Lord Roberts had now been six weeks in the capital, and British troops
had overrun the greater part of the south and west of the Transvaal,
but in spite of this there was continued Boer resistance, which flared
suddenly up in places which had been nominally pacified and disarmed.
It was found, as has often been shown in history, that it is easier
to defeat a republican army than to conquer it. From Klerksdorp, from
Ventersdorp, from Rustenburg, came news of risings against the newly
imposed British authority. The concealed Mauser and the bandolier were
dug up once more from the trampled corner of the cattle kraal, and the
farmer was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits of De Wet
stimulated the fighting burghers and shamed those who had submitted. A
letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to Cronje's son, who had
surrendered near Rustenburg. De Wet stated that he had gained two great
victories and had fifteen hundred captured rifles with which to replace
those which the burghers had given up. Not only were the outlying
districts in a state of revolt, but even round Pretoria the Boers were
inclined to take the offensive, while both that town and Johannesburg
were filled with malcontents who were ready to fly to their arms once
more.
Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realised
how helpless Lord Roberts was until his remounts should arrive. The
mosquitoes buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was an
attack upon Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten off by
the Canadians. Early in July some of the cavalry and mounted infantry
patrols were snapped up in the neighbourhood of the capital. Lord
Roberts gave orders accordingly that Hutton and Mahon should sweep the
Boers back upon his right, and push them as far as Bronkhorst Spruit.
This was done on July 6th and 7th, the British advance meeting with
considerable resistance from artillery as well as rifles. By this
movement the pressure upon the right was relieved, which might have
created a dangerous unrest in Johannesburg, and it was done at the
moderate cost of thirty-four killed and wounded, half of whom belonged
to the Imperial Light Horse. This famous corps, which had come across
with Mahon from the relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden
with mixed feelings through the streets of Johannesburg and past, in
many instances, the deserted houses which had once been their homes.
Many weary months were to pass before the survivors might occupy them.
On July 9th the Boers again attacked, but were again pushed back to the
eastward.
It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the right
of Lord Roberts's extended position were really feints in order to cover
the far-reaching plans which Botha had in his mind. The disposition of
the Boer forces at this time appears to have been as follows: Botha with
his army occupied a position along Delagoa railway line, further east
than Diamond Hill, whence he detached the bodies which attacked Hutton
upon the extreme right of the British position to the south-east of
Pretoria. To the north of Pretoria a second force was acting under
Grobler, while a third under De la Rey had been despatched secretly
across to the left wing of the British, north-west of Pretoria. While
Botha engaged the attention of Lord Roberts by energetic demonstrations
on his right, Grobler and De la Rey were to make a sudden attack upon
his centre and his left, each point being twelve or fifteen miles
from the other. It was well devised and very well carried out; but the
inherent defect of it was that, when subdivided in this way, the Boer
force was no longer strong enough to gain more than a mere success of
outposts.
De la Rey's attack was delivered at break of day on July 11th at
Uitval's Nek, a post some eighteen miles west of the capital. This
position could not be said to be part of Lord Roberts's line, but rather
to be a link to connect his army with Rustenburg. It was weakly held by
three companies of the Lincolns with two others in support, one squadron
of the Scots Greys, and two guns of O battery R.H.A. The attack came
with the first grey light of dawn, and for many hours the small garrison
bore up against a deadly fire, waiting for the help which never came.
All day they held their assailants at bay, and it was not until evening
that their ammunition ran short and they were forced to surrender.
Nothing could have been better than the behaviour of the men, both
infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their position was a hopeless one.
The casualties amounted to eighty killed and wounded. Nearly two hundred
were made prisoners and the two guns were taken.
On the same day that De la Rey made his coup at Uitval's Nek, Grobler
had shown his presence on the north side of the town by treating very
roughly a couple of squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards which had
attacked him. By the help of a section of the ubiquitous O battery and
of the 14th Hussars, Colonel Lowe was able to disengage his cavalry from
the trap into which they had fallen, but it was at the cost of between
thirty and forty officers and men killed, wounded, or taken. The old
'Black Horse' sustained their historical reputation, and fought their
way bravely out of an almost desperate situation, where they were
exposed to the fire of a thousand riflemen and four guns.
