gods, we ought to inquire into the part performed by the great gods,
whereby Rome has been made so great as to reign so long over so many
nations. Doubtless, therefore, this is the work of Jove. For they
will have it that he is the king of all the gods and goddesses,
as is shown by his sceptre and by the Capitol on the lofty hill.
Concerning that god they publish a saying which, although that of a
poet, is most apt, "All things are full of Jove."[163] Varro believes
that this god is worshipped, although called by another name, even
by those who worship one God alone without any image. But if this
is so, why has he been so badly used at Rome (and indeed by other
nations too), that an image of him should be made?--a thing which
was so displeasing to Varro himself, that although he was overborne
by the perverse custom of so great a city, he had not the least
hesitation in both saying and writing, that those who have appointed
images for the people have both taken away fear and added error.
10. _What opinions those have followed who have set divers gods
over divers parts of the world._
Why, also, is Juno united to him as his wife, who is called at once
"sister and yokefellow?"[164] Because, say they, we have Jove in the
ether, Juno in the air; and these two elements are united, the one
being superior, the other inferior. It is not he, then, of whom it is
said, "All things are full of Jove," if Juno also fills some part.
Does each fill either, and are both of this couple in both of these
elements, and in each of them at the same time? Why, then, is the ether
given to Jove, the air to Juno? Besides, these two should have been
enough. Why is it that the sea is assigned to Neptune, the earth to
Pluto? And that these also might not be left without mates, Salacia
is joined to Neptune, Proserpine to Pluto. For they say that, as Juno
possesses the lower part of the heavens,--that is, the air,--so Salacia
possesses the lower part of the sea, and Proserpine the lower part of
the earth. They seek how they may patch up these fables, but they find
no way. For if these things were so, their ancient sages would have
maintained that there are three chief elements of the world, not four,
in order that each of the elements might have a pair of gods. Now, they
have positively affirmed that the ether is one thing, the air another.
But water, whether higher or lower, is surely water. Suppose it ever
so unlike, can it ever be so much so as no longer to be water? And
the lower earth, by whatever divinity it may be distinguished, what
else can it be than earth? Lo, then, since the whole physical world
is complete in these four or three elements, where shall Minerva be?
What should she possess, what should she fill? For she is placed in
the Capitol along with these two, although she is not the offspring of
their marriage. Or if they say that she possesses the higher part of
the ether,--and on that account the poets have feigned that she sprang
from the head of Jove,--why then is she not rather reckoned queen of
the gods, because she is superior to Jove? Is it because it would be
improper to set the daughter before the father? Why, then, is not that
rule of justice observed concerning Jove himself toward Saturn? Is it
because he was conquered? Have they fought then? By no means, say they;
that is an old wife's fable. Lo, we are not to believe fables, and
must hold more worthy opinions concerning the gods! Why, then, do they
not assign to the father of Jove a seat, if not of higher, at least
of equal honour? Because Saturn, say they, is length of time.[165]
Therefore they who worship Saturn worship Time; and it is insinuated
that Jupiter, the king of the gods, was born of Time. For is anything
unworthy said when Jupiter and Juno are said to have been sprung from
Time, if he is the heaven and she is the earth, since both heaven and
earth have been made, and are therefore not eternal? For their learned
and wise men have this also in their books. Nor is that saying taken by
Virgil out of poetic figments, but out of the books of philosophers,
"Then Ether, the Father Almighty, in copious showers descended
Into his spouse's glad bosom, making it fertile,"[166]
--that is, into the bosom of Tellus, or the earth. Although here,
also, they will have it that there are some differences, and think
that in the earth herself Terra is one thing, Tellus another, and
Tellumo another. And they have all these as gods, called by their
own names, distinguished by their own offices, and venerated with
their own altars and rites. This same earth also they call the
mother of the gods, so that even the fictions of the poets are more
tolerable, if, according, not to their poetical but sacred books,
Juno is not only the sister and wife, but also the mother of Jove.
The same earth they worship as Ceres, and also as Vesta; while yet
they more frequently affirm that Vesta is nothing else than fire,
pertaining to the hearths, without which the city cannot exist; and
therefore virgins are wont to serve her, because as nothing is born
of a virgin, so nothing is born of fire;--but all this nonsense
ought to be completely abolished and extinguished by Him who is
born of a virgin. For who can bear that, while they ascribe to the
fire so much honour, and, as it were, chastity, they do not blush
sometimes even to call Vesta Venus, so that honoured virginity may
vanish in her handmaidens? For if Vesta is Venus, how can virgins
rightly serve her by abstaining from venery? Are there two Venuses,
the one a virgin, the other not a maid? Or rather, are there three,
one the goddess of virgins, who is also called Vesta, another the
goddess of wives, and another of harlots? To her also the Phenicians
offered a gift by prostituting their daughters before they united
them to husbands.[167] Which of these is the wife of Vulcan?
Certainly not the virgin, since she has a husband. Far be it from
us to say it is the harlot, lest we should seem to wrong the son of
Juno and fellow-worker of Minerva. Therefore it is to be understood
that she belongs to the married people; but we would not wish them
to imitate her in what she did with Mars. "Again," say they, "you
return to fables." What sort of justice is that, to be angry with us
because we say such things of their gods, and not to be angry with
themselves, who in their theatres most willingly behold the crimes of
their gods? And,--a thing incredible, if it were not thoroughly well
proved,--these very theatric representations of the crimes of their
gods have been instituted in honour of these same gods.
11. _Concerning the many gods whom the pagan doctors defend as
being one and the same Jove._
Let them therefore assert as many things as ever they please in
physical reasonings and disputations. One while let Jupiter be the
soul of this corporeal world, who fills and moves that whole mass,
constructed and compacted out of four, or as many elements as they
please; another while, let him yield to his sister and brothers their
parts of it: now let him be the ether, that from above he may embrace
Juno, the air spread out beneath; again, let him be the whole heaven
along with the air, and impregnate with fertilizing showers and seeds
the earth, as his wife, and, at the same time, his mother (for this
is not vile in divine beings); and yet again (that it may not be
necessary to run through them all), let him, the one god, of whom
many think it has been said by a most noble poet,
"For God pervadeth all things,
All lands, and the tracts of the sea, and the depth of the
heavens,"[168]--
let it be him who in the ether is Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the
sea, Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea, Salacia; in the earth,
Pluto; in the lower part of the earth, Proserpine; on the domestic
hearths, Vesta; in the furnace of the workmen, Vulcan; among the
stars, Sol, and Luna, and the Stars; in divination, Apollo; in
merchandise, Mercury; in Janus, the initiator; in Terminus, the
terminator; Saturn, in time; Mars and Bellona, in war; Liber, in
vineyards; Ceres, in corn-fields; Diana, in forests; Minerva, in
learning. Finally, let it be him who is in that crowd, as it were,
of plebeian gods: let him preside under the name of Liber over the
seed of men, and under that of Libera over that of women: let him be
Diespiter, who brings forth the birth to the light of day: let him be
the goddess Mena, whom they set over the menstruation of women: let
him be Lucina, who is invoked by women in childbirth: let him bring
help to those who are being born, by taking them up from the bosom
of the earth, and let him be called Opis: let him open the mouth in
the crying babe, and be called the god Vaticanus: let him lift it
from the earth, and be called the goddess Levana; let him watch over
cradles, and be called the goddess Cunina: let it be no other than he
who is in those goddesses, who sing the fates of the new born, and
are called Carmentes: let him preside over fortuitous events, and be
called Fortuna: in the goddess Rumina, let him milk out the breast
to the little one, because the ancients termed the breast _ruma_: in
the goddess Potina, let him administer drink: in the goddess Educa,
let him supply food: from the terror of infants, let him be styled
Paventia: from the hope which comes, Venilia; from voluptuousness,
Volupia; from action, Agenor: from the stimulants by which man is
spurred on to much action, let him be named the goddess Stimula:
let him be the goddess Strenia, for making strenuous; Numeria, who
teaches to number; Camœna, who teaches to sing: let him be both the
god Consus for granting counsel, and the goddess Sentia for inspiring
sentences: let him be the goddess Juventas, who, after the robe of
boyhood is laid aside, takes charge of the beginning of the youthful
age: let him be Fortuna Barbata, who endues adults with a beard, whom
they have not chosen to honour; so that this divinity, whatever it
may be, should at least be a male god, named either Barbatus, from
_barba_, like Nodotus, from _nodus_; or, certainly, not Fortuna, but
because he has beards, Fortunius: let him, in the god Jugatinus,
yoke couples in marriage; and when the girdle of the virgin wife is
loosed, let him be invoked as the goddess Virginiensis: let him be
Mutunus or Tuternus, who, among the Greeks, is called Priapus. If
they are not ashamed of it, let all these which I have named, and
whatever others I have not named (for I have not thought fit to name
all), let all these gods and goddesses be that one Jupiter, whether,
as some will have it, all these are parts of him, or are his powers,
as those think who are pleased to consider him the soul of the
world, which is the opinion of most of their doctors, and these the
greatest. If these things are so (how evil they may be I do not yet
meanwhile inquire), what would they lose, if they, by a more prudent
abridgment, should worship one god? For what part of him could be
contemned if he himself should be worshipped? But if they are afraid
lest parts of him should be angry at being passed by or neglected,
then it is not the case, as they will have it, that this whole is as
the life of one living being, which contains all the gods together,
as if they were its virtues, or members, or parts; but each part
has its own life separate from the rest, if it is so that one can
be angered, appeased, or stirred up more than another. But if it is
said that all together,--that is, the whole Jove himself,--would be
offended if his parts were not also worshipped singly and minutely,
it is foolishly spoken. Surely none of them could be passed by if
he who singly possesses them all should be worshipped. For, to omit
other things which are innumerable, when they say that all the stars
are parts of Jove, and are all alive, and have rational souls, and
therefore without controversy are gods, can they not see how many
they do not worship, to how many they do not build temples or set up
altars, and to how very few, in fact, of the stars they have thought
of setting them up and offering sacrifice? If, therefore, those are
displeased who are not severally worshipped, do they not fear to live
with only a few appeased, while all heaven is displeased? But if
they worship all the stars because they are part of Jove whom they
worship, by the same compendious method they could supplicate them
all in him alone. For in this way no one would be displeased, since
in him alone all would be supplicated. No one would be contemned,
instead of there being just cause of displeasure given to the
much greater number who are passed by in the worship offered to
some; especially when Priapus, stretched out in vile nakedness, is
preferred to those who shine from their supernal abode.
