[258] "Quanto iste innocentior esset, tanto frontosior appareret;"
being used for the shamelessness of innocence, as we use "face" for
the shamelessness of impudence.
[259] Cicero, _Tusc. Quæst._ v. 13.
[260] An interesting account of the changes made in the Roman year by
Numa is given in Plutarch's life of that king. Ovid also (_Fasti_,
ii.) explains the derivation of February, telling us that it was the
last month of the old year, and took its name from the lustrations
performed then: "Februa Romani dixere piamina patres."
[261] Ennius, in Cicero, _De Nat. Deor._ ii. 18.
[262] John x. 9.
[263] _Georgic_, ii. 470.
[264] _Summa_, which also includes the meaning "last."
[265] Virgil, _Eclog._ iii. 60, who borrows the expression from the
_Phænomena_ of Aratus.
[266] Soranus lived about B.C. 100. See Smith's _Dict._
[267] Tigillus.
[268] Ruma.
[269] "Pecunia," that is, property; the original meaning of "pecunia"
being property in cattle, then property or wealth of any kind. Comp.
Augustine, _De discipl. Christ._ 6.
[270] Sallust, _Catil._ c. 11.
[271] Quasi medius currens.
[272] Nuncius.
[273] Enunciantur.
[274] Cœlo.
[275] Cœlum.
[276] Sc. Χρόνος.
[277] See c. 16.
[278] Varro, _De Ling. Lat._ v. 68.
[279] Nourisher.
[280] Returner.
[281] In the book _De Ratione Naturali Deorum_.
[282] Mundum.
[283] Immundum.
[284] Mundus.
[285] Mundum.
[286] Virgil, _Æneid_, viii. 319-20.
[287] In the _Timæus_.
[288] Plutarch's _Numa_; Livy, xl. 29.
[289] Comp. Lactantius, _Instit._ i. 6.
[290] Egesserit.
BOOK EIGHTH.
ARGUMENT.
AUGUSTINE COMES NOW TO THE THIRD KIND OF THEOLOGY, THAT IS, THE
NATURAL, AND TAKES UP THE QUESTION, WHETHER THE WORSHIP OF THE
GODS OF THE NATURAL THEOLOGY IS OF ANY AVAIL TOWARDS SECURING
BLESSEDNESS IN THE LIFE TO COME. THIS QUESTION HE PREFERS TO
DISCUSS WITH THE PLATONISTS, BECAUSE THE PLATONIC SYSTEM IS
"FACILE PRINCEPS" AMONG PHILOSOPHIES, AND MAKES THE NEAREST
APPROXIMATION TO CHRISTIAN TRUTH. IN PURSUING THIS ARGUMENT, HE
FIRST REFUTES APULEIUS, AND ALL WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE DEMONS
SHOULD BE WORSHIPPED AS MESSENGERS AND MEDIATORS BETWEEN GODS
AND MEN; DEMONSTRATING THAT BY NO POSSIBILITY CAN MEN BE
RECONCILED TO GOOD GODS BY DEMONS, WHO ARE THE SLAVES OF VICE,
AND WHO DELIGHT IN AND PATRONIZE WHAT GOOD AND WISE MEN ABHOR
AND CONDEMN,--THE BLASPHEMOUS FICTIONS OF POETS, THEATRICAL
EXHIBITIONS, AND MAGICAL ARTS.
1. _That the question of natural theology is to be discussed with
those philosophers who sought a more excellent wisdom_.
We shall require to apply our mind with far greater intensity to the
present question than was requisite in the solution and unfolding
of the questions handled in the preceding books; for it is not with
ordinary men, but with philosophers that we must confer concerning the
theology which they call natural. For it is not like the fabulous, that
is, the theatrical; nor the civil, that is, the urban theology: the one
of which displays the crimes of the gods, whilst the other manifests
their criminal desires, which demonstrate them to be rather malign
demons than gods. It is, we say, with philosophers we have to confer
with respect to this theology,--men whose very name, if rendered into
Latin, signifies those who profess the love of wisdom. Now, if wisdom
is God, who made all things, as is attested by the divine authority and
truth,[291] then the philosopher is a lover of God. But since the thing
itself, which is called by this name, exists not in all who glory in
the name,--for it does not follow, of course, that all who are called
philosophers are lovers of true wisdom,--we must needs select from
the number of those with whose opinions we have been able to acquaint
ourselves by reading, some with whom we may not unworthily engage in
the treatment of this question. For I have not in this work undertaken
to refute all the vain opinions of the philosophers, but only such as
pertain to theology, which Greek word we understand to mean an account
or explanation of the divine nature. Nor, again, have I undertaken to
refute all the vain theological opinions of all the philosophers, but
only of such of them as, agreeing in the belief that there is a divine
nature, and that this divine nature is concerned about human affairs,
do nevertheless deny that the worship of the one unchangeable God is
sufficient for the obtaining of a blessed life after death, as well
as at the present time; and hold that, in order to obtain that life,
many gods, created, indeed, and appointed to their several spheres by
that one God, are to be worshipped. These approach nearer to the truth
than even Varro; for, whilst he saw no difficulty in extending natural
theology in its entirety even to the world and the soul of the world,
these acknowledge God as existing above all that is of the nature of
soul, and as the Creator not only of this visible world, which is often
called heaven and earth, but also of every soul whatsoever, and as Him
who gives blessedness to the rational soul,--of which kind is the human
soul,--by participation in His own unchangeable and incorporeal light.
There is no one, who has even a slender knowledge of these things, who
does not know of the Platonic philosophers, who derive their name from
their master Plato. Concerning this Plato, then, I will briefly state
such things as I deem necessary to the present question, mentioning
beforehand those who preceded him in time in the same department of
literature.
2. _Concerning the two schools of philosophers, that is, the
Italic and Ionic, and their founders._
As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language holds a
more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other nations,
history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called the Italic
school, originating in that part of Italy which was formerly called
Magna Græcia; the other called the Ionic school, having its origin in
those regions which are still called by the name of Greece. The Italic
school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos, to whom also the term
"philosophy" is said to owe its origin. For whereas formerly those who
seemed to excel others by the laudable manner in which they regulated
their lives were called sages, Pythagoras, on being asked what he
professed, replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a student or
lover of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be the height of arrogance to
profess oneself a sage.[292] The founder of the Ionic school, again,
was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were styled the "seven
sages," of whom six were distinguished by the kind of life they lived,
and by certain maxims which they gave forth for the proper conduct of
life. Thales was distinguished as an investigator into the nature of
things; and, in order that he might have successors in his school, he
committed his dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially
rendered him eminent was his ability, by means of astronomical
calculations, even to predict eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought,
however, that water was the first principle of things, and that of it
all the elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which
are generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however,
which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set nothing
of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his pupil,
who held a different opinion concerning the nature of things; for he
did not hold that all things spring from one principle, as Thales
did, who held that principle to be water, but thought that each thing
springs from its own proper principle. These principles of things he
believed to be infinite in number, and thought that they generated
innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them. He thought,
also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process of alternate
dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a longer or
shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case; nor did
he, any more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind in the
production of all this activity of things. Anaximander left as his
successor his disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of
things to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence
of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by them,
he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air. Anaxagoras,
however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind was the
productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all the
various kinds of things, according to their several modes and species,
were produced out of an infinite matter consisting of homogeneous
particles, but by the efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also,
another pupil of Anaximenes, said that a certain air was the original
substance of things out of which all things were produced, but that
it was possessed of a divine reason, without which nothing could be
produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his disciple Archelaus,
who also thought that all things consisted of homogeneous particles,
of which each particular thing was made, but that those particles were
pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal
bodies, namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united
and separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have been the
disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato's account it is that I have given
this brief historical sketch of the whole history of these schools.
3. _Of the Socratic philosophy._
Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire
effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all
who went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the
investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it
seems to me that it cannot be certainly discovered whether Socrates
did this because he was wearied of obscure and uncertain things,
and so wished to direct his mind to the discovery of something
manifest and certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining
of a blessed life,--that one great object toward which the labour,
vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been
directed,--or whether (as some yet more favourable to him suppose)
he did it because he was unwilling that minds defiled with earthly
desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things. For
he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them,--which
causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than
the will of the one true and supreme God,--and on this account he
thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and
therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of
the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the
depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native
vigour to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding,
contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light,
where live the causes of all created natures. It is evident, however,
that he hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness of
style and argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating urbanity,
the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that they knew this
or that,--sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes
dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to
which he seems to have directed the whole force of his mind. And
hence there arose hostility against him, which ended in his being
calumniously impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however,
that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned him,
did publicly bewail him,--the popular indignation having turned
with such vehemence on his accusers, that one of them perished by
the violence of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like
punishment by voluntary and perpetual exile.
Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death, Socrates
left very many disciples of his philosophy, who vied with one another
in desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which
concern the chief good (_summum bonum_), the possession of which can
make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates,
where he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then
demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he held to be the
chief good, every one took from these disputations what pleased him
best, and every one placed the final good[293] in whatever it appeared
to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the final good is
that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so diverse
were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning this
final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with respect to the
followers of one master) some placed the chief good in pleasure, as
Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it were tedious
to recount the various opinions of various disciples.