On this same day of skirmishes, July 11th, the Gordons had seen some hot
work twenty miles or so to the south of Uitval's Nek. Orders had been
given to the 19th Brigade (Smith-Dorrien's) to proceed to Krugersdorp,
and thence to make their way north. The Scottish Yeomanry and a section
of the 78th R.F.A. accompanied them. The idea seems to have been that
they would be able to drive north any Boers in that district, who would
then find the garrison of Uitval's Nek at their rear. The advance was
checked, however, at a place called Dolverkrantz, which was strongly
held by Boer riflemen. The two guns were insufficiently protected, and
the enemy got within short range of them, killing or wounding many of
the gunners. The lieutenant in charge, Mr. A.J. Turner, the famous Essex
cricketer, worked the gun with his own hands until he also fell wounded
in three places. The situation was now very serious, and became more
so when news was flashed of the disaster at Uitval's Nek, and they were
ordered to retire. They could not retire and abandon the guns, yet the
fire was so hot that it was impossible to remove them. Gallant attempts
were made by volunteers from the Gordons--Captain Younger and other
brave men throwing away their lives in the vain effort to reach and to
limber up the guns. At last, under the cover of night, the teams were
harnessed and the two field-pieces successfully removed, while the Boers
who rushed in to seize them were scattered by a volley. The losses in
the action were thirty-six and the gain nothing. Decidedly July 11th was
not a lucky day for the British arms.
It was well known to Botha that every train from the south was bringing
horses for Lord Roberts's army, and that it had become increasingly
difficult for De Wet and his men to hinder their arrival. The last horse
must win, and the Empire had the world on which to draw. Any movement
which the Boers would make must be made at once, for already both the
cavalry and the mounted infantry were rapidly coming back to their full
strength once more. This consideration must have urged Botha to deliver
an attack on July 16th, which had some success at first, but was
afterwards beaten off with heavy loss to the enemy. The fighting fell
principally upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, the corps chiefly engaged being
the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the New Zealanders, the Shropshires, and the
Canadian Mounted Infantry. The enemy tried repeatedly to assault the
position, but were beaten back each time with a loss of nearly a hundred
killed and wounded. The British loss was about sixty, and included two
gallant young Canadian officers, Borden and Birch, the former being the
only son of the minister of militia. So ended the last attempt made by
Botha upon the British positions round Pretoria. The end of the war
was not yet, but already its futility was abundantly evident. This had
become more apparent since the junction of Hamilton and of Buller had
cut off the Transvaal army from that of the Free State. Unable to send
their prisoners away, and also unable to feed them, the Freestaters were
compelled to deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom they had taken
at Lindley and Roodeval. These men, a ragged and starving battalion,
emerged at Ladysmith, having made their way through Van Reenen's Pass.
It is a singular fact that no parole appears on these and similar
occasions to have been exacted by the Boers.
Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was ready
now to advance eastward and give Botha battle. The first town of any
consequence along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some seventy miles
from the capital. This became the British objective, and the forces of
Mahon and Hamilton on the north, of Pole-Carew in the centre, and of
French and Hutton to the south, all converged upon it. There was no
serious resistance, though the weather was abominable, and on July 27th
the town was in the hands of the invaders. From that date until the
final advance to the eastward French held this advanced post, while
Pole-Carew guarded the railway line. Rumours of trouble in the west had
convinced Roberts that it was not yet time to push his advantage to the
east, and he recalled Ian Hamilton's force to act for a time upon
the other side of the seat of the war. This excellent little army,
consisting of Mahon's and Pilcher's mounted infantry, M battery R.H.A.,
the Elswick battery, two 5-inch and two 4.7 guns, with the Berkshires,
the Border Regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, and the Scottish
Borderers, put in as much hard work in marching and in fighting as any
body of troops in the whole campaign.