12. _Concerning the opinion of those who have thought that God is
the soul of the world, and the world is the body of God._
Ought not men of intelligence, and indeed men of every kind, to be
stirred up to examine the nature of this opinion? For there is no need
of excellent capacity for this task, that putting away the desire of
contention, they may observe that if God is the soul of the world, and
the world is as a body to Him, who is the soul, He must be one living
being consisting of soul and body, and that this same God is a kind
of womb of nature containing all things in Himself, so that the lives
and souls of all living things are taken, according to the manner of
each one's birth, out of His soul which vivifies that whole mass, and
therefore nothing at all remains which is not a part of God. And if
this is so, who cannot see what impious and irreligious consequences
follow, such as that whatever one may trample, he must trample a part
of God, and in slaying any living creature, a part of God must be
slaughtered? But I am unwilling to utter all that may occur to those
who think of it, yet cannot be spoken without irreverence.
13. _Concerning those who assert that only rational animals are
parts of the one God._
But if they contend that only rational animals, such as men, are
parts of God, I do not really see how, if the whole world is God,
they can separate beasts from being parts of Him. But what need
is there of striving about that? Concerning the rational animal
himself,--that is, man,--what more unhappy belief can be entertained
than that a part of God is whipped when a boy is whipped? And who,
unless he is quite mad, could bear the thought that parts of God can
become lascivious, iniquitous, impious, and altogether damnable? In
brief, why is God angry at those who do not worship Him, since these
offenders are parts of Himself? It remains, therefore, that they
must say that all the gods have their own lives; that each one lives
for himself, and none of them is a part of any one; but that all are
to be worshipped,--at least as many as can be known and worshipped;
for they are so many it is impossible that all can be so. And of
all these, I believe that Jupiter, because he presides as king, is
thought by them to have both established and extended the Roman
empire. For if he has not done it, what other god do they believe
could have attempted so great a work, when they must all be occupied
with their own offices and works, nor can one intrude on that of
another? Could the kingdom of men then be propagated and increased by
the king of the gods?
14. _The enlargement of kingdoms is unsuitably ascribed to Jove;
for if, as they will have it, Victoria is a goddess, she alone
would suffice for this business._
Here, first of all, I ask, why even the kingdom itself is not some
god? For why should not it also be so, if Victory is a goddess? Or
what need is there of Jove himself in this affair, if Victory favours
and is propitious, and always goes to those whom she wishes to be
victorious? With this goddess favourable and propitious, even if Jove
was idle and did nothing, what nations could remain unsubdued, what
kingdom would not yield? But perhaps it is displeasing to good men to
fight with most wicked unrighteousness, and provoke with voluntary
war neighbours who are peaceable and do no wrong, in order to enlarge
a kingdom? If they feel thus, I entirely approve and praise them.
15. _Whether it is suitable for good men to wish to rule more
widely._
Let them ask, then, whether it is quite fitting for good men to
rejoice in extended empire. For the iniquity of those with whom just
wars are carried on favours the growth of a kingdom, which would
certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbours had
not by any wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and
human affairs being thus more happy, all kingdoms would have been
small, rejoicing in neighbourly concord; and thus there would have
been very many kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are very
many houses of citizens in a city. Therefore, to carry on war and
extend a kingdom over wholly subdued nations seems to bad men to
be felicity, to good men necessity. But because it would be worse
that the injurious should rule over those who are more righteous,
therefore even that is not unsuitably called felicity. But beyond
doubt it is greater felicity to have a good neighbour at peace, than
to conquer a bad one by making war. Your wishes are bad, when you
desire that one whom you hate or fear should be in such a condition
that you can conquer him. If, therefore, by carrying on wars that
were just, not impious or unrighteous, the Romans could have acquired
so great an empire, ought they not to worship as a goddess even
the injustice of foreigners? For we see that this has co-operated
much in extending the empire, by making foreigners so unjust that
they became people with whom just wars might be carried on, and
the empire increased. And why may not injustice, at least that of
foreign nations, also be a goddess, if Fear and Dread, and Ague
have deserved to be Roman gods? By these two, therefore,--that is,
by foreign injustice, and the goddess Victoria, for injustice stirs
up causes of wars, and Victoria brings these same wars to a happy
termination,--the empire has increased, even although Jove has been
idle. For what part could Jove have here, when those things which
might be thought to be his benefits are held to be gods, called
gods, worshipped as gods, and are themselves invoked for their own
parts? He also might have some part here, if he himself might be
called Empire, just as she is called Victory. Or if empire is the
gift of Jove, why may not victory also be held to be his gift? And it
certainly would have been held to be so, had he been recognised and
worshipped, not as a stone in the Capitol, but as the true King of
kings and Lord of lords.
16. _What was the reason why the Romans, in detailing separate gods
for all things and all movements of the mind, chose to have the
temple of Quiet outside the gates._
But I wonder very much, that while they assigned to separate gods
single things, and (well nigh) all movements of the mind; that while
they invoked the goddess Agenoria, who should excite to action; the
goddess Stimula, who should stimulate to unusual action; the goddess
Murcia, who should not move men beyond measure, but make them, as
Pomponius says, _murcid_--that is, too slothful and inactive; the
goddess Strenua, who should make them strenuous; and that while they
offered to all these gods and goddesses solemn and public worship,
they should yet have been unwilling to give public acknowledgment
to her whom they name Quies because she makes men quiet, but built
her temple outside the Colline gate. Whether was this a symptom of
an unquiet mind, or rather was it thus intimated that he who should
persevere in worshipping that crowd, not, to be sure, of gods, but
of demons, could not dwell with quiet; to which the true Physician
calls, saying, "Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and ye
shall find rest unto your souls?"
17. _Whether, if the highest power belongs to Jove, Victoria also
ought to be worshipped._
Or do they say, perhaps, that Jupiter sends the goddess Victoria,
and that she, as it were, acting in obedience to the king of the
gods, comes to those to whom he may have despatched her, and takes
up her quarters on their side? This is truly said, not of Jove, whom
they, according to their own imagination, feign to be king of the
gods, but of Him who is the true eternal King, because he sends, not
Victory, who is no person, but His angel, and causes whom He pleases
to conquer; whose counsel may be hidden, but cannot be unjust. For
if Victory is a goddess, why is not Triumph also a god, and joined
to Victory either as husband, or brother, or son? Indeed, they have
imagined such things concerning the gods, that if the poets had
feigned the like, and they should have been discussed by us, they
would have replied that they were laughable figments of the poets not
to be attributed to true deities. And yet they themselves did not
laugh when they were, not reading in the poets, but worshipping in
the temples such doating follies. Therefore they should entreat Jove
alone for all things, and supplicate him only. For if Victory is a
goddess, and is under him as her king, wherever he might have sent
her, she could not dare to resist and do her own will rather than his.
18. _With what reason they who think Felicity and Fortune
goddesses have distinguished them._
What shall we say, besides, of the idea that Felicity also is a
goddess? She has received a temple; she has merited an altar;
suitable rites of worship are paid to her. She alone, then, should be
worshipped. For where she is present, what good thing can be absent?
But what does a man wish, that he thinks Fortune also a goddess
and worships her? Is felicity one thing, fortune another? Fortune,
indeed, may be bad as well as good; but felicity, if it could be
bad, would not be felicity. Certainly we ought to think all the
gods of either sex (if they also have sex) are only good. This says
Plato; this say other philosophers; this say all estimable rulers
of the republic and the nations. How is it, then, that the goddess
Fortune is sometimes good, sometimes bad? Is it perhaps the case
that when she is bad she is not a goddess, but is suddenly changed
into a malignant demon? How many Fortunes are there then? Just as
many as there are men who are fortunate, that is, of good fortune.
But since there must also be very many others who at the very same
time are men of bad fortune, could she, being one and the same
Fortune, be at the same time both bad and good--the one to these,
the other to those? She who is the goddess, is she always good?
Then she herself is felicity. Why, then, are two names given her?
Yet this is tolerable; for it is customary that one thing should be
called by two names. But why different temples, different altars,
different rituals? There is a reason, say they, because Felicity
is she whom the good have by previous merit; but fortune, which is
termed good without any trial of merit, befalls both good and bad
men fortuitously, whence also she is named Fortune. How, therefore,
is she good, who without any discernment comes both to the good and
to the bad? Why is she worshipped, who is thus blind, running at
random on any one whatever, so that for the most part she passes by
her worshippers, and cleaves to those who despise her? Or if her
worshippers profit somewhat, so that they are seen by her and loved,
then she follows merit, and does not come fortuitously. What, then,
becomes of that definition of fortune? What becomes of the opinion
that she has received her very name from fortuitous events? For it
profits one nothing to worship her if she is truly _fortune_. But if
she distinguishes her worshippers, so that she may benefit them, she
is not fortune. Or does Jupiter send her too, whither he pleases?
Then let him alone be worshipped; because Fortune is not able to
resist him when he commands her, and sends her where he pleases. Or,
at least, let the bad worship her, who do not choose to have merit by
which the goddess Felicity might be invited.
19. _Concerning Fortuna Muliebris._[169]
To this supposed deity, whom they call Fortuna, they ascribe so much,
indeed, that they have a tradition that the image of her, which was
dedicated by the Roman matrons, and called Fortuna Muliebris, has
spoken, and has said, once and again, that the matrons pleased her by
their homage; which, indeed, if it is true, ought not to excite our
wonder. For it is not so difficult for malignant demons to deceive,
and they ought the rather to advert to their wits and wiles, because
it is that goddess who comes by haphazard who has spoken, and not she
who comes to reward merit. For Fortuna was loquacious, and Felicitas
mute; and for what other reason but that men might not care to live
rightly, having made Fortuna their friend, who could make them
fortunate without any good desert? And truly, if Fortuna speaks, she
should at least speak, not with a womanly, but with a manly voice;
lest they themselves who have dedicated the image should think so
great a miracle has been wrought by feminine loquacity.
20. _Concerning Virtue and Faith, which the pagans have honoured
with temples and sacred rites, passing by other good qualities,
which ought likewise to have been worshipped, if deity was
rightly attributed to these._
They have made Virtue also a goddess, which, indeed, if it could be
a goddess, had been preferable to many. And now, because it is not
a goddess, but a gift of God, let _it_ be obtained by prayer from
Him, by whom alone it can be given, and the whole crowd of false gods
vanishes. But why is Faith believed to be a goddess, and why does she
herself receive temple and altar? For whoever prudently acknowledges
her makes his own self an abode for her. But how do they know what
faith is, of which it is the prime and greatest function that the
true God may be believed in? But why had not virtue sufficed? Does
it not include faith also? Forasmuch as they have thought proper to
distribute virtue into four divisions--prudence, justice, fortitude,
and temperance--and as each of these divisions has its own virtues,
faith is among the parts of justice, and has the chief place with
as many of us as know what that saying means, "The just shall live
by faith."[170] But if Faith is a goddess, I wonder why these keen
lovers of a multitude of gods have wronged so many other goddesses,
by passing them by, when they could have dedicated temples and altars
to them likewise. Why has temperance not deserved to be a goddess,
when some Roman princes have obtained no small glory on account of
her? Why, in fine, is fortitude not a goddess, who aided Mucius
when he thrust his right hand into the flames; who aided Curtius,
when for the sake of his country he threw himself headlong into the
yawning earth; who aided Decius the sire, and Decius the son, when
they devoted themselves for the army?--though we might question
whether these men had _true_ fortitude, if this concerned our present
discussion. Why have prudence and wisdom merited no place among the
gods? Is it because they are all worshipped under the general name
of Virtue itself? Then they could thus worship the true God also, of
whom all the other gods are thought to be parts. But in that one name
of virtue is comprehended both faith and chastity, which yet have
obtained separate altars in temples of their own.