4. _Concerning Plato, the chief among the disciples of Socrates,
and his threefold division of philosophy._
But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with
a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly
eclipsed them all. By birth an Athenian of honourable parentage, he
far surpassed his fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which
he was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the
Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to
perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every
place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make
himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held
and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of
Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered,
with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers,
all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a
peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker in
all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had learned,
either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful intellect,
tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and politeness of
the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in action and
contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the
other contemplative,--the active part having reference to the conduct
of life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative
part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure
truth,--Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that
study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part,
on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To
Plato is given the praise of having perfected philosophy by combining
both parts into one. He then divides it into three parts,--the first
moral, which is chiefly occupied with action; the second natural,
of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational, which
discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last
is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation,
nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating
the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite division is not contrary
to that which made the study of wisdom to consist in action and
contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought with respect to each of
these parts,--that is, what he believed to be the end of all actions,
the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences,--it
would be a question too long to discuss, and about which we ought
not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly
affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of
dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover
clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than
it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must,
nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions which he
expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates
them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve of,--opinions
sometimes favourable to the true religion, which our faith takes up
and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for example, in the
questions concerning the existence of one God or of many, as it relates
to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For those who are
praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred
to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have
manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps
entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found
the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding,
and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated.
Of which three things, the first is understood to pertain to the
natural, the second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of
philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain, through that
which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things,--that
is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature
exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits,--let Him be sought
in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all
truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right
to us.
5. _That it is especially with the Platonists that we must carry
on our disputations on matters of theology, their opinions
being preferable to those of all other philosophers._
If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows,
loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with
Him in His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers?
It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists.
To them, therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which
delights the minds of men with the crimes of the gods; and that
civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name of
gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly
pleasures, desiring to be honoured by the errors of men, and, by
filling the minds of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting
them to make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of
their worship, whilst they themselves found in the spectators of
these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle,--a theology in which,
whatever was honourable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture
with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever was base in the
theatre was vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these
philosophers also the interpretations of Varro must give place, in
which he explains the sacred rites as having reference to heaven and
earth, and to the seeds and operations of perishable things; for,
in the first place, those rites have not the signification which
he would have men believe is attached to them, and therefore truth
does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even
if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be
worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below
it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself
as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference.
The same must be said of those writings pertaining to the sacred
rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal by causing them to
be buried along with himself, and which, when they were afterwards
turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate. And, to
treat Numa with all honour, let us mention as belonging to the same
rank as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his
mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In
this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus, or even
Hercules and Æsculapius and Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons
of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who have been deified, but even
the principal gods themselves,[294] to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan
questions,[295] alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter,
Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to
identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are shown to
have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity between this
case and that of Numa; for, the priest being afraid because he had
revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander to command his
mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to her.
Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give
place to the Platonic philosophers, who have recognised the true God
as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and
the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only, but
to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those philosophers
must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their body, supposed
the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held that
the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it
was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that
it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscules; and
many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who believed that
bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless
bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For some of
them--as, for instance, the Epicureans--believed that living things
could originate from things without life; others held that all things
living or without life spring from a living principle, but that,
nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material
principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four
material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both
living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things
contained in it,--that it was in fact God. These and others like
them have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved
to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within
themselves something which they could not see: they represented
to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even
when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But
this representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the
similitude of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this
similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of
a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation is
beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object judged of.
This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and
it is certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which
it beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither
earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the
four elements, we see that this world is composed. And if the soul
is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those
philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists,
and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but
yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They
have not been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul,--an
attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine
nature,--but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in
itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, "Flesh is wounded
by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable." In a word, that
which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which
can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable.
6. _Concerning the meaning of the Platonists in that part of
philosophy called physical._
These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above
the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God,
and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God.
They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God,
and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable
spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every
changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever
be its mode or nature, can only _be_ through Him who truly _is_,
because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the
whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement,
and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider
all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life
of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the
life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the
life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment,
but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels,--all
can only _be_ through Him who absolutely _is_. For to Him it is not
one thing to _be_, and another to live, as though He could _be_,
not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing
to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is
it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as
though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to
understand, to be blessed, are to _be_. They have understood, from
this unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have
been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none.
For they have considered that whatever is is either body or life,
and that life is something better than body, and that the nature
of body is sensible, and that of life intelligible. Therefore they
have preferred the intelligible nature to the sensible. We mean by
sensible things such things as can be perceived by the sight and
touch of the body; by intelligible things, such as can be understood
by the sight of the mind. For there is no corporeal beauty, whether
in the condition of a body, as figure, or in its movement, as in
music, of which it is not the mind that judges. But this could never
have been, had there not existed in the mind itself a superior form
of these things, without bulk, without noise of voice, without
space and time. But even in respect of these things, had the mind
not been mutable, it would not have been possible for one to judge
better than another with regard to sensible forms. He who is clever
judges better than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is
unskilful, he who is practised than he who is unpractised; and the
same person judges better after he has gained experience than he did
before. But that which is capable of more and less is mutable; whence
able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have gathered
that the first form is not to be found in those things whose form is
changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind might be
more or less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they
could have no existence, they saw that there is some existence in
which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore not admitting
of degrees of comparison, and in that they most rightly believed
was the first principle of things, which was not made, and by which
all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He
manifested to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being
understood by those things which have been made; also His eternal
power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things have been
created.[296] We have said enough upon that part of theology which
they call physical, that is, natural.
7. _How much the Platonists are to be held as excelling other
philosophers in logic_, i.e. _rational philosophy._
Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that
which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from
us to compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the
faculty of discriminating truth, and thought that all we learn is to
be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were the
Epicureans, and all of the same school. Such also were the Stoics, who
ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation which they
so ardently love, called by them dialectic, asserting that from the
senses the mind conceives the notions (ἔννοιαι) of those things which
they explicate by definition. And hence is developed the whole plan and
connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder, with respect
to this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise; for
by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty, by what eyes of
the flesh have they seen wisdom's comeliness of form? Those, however,
whom we justly rank before all others, have distinguished those things
which are conceived by the mind from those which are perceived by the
senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are
competent, nor attributing to them anything beyond their competency.
And the light of our understandings, by which all things are learned by
us, they have affirmed to be that selfsame God by whom all things were
made.
8. _That the Platonists hold the first rank in moral philosophy
also._
The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the
Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief
good,--that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to
be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it
not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore
it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it,
but itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore,
according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,
from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For
they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore
they believed that from either of these two, or from both together,
their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good,
which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all
their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that
good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good
things, which they call extrinsic,--as honour, glory, wealth, and the
like,--have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to
be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be
sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of
good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether
they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or
from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that
it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have
sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from
the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from
both, from the whole man. Whether, therefore, they have sought it
from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it
from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only
to three dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse
philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of
the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together.
Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have
not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or
by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,--enjoying
Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one
friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we
may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of
this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place,
to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention
that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to
virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and
imitates God,--which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of
blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to
love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows
that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then
become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he
is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many
are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still
more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed
who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things
which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving
merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will
deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves
the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according
to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who
loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed
life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.
9. _Concerning that philosophy which has come nearest to the
Christian faith._
Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme God,
that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which
things are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be
done; that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth
of doctrine, and the happiness of life,--whether these philosophers
may be more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some
other name to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men
of the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well
understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include the
Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and all
who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include
all who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations
who are discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics,
Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls,
Spaniards, or of other nations,--we prefer these to all other
philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.
10. _That the excellency of the Christian religion is above all
the science of philosophers._
For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical
literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and
may not even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers
speaking the Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is
nevertheless not so deaf with respect to human affairs, as not to
know that philosophers profess the study, and even the possession,
of wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect to those who
philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according
to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the
precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said,
"Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit,
according to the elements of the world."[297] Then, that he may not
suppose that all philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same
apostle say concerning certain of them, "Because that which is known
of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them. For
His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen,
being understood by the things which are made, also His eternal power
and Godhead."[298] And, when speaking to the Athenians, after having
spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to understand,
"In Him we live, and move, and have our being,"[299] he goes on to say,
"As certain also of your own have said." He knows well, too, to be on
his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For where
it has been said by him, "that God has manifested to them by those
things which are made His invisible things, that they might be seen
by the understanding," there it has also been said that they did not
rightly worship God Himself, because they paid divine honours, which
are due to Him alone, to other things also to which they ought not to
have paid them,--"because, knowing God, they glorified Him not as God;
neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their
foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they
became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the
likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted
beasts, and creeping things;"[300]--where the apostle would have us
understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who
gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning this we will dispute
with them afterwards. With respect, however, to that wherein they
agree with us we prefer them to all others, namely, concerning the one
God, the author of this universe, who is not only above every body,
being incorporeal, but also above all souls, being incorruptible--our
principle, our light, our good. And though the Christian man, being
ignorant of their writings, does not use in disputation words which he
has not learned,--not calling that part of philosophy natural (which
is the Latin term), or physical (which is the Greek one), which treats
of the investigation of nature; or that part rational, or logical,
which deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that
part moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is
to be sought, and evil to be shunned,--he is not, therefore, ignorant
that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that
nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by
which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by
cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we
prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers
have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things,
and endeavouring to discover the right mode of learning and of living,
these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which
the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to
be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All
philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether
Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to
plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better
known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the
languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings;
and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or their renown, have
studied them more heartily than other writings, and, by translating
them into our tongue, have given them greater celebrity and notoriety.