The renewal of the war in the west had begun some weeks before, but was
much accelerated by the transference of De la Rey and his burghers to
that side. There is no district in the Transvaal which is better worth
fighting for, for it is a fair country side, studded with farmhouses and
green with orange-groves, with many clear streams running through it.
The first sign of activity appears to have been on July 7th, when a
commando with guns appeared upon the hills above Rustenburg. Hanbury
Tracy, commandant of Rustenburg, was suddenly confronted with a summons
to surrender. He had only 120 men and one gun, but he showed a bold
front. Colonel Houldsworth, at the first whisper of danger, had started
from Zeerust with a small force of Australian bushmen, and arrived at
Rustenburg in time to drive the enemy away in a very spirited action. On
the evening of July 8th Baden-Powell took over the command, the garrison
being reinforced by Plumer's command.
The Boer commando was still in existence, however, and it was reinforced
and reinvigorated by De la Rey's success at Uitval's Nek. On July 18th
they began to close in upon Rustenburg again, and a small skirmish took
place between them and the Australians. Methuen's division, which had
been doing very arduous service in the north of the Free State during
the last six weeks, now received orders to proceed into the Transvaal
and to pass northwards through the disturbed districts en route for
Rustenburg, which appeared to be the storm centre. The division was
transported by train from Kroonstad to Krugersdorp, and advanced on the
evening of July 18th upon its mission, through a bare and fire-blackened
country. On the 19th Lord Methuen manoeuvred the Boers out of a strong
position, with little loss to either side. On the 21st he forced his
way through Olifant's Nek, in the Magaliesberg range, and so established
communication with Baden-Powell, whose valiant bushmen, under Colonel
Airey, had held their own in a severe conflict near Magato Pass, in
which they lost six killed, nineteen wounded, and nearly two hundred
horses. The fortunate arrival of Captain FitzClarence with the
Protectorate Regiment helped on this occasion to avert a disaster. The
force, only 300 strong, without guns, had walked into an ugly ambuscade,
and only the tenacity and resource of the men enabled them ever to
extricate themselves.
Although Methuen came within reach of Rustenburg, he did not actually
join hands with Baden-Powell. No doubt he saw and heard enough to
convince him that that astute soldier was very well able to take care of
himself. Learning of the existence of a Boer force in his rear,
Methuen turned, and on July 29th he was back at Frederickstad on the
Potchefstroom to Krugersdorp railway. The sudden change in his plans
was caused doubtless by the desire to head off De Wet in case he should
cross the Vaal River. Lord Roberts was still anxious to clear the
neighbourhood of Rustenburg entirely of the enemy; and he therefore,
since Methuen was needed to complete the cordon round De Wet, recalled
Hamilton's force from the east and despatched it, as already described,
to the west of Pretoria.
Before going into the details of the great De Wet hunt, in which
Methuen's force was to be engaged, I shall follow Hamilton's division
across, and give some account of their services. On August 1st he set
out from Pretoria for Rustenburg. On that day and on the next he had
brisk skirmishes which brought him successfully through the Magaliesberg
range with a loss of forty wounded, mostly of the Berkshires. On the 5th
of August he had made his way to Rustenburg and drove off the investing
force. A smaller siege had been going on to westward, where at Elands
River another Mafeking man, Colonel Hore, had been held up by the
burghers. For some days it was feared, and even officially announced,
that the garrison had surrendered. It was known that an attempt by
Carrington to relieve the place on August 5th had been beaten back, and
that the state of the country appeared so threatening that he had been
compelled, or had imagined himself to be compelled, to retreat as far
as Mafeking, evacuating Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, abandoning the
considerable stores which were collected at those places. In spite of
all these sinister indications the garrison was still holding its own,
and on August 16th it was relieved by Lord Kitchener.