21. _That although not understanding them to be the gifts of God,
they ought at least to have been content with Virtue and Felicity._
These, not verity but vanity has made goddesses. For these are gifts
of the true God, not themselves goddesses. However, where virtue and
felicity are, what else is sought for? What can suffice the man whom
virtue and felicity do not suffice? For surely virtue comprehends
all things we need do, felicity all things we need wish for. If
Jupiter, then, was worshipped in order that he might give these two
things,--because, if extent and duration of empire is something good,
it pertains to this same felicity,--why is it not understood that
they are not goddesses, but the gifts of God? But if they are judged
to be goddesses, then at least that other great crowd of gods should
not be sought after. For, having considered all the offices which
their fancy has distributed among the various gods and goddesses,
let them find out, if they can, anything which could be bestowed by
any god whatever on a man possessing virtue, possessing felicity.
What instruction could be sought either from Mercury or Minerva, when
Virtue already possessed all in herself? Virtue, indeed, is defined
by the ancients as itself the art of living well and rightly. Hence,
because virtue is called in Greek ἀρετὴ, it has been thought the
Latins have derived from it the term _art_. But if Virtue cannot
come except to the clever, what need was there of the god Father
Catius, who should make men cautious, that is, acute, when Felicity
could confer this? Because, to be born clever belongs to felicity.
Whence, although goddess Felicity could not be worshipped by one not
yet born, in order that, being made his friend, she might bestow
this on him, yet she might confer this favour on parents who were
her worshippers, that clever children should be born to them. What
need had women in childbirth to invoke Lucina, when, if Felicity
should be present, they would have, not only a good delivery, but
good children too? What need was there to commend the children to
the goddess Ops when they were being born; to the god Vaticanus in
their birth-cry; to the goddess Cunina when lying cradled; to the
goddess Rumina when sucking; to the god Statilinus when standing; to
the goddess Adeona when coming; to Abeona when going away; to the
goddess Mens that they might have a good mind; to the god Volumnus,
and the goddess Volumna, that they might wish for good things; to
the nuptial gods, that they might make good matches; to the rural
gods, and chiefly to the goddess Fructesca herself, that they might
receive the most abundant fruits; to Mars and Bellona, that they
might carry on war well; to the goddess Victoria, that they might
be victorious; to the god Honor, that they might be honoured; to
the goddess Pecunia, that they might have plenty money; to the god
Aesculanus, and his son Argentinus, that they might have brass and
silver coin? For they set down Aesculanus as the father of Argentinus
for this reason, that brass coin began to be used before silver.
But I wonder Argentinus has not begotten Aurinus, since gold coin
also has followed. Could they have him for a god, they would prefer
Aurinus both to his father Argentinus and his grandfather Aesculanus,
just as they set Jove before Saturn. Therefore, what necessity was
there on account of these gifts, either of soul, or body, or outward
estate, to worship and invoke so great a crowd of gods, all of whom I
have not mentioned, nor have they themselves been able to provide for
all human benefits, minutely and singly methodized, minute and single
gods, when the one goddess Felicity was able, with the greatest ease,
compendiously to bestow the whole of them? nor should any other be
sought after, either for the bestowing of good things, or for the
averting of evil. For why should they invoke the goddess Fessonia for
the weary; for driving away enemies, the goddess Pellonia; for the
sick, as a physician, either Apollo or Æsculapius, or both together
if there should be great danger? Neither should the god Spiniensis be
entreated that he might root out the thorns from the fields; nor the
goddess Rubigo that the mildew might not come,--Felicitas alone being
present and guarding, either no evils would have arisen, or they
would have been quite easily driven away. Finally, since we treat of
these two goddesses, Virtue and Felicity, if felicity is the reward
of virtue, she is not a goddess, but a gift of God. But if she is a
goddess, why may she not be said to confer virtue itself, inasmuch as
it is a great felicity to attain virtue?
22. _Concerning the knowledge of the worship due to the gods,
which Varro glories in having himself conferred on the Romans._
What is it, then, that Varro boasts he has bestowed as a very great
benefit on his fellow-citizens, because he not only recounts the gods
who ought to be worshipped by the Romans, but also tells what pertains
to each of them? "Just as it is of no advantage," he says, "to know the
name and appearance of any man who is a physician, and not know that he
is a physician, so," he says, "it is of no advantage to know well that
Æsculapius is a god, if you are not aware that he can bestow the gift
of health, and consequently do not know why you ought to supplicate
him." He also affirms this by another comparison, saying, "No one is
able, not only to live well, but even to live at all, if he does not
know who is a smith, who a baker, who a weaver, from whom he can seek
any utensil, whom he may take for a helper, whom for a leader, whom for
a teacher;" asserting, "that in this way it can be doubtful to no one,
that thus the knowledge of the gods is useful, if one can know what
force, and faculty, or power any god may have in anything. For from
this we may be able," he says, "to know what god we ought to call to,
and invoke for any cause; lest we should do as too many are wont to
do, and desire water from Liber, and wine from Lymphs." Very useful,
forsooth! Who would not give this man thanks if he could show true
things, and if he could teach that the one true God, from whom all good
things are, is to be worshipped by men?
23. _Concerning Felicity, whom the Romans, who venerate many gods,
for a long time did not worship with divine honour, though she
alone would have sufficed instead of all._
But how does it happen, if their books and rituals are true, and
Felicity is a goddess, that she herself is not appointed as the
only one to be worshipped, since she could confer all things, and
all at once make men happy? For who wishes anything for any other
reason than that he may become happy? Why was it left to Lucullus
to dedicate a temple to so great a goddess at so late a date, and
after so many Roman rulers? Why did Romulus himself, ambitious as he
was of founding a fortunate city, not erect a temple to this goddess
before all others? Why did he supplicate the other gods for anything,
since he would have lacked nothing had she been with him? For even
he himself would neither have been first a king, then afterwards,
as they think, a god, if this goddess had not been propitious to
him. Why, therefore, did he appoint as gods for the Romans, Janus,
Jove, Mars, Picus, Faunus, Tiberinus, Hercules, and others, if there
were more of them? Why did Titus Tatius add Saturn, Ops, Sun, Moon,
Vulcan, Light, and whatever others he added, among whom was even the
goddess Cloacina, while Felicity was neglected? Why did Numa appoint
so many gods and so many goddesses without this one? Was it perhaps
because he could not see her among so great a crowd? Certainly king
Hostilius would not have introduced the new gods Fear and Dread to
be propitiated, if he could have known or might have worshipped this
goddess. For, in presence of Felicity, Fear and Dread would have
disappeared,--I do not say propitiated, but put to flight. Next, I
ask, how is it that the Roman empire had already immensely increased
before any one worshipped Felicity? Was the empire, therefore, more
great than happy? For how could true felicity be there, where there
was not true piety? For piety is the genuine worship of the true God,
and not the worship of as many demons as there are false gods. Yet
even afterwards, when Felicity had already been taken into the number
of the gods, the great infelicity of the civil wars ensued. Was
Felicity perhaps justly indignant, both because she was invited so
late, and was invited not to honour, but rather to reproach, because
along with her were worshipped Priapus, and Cloacina, and Fear and
Dread, and Ague, and others which were not gods to be worshipped,
but the crimes of the worshippers? Last of all, if it seemed good
to worship so great a goddess along with a most unworthy crowd, why
at least was she not worshipped in a more honourable way than the
rest? For is it not intolerable that Felicity is placed neither among
the gods _Consentes_,[171] whom they allege to be admitted into the
council of Jupiter, nor among the gods whom they term _Select_? Some
temple might be made for her which might be pre-eminent, both in
loftiness of site and dignity of style. Why, indeed, not something
better than is made for Jupiter himself? For who gave the kingdom
even to Jupiter but Felicity? I am supposing that when he reigned
he was happy. Felicity, however, is certainly more valuable than
a kingdom. For no one doubts that a man might easily be found who
may fear to be made a king; but no one is found who is unwilling
to be happy. Therefore, if it is thought they can be consulted by
augury, or in any other way, the gods themselves should be consulted
about this thing, whether they may wish to give place to Felicity.
If, perchance, the place should already be occupied by the temples
and altars of others, where a greater and more lofty temple might
be built to Felicity, even Jupiter himself might give way, so that
Felicity might rather obtain the very pinnacle of the Capitoline
hill. For there is not any one who would resist Felicity, except,
which is impossible, one who might wish to be unhappy. Certainly, if
he should be consulted, Jupiter would in no case do what those three
gods, Mars, Terminus, and Juventas, did, who positively refused to
give place to their superior and king. For, as their books record,
when king Tarquin wished to construct the Capitol, and perceived that
the place which seemed to him to be the most worthy and suitable was
preoccupied by other gods, not daring to do anything contrary to
their pleasure, and believing that they would willingly give place
to a god who was so great, and was their own master, because there
were many of them there when the Capitol was founded, he inquired by
augury whether they chose to give place to Jupiter, and they were
all willing to remove thence except those whom I have named, Mars,
Terminus, and Juventas; and therefore the Capitol was built in such a
way that these three also might be within it, yet with such obscure
signs that even the most learned men could scarcely know this.
Surely, then, Jupiter himself would by no means despise Felicity as
he was himself despised by Terminus, Mars, and Juventas. But even
they themselves who had not given place to Jupiter, would certainly
give place to Felicity, who had made Jupiter king over them. Or if
they should not give place, they would act thus not out of contempt
of her, but because they chose rather to be obscure in the house of
Felicity, than to be eminent without her in their own places.
Thus the goddess Felicity being established in the largest and
loftiest place, the citizens should learn whence the furtherance
of every good desire should be sought. And so, by the persuasion
of nature herself, the superfluous multitude of other gods being
abandoned, Felicity alone would be worshipped, prayer would be made
to her alone, her temple alone would be frequented by the citizens
who wished to be happy, which no one of them would not wish; and
thus felicity, who was sought for from all the gods, would be sought
for only from her own self. For who wishes to receive from any god
anything else than felicity, or what he supposes to tend to felicity?