11. _How Plato has been able to approach so nearly to Christian
knowledge._
Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when
they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in
which they recognise considerable agreement with the truth of our
religion. Some have concluded from this, that when he went to Egypt
he had heard the prophet Jeremiah, or, whilst travelling in the
same country, had read the prophetic scriptures, which opinion I
myself have expressed in certain of my writings.[301] But a careful
calculation of dates, contained in chronological history, shows
that Plato was born about a hundred years after the time in which
Jeremiah prophesied, and, as he lived eighty-one years, there are
found to have been about seventy years from his death to that time
when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, requested the prophetic scriptures
of the Hebrew people to be sent to him from Judea, and committed
them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew the Greek tongue, to be
translated and kept. Therefore, on that voyage of his, Plato could
neither have seen Jeremiah, who was dead so long before, nor have
read those same scriptures which had not yet been translated into
the Greek language, of which he was a master, unless, indeed, we
say that, as he was most earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, he
also studied those writings through an interpreter, as he did those
of the Egyptians,--not, indeed, writing a translation of them (the
facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy in return
for munificent acts of kindness,[302] though fear of his kingly
authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but learning as
much as he possibly could concerning their contents by means of
conversation. What warrants this supposition is the opening verses
of Genesis: "In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the
earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the
abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters."[303] For in
the _Timæus_, when writing on the formation of the world, he says
that God first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that
he assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain
resemblance to the statement, "In the beginning God made heaven and
earth." Plato next speaks of those two intermediary elements, water
and air, by which the other two extremes, namely, earth and fire,
were mutually united; from which circumstance he is thought to have
so understood the words, "The Spirit of God moved over the waters."
For, not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by
those scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought that the
four elements are spoken of in that place, because the air also is
called spirit.[304] Then, as to Plato's saying that the philosopher
is a lover of God, nothing shines forth more conspicuously in those
sacred writings. But the most striking thing in this connection, and
that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion
that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which
was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words
of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was
the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the
Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: "I am who am;
and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who _is_ sent me
unto you;"[305] as though compared with Him that truly _is_, because
He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable
_are_ not,--a truth which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently
commended. And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be
found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in that
book where it is said, "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the
children of Israel, _Who is_ sent me unto you."
12. _That even the Platonists, though they say these things
concerning the one true God, nevertheless thought that sacred
rites were to be performed in honour of many gods._
But we need not determine from what source he learned these
things,--whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded
him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: "Because
that which is known of God has been manifested among them, for
God hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by
those things which have been made, also His eternal power and
Godhead."[306] From whatever source he may have derived this
knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that
I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the
parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just
taken up concerns the natural theology,--the question, namely,
whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many,
for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have
specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the
one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among
philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others
in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple
of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to
Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the
Peripatetic sect,--so called because they were in the habit of
walking about during their disputations,--and though he had, through
the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his
school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his
death was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by
Speusippus, his sister's son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple,
who, together with their successors, were called from this name of
the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent
philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to
be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of
Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and
Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned
both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest
who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that
sacred rites ought to be performed in honour of many gods.
13. _Concerning the opinion of Plato, according to which he defined
the gods as beings entirely good and the friends of virtue._
Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from
us, nevertheless with respect to this particular point of difference,
which I have just stated, as it is one of great moment, and the
question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods
they think that sacred rites are to be performed,--to the good or to
the bad, or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of
Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not
one of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be
performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if
they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case
(for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly
it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by
sacred rites in order that they may not harm us, but the good gods
are to be invoked in order that they may assist us. For there are no
bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honour of
such rites is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who
love scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them among
divine things, and that they be exhibited in their honour? The power
of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things
proves that they are bad. For it is well known what Plato's opinion
was concerning scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves,
because they have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and
goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what
character, therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself
about those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed
by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated
in their own honour.
In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not
only demanded base things, but also did cruel things, taking from
Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease upon him because he
had refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled
their commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not
think they were to be feared; but, holding to his opinion with the
utmost firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a
well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with
which these gods are delighted because they themselves are impure.
But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the
second book[307]) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the
bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts
accompanied with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all
other things which are associated with joyfulness. How comes it,
then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away
those pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods
but from the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very
gods themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they
showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and
sportive, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists, therefore,
explain these things to us, since, following the opinion of their
master, they think that all the gods are good and honourable, and
friendly to the virtues of the wise, holding it unlawful to think
otherwise concerning any of the gods. We will explain it, say they.
Let us then attentively listen to them.
14. _Of the opinion of those who have said that rational souls are
of three kinds, to wit, those of the celestial gods, those of
the aerial demons, and those of terrestrial men._
There is, say they, a threefold division of all animals endowed with
a rational soul, namely, into gods, men, and demons. The gods occupy
the loftiest region, men the lowest, the demons the middle region.
For the abode of the gods is heaven, that of men the earth, that of
the demons the air. As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so
also is that of their natures; therefore the gods are better than men
and demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons, both in
respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and the difference
of their merits. The demons, therefore, who hold the middle place,
as they are inferior to the gods, than whom they inhabit a lower
region, so they are superior to men, than whom they inhabit a loftier
one. For they have immortality of body in common with the gods, but
passions of the mind in common with men. On which account, say they,
it is not wonderful that they are delighted with the obscenities
of the theatre, and the fictions of the poets, since they are also
subject to human passions, from which the gods are far removed, and
to which they are altogether strangers. Whence we conclude that it
was not the gods, who are all good and highly exalted, that Plato
deprived of the pleasure of theatric plays, by reprobating and
prohibiting the fictions of the poets, but the demons.
Of these things many have written: among others Apuleius, the Platonist
of Madaura, who composed a whole work on the subject, entitled,
_Concerning the God of Socrates_. He there discusses and explains of
what kind that deity was who attended on Socrates, a sort of familiar,
by whom it is said he was admonished to desist from any action which
would not turn out to his advantage. He asserts most distinctly, and
proves at great length, that it was not a god but a demon; and he
discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato concerning the
lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men, and the middle
estate of demons. These things being so, how did Plato dare to take
away, if not from the gods, whom he removed from all human contagion,
certainly from the demons, all the pleasures of the theatre, by
expelling the poets from the state? Evidently in this way he wished
to admonish the human soul, although still confined in these moribund
members, to despise the shameful commands of the demons, and to detest
their impurity, and to choose rather the splendour of virtue. But
if Plato showed himself virtuous in answering and prohibiting these
things, then certainly it was shameful of the demons to command them.
Therefore either Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates' familiar did not
belong to this class of deities, or Plato held contradictory opinions,
now honouring the demons, now removing from the well-regulated
state the things in which they delighted, or Socrates is not to be
congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which Apuleius was
so ashamed that he entitled his book _On the God of Socrates_, whilst
according to the tenor of his discussion, wherein he so diligently
and at such length distinguishes gods from demons, he ought not to
have entitled it, _Concerning the God_, but _Concerning the Demon of
Socrates_. But he preferred to put this into the discussion itself
rather than into the title of his book. For, through the sound doctrine
which has illuminated human society, all, or almost all men have such
a horror at the name of demons, that every one who, before reading
the dissertation of Apuleius, which sets forth the dignity of demons,
should have read the title of the book, _On the Demon of Socrates_,
would certainly have thought that the author was not a sane man. But
what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons, except subtlety
and strength of body and a higher place of habitation? For when he
spoke generally concerning their manners, he said nothing that was
good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no one, when he has read
that book, wonders that they desired to have even the obscenity of the
stage among divine things, or that, wishing to be thought gods, they
should be delighted with the crimes of the gods, or that all those
sacred solemnities, whose obscenity occasions laughter, and whose
shameful cruelty causes horror, should be in agreement with their
passions.
15. _That the demons are not better than men because of their
aerial bodies, or on account of their superior place of abode._
Wherefore let not the mind truly religious, and submitted to the
true God, suppose that demons are better than men, because they
have better bodies. Otherwise it must put many beasts before itself
which are superior to us both in acuteness of the senses, in ease
and quickness of movement, in strength and in long-continued vigour
of body. What man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of
vision? Who can equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can equal
the hare, the stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who can equal
in strength the lion or the elephant? Who can equal in length of
life the serpents, which are affirmed to put off old age along with
their skin, and to return to youth again? But as we are better than
all these by the possession of reason and understanding, so we ought
also to be better than the demons by living good and virtuous lives.