This stand at Brakfontein on the Elands River appears to have been one
of the very finest deeds of arms of the war. The Australians have been
so split up during the campaign, that though their valour and efficiency
were universally recognised, they had no single exploit which they could
call their own. But now they can point to Elands River as proudly as the
Canadians can to Paardeberg. They were 500 in number, Victorians, New
South Welshmen, and Queenslanders, the latter the larger unit, with a
corps of Rhodesians. Under Hore were Major Hopper of the Rhodesians, and
Major Toubridge of the Queenslanders. Two thousand five hundred Boers
surrounded them, and most favourable terms of surrender were offered and
scouted. Six guns were trained upon them, and during 11 days 1800 shells
fell within their lines. The river was half a mile off, and every drop
of water for man or beast had to come from there. Nearly all their
horses and 75 of the men were killed or wounded. With extraordinary
energy and ingenuity the little band dug shelters which are said to
have exceeded in depth and efficiency any which the Boers have devised.
Neither the repulse of Carrington, nor the jamming of their only gun,
nor the death of the gallant Annett, was sufficient to dishearten them.
They were sworn to die before the white flag should wave above them. And
so fortune yielded, as fortune will when brave men set their teeth, and
Broadwood's troopers, filled with wonder and admiration, rode into the
lines of the reduced and emaciated but indomitable garrison. When the
ballad-makers of Australia seek for a subject, let them turn to Elands
River, for there was no finer resistance in the war. They will not
grudge a place in their record to the 130 gallant Rhodesians who shared
with them the honours and the dangers of the exploit.
On August 7th Ian Hamilton abandoned Rustenburg, taking Baden-Powell and
his men with him. It was obviously unwise to scatter the British forces
too widely by attempting to garrison every single town. For the instant
the whole interest of the war centred upon De Wet and his dash into the
Transvaal. One or two minor events, however, which cannot be fitted into
any continuous narrative may be here introduced.
One of these was the action at Faber's Put, by which Sir Charles Warren
crushed the rebellion in Griqualand. In that sparsely inhabited country
of vast distances it was a most difficult task to bring the revolt to
a decisive ending. This Sir Charles Warren, with his special local
knowledge and interest, was able to do, and the success is doubly
welcome as bringing additional honour to a man who, whatever view one
may take of his action at Spion Kop, has grown grey in the service of
the Empire. With a column consisting mainly of colonials and of yeomanry
he had followed the rebels up to a point within twelve miles of Douglas.
Here at the end of May they turned upon him and delivered a fierce night
attack, so sudden and so strongly pressed that much credit is due both
to General and to troops for having repelled it. The camp was attacked
on all sides in the early dawn. The greater part of the horses were
stampeded by the firing, and the enemy's riflemen were found to be at
very close quarters. For an hour the action was warm, but at the end
of that time the Boers fled, leaving a number of dead behind them. The
troops engaged in this very creditable action, which might have tried
the steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of the Duke of Edinburgh's
volunteers, some of Paget's horse and of the 8th Regiment Imperial
Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and twenty-five of Warren's Scouts. Their
losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence, of the
volunteers, died at the head of his regiment. A few days before, on May
27th, Colonel Adye had won a small engagement at Kheis, some distance
to the westward, and the effect of the two actions was to put an end
to open resistance. On June 20th De Villiers, the Boer leader, finally
surrendered to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two hundred and twenty
men with stores, rifles, and ammunition. The last sparks had for the
time been stamped out in the colony.
There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the
railway which had spread from the Free State to the Transvaal. On July
19th a train was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroom to Krugersdorp
without serious injury to the passengers. On July 31st, however, the
same thing occurred with more murderous effect, the train running at
full speed off the metals. Thirteen of the Shropshires were killed and
thirty-seven injured in this deplorable affair, which cost us more
than many an important engagement. On August 2nd a train coming up from
Bloemfontein was derailed by Sarel Theron and his gang some miles south
of Kroonstad. Thirty-five trucks of stores were burned, and six of the
passengers (unarmed convalescent soldiers) were killed or wounded. A
body of mounted infantry followed up the Boers, who numbered eighty, and
succeeded in killing and wounding several of them.
On July 21st the Boers made a determined attack upon the railhead at
a point thirteen miles east of Heidelberg, where over a hundred Royal
Engineers were engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by three
hundred Dublin Fusiliers under Major English. For some hours the little
party was hard pressed by the burghers, who had two field-pieces and a
pom-pom. They could make no impression, however, upon the steady
Irish infantry, and after some hours the arrival of General Hart with
reinforcements scattered the assailants, who succeeded in getting their
guns away in safety.