Wherefore, if Felicity has it in her power to be with what man she
pleases (and she has it if she is a goddess), what folly is it, after
all, to seek from any other god her whom you can obtain by request
from her own self! Therefore they ought to honour this goddess above
other gods, even by dignity of place. For, as we read in their own
authors, the ancient Romans paid greater honours to I know not what
Summanus, to whom they attributed nocturnal thunderbolts, than to
Jupiter, to whom diurnal thunderbolts were held to pertain. But,
after a famous and conspicuous temple had been built to Jupiter,
owing to the dignity of the building, the multitude resorted to him
in so great numbers, that scarce one can be found who remembers even
to have read the name of Summanus, which now he cannot once hear
named. But if Felicity is not a goddess, because, as is true, it is
a gift of God, that god must be sought who has power to give it, and
that hurtful multitude of false gods must be abandoned which the vain
multitude of foolish men follows after, making gods to itself of
the gifts of God, and offending Himself whose gifts they are by the
stubbornness of a proud will. For he cannot be free from infelicity
who worships Felicity as a goddess, and forsakes God, the giver of
felicity; just as he cannot be free from hunger who licks a painted
loaf of bread, and does not buy it of the man who has a real one.
24. _The reasons by which the pagans attempt to defend their
worshipping among the gods the divine gifts themselves._
We may, however, consider their reasons. Is it to be believed, say
they, that our forefathers were besotted even to such a degree as
not to know that these things are divine gifts, and not gods? But as
they knew that such things are granted to no one, except by some god
freely bestowing them, they called the gods whose names they did not
find out by the names of those things which they deemed to be given
by them; sometimes slightly altering the name for that purpose,
as, for example, from war they have named Bellona, not _bellum_;
from cradles, Cunina, not _cunæ_; from standing corn, Segetia, not
_seges_; from apples, Pomona, not _pomum_; from oxen, Bubona, not
_bos_. Sometimes, again, with no alteration of the word, just as the
things themselves are named, so that the goddess who gives money is
called Pecunia, and money is not thought to be itself a goddess: so
of Virtus, who gives virtue; Honor, who gives honour; Concordia,
who gives concord; Victoria, who gives victory. So, they say, when
Felicitas is called a goddess, what is meant is not the thing itself
which is given, but that deity by whom felicity is given.
25. _Concerning the one God only to be worshipped, who, although
His name is unknown, is yet deemed to be the giver of felicity._
Having had that reason rendered to us, we shall perhaps much more
easily persuade, as we wish, those whose heart has not become too
much hardened. For if now human infirmity has perceived that felicity
cannot be given except by some god; if this was perceived by those
who worshipped so many gods, at whose head they set Jupiter himself;
if, in their ignorance of the name of Him by whom felicity was given,
they agreed to call Him by the name of that very thing which they
believed He gave;--then it follows that they thought that felicity
could not be given even by Jupiter himself, whom they already
worshipped, but certainly by him whom they thought fit to worship
under the name of Felicity itself. I thoroughly affirm the statement
that they believed felicity to be given by a certain God whom they
knew not: let Him therefore be sought after, let Him be worshipped,
and it is enough. Let the train of innumerable demons be repudiated,
and let this God suffice every man whom his gift suffices. For him,
I say, God the giver of felicity will not be enough to worship,
for whom felicity itself is not enough to receive. But let him for
whom it suffices (and man has nothing more he ought to wish for)
serve the one God, the giver of felicity. This God is not he whom
they call Jupiter. For if they acknowledged him to be the giver of
felicity, they would not seek, under the name of Felicity itself, for
another god or goddess by whom felicity might be given; nor could
they tolerate that Jupiter himself should be worshipped with such
infamous attributes. For he is said to be the debaucher of the wives
of others; he is the shameless lover and ravisher of a beautiful boy.
26. _Of the scenic plays, the celebration of which the gods have
exacted from their worshippers._
"But," says Cicero, "Homer invented these things, and transferred
things human to the gods: I would rather transfer things divine to
us."[172] The poet, by ascribing such crimes to the gods, has justly
displeased the grave man. Why, then, are the scenic plays, where
these crimes are habitually spoken of, acted, exhibited, in honour
of the gods, reckoned among things divine by the most learned men?
Cicero should exclaim, not against the inventions of the poets, but
against the customs of the ancients. Would not they have exclaimed in
reply, What have we done? The gods themselves have loudly demanded
that these plays should be exhibited in their honour, have fiercely
exacted them, have menaced destruction unless this was performed,
have avenged its neglect with great severity, and have manifested
pleasure at the reparation of such neglect. Among their virtuous
and wonderful deeds the following is related. It was announced in a
dream to Titus Latinius, a Roman rustic, that he should go to the
senate and tell them to recommence the games of Rome, because on the
first day of their celebration a condemned criminal had been led to
punishment in sight of the people, an incident so sad as to disturb
the gods who were seeking amusement from the games. And when the
peasant who had received this intimation was afraid on the following
day to deliver it to the senate, it was renewed next night in a
severer form: he lost his son, because of his neglect. On the third
night he was warned that a yet graver punishment was impending, if
he should still refuse obedience. When even thus he did not dare to
obey, he fell into a virulent and horrible disease. But then, on the
advice of his friends, he gave information to the magistrates, and
was carried in a litter into the senate, and having, on declaring
his dream, immediately recovered strength, went away on his own
feet whole.[173] The senate, amazed at so great a miracle, decreed
that the games should be renewed at fourfold cost. What sensible
man does not see that men, being put upon by malignant demons, from
whose domination nothing save the grace of God through Jesus Christ
our Lord sets free, have been compelled by force to exhibit to such
gods as these, plays which, if well advised, they should condemn as
shameful? Certain it is that in these plays the poetic crimes of the
gods are celebrated, yet they are plays which were re-established
by decree of the senate, under compulsion of the gods. In these
plays the most shameless actors celebrated Jupiter as the corrupter
of chastity, and thus gave him pleasure. If that was a fiction, he
would have been moved to anger; but if he was delighted with the
representation of his crimes, even although fabulous, then, when he
happened to be worshipped, who but the devil could be served? Is
it so that he could found, extend, and preserve the Roman empire,
who was more vile than any Roman man whatever, to whom such things
were displeasing? Could he give felicity who was so infelicitously
worshipped, and who, unless he should be thus worshipped, was yet
more infelicitously provoked to anger?
27. _Concerning the three kinds of gods about which the pontiff
Scævola has discoursed._
It is recorded that the very learned pontiff Scævola[174] had
distinguished about three kinds of gods--one introduced by the poets,
another by the philosophers, another by the statesmen. The first kind
he declares to be trifling, because many unworthy things have been
invented by the poets concerning the gods; the second does not suit
states, because it contains some things that are superfluous, and
some, too, which it would be prejudicial for the people to know. It
is no great matter about the superfluous things, for it is a common
saying of skilful lawyers, "Superfluous things do no harm."[175]
But what are those things which do harm when brought before the
multitude? "These," he says, "that Hercules, Æsculapius, Castor and
Pollux, are not gods; for it is declared by learned men that these
were but men, and yielded to the common lot of mortals." What else?
"That states have not the true images of the gods; because the true
God has neither sex, nor age, nor definite corporeal members." The
pontiff is not willing that the people should know these things; for
he does not think they are false. He thinks it expedient, therefore,
that states should be deceived in matters of religion; which Varro
himself does not hesitate even to say in his books about things
divine. Excellent religion! to which the weak, who requires to be
delivered, may flee for succour; and when he seeks for the truth by
which he may be delivered, it is believed to be expedient for him
that he be deceived. And, truly, in these same books, Scævola is not
silent as to his reason for rejecting the poetic sort of gods,--to
wit, "because they so disfigure the gods that they could not bear
comparison even with good men, when they make one to commit theft,
another adultery; or, again, to say or do something else basely and
foolishly; as that three goddesses contested (with each other) the
prize of beauty, and the two vanquished by Venus destroyed Troy; that
Jupiter turned himself into a bull or swan that he might copulate
with some one; that a goddess married a man, and Saturn devoured his
children; that, in fine, there is nothing that could be imagined,
either of the miraculous or vicious, which may not be found there,
and yet is far removed from the nature of the gods." O chief pontiff
Scævola, take away the plays if thou art able; instruct the people
that they may not offer such honours to the immortal gods, in which,
if they like, they may admire the crimes of the gods, and, so far as
it is possible, may, if they please, imitate them. But if the people
shall have answered thee, You, O pontiff, have brought these things
in among us, then ask the gods themselves at whose instigation you
have ordered these things, that they may not order such things to
be offered to them. For if they are bad, and therefore in no way to
be believed concerning the majority of the gods, the greater is the
wrong done the gods about whom they are feigned with impunity. But
they do not hear thee, they are demons, they teach wicked things,
they rejoice in vile things; not only do they not count it a wrong if
these things are feigned about them, but it is a wrong they are quite
unable to bear if they are not acted at their stated festivals. But
now, if thou wouldst call on Jupiter against them, chiefly for that
reason that more of his crimes are wont to be acted in the scenic
plays, is it not the case that, although you call him god Jupiter, by
whom this whole world is ruled and administered, it is he to whom the
greatest wrong is done by you, because you have thought he ought to
be worshipped along with them, and have styled him their king?
28. _Whether the worship of the gods has been of service to the
Romans in obtaining and extending the empire._
Therefore such gods, who are propitiated by such honours, or rather are
impeached by them (for it is a greater crime to delight in having such
things said of them falsely, than even if they could be said truly),
could never by any means have been able to increase and preserve
the Roman empire. For if they could have done it, they would rather
have bestowed so grand a gift on the Greeks, who, in this kind of
divine things,--that is, in scenic plays,--have worshipped them more
honourably and worthily, although they have not exempted themselves
from those slanders of the poets, by whom they saw the gods torn in
pieces, giving them licence to ill-use any man they pleased, and have
not deemed the scenic players themselves to be base, but have held
them worthy even of distinguished honour. But just as the Romans were
able to have gold money, although they did not worship a god Aurinus,
so also they could have silver and brass coin, and yet worship neither
Argentinus nor his father Æsculanus; and so of all the rest, which it
would be irksome for me to detail. It follows, therefore, both that
they could not by any means attain such dominion if the true God was
unwilling; and that if these gods, false and many, were unknown or
contemned, and He alone was known and worshipped with sincere faith
and virtue, they would both have a better kingdom here, whatever might
be its extent, and whether they might have one here or not, would
afterwards receive an eternal kingdom.