For divine providence gave to them bodies of a better quality than
ours, that that in which we excel them might in this way be commended
to us as deserving to be far more cared for than the body, and that
we should learn to despise the bodily excellence of the demons
compared with goodness of life, in respect of which we are better
than they, knowing that we too shall have immortality of body,--not
an immortality tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is
consequent on purity of soul.
But now, as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous
to be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit the air, and
we the earth, as to think that on that account they are to be put
before us; for in this way we put all the birds before ourselves.
But the birds, when they are weary with flying, or require to repair
their bodies with food, come back to the earth to rest or to feed,
which the demons, they say, do not. Are they, therefore, inclined
to say that the birds are superior to us, and the demons superior
to the birds? But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason
why we should think that, on account of their inhabiting a loftier
element, the demons have a claim to our religious submission. But
as it is really the case that the birds of the air are not only not
put before us who dwell on the earth, but are even subjected to us
on account of the dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so
also it is the case that the demons, though they are aerial, are not
better than we who are terrestrial because the air is higher than
the earth, but, on the contrary, men are to be put before demons
because their despair is not to be compared to the hope of pious men.
Even that law of Plato's, according to which he mutually orders
and arranges the four elements, inserting between the two extreme
elements--namely, fire, which is in the highest degree mobile, and
the immoveable earth--the two middle ones, air and water, that by
how much the air is higher up than the water, and the fire than the
air, by so much also are the waters higher than the earth,--this
law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us not to estimate the merits
of animated creatures according to the grades of the elements. And
Apuleius himself says that man is a terrestrial animal in common with
the rest, who is nevertheless to be put far before aquatic animals,
though Plato puts the waters themselves before the land. By this he
would have us understand that the same order is not to be observed
when the question concerns the merits of animals, though it seems
to be the true one in the gradation of bodies; for it appears to be
possible that a soul of a higher order may inhabit a body of a lower,
and a soul of a lower order a body of a higher.
16. _What Apuleius the Platonist thought concerning the manners
and actions of demons._
The same Apuleius, when speaking concerning the manners of demons,
said that they are agitated with the same perturbations of mind as
men; that they are provoked by injuries, propitiated by services and
by gifts, rejoice in honours, are delighted with a variety of sacred
rites, and are annoyed if any of them be neglected. Among other
things, he also says that on them depend the divinations of augurs,
soothsayers, and prophets, and the revelations of dreams; and that
from them also are the miracles of the magicians. But, when giving a
brief definition of them, he says, "Demons are of an animal nature,
passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time."
"Of which five things, the three first are common to them and us, the
fourth peculiar to themselves, and the fifth common to them with the
gods."[308] But I see that they have in common with the gods two of
the first things, which they have in common with us. For he says that
the gods also are animals; and when he is assigning to every order
of beings its own element, he places us among the other terrestrial
animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore, if the demons
are animals as to genus, this is common to them, not only with men,
but also with the gods and with beasts; if they are rational as to
their mind, this is common to them with the gods and with men; if
they are eternal in time, this is common to them with the gods only;
if they are passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men
only; if they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore
it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature, for so also
are the beasts; in being rational as to mind, they are not above
ourselves, for so are we also; and as to their being eternal as to
time, what is the advantage of that if they are not blessed? for
better is temporal happiness than eternal misery. Again, as to their
being passive in soul, how are they in this respect above us, since
we also are so, but would not have been so had we not been miserable?
Also, as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set
on that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above every
body? and therefore religious worship, which ought to be rendered
from the soul, is by no means due to that thing which is inferior
to the soul. Moreover, if he had, among those things which he says
belong to demons, enumerated virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirmed
that they have those things in common with the gods, and, like them,
eternally, he would assuredly have attributed to them something
greatly to be desired, and much to be prized. And even in that case
it would not have been our duty to worship them like God on account
of these things, but rather to worship Him from whom we know they had
received them. But how much less are they really worthy of divine
honour,--those aerial animals who are only rational that they may be
capable of misery, passive that they may be actually miserable, and
eternal that it may be impossible for them to end their misery!
17. _Whether it is proper that men should worship those spirits
from whose vices it is necessary that they be freed._
Wherefore, to omit other things, and confine our attention to that
which he says is common to the demons with us, let us ask this
question: If all the four elements are full of their own animals, the
fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the earth of mortal
ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by the whirlwinds and
tempests of passions?--for the Greek word πάθος means perturbation,
whence he chose to call the demons "passive in soul," because the word
passion, which is derived from πάθος, signified a commotion of the
mind contrary to reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of
demons which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears in
beasts, it is not perturbation, because it is not contrary to reason,
of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or misery which is
the cause of these perturbations in the case of men, for we are not
yet blessed in the possession of that perfection of wisdom which is
promised to us at last, when we shall be set free from our present
mortality. But the gods, they say, are free from these perturbations,
because they are not only eternal, but also blessed; for they also
have the same kind of rational souls, but most pure from all spot and
plague. Wherefore, if the gods are free from perturbation because they
are blessed, not miserable animals, and the beasts are free from them
because they are animals which are capable neither of blessedness
nor misery, it remains that the demons, like men, are subject to
perturbations because they are not blessed but miserable animals.
What folly, therefore, or rather what madness, to submit ourselves
through any sentiment of religion to demons, when it belongs to the
true religion to deliver us from that depravity which makes us like to
them! For Apuleius himself, although he is very sparing toward them,
and thinks they are worthy of divine honours, is nevertheless compelled
to confess that they are subject to anger; and the true religion
commands us not to be moved with anger, but rather to resist it. The
demons are won over by gifts; and the true religion commands us to
favour no one on account of gifts received. The demons are flattered by
honours; but the true religion commands us by no means to be moved by
such things. The demons are haters of some men and lovers of others,
not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment, but because of what
he calls their "passive soul;" whereas the true religion commands us
to love even our enemies. Lastly, the true religion commands us to
put away all disquietude of heart, and agitation of mind, and also
all commotions and tempests of the soul, which Apuleius asserts to
be continually swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why,
therefore, except through foolishness and miserable error, shouldst
thou humble thyself to worship a being to whom thou desirest to be
unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou pay religious homage to him
whom thou art unwilling to imitate, when it is the highest duty of
religion to imitate Him whom thou worshippest?
18. _What kind of religion that is which teaches that men ought to
employ the advocacy of demons in order to be recommended to the
favour of the good gods._
In vain, therefore, have Apuleius, and they who think with him,
conferred on the demons the honour of placing them in the air, between
the ethereal heavens and the earth, that they may carry to the gods
the prayers of men, to men the answers of the gods; for Plato held,
they say, that no god has intercourse with man. They who believe these
things have thought it unbecoming that men should have intercourse with
the gods, and the gods with men, but a befitting thing that the demons
should have intercourse with both gods and men, presenting to the gods
the petitions of men, and conveying to men what the gods have granted;
so that a chaste man, and one who is a stranger to the crimes of the
magic arts, must use as patrons, through whom the gods may be induced
to hear him, demons who love these crimes, although the very fact of
his not loving them ought to have recommended him to them as one who
deserved to be listened to with greater readiness and willingness on
their part. They love the abominations of the stage, which chastity
does not love. They love, in the sorceries of the magicians, "_a
thousand arts of inflicting harm_,"[309] which innocence does not love.
Yet both chastity and innocence, if they wish to obtain anything from
the gods, will not be able to do so by their own merits, except their
enemies act as mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not attempt
to justify the fictions of the poets, and the mockeries of the stage.
If human modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not only to
love shameful things, but even to think that they are pleasing to the
divinity, we can cite on the other side their own highest authority and
teacher, Plato.
19. _Of the impiety of the magic art, which is dependent on the
assistance of malign spirits._
Moreover, against those magic arts, concerning which some men,
exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight to boast, may
not public opinion itself be brought forward as a witness? For why are
those arts so severely punished by the laws, if they are the works
of deities who ought to be worshipped? Shall it be said that the
Christians have ordained those laws by which magic arts are punished?
With what other meaning, except that these sorceries are without doubt
pernicious to the human race, did the most illustrious poet say,
"By heaven, I swear, and your dear life,
Unwillingly these arms I wield,
And take, to meet the coming strife,
Enchantment's sword and shield."[310]
And that also which he says in another place concerning magic arts,
"I've seen him to another place transport the standing
corn,"[311]
has reference to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to
be transferred to another by these arts which this pestiferous and
accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that, among
the laws of the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient laws of
the Romans, there was a law written which appointed a punishment
to be inflicted on him who should do this?[312] Lastly, was it
before Christian judges that Apuleius himself was accused of magic
arts?[313] Had he known these arts to be divine and pious, and
congruous with the works of divine power, he ought not only to
have confessed, but also to have professed them, rather blaming
the laws by which these things were prohibited and pronounced
worthy of condemnation, while they ought to have been held worthy
of admiration and respect. For by so doing, either he would have
persuaded the judges to adopt his own opinion, or, if they had
shown their partiality for unjust laws, and condemned him to death
notwithstanding his praising and commending such things, the demons
would have bestowed on his soul such rewards as he deserved, who, in
order to proclaim and set forth their divine works, had not feared
the loss of his human life. As our martyrs, when that religion was
charged on them as a crime, by which they knew they were made safe
and most glorious throughout eternity, did not choose, by denying it,
to escape temporal punishments, but rather by confessing, professing,
and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and
fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness, put to shame the
law by which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation.
