thirty guns took
to the water, diving completely under the coffee-coloured surface, to
reappear glistening upon the southern bank. Everywhere there were signs
of the passage of the enemy. A litter of crippled or dying horses marked
their track, and a Krupp gun was found abandoned by the drift. The
Dewetsdorp prisoners, too, had been set loose, and began to stumble
and stagger back to their countrymen, their boots worn off, and their
putties wrapped round their bleeding feet. It is painful to add that
they had been treated with a personal violence and a brutality in marked
contrast to the elaborate hospitality shown by the British Government to
its involuntary guests.
On December 6th De Wet had at last reached the Orange River a clear day
in front of his pursuers. But it was only to find that his labours had
been in vain. At Odendaal, where he had hoped to cross, the river was in
spate, the British flag waved from a post upon the further side, and a
strong force of expectant Guardsmen eagerly awaited him there. Instantly
recognising that the game was up, the Boer leader doubled back for the
north and safety. At Rouxville he hesitated as to whether he should snap
up the small garrison, but the commandant, Rundle, showed a bold face,
and De Wet passed on to the Coomassie Bridge over the Caledon. The small
post there refused to be bluffed into a surrender, and the Boers,
still dropping their horses fast, passed on, and got over the drift
at Amsterdam, their rearguard being hardly across before Knox had also
reached the river.
On the 10th the British were in touch again near Helvetia, where
there was a rearguard skirmish. On the 11th both parties rode
through Reddersberg, a few hours separating them. The Boers in
their cross-country trekking go, as one of their prisoners observed,
'slap-bang at everything,' and as they are past-masters in the art of ox
and mule driving, and have such a knowledge of the country that they can
trek as well by night as by day, it says much for the energy of Knox
and his men that he was able for a fortnight to keep in close touch with
them.
It became evident now that there was not much chance of overtaking
the main body of the burghers, and an attempt was therefore made to
interpose a fresh force who might head them off. A line of posts existed
between Thabanchu and Ladybrand, and Colonel Thorneycroft was stationed
there with a movable column. It was Knox's plan therefore to prevent
the Boers from breaking to the west and to head them towards the Basuto
border. A small column under Parsons had been sent by Hunter from
Bloemfontein, and pushed in upon the flank of De Wet, who had on the
12th got back to Dewetsdorp. Again the pursuit became warm, but De Wet's
time was not yet come. He headed for Springhaan Nek, about fifteen miles
east of Thabanchu. This pass is about four miles broad, with a British
fort upon either side of it. There was only one way to safety, for
Knox's mounted infantrymen and lancers were already dotting the southern
skyline. Without hesitation the whole Boer force, now some 2500 strong,
galloped at full speed in open order through the Nek, braving the long
range fire of riflemen and guns. The tactics were those of French in
his ride to Kimberley, and the success was as complete. De Wet's force
passed through the last barrier which had been held against him, and
vanished into the mountainous country round Ficksburg, where it could
safely rest and refit.
The result then of these bustling operations had been that De Wet and
his force survived, but that he had failed in his purpose of invading
the Colony, and had dropped some five hundred horses, two guns, and
about a hundred of his men. Haasbroek's commando had been detached by
De Wet to make a feint at another pass while he made his way through the
Springhaan. Parsons's force followed Haasbroek up and engaged him, but
under cover of night he was able to get away and to join his leader to
the north of Thabanchu. On December 13th, this, the second great chase
after De Wet, may be said to have closed.