29. _Of the falsity of the augury by which the strength and
stability of the Roman empire was considered to be indicated._
For what kind of augury is that which they have declared to be most
beautiful, and to which I referred a little ago, that Mars, and
Terminus, and Juventas would not give place even to Jove the king
of the gods? For thus, they say, it was signified that the nation
dedicated to Mars,--that is, the Roman,--should yield to none
the place it once occupied; likewise, that on account of the god
Terminus, no one would be able to disturb the Roman frontiers; and
also, that the Roman youth, because of the goddess Juventas, should
yield to no one. Let them see, therefore, how they can hold him to
be the king of their gods, and the giver of their own kingdom, if
these auguries set him down for an adversary, to whom it would have
been honourable not to yield. However, if these things are true, they
need not be at all afraid. For they are not going to confess that the
gods who would not yield to Jove have yielded to Christ. For, without
altering the boundaries of the empire, Jesus Christ has proved
Himself able to drive them, not only from their temples, but from the
hearts of their worshippers. But, before Christ came in the flesh,
and, indeed, before these things which we have quoted from their
books could have been written, but yet after that auspice was made
under king Tarquin, the Roman army has been divers times scattered or
put to flight, and has shown the falseness of the auspice, which they
derived from the fact that the goddess Juventas had not given place
to Jove; and the nation dedicated to Mars was trodden down in the
city itself by the invading and triumphant Gauls; and the boundaries
of the empire, through the falling away of many cities to Hannibal,
had been hemmed into a narrow space. Thus the beauty of the auspices
is made void, and there has remained only the contumacy against Jove,
not of gods, but of demons. For it is one thing not to have yielded,
and another to have returned whither you have yielded. Besides, even
afterwards, in the oriental regions, the boundaries of the Roman
empire were changed by the will of Hadrian; for he yielded up to the
Persian empire those three noble provinces, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and
Assyria. Thus that god Terminus, who according to these books was the
guardian of the Roman frontiers, and by that most beautiful auspice
had not given place to Jove, would seem to have been more afraid of
Hadrian, a king of men, than of the king of the gods. The aforesaid
provinces having also been taken back again, almost within our own
recollection the frontier fell back, when Julian, given up to the
oracles of their gods, with immoderate daring ordered the victualling
ships to be set on fire. The army being thus left destitute of
provisions, and he himself also being presently killed by the enemy,
and the legions being hard pressed, while dismayed by the loss of
their commander, they were reduced to such extremities that no one
could have escaped, unless by articles of peace the boundaries of
the empire had then been established where they still remain; not,
indeed, with so great a loss as was suffered by the concession of
Hadrian, but still at a considerable sacrifice. It was a vain augury,
then, that the god Terminus did not yield to Jove, since he yielded
to the will of Hadrian, and yielded also to the rashness of Julian,
and the necessity of Jovinian. The more intelligent and grave Romans
have seen these things, but have had little power against the custom
of the state, which was bound to observe the rites of the demons;
because even they themselves, although they perceived that these
things were vain, yet thought that the religious worship which is due
to God should be paid to the nature of things which is established
under the rule and government of the one true God, "serving," as
saith the apostle, "the creature more than the Creator, who is
blessed for evermore."[176] The help of this true God was necessary
to send holy and truly pious men, who would die for the true religion
that they might remove the false from among the living.
30. _What kind of things even their worshippers have owned they
have thought about the gods of the nations._
Cicero the augur laughs at auguries, and reproves men for regulating
the purposes of life by the cries of crows and jackdaws.[177] But
it will be said that an academic philosopher, who argues that all
things are uncertain, is unworthy to have any authority in these
matters. In the second book of his _De Natura Deorum_,[178] he
introduces Lucilius Balbus, who, after showing that superstitions
have their origin in physical and philosophical truths, expresses
his indignation at the setting up of images and fabulous notions,
speaking thus: "Do you not therefore see that from true and useful
physical discoveries the reason may be drawn away to fabulous and
imaginary gods? This gives birth to false opinions and turbulent
errors, and superstitions well-nigh old-wifeish. For both the forms
of the gods, and their ages, and clothing, and ornaments, are made
familiar to us; their genealogies, too, their marriages, kinships,
and all things about them, are debased to the likeness of human
weakness. They are even introduced as having perturbed minds; for
we have accounts of the lusts, cares, and angers of the gods. Nor,
indeed, as the fables go, have the gods been without their wars and
battles. And that not only when, as in Homer, some gods on either
side have defended two opposing armies, but they have even carried
on wars on their own account, as with the Titans or with the Giants.
Such things it is quite absurd either to say or to believe: they are
utterly frivolous and groundless." Behold, now, what is confessed by
those who defend the gods of the nations. Afterwards he goes on to
say that some things belong to superstition, but others to religion,
which he thinks good to teach according to the Stoics. "For not only
the philosophers," he says, "but also our forefathers, have made a
distinction between superstition and religion. For those," he says,
"who spent whole days in prayer, and offered sacrifice, that their
children might outlive them, are called superstitious."[179] Who does
not see that he is trying, while he fears the public prejudice, to
praise the religion of the ancients, and that he wishes to disjoin
it from superstition, but cannot find out how to do so? For if
those who prayed and sacrificed all day were called superstitious
by the ancients, were those also called so who instituted (what
he blames) the images of the gods of diverse age and distinct
clothing, and invented the genealogies of gods, their marriages,
and kinships? When, therefore, these things are found fault with
as superstitious, he implicates in that fault the ancients who
instituted and worshipped such images. Nay, he implicates himself,
who, with whatever eloquence he may strive to extricate himself and
be free, was yet under the necessity of venerating these images;
nor dared he so much as whisper in a discourse to the people what
in this disputation he plainly sounds forth. Let us Christians,
therefore, give thanks to the Lord our God,--not to heaven and earth,
as that author argues, but to Him who has made heaven and earth;
because these superstitions, which that Balbus, like a babbler,[180]
scarcely reprehends, He, by the most deep lowliness of Christ, by
the preaching of the apostles, by the faith of the martyrs dying
for the truth and living with the truth, has overthrown, not only
in the hearts of the religious, but even in the temples of the
superstitious, by their own free service.
31. _Concerning the opinions of Varro, who, while reprobating the
popular belief, thought that their worship should be confined
to one god, though he was unable to discover the true God._
What says Varro himself, whom we grieve to have found, although not
by his own judgment, placing the scenic plays among things divine?
When in many passages he is exhorting, like a religious man, to the
worship of the gods, does he not in doing so admit that he does not in
his own judgment believe those things which he relates that the Roman
state has instituted; so that he does not hesitate to affirm that if he
were founding a new state, he could enumerate the gods and their names
better by the rule of nature? But being born into a nation already
ancient, he says that he finds himself bound to accept the traditional
names and surnames of the gods, and the histories connected with them,
and that his purpose in investigating and publishing these details is
to incline the people to worship the gods, and not to despise them. By
which words this most acute man sufficiently indicates that he does not
publish all things, because they would not only have been contemptible
to himself, but would have seemed despicable even to the rabble, unless
they had been passed over in silence. I should be thought to conjecture
these things, unless he himself, in another passage, had openly said,
in speaking of religious rites, that many things are true which it
is not only not useful for the common people to know, but that it is
expedient that the people should think otherwise, even though falsely,
and therefore the Greeks have shut up the religious ceremonies and
mysteries in silence, and within walls. In this he no doubt expresses
the policy of the so-called wise men by whom states and peoples are
ruled. Yet by this crafty device the malign demons are wonderfully
delighted, who possess alike the deceivers and the deceived, and from
whose tyranny nothing sets free save the grace of God through Jesus
Christ our Lord.
The same most acute and learned author also says, that those alone
seem to him to have perceived what God is, who have believed Him to
be the soul of the world, governing it by design and reason.[181]
And by this, it appears, that although he did not attain to the
truth,--for the true God is not a soul, but the maker and author
of the soul,--yet if he could have been free to go against the
prejudices of custom, he could have confessed and counselled others
that the one God ought to be worshipped, who governs the world by
design and reason; so that on this subject only this point would
remain to be debated with him, that he had called Him a soul, and
not rather the creator of the soul. He says, also, that the ancient
Romans, for more than a hundred and seventy years, worshipped the
gods without an image.[182] "And if this custom," he says, "could
have remained till now, the gods would have been more purely
worshipped." In favour of this opinion, he cites as a witness among
others the Jewish nation; nor does he hesitate to conclude that
passage by saying of those who first consecrated images for the
people, that they have both taken away religious fear from their
fellow-citizens, and increased error, wisely thinking that the gods
easily fall into contempt when exhibited under the stolidity of
images. But as he does not say they have transmitted error, but that
they have increased it, he therefore wishes it to be understood that
there was error already when there were no images. Wherefore, when
he says they alone have perceived what God is who have believed Him
to be the governing soul of the world, and thinks that the rites
of religion would have been more purely observed without images,
who fails to see how near he has come to the truth? For if he had
been able to do anything against so inveterate an error, he would
certainly have given it as his opinion both that the one God should
be worshipped, and that He should be worshipped without an image;
and having so nearly discovered the truth, perhaps he might easily
have been put in mind of the mutability of the soul, and might thus
have perceived that the true God is that immutable nature which made
the soul itself. Since these things are so, whatever ridicule such
men have poured in their writings against the plurality of the gods,
they have done so rather as compelled by the secret will of God to
confess them, than as trying to persuade others. If, therefore, any
testimonies are adduced by us from these writings, they are adduced
for the confutation of those who are unwilling to consider from how
great and malignant a power of the demons the singular sacrifice of
the shedding of the most holy blood, and the gift of the imparted
Spirit, can set us free.
32. _In what interest the princes of the nations wished false
religions to continue among the people subject to them._
Varro says also, concerning the generations of the gods, that
the people have inclined to the poets rather than to the natural
philosophers; and that therefore their forefathers,--that is, the
ancient Romans,--believed both in the sex and the generations of the
gods, and settled their marriages; which certainly seems to have
been done for no other cause except that it was the business of
such men as were prudent and wise to deceive the people in matters
of religion, and in that very thing not only to worship, but also
to imitate the demons, whose greatest lust is to deceive. For just
as the demons cannot possess any but those whom they have deceived
with guile, so also men in princely office, not indeed being just,
but like demons, have persuaded the people in the name of religion
to receive as true those things which they themselves knew to be
false; in this way, as it were, binding them up more firmly in civil
society, so that they might in like manner possess them as subjects.
But who that was weak and unlearned could escape the deceits of both
the princes of the state and the demons?
33. _That the times of all kings and kingdoms are ordained by the
judgment and power of the true God._
Therefore that God, the author and giver of felicity, because He
alone is the true God, Himself gives earthly kingdoms both to
good and bad. Neither does He do this rashly, and, as it were,
fortuitously,--because He is God, not fortune,--but according to the
order of things and times, which is hidden from us, but thoroughly
known to Himself; which same order of times, however, He does not
serve as subject to it, but Himself rules as lord and appoints as
governor. Felicity He gives only to the good. Whether a man be a
subject or a king makes no difference: he may equally either possess
or not possess it. And it shall be full in that life where kings and
subjects exist no longer. And therefore earthly kingdoms are given by
Him both to the good and the bad; lest His worshippers, still under
the conduct of a very weak mind, should covet these gifts from Him as
some great things. And this is the mystery of the Old Testament, in
which the New was hidden, that there even earthly gifts are promised:
those who were spiritual understanding even then, although not yet
openly declaring, both the eternity which was symbolized by these
earthly things, and in what gifts of God true felicity could be found.