But there is extant a most copious and eloquent oration of this
Platonic philosopher, in which he defends himself against the charge
of practising these arts, affirming that he is wholly a stranger to
them, and only wishing to show his innocence by denying such things
as cannot be innocently committed. But all the miracles of the
magicians, who he thinks are justly deserving of condemnation, are
performed according to the teaching and by the power of demons. Why,
then, does he think that they ought to be honoured? For he asserts
that they are necessary, in order to present our prayers to the
gods, and yet their works are such as we must shun if we wish our
prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask, what kind of prayers of
men does he suppose are presented to the good gods by the demons?
If magical prayers, they will have none such; if lawful prayers,
they will not receive them through such beings. But if a sinner who
is penitent pour out prayers, especially if he has committed any
crime of sorcery, does he receive pardon through the intercession of
those demons by whose instigation and help he has fallen into the
sin he mourns? or do the demons themselves, in order that they may
merit pardon for the penitent, first become penitents because they
have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the demons;
for had this been the case, they would never have dared to seek for
themselves divine honours. For how should they do so who desired by
penitence to obtain the grace of pardon, seeing that such detestable
pride could not exist along with a humility worthy of pardon?
20. _Whether we are to believe that the good gods are more willing
to have intercourse with demons than with men._
But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the demons to
mediate between the gods and men, that they may offer the prayers of
men, and bring back the answers from the gods? and if so, what, pray,
is that cause, what is that so great necessity? Because, say they, no
god has intercourse with man. Most admirable holiness of God, which
has no intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse
with an arrogant demon! which has no intercourse with a penitent
man, and yet has intercourse with a deceiving demon! which has no
intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the divine nature, and
yet has intercourse with a demon feigning divinity! which has no
intercourse with a man seeking pardon, and yet has intercourse with
a demon persuading to wickedness! which has no intercourse with a
man expelling the poets by means of philosophical writings from a
well-regulated state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting
from the princes and priests of a state the theatrical performance of
the mockeries of the poets! which has no intercourse with the man who
prohibits the ascribing of crime to the gods, and yet has intercourse
with a demon who takes delight in the fictitious representation of
their crimes! which has no intercourse with a man punishing the
crimes of the magicians by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a
demon teaching and practising magical arts! which has no intercourse
with a man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse
with a demon lying in wait for the deception of a man!
21. _Whether the gods use the demons as messengers and
interpreters, and whether they are deceived by them willingly,
or without their own knowledge._
But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity, so
unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned about
human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless
the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether
is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is
contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom!
what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they say, are
all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about
human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst,
on the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are
ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that they have
supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the gods
may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through
whom, when necessary, they may succour men; and it is on account of
this office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of
worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these
good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of mind.
O mournful necessity! or shall I not rather say detestable and vain
error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature! For if the
gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see
our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to
them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the
corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and
thence understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible
that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if the
divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can it
be ignorant of our actions. But I would they would tell me whether the
demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets concerning
the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which
they themselves take in them; or whether they have concealed both, and
have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect to this
whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious prudence of Plato
with respect to the gods as their own lust, which is injurious to the
gods; or whether they have concealed Plato's opinion, according to
which he was unwilling that the gods should be defamed with falsely
alleged crimes through the impious licence of the poets, whilst they
have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness,
which make them love theatrical plays, in which the infamous deeds of
the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these
four alternatives, and let them consider how much evil any one of
them would require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the
first, they must then confess that it was not possible for the good
gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things
injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted
in their injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods
can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from them,
through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on account
of their nearness to themselves.[314] If they shall choose the second,
and shall say that both these things are concealed by the demons, so
that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most religious law
and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can
the gods know to any profit with respect to human affairs through
these mediating demons, when they do not know those things which are
decreed, through the piety of good men, for the honour of the good
gods against the lust of evil demons? But if they shall choose the
third, and reply that these intermediary demons have communicated,
not only the opinion of Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to
the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if
such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the gods, hearing
both and knowing both, not only permit the approach of those malign
demons, who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods
and the religion of Plato, but also, through these wicked demons, who
are near to them, send good things to the good Plato, who is far away
from them; for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of
the elements, that they can come into contact with those by whom they
are accused, but not with him by whom they are defended,--knowing the
truth on both sides, but not being able to change the weight of the air
and the earth. There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse
than the rest. For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have
made known the calumnious fictions of the poets concerning the immortal
gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries of the theatres, and their
own most ardent lust after, and most sweet pleasure in these things,
whilst they have concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of
a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to
be removed from a well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are
now compelled, through such messengers, to know the evil doings of the
most wicked beings, that is to say, of the messengers themselves, and
are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the
former are for the injury, but these latter for the honour of the gods
themselves?
22. _That we must, notwithstanding the opinion of Apuleius, reject
the worship of demons._
None of these four alternatives, then, is to be chosen; for we
dare not suppose such unbecoming things concerning the gods as the
adoption of any one of them would lead us to think. It remains,
therefore, that no credence whatever is to be given to the opinion
of Apuleius and the other philosophers of the same school, namely,
that the demons act as messengers and interpreters between the gods
and men to carry our petitions from us to the gods, and to bring
back to us the help of the gods. On the contrary, we must believe
them to be spirits most eager to inflict harm, utterly alien from
righteousness, swollen with pride, pale with envy, subtle in deceit;
who dwell indeed in this air as in a prison, in keeping with their
own character, because, cast down from the height of the higher
heaven, they have been condemned to dwell in this element as the
just reward of irretrievable transgression. But, though the air is
situated above the earth and the waters, they are not on that account
superior in merit to men, who, though they do not surpass them as
far as their earthly bodies are concerned, do nevertheless far excel
them through piety of mind,--they having made choice of the true God
as their helper. Over many, however, who are manifestly unworthy of
participation in the true religion, they tyrannize as over captives
whom they have subdued,--the greatest part of whom they have
persuaded of their divinity by wonderful and lying signs, consisting
either of deeds or of predictions. Some, nevertheless, who have more
attentively and diligently considered their vices, they have not been
able to persuade that they are gods, and so have feigned themselves
to be messengers between the gods and men. Some, indeed, have
thought that not even this latter honour ought to be acknowledged as
belonging to them, not believing that they were gods, because they
saw that they were wicked, whereas the gods, according to their view,
are all good. Nevertheless they dared not say that they were wholly
unworthy of all divine honour, for fear of offending the multitude,
by whom, through inveterate superstition, the demons were served by
the performance of many rites, and the erection of many temples.
23. _What Hermes Trismegistus thought concerning idolatry, and from
what source he knew that the superstitions of Egypt were to be
abolished._
The Egyptian Hermes, whom they call Trismegistus, had a different
opinion concerning those demons. Apuleius, indeed, denies that they
are gods; but when he says that they hold a middle place between the
gods and men, so that they seem to be necessary for men as mediators
between them and the gods, he does not distinguish between the
worship due to them and the religious homage due to the supernal
gods. This Egyptian, however, says that there are some gods made by
the supreme God, and some made by men. Any one who hears this, as I
have stated it, no doubt supposes that it has reference to images,
because they are the works of the hands of men; but he asserts that
visible and tangible images are, as it were, only the bodies of the
gods, and that there dwell in them certain spirits, which have been
invited to come into them, and which have power to inflict harm, or
to fulfil the desires of those by whom divine honours and services
are rendered to them. To unite, therefore, by a certain art, those
invisible spirits to visible and material things, so as to make, as
it were, animated bodies, dedicated and given up to those spirits
who inhabit them,--this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men
have received this great and wonderful power. I will give the words
of this Egyptian as they have been translated into our tongue: "And,
since we have undertaken to discourse concerning the relationship
and fellowship between men and the gods, know, O Æsculapius, the
power and strength of man. As the Lord and Father, or that which is
highest, even God, is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is
the maker of the gods who are in the temples, content to dwell near
to men."[315] And a little after he says, "Thus humanity, always
mindful of its nature and origin, perseveres in the imitation of
divinity; and as the Lord and Father made eternal gods, that they
should be like Himself, so humanity fashioned its own gods according
to the likeness of its own countenance." When this Æsculapius, to
whom especially he was speaking, had answered him, and had said,
"Dost thou mean the statues, O Trismegistus?"--"Yes, the statues,"
replied he, "however unbelieving thou art, O Æsculapius,--the
statues, animated, and full of sensation and spirit, and who do
such great and wonderful things,--the statues, prescient of future
things, and foretelling them by lot, by prophet, by dreams, and
many other things, who bring diseases on men and cure them again,
giving them joy or sorrow according to their merits. Dost thou
not know, Æsculapius, that Egypt is an image of heaven, or, more
truly, a translation and descent of all things which are ordered and
transacted there,--that it is, in truth, if we may say so, to be the
temple of the whole world? And yet, as it becomes the prudent man to
know all things beforehand, ye ought not to be ignorant of this, that
there is a time coming when it shall appear that the Egyptians have
all in vain, with pious mind, and with most scrupulous diligence,
waited on the divinity, and when all their holy worship shall come to
nought, and be found to be in vain."