At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general
situation in the Transvaal was not reassuring. Springs near Johannesburg
had in some inexplicable way, without fighting, fallen into the hands
of the enemy. Klerksdorp, an important place in the south-west, had also
been reoccupied, and a handful of men who garrisoned it had been made
prisoners without resistance. Rustenburg was about to be abandoned, and
the British were known to be falling back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop,
concentrating upon Mafeking. The sequel proved however, that there was
no cause for uneasiness in all this. Lord Roberts was concentrating his
strength upon those objects which were vital, and letting the others
drift for a time. At present the two obviously important things were
to hunt down De Wet and to scatter the main Boer army under Botha. The
latter enterprise must wait upon the former, so for a fortnight all
operations were in abeyance while the flying columns of the British
endeavoured to run down their extremely active and energetic antagonist.
At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly difficult
country near Reitzburg, seven miles south of the Vaal River. The
operations were proceeding vigorously at that time against the main army
at Fouriesberg, and sufficient troops could not be spared to attack him,
but he was closely observed by Kitchener and Broadwood with a force of
cavalry and mounted infantry. With the surrender of Prinsloo a large
army was disengaged, and it was obvious that if De Wet remained where he
was he must soon be surrounded. On the other hand, there was no place of
refuge to the south of him. With great audacity he determined to make
a dash for the Transvaal, in the hope of joining hands with De la Rey's
force, or else of making his way across the north of Pretoria, and
so reaching Botha's army. President Steyn went with him, and a most
singular experience it must have been for him to be harried like a mad
dog through the country in which he had once been an honoured guest. De
Wet's force was exceedingly mobile, each man having a led horse, and the
ammunition being carried in light Cape carts.
In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his
lurking-place, and De Wet knew that it was time for him to go. He made
a great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse to deceive
those who watched him. Travelling as lightly as possible, he made a dash
on August 7th at the drift which bears his own name, and so won his
way across the Vaal River, Kitchener thundering at his heels with
his cavalry and mounted infantry. Methuen's force was at that time at
Potchefstroom, and instant orders had been sent to him to block the
drifts upon the northern side. It was found as he approached the river
that the vanguard of the enemy was already across and that it was
holding the spurs of the hills which would cover the crossing of their
comrades. By the dash of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the exertions of
the artillery ridge after ridge was carried, but before evening De Wet
with supreme skill had got his convoy across, and had broken away, first
to the eastward and then to the north. On the 9th Methuen was in touch
with him again, and the two savage little armies, Methuen worrying at
the haunch, and De Wet snapping back over his shoulder, swept northward
over the huge plains. Wherever there was ridge or kopje the Boer
riflemen staved off the eager pursuers. Where the ground lay flat and
clear the British guns thundered onwards and fired into the lines of
wagons. Mile after mile the running fight was sustained, but the other
British columns, Broadwood's men and Kitchener's men, had for some
reason not come up. Methuen alone was numerically inferior to the men he
was chasing, but he held on with admirable energy and spirit. The Boers
were hustled off the kopjes from which they tried to cover their rear.
Twenty men of the Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the bayonet,
though only twelve of them were left to reach the top.
De Wet trekked onwards during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons and
stores as he went. He was able to replace some of his exhausted beasts
from the farmhouses which he passed. Methuen on the morning of the
10th struck away to the west, sending messages back to Broadwood and
Kitchener in the rear that they should bear to the east, and so nurse
the Boer column between them. At the same time he sent on a messenger,
who unfortunately never arrived, to warn Smith-Dorrien at Bank Station
to throw himself across De Wet's path. On the 11th it was realised
that De Wet had succeeded, in spite of great exertions upon the part of
Smith-Dorrien's infantry, in crossing the railway line, and that he had
left all his pursuers to the south of him. But across his front lay
the Magaliesberg range. There are only three passes, the Magato Pass,
Olifant's Nek, and Commando Nek. It was understood that all three were
held by British troops. It was obvious, therefore, that if Methuen could
advance in such a way as to cut De Wet off from slipping through to the
west he would be unable to get away. Broadwood and Kitchener would be
behind him, and Pretoria, with the main British army, to the east.