34. _Concerning the kingdom of the Jews, which was founded by the
one and true God, and preserved by Him as long as they remained
in the true religion._
Therefore, that it might be known that these earthly good things, after
which those pant who cannot imagine better things, remain in the power
of the one God Himself, not of the many false gods whom the Romans
have formerly believed worthy of worship, He multiplied His people in
Egypt from being very few, and delivered them out of it by wonderful
signs. Nor did their women invoke Lucina when their offspring was being
incredibly multiplied; and that nation having increased incredibly,
He Himself delivered, He Himself saved them from the hands of the
Egyptians, who persecuted them, and wished to kill all their infants.
Without the goddess Rumina they sucked; without Cunina they were
cradled; without Educa and Potina they took food and drink; without
all those puerile gods they were educated; without the nuptial gods
they were married; without the worship of Priapus they had conjugal
intercourse; without invocation of Neptune the divided sea opened up
a way for them to pass over, and overwhelmed with its returning waves
their enemies who pursued them. Neither did they consecrate any goddess
Mannia when they received manna from heaven; nor, when the smitten rock
poured forth water to them when they thirsted, did they worship Nymphs
and Lymphs. Without the mad rites of Mars and Bellona they carried
on war; and while, indeed, they did not conquer without victory, yet
they did not hold it to be a goddess, but the gift of their God.
Without Segetia they had harvests; without Bubona, oxen; honey without
Mellona; apples without Pomona: and, in a word, everything for which
the Romans thought they must supplicate so great a crowd of false
gods, they received much more happily from the one true God. And if
they had not sinned against Him with impious curiosity, which seduced
them like magic arts, and drew them to strange gods and idols, and at
last led them to kill Christ, their kingdom would have remained to
them, and would have been, if not more spacious, yet more happy, than
that of Rome. And now that they are dispersed through almost all lands
and nations, it is through the providence of that one true God; that
whereas the images, altars, groves, and temples of the false gods are
everywhere overthrown, and their sacrifices prohibited, it may be shown
from their books how this has been foretold by their prophets so long
before; lest, perhaps, when they should be read in ours, they might
seem to be invented by us. But now, reserving what is to follow for the
following book, we must here set a bound to the prolixity of this one.
FOOTNOTES:
[155] In Augustine's letter to Evodius (169), which was written
towards the end of the year 415, he mentions that this fourth book
and the following one were begun and finished during that same year.
[156] Comp. Bacon's _Essay on the Vicissitudes of Things_.
[157] Matt. v. 45.
[158] 2 Pet. ii. 19.
[159] Nonius Marcell. borrows this anecdote from Cicero, _De Repub._
iii.
[160] It was extinguished by Crassus in its third year.
[161] Cloacina, supposed by Lactantius (_De falsa relig._ i. 20),
Cyprian (_De Idol. vanit._), and Augustine (_infra._, c. 23) to be
the goddess of the "cloaca," or sewage of Rome. Others, however,
suppose it to be equivalent to Cluacina, a title given to Venus,
because the Romans after the end of the Sabine war purified
themselves (_cluere_) in the vicinity of her statue.
[162] Forculum foribus, Cardeam cardini, Limentinum limini.
[163] Virgil, _Eclog._ iii. 60.
[164] Virgil, _Æneid_, i. 47.
[165] Cicero, _De Nat. Deor._ ii. 25.
[166] Virgil, _Georg._ ii. 325, 326.
[167] Eusebius, _De Præp. Evang._ i. 10.
[168] Virgil, _Georg._ iv. 221, 222.
[169] The feminine Fortune.
[170] Hab. ii. 4.
[171] So called from the consent or harmony of the celestial
movements of these gods.
[172] _Tusc. Quæst._ i. 26.
[173] Livy, ii. 36; Cicero, _De Divin._ 26.
[174] Called by Cicero (_De Oratore_, i. 39) the most eloquent of
lawyers, and the best skilled lawyer among eloquent men.
[175] Superflua non nocent.
[176] Rom. i. 25.
[177] _De Divin._ ii. 37.
[178] Cic. _De Nat. Deorum_, lib. ii. c. 28.
[179] Superstition, from _superstes_. Against this etymology of
Cicero, see Lact. _Inst. Div._ iv. 28.
[180] Balbus, from _balbutiens_, stammering, babbling.
[181] See Cicero, _De Nat. Deor._ i. 2.
[182] Plutarch's _Numa_, c. 8.
BOOK FIFTH.[183]
ARGUMENT.
AUGUSTINE FIRST DISCUSSES THE DOCTRINE OF FATE, FOR THE SAKE OF
CONFUTING THOSE WHO ARE DISPOSED TO REFER TO FATE THE POWER AND
INCREASE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, WHICH COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED
TO FALSE GODS, AS HAS BEEN SHOWN IN THE PRECEDING BOOK. AFTER
THAT, HE PROVES THAT THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN GOD'S
PRESCIENCE AND OUR FREE WILL. HE THEN SPEAKS OF THE MANNERS OF
THE ANCIENT ROMANS, AND SHOWS IN WHAT SENSE IT WAS DUE TO THE
VIRTUE OF THE ROMANS THEMSELVES, AND IN HOW FAR TO THE COUNSEL
OF GOD, THAT HE INCREASED THEIR DOMINION, THOUGH THEY DID NOT
WORSHIP HIM. FINALLY, HE EXPLAINS WHAT IS TO BE ACCOUNTED THE
TRUE HAPPINESS OF THE CHRISTIAN EMPERORS.
PREFACE.
Since, then, it is established that the complete attainment of all we
desire is that which constitutes felicity, which is no goddess, but a
gift of God, and that therefore men can worship no god save Him who
is able to make them happy,--and were Felicity herself a goddess, she
would with reason be the only object of worship,--since, I say, this
is established, let us now go on to consider why God, who is able to
give with all other things those good gifts which can be possessed
by men who are not good, and consequently not happy, has seen fit to
grant such extended and long-continued dominion to the Roman empire;
for that this was not effected by that multitude of false gods which
they worshipped, we have both already adduced, and shall, as occasion
offers, yet adduce considerable proof.
1. _That the cause of the Roman empire, and of all kingdoms, is
neither fortuitous nor consists in the position of the stars._[184]
The cause, then, of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither
fortuitous nor fatal, according to the judgment or opinion of those
who call those things _fortuitous_ which either have no causes, or
such causes as do not proceed from some intelligible order, and those
things _fatal_ which happen independently of the will of God and man,
by the necessity of a certain _order_. In a word, human kingdoms are
established by divine providence. And if any one attributes their
existence to fate, because he calls the will or the power of God
itself by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion, but correct his
language. For why does he not say at first what he will say afterwards,
when some one shall put the question to him, What he means by _fate_?
For when men hear that word, according to the ordinary use of the
language, they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular
position of the stars which may exist at the time when any one is born
or conceived, which some separate altogether from the will of God,
whilst others affirm that this also is dependent on that will. But
those who are of opinion that, apart from the will of God, the stars
determine what we shall do, or what good things we shall possess, or
what evils we shall suffer, must be refused a hearing by all, not
only by those who hold the true religion, but by those who wish to
be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever, even false gods. For what
does this opinion really amount to but this, that no god whatever is
to be worshipped or prayed to? Against these, however, our present
disputation is not intended to be directed, but against those who,
in defence of those whom they think to be gods, oppose the Christian
religion. They, however, who make the position of the stars depend on
the divine will, and in a manner decree what character each man shall
have, and what good or evil shall happen to him, if they think that
these same stars have that power conferred upon them by the supreme
power of God, in order that they may determine these things according
to their will, do a great injury to the celestial sphere, in whose most
brilliant senate, and most splendid senate-house, as it were, they
suppose that wicked deeds are decreed to be done,--such deeds as that
if any terrestrial state should decree them, it would be condemned
to overthrow by the decree of the whole human race. What judgment,
then, is left to God concerning the deeds of men, who is Lord both of
the stars and of men, when to these deeds a celestial necessity is
attributed? Or, if they do not say that the stars, though they have
indeed received a certain power from God, who is supreme, determine
those things according to their own discretion, but simply that His
commands are fulfilled by them instrumentally in the application and
enforcing of such necessities, are we thus to think concerning God even
what it seemed unworthy that we should think concerning the will of
the stars? But, if the stars are said rather to signify these things
than to effect them, so that that _position of the stars_ is, as it
were, a kind of speech predicting, not causing future things,--for
this has been the opinion of men of no ordinary learning,--certainly
the mathematicians are not wont so to speak, saying, for example,
Mars in such or such a position _signifies_ a homicide, but _makes_ a
homicide. But, nevertheless, though we grant that they do not speak as
they ought, and that we ought to accept as the proper form of speech
that employed by the philosophers in predicting those things which
they think they discover in the position of the stars, how comes it
that they have never been able to assign any cause why, in the life
of twins, in their actions, in the events which befall them, in their
professions, arts, honours, and other things pertaining to human life,
also in their very death, there is often so great a difference, that,
as far as these things are concerned, many entire strangers are more
like them than they are like each other, though separated at birth by
the smallest interval of time, but at conception generated by the same
act of copulation, and at the same moment?
2. _On the difference in the health of twins._
Cicero says that the famous physician Hippocrates has left in writing
that he had suspected that a certain pair of brothers were twins,
from the fact that they both took ill at once, and their disease
advanced to its crisis and subsided in the same time in each of
them.[185] Posidonius the Stoic, who was much given to astrology,
used to explain the fact by supposing that they had been born
and conceived under the same constellation. In this question the
conjecture of the physician is by far more worthy to be accepted,
and approaches much nearer to credibility, since, according as the
parents were affected in body at the time of copulation, so might the
first elements of the fœtuses have been affected, so that all that
was necessary for their growth and development up till birth having
been supplied from the body of the same mother, they might be born
with like constitutions. Thereafter, nourished in the same house, on
the same kinds of food, where they would have also the same kinds of
air, the same locality, the same quality of water,--which, according
to the testimony of medical science, have a very great influence,
good or bad, on the condition of bodily health,--and where they
would also be accustomed to the same kinds of exercise, they would
have bodily constitutions so similar that they would be similarly
affected with sickness at the same time and by the same causes. But,
to wish to adduce that particular position of the stars which existed
at the time when they were born or conceived as the cause of their
being simultaneously affected with sickness, manifests the greatest
arrogance, when so many beings of most diverse kinds, in the most
diverse conditions, and subject to the most diverse events, may have
been conceived and born at the same time, and in the same district,
lying under the same sky. But we know that twins do not only act
differently, and travel to very different places, but that they
also suffer from different kinds of sickness; for which Hippocrates
would give what is in my opinion the simplest reason, namely, that,
through diversity of food and exercise, which arises not from the
constitution of the body, but from the inclination of the mind, they
may have come to be different from each other in respect of health.