Hermes then follows out at great length the statements of this
passage, in which he seems to predict the present time, in which
the Christian religion is overthrowing all lying figments with
a vehemence and liberty proportioned to its superior truth and
holiness, in order that the grace of the true Saviour may deliver
men from those gods which man has made, and subject them to that
God by whom man was made. But when Hermes predicts these things, he
speaks as one who is a friend to these same mockeries of demons,
and does not clearly express the name of Christ. On the contrary,
he deplores, as if it had already taken place, the future abolition
of those things by the observance of which there was maintained in
Egypt a resemblance of heaven,--he bears witness to Christianity
by a kind of mournful prophecy. Now it was with reference to such
that the apostle said, that "knowing God, they glorified Him not as
God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations,
and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be
wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible
God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man,"[316] and so
on, for the whole passage is too long to quote. For Hermes makes
many such statements agreeable to the truth concerning the one true
God who fashioned this world. And I know not how he has become so
bewildered by that "darkening of the heart" as to stumble into the
expression of a desire that men should always continue in subjection
to those gods which he confesses to be made by men, and to bewail
their future removal; as if there could be anything more wretched
than mankind tyrannized over by the work of his own hands, since man,
by worshipping the works of his own hands, may more easily cease to
be man, than the works of his hands can, through his worship of them,
become gods. For it can sooner happen that man, who has received
an honourable position, may, through lack of understanding, become
comparable to the beasts, than that the works of man may become
preferable to the work of God, made in His own image, that is, to man
himself. Wherefore deservedly is man left to fall away from Him who
made him, when he prefers to himself that which he himself has made.
For these vain, deceitful, pernicious, sacrilegious things did the
Egyptian Hermes sorrow, because he knew that the time was coming when
they should be removed. But his sorrow was as impudently expressed
as his knowledge was imprudently obtained; for it was not the Holy
Spirit who revealed these things to him, as He had done to the holy
prophets, who, foreseeing these things, said with exultation, "If
a man shall make gods, lo, they are no gods;"[317] and in another
place, "And it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that
I will cut off the names of the idols out of the land, and they
shall no more be remembered."[318] But the holy Isaiah prophesies
expressly concerning Egypt in reference to this matter, saying, "And
the idols of Egypt shall be moved at His presence, and their heart
shall be overcome in them,"[319] and other things to the same effect.
And with the prophet are to be classed those who rejoiced that that
which they knew was to come had actually come,--as Simeon, or Anna,
who immediately recognised Jesus when He was born, or Elisabeth, who
in the Spirit recognised Him when He was conceived, or Peter, who
said by the revelation of the Father, "Thou art Christ, the Son of
the living God."[320] But to this Egyptian those spirits indicated
the time of their own destruction, who also, when the Lord was
present in the flesh, said with trembling, "Art Thou come hither to
destroy us before the time?"[321] meaning by destruction before the
time, either that very destruction which they expected to come, but
which they did not think would come so suddenly as it appeared to
have done, or only that destruction which consisted in their being
brought into contempt by being made known. And, indeed, this was a
destruction before the time, that is, before the time of judgment,
when they are to be punished with eternal damnation, together with
all men who are implicated in their wickedness, as the true religion
declares, which neither errs nor leads into error; for it is not like
him who, blown hither and thither by every wind of doctrine, and
mixing true things with things which are false, bewails as about to
perish a religion which he afterwards confesses to be error.
24. _How Hermes openly confessed the error of his forefathers, the
coming destruction of which he nevertheless bewailed._
After a long interval, Hermes again comes back to the subject of
the gods which men have made, saying as follows: "But enough on
this subject. Let us return to man and to reason, that divine gift
on account of which man has been called a rational animal. For the
things which have been said concerning man, wonderful though they
are, are less wonderful than those which have been said concerning
reason. For man to discover the divine nature, and to make it,
surpasses the wonder of all other wonderful things. Because,
therefore, our forefathers erred very far with respect to the
knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want of
attention to their worship and service, they invented this art of
making gods; and this art once invented, they associated with it a
suitable virtue borrowed from universal nature, and, being incapable
of making souls, they evoked those of demons or of angels, and united
them with these holy images and divine mysteries, in order that
through these souls the images might have power to do good or harm to
men." I know not whether the demons themselves could have been made,
even by adjuration, to confess as he has confessed in these words:
"Because our forefathers erred very far with respect to the knowledge
of the gods, through incredulity and through want of attention to
their worship and service, they invented the art of making gods."
Does he say that it was a moderate degree of error which resulted
in their discovery of the art of making gods, or was he content to
say "they erred?" No; he must needs add "very far," and say, "_They
erred very far._" It was this great error and incredulity, then,
of their forefathers who did not attend to the worship and service
of the gods, which was the origin of the art of making gods. And
yet this wise man grieves over the ruin of this art at some future
time, as if it were a divine religion. Is he not verily compelled by
divine influence, on the one hand, to reveal the past error of his
forefathers, and by a diabolical influence, on the other hand, to
bewail the future punishment of demons? For if their forefathers, by
erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the gods, through
incredulity and aversion of mind from their worship and service,
invented the art of making gods, what wonder is it that all that is
done by this detestable art, which is opposed to the divine religion,
should be taken away by that religion, when truth corrects error,
faith refutes incredulity, and conversion rectifies aversion?
For if he had only said, without mentioning the cause, that his
forefathers had discovered the art of making gods, it would have
been our duty, if we paid any regard to what is right and pious, to
consider and to see that they could never have attained to this art
if they had not erred from the truth, if they had believed those
things which are worthy of God, if they had attended to divine
worship and service. However, if we alone should say that the causes
of this art were to be found in the great error and incredulity of
men, and aversion of the mind erring from and unfaithful to divine
religion, the impudence of those who resist the truth were in some
way to be borne with; but when he who admires in man, above all other
things, this power which it has been granted him to practise, and
sorrows because a time is coming when all those figments of gods
invented by men shall even be commanded by the laws to be taken
away,--when even this man confesses nevertheless, and explains the
causes which led to the discovery of this art, saying that their
ancestors, through great error and incredulity, and through not
attending to the worship and service of the gods, invented this art
of making gods,--what ought we to say, or rather to do, but to give
to the Lord our God all the thanks we are able, because He has taken
away those things by causes the contrary of those which led to their
institution? For that which the prevalence of error instituted, the
way of truth took away; that which incredulity instituted, faith took
away; that which aversion from divine worship and service instituted,
conversion to the one true and holy God took away. Nor was this the
case only in Egypt, for which country alone the spirit of the demons
lamented in Hermes, but in all the earth, which sings to the Lord a
new song,[322] as the truly holy and truly prophetic Scriptures have
predicted, in which it is written, "Sing unto the Lord a new song;
sing unto the Lord, all the earth." For the title of this psalm is,
"When the house was built after the captivity." For a house is being
built to the Lord in all the earth, even the city of God, which is
the holy Church, after that captivity in which demons held captive
those men who, through faith in God, became living stones in the
house. For although man made gods, it did not follow that he who made
them was not held captive by them, when, by worshipping them, he was
drawn into fellowship with them,--into the fellowship not of stolid
idols, but of cunning demons; for what are idols but what they are
represented to be in the same Scriptures, "They have eyes, but they
do not see,"[323] and, though artistically fashioned, are still
without life and sensation? But unclean spirits, associated through
that wicked art with these same idols, have miserably taken captive
the souls of their worshippers, by bringing them down into fellowship
with themselves. Whence the apostle says, "We know that an idol is
nothing, but those things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice
to demons, and not to God; and I would not ye should have fellowship
with demons."[324] After this captivity, therefore, in which men were
held by malign demons, the house of God is being built in all the
earth; whence the title of that psalm in which it is said, "Sing unto
the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all the earth. Sing unto the
Lord, bless His name; declare well His salvation from day to day.