Methuen continued to act with great energy and judgment. At three A.M.
on the 12th be started from Fredericstadt, and by 5 P.M. on Tuesday he
had done eighty miles in sixty hours. The force which accompanied him
was all mounted, 1200 of the Colonial Division (1st Brabant's, Cape
Mounted Rifles, Kaffrarian Rifles, and Border Horse), and the Yeomanry
with ten guns. Douglas with the infantry was to follow behind, and these
brave fellows covered sixty-six miles in seventy-six hours in their
eagerness to be in time. No men could have made greater efforts than
did those of Methuen, for there was not one who did not appreciate the
importance of the issue and long to come to close quarters with the wily
leader who had baffled us so long.
On the 12th Methuen's van again overtook De Wet's rear, and the old game
of rearguard riflemen on one side, and a pushing artillery on the other,
was once more resumed. All day the Boers streamed over the veld with
the guns and the horsemen at their heels. A shot from the 78th battery
struck one of De Wet's guns, which was abandoned and captured. Many
stores were taken and much more, with the wagons which contained
them, burned by the Boers. Fighting incessantly, both armies traversed
thirty-five miles of ground that day.
It was fully understood that Olifant's Nek was held by the British, so
Methuen felt that if he could block the Magato Pass all would be well.
He therefore left De Wet's direct track, knowing that other British
forces were behind him, and he continued his swift advance until he
had reached the desired position. It really appeared that at last the
elusive raider was in a corner. But, alas for fallen hopes, and alas for
the wasted efforts of gallant men! Olifant's Nek had been abandoned and
De Wet had passed safely through it into the plains beyond, where De
la Rey's force was still in possession. In vain Methuen's weary column
forced the Magato Pass and descended into Rustenburg. The enemy was in a
safe country once more. Whose the fault, or whether there was a fault at
all, it is for the future to determine. At least unalloyed praise can
be given to the Boer leader for the admirable way in which he had
extricated himself from so many dangers. On the 17th., moving along
the northern side of the mountains, he appeared at Commando Nek on the
Little Crocodile River, where he summoned Baden-Powell to surrender, and
received some chaff in reply from that light-hearted commander. Then,
swinging to the eastward, he endeavoured to cross to the north of
Pretoria. On the 19th he was heard of at Hebron. Baden-Powell and Paget
had, however, already barred this path, and De Wet, having sent Steyn on
with a small escort, turned back to the Free State. On the 22nd it was
reported that, with only a handful of his followers, he had crossed
the Magaliesberg range by a bridlepath and was riding southwards. Lord
Roberts was at last free to turn his undivided attention upon Botha.
Two Boer plots had been discovered during the first half of August,
the one in Pretoria and the other in Johannesburg, each having for its
object a rising against the British in the town. Of these the former,
which was the more serious, involving as it did the kidnapping of Lord
Roberts, was broken up by the arrest of the deviser, Hans Cordua,
a German lieutenant in the Transvaal Artillery. On its merits it is
unlikely that the crime would have been met by the extreme penalty,
especially as it was a question whether the agent provocateur had
not played a part. But the repeated breaches of parole, by which our
prisoners of one day were in the field against us on the next, called
imperatively for an example, and it was probably rather for his broken
faith than for his hare-brained scheme that Cordua died. At the
same time it is impossible not to feel sorrow for this idealist of
twenty-three who died for a cause which was not his own. He was shot in
the garden of Pretoria Gaol upon August 24th. A fresh and more stringent
proclamation from Lord Roberts showed that the British Commander was
losing his patience in the face of the wholesale return of paroled
men to the field, and announced that such perfidy would in future be
severely punished. It was notorious that the same men had been taken and
released more than once. One man killed in action was found to have nine
signed passes in his pocket. It was against such abuses that the extra
severity of the British was aimed.