Moreover, Posidonius, or any other asserter of the fatal influence of
the stars, will have enough to do to find anything to say to this,
if he be unwilling to impose upon the minds of the uninstructed in
things of which they are ignorant. But, as to what they attempt to
make out from that very small interval of time elapsing between
the births of twins, on account of that point in the heavens where
the mark of the natal hour is placed, and which they call the
"horoscope," it is either disproportionately small to the diversity
which is found in the dispositions, actions, habits, and fortunes
of twins, or it is disproportionately great when compared with the
estate of twins, whether low or high, which is the same for both of
them, the cause for whose greatest difference they place, in every
case, in the hour on which one is born; and, for this reason, if the
one is born so immediately after the other that there is no change
in the horoscope, I demand an entire similarity in all that respects
them both, which can never be found in the case of any twins. But if
the slowness of the birth of the second give time for a change in the
horoscope, I demand different parents, which twins can never have.
3. _Concerning the arguments which Nigidius the mathematician drew
from the potter's wheel, in the question about the birth of
twins._
It is to no purpose, therefore, that that famous fiction about the
potter's wheel is brought forward, which tells of the answer which
Nigidius is said to have given when he was perplexed with this
question, and on account of which he was called _Figulus_.[186] For,
having whirled round the potter's wheel with all his strength, he
marked it with ink, striking it twice with the utmost rapidity, so
that the strokes seemed to fall on the very same part of it. Then,
when the rotation had ceased, the marks which he had made were found
upon the rim of the wheel at no small distance apart. Thus, said
he, considering the great rapidity with which the celestial sphere
revolves, even though twins were born with as short an interval
between their births as there was between the strokes which I gave
this wheel, that brief interval of time is equivalent to a very great
distance in the celestial sphere. Hence, said he, come whatever
dissimilitudes may be remarked in the habits and fortunes of twins.
This argument is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned
by the rotation of that wheel. For if there is so much significance
in the heavens which cannot be comprehended by observation of the
constellations, that, in the case of twins, an inheritance may fall
to the one and not to the other, why, in the case of others who
are not twins, do they dare, having examined their constellations,
to declare such things as pertain to that secret which no one can
comprehend, and to attribute them to the precise moment of the birth
of each individual? Now, if such predictions in connection with the
natal hours of others who are not twins are to be vindicated on the
ground that they are founded on the observation of more extended
spaces in the heavens, whilst those very small moments of time which
separated the births of twins, and correspond to minute portions
of celestial space, are to be connected with trifling things about
which the mathematicians are not wont to be consulted,--for who would
consult them as to when he is to sit, when to walk abroad, when and
on what he is to dine?--how can we be justified in so speaking, when
we can point out such manifold diversity both in the habits, doings,
and destinies of twins?
4. _Concerning the twins Esau and Jacob, who were very unlike each
other both in their character and actions._
In the time of the ancient fathers, to speak concerning illustrious
persons, there were born two twin brothers, the one so immediately
after the other, that the first took hold of the heel of the second.
So great a difference existed in their lives and manners, so great a
dissimilarity in their actions, so great a difference in their parents'
love for them respectively, that the very contrast between them
produced even a mutual hostile antipathy. Do we mean, when we say that
they were so unlike each other, that when the one was walking the other
was sitting, when the one was sleeping the other was waking,--which
differences are such as are attributed to those minute portions of
space which cannot be appreciated by those who note down the position
of the stars which exists at the moment of one's birth, in order that
the mathematicians may be consulted concerning it? One of these twins
was for a long time a hired servant; the other never served. One of
them was beloved by his mother; the other was not so. One of them lost
that honour which was so much valued among their people; the other
obtained it. And what shall we say of their wives, their children, and
their possessions? How different they were in respect to all these!
If, therefore, such things as these are connected with those minute
intervals of time which elapse between the births of twins, and are not
to be attributed to the constellations, wherefore are they predicted in
the case of others from the examination of their constellations? And
if, on the other hand, these things are said to be predicted, because
they are connected, not with minute and inappreciable moments, but with
intervals of time which can be observed and noted down, what purpose
is that potter's wheel to serve in this matter, except it be to whirl
round men who have hearts of clay, in order that they may be prevented
from detecting the emptiness of the talk of the mathematicians?
5. _In what manner the mathematicians are convicted of professing
a vain science._
Do not those very persons whom the medical sagacity of Hippocrates
led him to suspect to be twins, because their disease was observed
by him to develope to its crisis and to subside again in the same
time in each of them,--do not these, I say, serve as a sufficient
refutation of those who wish to attribute to the influence of the
stars that which was owing to a similarity of bodily constitution?
For wherefore were they both sick of the same disease, and at the
same time, and not the one after the other in the order of their
birth? (for certainly they could not both be born at the same time.)
Or, if the fact of their having been born at different times by
no means necessarily implies that they must be sick at different
times, why do they contend that the difference in the time of their
births was the cause of their difference in other things? Why could
they travel in foreign parts at different times, marry at different
times, beget children at different times, and do many other things
at different times, by reason of their having been born at different
times, and yet could not, for the same reason, also be sick at
different times? For if a difference in the moment of birth changed
the horoscope, and occasioned dissimilarity in all other things, why
has that simultaneousness which belonged to their conception remained
in their attacks of sickness? Or, if the destinies of health are
involved in the time of conception, but those of other things be
said to be attached to the time of birth, they ought not to predict
anything concerning health from examination of the constellations
of birth, when the hour of conception is not also given, that its
constellations may be inspected. But if they say that they predict
attacks of sickness without examining the horoscope of conception,
because these are indicated by the moments of birth, how could
they inform either of these twins when he would be sick, from the
horoscope of his birth, when the other also, who had not the same
horoscope of birth, must of necessity fall sick at the same time?
Again, I ask, if the distance of time between the births of twins
is so great as to occasion a difference of their constellations on
account of the difference of their horoscopes, and therefore of
all the cardinal points to which so much influence is attributed,
that even from such change there comes a difference of destiny,
how is it possible that this should be so, since they cannot have
been conceived at different times? Or, if two conceived at the same
moment of time could have different destinies with respect to their
births, why may not also two born at the same moment of time have
different destinies for life and for death? For if the one moment
in which both were conceived did not hinder that the one should be
born before the other, why, if two are born at the same moment,
should anything hinder them from dying at the same moment? If a
simultaneous conception allows of twins being differently affected
in the _womb_, why should not simultaneousness of birth allow of any
two individuals having different fortunes in the _world_? and thus
would all the fictions of this art, or rather delusion, be swept
away. What strange circumstance is this, that two children conceived
at the same time, nay, at the same moment, under the same position of
the stars, have different fates which bring them to different hours
of birth, whilst two children, born of two different mothers, at the
same moment of time, under one and the same position of the stars,
cannot have different fates which shall conduct them by necessity
to diverse manners of life and of death? Are they at conception as
yet without destinies, because they can only have them if they be
born? What, therefore, do they mean when they say that, if the hour
of the conception be found, many things can be predicted by these
astrologers? from which also arose that story which is reiterated
by some, that a certain sage chose an hour in which to lie with his
wife, in order to secure his begetting an illustrious son. From this
opinion also came that answer of Posidonius, the great astrologer
and also philosopher, concerning those twins who were attacked with
sickness at the same time, namely, "That this had happened to them
because they were conceived at the same time, and born at the same
time." For certainly he added "conception," lest it should be said
to him that they could not both be _born_ at the same time, knowing
that at any rate they must both have been conceived at the same time;
wishing thus to show that he did not attribute the fact of their
being similarly and simultaneously affected with sickness to the
similarity of their bodily constitutions as its proximate cause, but
that he held that even in respect of the similarity of their health,
they were bound together by a sidereal connection. If, therefore,
the time of conception has so much to do with the similarity of
destinies, these same destinies ought not to be changed by the
circumstances of birth; or, if the destinies of twins be said to be
changed because they are born at different times, why should we not
rather understand that they had been already changed in order that
they might be born at different times? Does not, then, the will of
men living in the world change the destinies of birth, when the order
of birth can change the destinies they had at conception?
6. _Concerning twins of different sexes._
But even in the very conception of twins, which certainly occurs at
the same moment in the case of both, it often happens that the one is
conceived a male, and the other a female. I know two of different sexes
who are twins. Both of them are alive, and in the flower of their age;
and though they resemble each other in body, as far as difference of
sex will permit, still they are very different in the whole scope and
purpose of their lives (consideration being had of those differences
which necessarily exist between the lives of males and females),--the
one holding the office of a count, and being almost constantly away
from home with the army in foreign service, the other never leaving
her country's soil, or her native district. Still more,--and this is
more incredible, if the destinies of the stars are to be believed in,
though it is not wonderful if we consider the wills of men, and the
free gifts of God,--he is married; she is a sacred virgin: he has
begotten a numerous offspring; she has never even married. But is not
the virtue of the horoscope very great? I think I have said enough
to show the absurdity of that. But, say those astrologers, whatever
be the virtue of the horoscope in other respects, it is certainly of
significance with respect to birth. But why not also with respect to
conception, which takes place undoubtedly with one act of copulation?
And, indeed, so great is the force of nature, that after a woman has
once conceived, she ceases to be liable to conception. Or were they,
perhaps, changed at birth, either he into a male, or she into a female,
because of the difference in their horoscopes? But, whilst it is not
altogether absurd to say that certain sidereal influences have some
power to cause differences in bodies alone,--as, for instance, we see
that the seasons of the year come round by the approaching and receding
of the sun, and that certain kinds of things are increased in size or
diminished by the waxings and wanings of the moon, such as sea-urchins,
oysters, and the wonderful tides of the ocean,--it does not follow that
the _wills of men_ are to be made subject to the position of the stars.
The astrologers, however, when they wish to bind our actions also to
the constellations, only set us on investigating whether, even in
these bodies, the changes may not be attributable to some other than a
sidereal cause. For what is there which more intimately concerns a body
than its sex? And yet, under the same position of the stars, twins of
different sexes may be conceived. Wherefore, what greater absurdity can
be affirmed or believed than that the position of the stars, which was
the same for both of them at the time of conception, could not cause
that the one child should not have been of a different sex from her
brother, with whom she had a common constellation, whilst the position
of the stars which existed at the hour of their birth could cause that
she should be separated from him by the great distance between marriage
and holy virginity?