Declare His glory among the nations, among all people His wonderful
things. For great is the Lord, and much to be praised: He is terrible
above all gods. For all the gods of the nations are demons: but the
Lord made the heavens."[325]
Wherefore he who sorrowed because a time was coming when the worship
of idols should be abolished, and the domination of the demons over
those who worshipped them, wished, under the influence of a demon,
that that captivity should always continue, at the cessation of which
that psalm celebrates the building of the house of the Lord in all
the earth. Hermes foretold these things with grief, the prophet with
joyfulness; and because the Spirit is victorious who sang these things
through the ancient prophets, even Hermes himself was compelled in a
wonderful manner to confess, that those very things which he wished not
to be removed, and at the prospect of whose removal he was sorrowful,
had been instituted, not by prudent, faithful, and religious, but by
erring and unbelieving men, averse to the worship and service of the
gods. And although he calls them gods, nevertheless, when he says
that they were made by such men as we certainly ought not to be, he
shows, whether he will or not, that they are not to be worshipped by
those who do not resemble these image-makers, that is, by prudent,
faithful, and religious men, at the same time also making it manifest
that the very men who made them involved themselves in the worship
of those as gods who were not gods. For true is the saying of the
prophet, "If a man _make_ gods, lo, they are no gods."[326] Such gods,
therefore, acknowledged by such worshippers and made by such men,
did Hermes call "gods made by men," that is to say, demons, through
some art of I know not what description, bound by the chains of their
own lusts to images. But, nevertheless, he did not agree with that
opinion of the Platonic Apuleius, of which we have already shown the
incongruity and absurdity, namely, that they were interpreters and
intercessors between the gods whom God made, and men whom the same
God made, bringing to God the prayers of men, and from God the gifts
given in answer to these prayers. For it is exceedingly stupid to
believe that gods whom men have made have more influence with gods
whom God has made than men themselves have, whom the very same God has
made. And consider, too, that it is a demon which, bound by a man to
an image by means of an impious art, has been made a god, but a god
to such a man only, not to every man. What kind of god, therefore, is
that which no man would make but one erring, incredulous, and averse
to the true God? Moreover, if the demons which are worshipped in the
temples, being introduced by some kind of strange art into images, that
is, into visible representations of themselves, by those men who by
this art made gods when they were straying away from, and were averse
to the worship and service of the gods,--if, I say, those demons are
neither mediators nor interpreters between men and the gods, both on
account of their own most wicked and base manners, and because men,
though erring, incredulous, and averse from the worship and service of
the gods, are nevertheless beyond doubt better than the demons whom
they themselves have evoked, then it remains to be affirmed that what
power they possess they possess as demons, doing harm by bestowing
pretended benefits,--harm all the greater for the deception,--or else
openly and undisguisedly doing evil to men. They cannot, however, do
anything of this kind unless where they are permitted by the deep and
secret providence of God, and then only so far as they are permitted.
When, however, they are permitted, it is not because they, being
midway between men and the gods, have through the friendship of the
gods great power over men; for these demons cannot possibly be friends
to the good gods who dwell in the holy and heavenly habitation, by
whom we mean holy angels and rational creatures, whether thrones, or
dominations, or principalities, or powers, from whom they are as far
separated in disposition and character as vice is distant from virtue,
wickedness from goodness.
25. _Concerning those things which may be common to the holy angels
and to men._
Wherefore we must by no means seek, through the supposed mediation
of demons, to avail ourselves of the benevolence or beneficence of
the gods, or rather of the good angels, but through resembling them
in the possession of a good will, through which we are with them,
and live with them, and worship with them the same God, although
we cannot see them with the eyes of our flesh. But it is not in
locality we are distant from them, but in merit of life, caused by
our miserable unlikeness to them in will, and by the weakness of
our character; for the mere fact of our dwelling on earth under the
conditions of life in the flesh does not prevent our fellowship with
them. It is only prevented when we, in the impurity of our hearts,
mind earthly things. But in this present time, while we are being
healed that we may eventually be as they are, we are brought near to
them by faith, if by their assistance we believe that He who is their
blessedness is also ours.
26. _That all the religion of the pagans has reference to dead
men._
It is certainly a remarkable thing how this Egyptian, when expressing
his grief that a time was coming when those things would be taken
away from Egypt, which he confesses to have been invented by men
erring, incredulous, and averse to the service of divine religion,
says, among other things, "Then shall that land, the most holy place
of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," as if,
in sooth, if these things were not taken away, men would not die!
as if dead bodies could be buried elsewhere than in the ground! as
if, as time advanced, the number of sepulchres must not necessarily
increase in proportion to the increase of the number of the dead!
But they who are of a perverse mind, and opposed to us, suppose that
what he grieves for is that the memorials of our martyrs were to
succeed to their temples and shrines, in order, forsooth, that they
may have grounds for thinking that gods were worshipped by the pagans
in temples, but that dead men are worshipped by us in sepulchres.
For with such blindness do impious men, as it were, stumble over
mountains, and will not see the things which strike their own eyes,
that they do not attend to the fact that in all the literature of
the pagans there are not found any, or scarcely any gods, who have
not been men, to whom, when dead, divine honours have been paid. I
will not enlarge on the fact that Varro says that all dead men are
thought by them to be gods Manes, and proves it by those sacred
rites which are performed in honour of almost all the dead, among
which he mentions funeral games, considering this the very highest
proof of divinity, because games are only wont to be celebrated in
honour of divinities. Hermes himself, of whom we are now treating,
in that same book in which, as if foretelling future things, he
says with sorrow, "Then shall that land, the most holy place of
shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men," testifies
that the gods of Egypt were dead men. For, having said that their
forefathers, erring very far with respect to the knowledge of the
gods, incredulous and inattentive to the divine worship and service,
invented the art of making gods, with which art, when invented, they
associated the appropriate virtue which is inherent in universal
nature, and by mixing up that virtue with this art, they called forth
the souls of demons or of angels (for they could not make souls),
and caused them to take possession of, or associate themselves with
holy images and divine mysteries, in order that through these souls
the images might have power to do good or harm to men;--having said
this, he goes on, as it were, to prove it by illustrations, saying,
"Thy grandsire, O Æsculapius, the first discoverer of medicine,
to whom a temple was consecrated in a mountain of Libya, near to
the shore of the crocodiles, in which temple lies his earthly man,
that is, his body,--for the better part of him, or rather the whole
of him, if the whole man is in the intelligent life, went back to
heaven,--affords even now by his divinity all those helps to infirm
men, which formerly he was wont to afford to them by the art of
medicine." He says, therefore, that a dead man was worshipped as a
god in that place where he had his sepulchre. He deceives men by a
falsehood, for the man "went back to heaven." Then he adds, "Does not
Hermes, who was my grandsire, and whose name I bear, abiding in the
country which is called by his name, help and preserve all mortals
who come to him from every quarter?" For this elder Hermes, that is,
Mercury, who, he says, was his grandsire, is said to be buried in
Hermopolis, that is, in the city called by his name; so here are two
gods whom he affirms to have been men, Æsculapius and Mercury. Now
concerning Æsculapius, both the Greeks and the Latins think the same
thing; but as to Mercury, there are many who do not think that he was
formerly a mortal, though Hermes testifies that he was his grandsire.
But are these two different individuals who were called by the same
name? I will not dispute much whether they are different individuals
or not. It is sufficient to know that this Mercury of whom Hermes
speaks is, as well as Æsculapius, a god who once was a man, according
to the testimony of this same Trismegistus, esteemed so great by his
countrymen, and also the grandson of Mercury himself.
Hermes goes on to say, "But do we know how many good things Isis,
the wife of Osiris, bestows when she is propitious, and what great
opposition she can offer when enraged?" Then, in order to show that
there were gods made by men through this art, he goes on to say,
"For it is easy for earthly and mundane gods to be angry, being
made and composed by men out of either nature;" thus giving us to
understand that he believed that demons were formerly the souls of
dead men, which, as he says, by means of a certain art invented by
men very far in error, incredulous, and irreligious, were caused
to take possession of images, because they who made such gods were
not able to make souls. When, therefore, he says "either nature,"
he means soul and body,--the demon being the soul, and the image
the body. What, then, becomes of that mournful complaint, that the
land of Egypt, the most holy place of shrines and temples, was to be
full of sepulchres and dead men? Verily, the fallacious spirit, by
whose inspiration Hermes spoke these things, was compelled to confess
through him that even already that land was full of sepulchres and of
dead men, whom they were worshipping as gods. But it was the grief of
the demons which was expressing itself through his mouth, who were
sorrowing on account of the punishments which were about to fall upon
them at the tombs of the martyrs. For in many such places they are
tortured and compelled to confess, and are cast out of the bodies of
men, of which they had taken possession.
27. _Concerning the nature of the honour which the Christians
pay to their martyrs._
But, nevertheless, we do not build temples, and ordain priests,
rites, and sacrifices for these same martyrs; for they are not
our gods, but their God is our God. Certainly we honour their
reliquaries, as the memorials of holy men of God who strove for the
truth even to the death of their bodies, that the true religion might
be made known, and false and fictitious religions exposed. For if
there were some before them who thought that these religions were
really false and fictitious, they were afraid to give expression
to their convictions. But who ever heard a priest of the faithful,
standing at an altar built for the honour and worship of God over
the holy body of some martyr, say in the prayers, I offer to thee a
sacrifice, O Peter, or O Paul, or O Cyprian? for it is to God that
sacrifices are offered at their tombs,--the God who made them both
men and martyrs, and associated them with holy angels in celestial
honour; and the reason why we pay such honours to their memory
is, that by so doing we may both give thanks to the true God for
their victories, and, by recalling them afresh to remembrance, may
stir ourselves up to imitate them by seeking to obtain like crowns
and palms, calling to our help that same God on whom they called.
Therefore, whatever honours the religious may pay in the places of
the martyrs, they are but honours rendered to their memory,[327] not
sacred rites or sacrifices offered to dead men as to gods. And even
such as bring thither food,--which, indeed, is not done by the better
Christians, and in most places of the world is not done at all,--do
so in order that it may be sanctified to them through the merits of
the martyrs, in the name of the Lord of the martyrs, first presenting
the food and offering prayer, and thereafter taking it away to be
eaten, or to be in part bestowed upon the needy.[328] But he who
knows the one sacrifice of Christians, which is the sacrifice offered
in those places, also knows that these are not sacrifices offered to
the martyrs. It is, then, neither with divine honours nor with human
crimes, by which they worship their gods, that we honour our martyrs;
neither do we offer sacrifices to them, or convert the crimes of the
gods into their sacred rites. For let those who will and can read
the letter of Alexander to his mother Olympias, in which he tells
the things which were revealed to him by the priest Leon, and let
those who have read it recall to memory what it contains, that they
may see what great abominations have been handed down to memory, not
by poets, but by the mystic writings of the Egyptians, concerning
the goddess Isis, the wife of Osiris, and the parents of both, all
of whom, according to these writings, were royal personages. Isis,
when sacrificing to her parents, is said to have discovered a crop
of barley, of which she brought some ears to the king her husband,
and his councillor Mercurius, and hence they identify her with Ceres.
Those who read the letter may there see what was the character of
those people to whom when dead sacred rites were instituted as
to gods, and what those deeds of theirs were which furnished the
occasion for these rites. Let them not once dare to compare in any
respect those people, though they hold them to be gods, to our holy
martyrs, though we do not hold them to be gods. For we do not ordain
priests and offer sacrifices to our martyrs, as they do to their
dead men, for that would be incongruous, undue, and unlawful, such
being due only to God; and thus we do not delight them with their
own crimes, or with such shameful plays as those in which the crimes
of the gods are celebrated, which are either real crimes committed
by them at a time when they were men, or else, if they never were
men, fictitious crimes invented for the pleasure of noxious demons.
The god of Socrates, if he had a god, cannot have belonged to this
class of demons. But perhaps they who wished to excel in this art of
making gods, imposed a god of this sort on a man who was a stranger
to, and innocent of any connection with that art. What need we say
more? No one who is even moderately wise imagines that demons are to
be worshipped on account of the blessed life which is to be after
death. But perhaps they will say that all the gods are good, but that
of the demons some are bad and some good, and that it is the good who
are to be worshipped, in order that through them we may attain to the
eternally blessed life. To the examination of this opinion we will
devote the following book.
FOOTNOTES:
[291] Wisdom vii. 24-27.
[292] "Sapiens," that is, a wise man, one who had attained to wisdom.
[293] Finem boni.
[294] Dii majorum gentium.
[295] Book i. 13.
[296] Rom. i. 19, 20.
[297] Col. ii. 8.
[298] Rom. i. 19, 20.
[299] Acts xvii. 28.
[300] Rom. i. 21-23.
[301] _De Doctrina Christiana_, ii. 43. Comp. _Retract._ ii. 4, 2.
[302] Liberating Jewish slaves, and sending gifts to the temple. See
Josephus, _Ant._ xii. 2.
[303] Gen. i. 1, 2.
[304] Spiritus.
[305] Ex. iii. 14.
[306] Rom. i. 20.
[307] Ch. 14.
[308] _De Deo Socratis._
[309] Virgil, _Æn._ 7. 338.
[310] Virgil, _Æn._ 4. 492, 493.
[311] Virgil, _Ec._ 8. 99.
[312] Pliny (_Hist. Nat._ xxviii. 2) and others quote the law as
running: "Qui fruges incantasit, qui malum carmen incantasit.... neu
alienam segetem pelexeris."
[313] Before Claudius, the prefect of Africa, a heathen.
[314] Another reading, "whom they could not know, though near to
themselves."
[315] These quotations are from a dialogue between Hermes and
Æsculapius, which is said to have been translated into Latin by
Apuleius.
[316] Rom. i. 21.
[317] Jer. xvi. 20.
[318] Zech. xiii. 2.
[319] Isa. xix. 1.
[320] Matt. xvi. 16.
[321] Matt. viii. 29.
[322] Ps. xcvi. 1.
[323] Ps. cxv. 5, etc.
[324] 1 Cor. x. 19, 20.
[325] Ps. xcvi. 1-5.
[326] Jer. xvi. 20.
[327] Ornamenta memoriarum.
[328] Comp. _The Confessions_, vi. 2.
BOOK NINTH.
ARGUMENT.
HAVING IN THE PRECEDING BOOK SHOWN THAT THE WORSHIP OF DEMONS MUST
BE ABJURED, SINCE THEY IN A THOUSAND WAYS PROCLAIM THEMSELVES
TO BE WICKED SPIRITS, AUGUSTINE IN THIS BOOK MEETS THOSE WHO
ALLEGE A DISTINCTION AMONG DEMONS, SOME BEING EVIL, WHILE
OTHERS ARE GOOD; AND, HAVING EXPLODED THIS DISTINCTION, HE
PROVES THAT TO NO DEMON, BUT TO CHRIST ALONE, BELONGS THE
OFFICE OF PROVIDING MEN WITH ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS.
1. _The point at which the discussion has arrived, and what remains
to be handled._
Some have advanced the opinion that there are both good and bad gods;
but some, thinking more respectfully of the gods have attributed
to them so much honour and praise as to preclude the supposition
of any god being wicked. But those who have maintained that there
are wicked gods as well as good ones have included the demons under
the name "gods," and sometimes, though more rarely, have called the
gods demons; so that they admit that Jupiter, whom they make the
king and head of all the rest, is called a demon by Homer.[329]
Those, on the other hand, who maintain that the gods are all good,
and far more excellent than the men who are justly called good, are
moved by the actions of the demons, which they can neither deny nor
impute to the gods whose goodness they affirm, to distinguish between
gods and demons; so that, whenever they find anything offensive
in the deeds or sentiments by which unseen spirits manifest their
power, they believe this to proceed not from the gods, but from
the demons. At the same time they believe that, as no god can hold
direct intercourse with men, these demons hold the position of
mediators, ascending with prayers, and returning with gifts. This
is the opinion of the Platonists, the ablest and most esteemed of
their philosophers, with whom we therefore chose to debate this
question,--whether the worship of a number of gods is of any service
towards obtaining blessedness in the future life. And this is the
reason why, in the preceding book, we have inquired how the demons,
who take pleasure in such things as good and wise men loathe and
execrate, in the sacrilegious and immoral fictions which the poets
have written, not of men, but of the gods themselves, and in the
wicked and criminal violence of magical arts, can be regarded as
more nearly related and more friendly to the gods than men are, and
can mediate between good men and the good gods; and it has been
demonstrated that this is absolutely impossible.
2. _Whether among the demons, inferior to the gods, there are any
good spirits under whose guardianship the human soul might
reach true blessedness._
This book, then, ought, according to the promise made in the end of the
preceding one, to contain a discussion, not of the difference which
exists among the gods, who, according to the Platonists, are all good,
nor of the difference between gods and demons, the former of whom they
separate by a wide interval from men, while the latter are placed
intermediately between the gods and men, but of the difference, since
they make one, among the demons themselves. This we shall discuss so
far as it bears on our theme. It has been the common and usual belief
that some of the demons are bad, others good; and this opinion, whether
it be that of the Platonists or any other sect, must by no means be
passed over in silence, lest some one suppose he ought to cultivate
the good demons in order that by their mediation he may be accepted
by the gods, all of whom he believes to be good, and that he may live
with them after death; whereas he would thus be ensnared in the toils
of wicked spirits, and would wander far from the true God, with whom
alone, and in whom alone, the human soul, that is to say, the soul that
is rational and intellectual, is blessed.
3. _What Apuleius attributes to the demons, to whom, though he
does not deny them reason, he does not ascribe virtue._
What, then, is the difference between good and evil demons? For the
Platonist Apuleius, in a treatise on this whole subject,[330] while
he says a great deal about their aerial bodies, has not a word to say
of the spiritual virtues with which, if they were good, they must have
been endowed. Not a word has he said, then, of that which could give
them happiness; but proof of their misery he has given, acknowledging
that their mind, by which they rank as reasonable beings, is not only
not imbued and fortified with virtue so as to resist all unreasonable
passions, but that it is somehow agitated with tempestuous emotions,
and is thus on a level with the mind of foolish men. His own words
are: "It is this class of demons the poets refer to, when, without
serious error, they feign that the gods hate and love individuals
among men, prospering and ennobling some, and opposing and distressing
others. Therefore pity, indignation, grief, joy, every human emotion is
experienced by the demons, with the same mental disturbance, and the
same tide of feeling and thought. These turmoils and tempests banish
them far from the tranquillity of the celestial gods." Can there be
any doubt that in these words it is not some inferior part of their
spiritual nature, but the very mind by which the demons hold their
rank as rational beings, which he says is tossed with passion like a
stormy sea? They cannot, then, be compared even to wise men, who with
undisturbed mind resist these perturbations to which they are exposed
in this life, and from which human infirmity is never exempt, and who
do not yield themselves to approve of or perpetrate anything which
might deflect them from the path of wisdom and law of rectitude. They
resemble in character, though not in bodily appearance, wicked and
foolish men. I might indeed say they are worse, inasmuch as they have
grown old in iniquity, and incorrigible by punishment. Their mind, as
Apuleius says, is a sea tossed with tempest, having no rallying point
of truth or virtue in their soul from which they can resist their
turbulent and depraved emotions.
4. _The opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics about mental
emotions._