7. _Concerning the choosing of a day for marriage, or for planting,
or sowing._
Now, will any one bring forward this, that in choosing certain
particular days for particular actions, men bring about certain new
destinies for their actions? That man, for instance, according to
this doctrine, was not born to have an illustrious son, but rather a
contemptible one, and therefore, being a man of learning, he chose an
hour in which to lie with his wife. He made, therefore, a destiny
which he did not have before, and from that destiny of his own making
something began to be fatal which was not contained in the destiny of
his natal hour. Oh, singular stupidity! A day is chosen on which to
marry; and for this reason, I believe, that unless a day be chosen,
the marriage may fall on an unlucky day, and turn out an unhappy
one. What then becomes of what the stars have already decreed at
the hour of birth? Can a man be said to change by an act of choice
that which has already been determined for him, whilst that which he
himself has determined in the choosing of a day cannot be changed by
another power? Thus, if men alone, and not all things under heaven,
are subject to the influence of the stars, why do they choose some
days as suitable for planting vines or trees, or for sowing grain,
other days as suitable for taming beasts on, or for putting the
males to the females, that the cows and mares may be impregnated,
and for such-like things? If it be said that certain chosen days
have an influence on these things, because the constellations rule
over all terrestrial bodies, animate and inanimate, according to
differences in moments of time, let it be considered what innumerable
multitudes of beings are born or arise, or take their origin at the
very same instant of time, which come to ends so different, that
they may persuade any little boy that these observations about days
are ridiculous. For who is so mad as to dare affirm that all trees,
all herbs, all beasts, serpents, birds, fishes, worms, have each
separately their own moments of birth or commencement? Nevertheless,
men are wont, in order to try the skill of the mathematicians,
to bring before them the constellations of dumb animals, the
constellations of whose birth they diligently observe at home with
a view to this discovery; and they prefer those mathematicians to
all others, who say from the inspection of the constellations that
they indicate the birth of a beast and not of a man. They also dare
tell what kind of beast it is, whether it is a wool-bearing beast,
or a beast suited for carrying burthens, or one fit for the plough,
or for watching a house; for the astrologers are also tried with
respect to the fates of dogs, and their answers concerning these are
followed by shouts of admiration on the part of those who consult
them. They so deceive men as to make them think that during the birth
of a man the births of all other beings are suspended, so that not
even a fly comes to life at the same time that he is being born,
under the same region of the heavens. And if this be admitted with
respect to the fly, the reasoning cannot stop there, but must ascend
from flies till it lead them up to camels and elephants. Nor are they
willing to attend to this, that when a day has been chosen whereon
to sow a field, so many grains fall into the ground simultaneously,
germinate simultaneously, spring up, come to perfection, and ripen
simultaneously; and yet, of all the ears which are coeval, and, so to
speak, _congerminal_, some are destroyed by mildew, some are devoured
by the birds, and some are pulled by men. How can they say that all
these had their different constellations, which they see coming to so
different ends? Will they confess that it is folly to choose days for
such things, and to affirm that they do not come within the sphere of
the celestial decree, whilst they subject men alone to the stars, on
whom alone in the world God has bestowed free wills? All these things
being considered, we have good reason to believe that, when the
astrologers give very many wonderful answers, it is to be attributed
to the occult inspiration of spirits not of the best kind, whose care
it is to insinuate into the minds of men, and to confirm in them,
those false and noxious opinions concerning the fatal influence of
the stars, and not to their marking and inspecting of horoscopes,
according to some kind of art which in reality has no existence.
8. _Concerning those who call by the name of fate, not the
position of the stars, but the connection of causes which
depends on the will of God._
But, as to those who call by the name of fate, not the disposition of
the stars as it may exist when any creature is conceived, or born,
or commences its existence, but the whole connection and train of
causes which makes everything become what it does become, there is
no need that I should labour and strive with them in a merely verbal
controversy, since they attribute the so-called order and connection
of causes to the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly
and most truly believed to know all things before they come to pass,
and to leave nothing unordained; from whom are all powers, although
the wills of all are not from Him. Now, that it is chiefly the will
of God most high, whose power extends itself irresistibly through all
things which they call fate, is proved by the following verses, of
which, if I mistake not, Annæus Seneca is the author:--
"Father supreme, Thou ruler of the lofty heavens,
Lead me where'er it is Thy pleasure; I will give
A prompt obedience, making no delay,
Lo! here I am. Promptly I come to do Thy sovereign will;
If Thy command shall thwart my inclination, I will still
Follow Thee groaning, and the work assigned,
With all the suffering of a mind repugnant,
Will perform, being evil; which, had I been good,
I should have undertaken and performed, though hard,
With virtuous cheerfulness.
The Fates do lead the man that follows willing;
But the man that is unwilling, him they drag."[187]
Most evidently, in this last verse, he calls that "fate" which he had
before called "the will of the Father supreme," whom, he says, he is
ready to obey that he may be led, being willing, not dragged, being
unwilling, since "the Fates do lead the man that follows willing, but
the man that is unwilling, him they drag."
The following Homeric lines, which Cicero translates into Latin, also
favour this opinion:--
"Such are the minds of men, as is the light
Which Father Jove himself doth pour
Illustrious o'er the fruitful earth."[188]
Not that Cicero wishes that a poetical sentiment should have any
weight in a question like this; for when he says that the Stoics, when
asserting the power of fate, were in the habit of using these verses
from Homer, he is not treating concerning the opinion of that poet, but
concerning that of those philosophers, since by these verses, which
they quote in connection with the controversy which they hold about
fate, is most distinctly manifested what it is which they reckon fate,
since they call by the name of Jupiter him whom they reckon the supreme
god, from whom, they say, hangs the whole chain of fates.
9. _Concerning the foreknowledge of God and the free will of man,
in opposition to the definition of Cicero._
The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of
refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect
anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished
divination.[189] And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that
there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all
his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man,
and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the
foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing
to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all
prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these
oracles are not refuted by him).
But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his
argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy
and refute themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable
who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the
foreknowledge of future events. For, to confess that God exists,
and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future
things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw, and
therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of
Scripture, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."[190]
That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious
and offensive such an opinion would be; and, therefore in his book
on the nature of the gods,[191] he makes Cotta dispute concerning
this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in
favour of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the
Stoical position, rather than in favour of Cotta, who maintained
that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in
his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of
future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not
grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he
thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate
follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.
But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the
philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the
most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power,
and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not
do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge
is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero
was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also
maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although
they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it,
then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless
it was this,--that if all future things have been foreknown, they will
happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come
to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown
by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of
causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient
cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which
everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things
happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in
our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if
we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted.
In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings,
exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the
appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked.
And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to
humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of
future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to
make choice between two things, either that something is in our own
power, or that there is foreknowledge,--both of which cannot be true;
but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore,
like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and
very skilfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom
of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future
things; and thus, wishing to make men free, he makes them sacrilegious.
But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both
by the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of
future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences
which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free
wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we
must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the
conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go
backwards through all the steps in the following order:--If there is
free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do
not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes;
and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a
certain order of things foreknown by God,--for things cannot come to
pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,--but, if there is no
fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot
be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And
further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have
been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge
of future events.
Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we
assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and
that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done
by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by
fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by
fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to
be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position
of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an
unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of
causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of
God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate,
unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken,
deriving it from _fari_, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is
written in the sacred Scriptures, "God hath spoken once; these two
things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee, O
God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man according
to his works."[192] Now the expression, "Once hath He spoken," is to
be understood as meaning "_immovably_," that is, unchangeably hath
He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall
be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word
fate in the sense it bears when derived from _fari_, to speak, had
it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I
am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But
it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of
all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free
exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in
that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His
foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions;
and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among
those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very
concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in
this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes
place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being
a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is
sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded
by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous
are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent,
and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that
of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no
means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer
of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable
either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever
description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid
of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek
or shun various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of
the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we
call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the
angels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the
wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from this we conclude
that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass
unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which
is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but,
inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit
of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator
of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the
uncreated spirit. In His supreme will resides the power which acts
on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the
evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to
others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the
bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not
from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies,
they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean
the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of
men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the
will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no
power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things,
therefore, which makes but is not made, is God; but all other causes
both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially
the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to
be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes,
because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How,
then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge
of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent
on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place
in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call
this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself
by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on
account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand
as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order
of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience
of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either
denies that God exists,--which, indeed, in an assumed personage,
he has laboured to do, in his book _De Natura Deorum_,--or if he
confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future
things, what is that but just "the fool saying in his heart there is
no God?" For one who is not prescient of all future things is not
God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed
and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power
they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they
are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge
is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and
would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate
to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the
weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his
power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order
of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to
themselves, the Stoics call _Fate_.
10. _Whether our wills are ruled by necessity._
Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which
the Stoics laboured to make such distinctions among the causes of
things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion
of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which
they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills,
knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For
if that is to be called _our necessity_ which is not in our power,
but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect,--as, for
instance, the necessity of death,--it is manifest that our wills by
which we live uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for
we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly
not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself,--for if
we will, it _is_; if we will not, it _is_ not,--for we should not will
if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according
to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such
a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we
should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of
our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of
God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God
should live for ever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power
diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,--for
this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for
Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called
omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He
is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on
account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall
Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some
things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say
that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in
so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still
subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our
wills, therefore, _exist_ as _wills_, and do themselves whatever we
do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But
when any one suffers anything, being unwilling, by the will of another,
even in that case will retains its essential validity,--we do not mean
the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it
into the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be
able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful
will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and
that not the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed,
but was not able to accomplish what he willed. Therefore, whatsoever
a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to
the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to
His will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that
because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is
for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew
this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what would
be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something,
assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is something in the
power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either,
retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will,
or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of
future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We faithfully
and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well; the
latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe
well concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain
our freedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or
shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted,
and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had
recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and they are of great avail,
even as great as He foreknew that they would be of. Prayers, also, are
of avail to procure those things which He foreknew that He would grant
to those who offered them; and with justice have rewards been appointed
for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore
sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted
but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He,
whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune,
or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who,
if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this
did God foreknow.
11. _Concerning the universal providence of God in the laws of
which all things are comprehended._
Therefore God supreme and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which
three are one), one God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and
of every body; by whose gift all are happy who are happy through verity
and not through vanity; who made man a rational animal consisting
of soul and body, who, when he sinned, neither permitted him to go
unpunished, nor left him without mercy; who has given to the good and
to the evil, being in common with stones, vegetable life in common with
trees, sensuous life in common with brutes, intellectual life in common
with angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order;
from whom are measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which
has an existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever
value; from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and
the motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin,
beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, and
the salutary concord of its parts; who also to the irrational soul has
given memory, sense, appetite, but to the rational soul, in addition to
these, has given intelligence and will; who has not left, not to speak
of heaven and earth, angels and men, but not even the entrails of the
smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the
little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony,
and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts;--that God can
never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations
and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence.
12. _By what virtues the ancient Romans merited that the true God,
although they did not worship Him, should enlarge their empire._