All investigations of the sea-going qualities of torpedo boats show that
while the basin experiments are highly satisfactory, those made at sea
prove with equal force the unreliability of these craft when they leave the
coast. At the beginning of the Milford Haven operations, the boisterous
weather necessitated the postponing of operations, on account of the
unfitness of the torpedo boat crews to continue work after the twelve hours
of serious fatigue they had already undergone. In the French evolutions,
the difficulties of the passage from Bastia to Ajaccio, although not
remarkably severe, so unfitted fifteen of the twenty boats that they could
take no part in the final attack. In two nights we find recorded collisions
which disable boats Nos. 52, 61, 63, and 72, and required their return to
port for repairs.
Of the twenty-two torpedo boats leaving Toulon a few days before, but six
arrived near the enemy, although their commanders displayed admirable
energy. One had run aground, and was full of water; another had been sunk
by collision; another's engine was seriously injured; and as for the rest,
they could not follow.
Of the boats under the command of Admiral Brown de Colstoun, but five
remained for service, for the sixth received an accident to her machinery
which prevented her taking part in the attack.
During the operations off the Balearic Isles, only one of six boats
attacked, and none was able to follow the armorclads, all meeting with
circumstances quite unexpected and embarrassing.
With the weather as it existed May 13, the armorclads had the torpedo fleet
completely at their mercy, for even if they had not been destroyed by the
excellent practice of the Hotchkiss gunners, they would have been of no
use, as they could not with safety discharge their torpedoes. In fact, the
search lights discovered distinctly that one of the boats, which burned her
Coston's signal to announce victory, did not have her torpedo tube open, on
account of the heavy sea.
Furthermore, their positions were frequently easily discovered by the
immense volume of smoke and flame ejected while going at great speed. This
applies as well by night as by day. It was also reported that after the
four days' running the speed of the boats was reduced to twelve knots.
With such evidence before us, the seaworthiness of boats of the Nos. 63 and
64 type may be seriously questioned. Weyl emphasizes the facts that
"practice has shown that boats of No. 61 type cannot make headway in a
heavy sea, and that it is then often impossible to open their torpedo
tubes. On this account they are greatly inferior to ships of moderate
tonnage, which can certainly make some progress, fire their torpedoes, and
use their artillery in weather when a torpedo boat will be utterly
helpless. The torpedo boat abandoned to itself has a very limited field of
action."
Du Pin de Saint Andre admits the success of the torpedo boat for harbor and
coast work, but wisely concludes that this can prove nothing as to what
they may or may not be able to do at sea.
In an article which appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ in June last,
he presented able reasons why the torpedo boats of to-day's type, being
destitute of most, if not all, of the requisites of sea-going craft, cannot
go to sea, take care of themselves, and remain there prepared to attack an
enemy wherever he may be found. Invisibility to an enemy may facilitate
attack, but it has to be dearly paid for in diminished safety. Further, the
life that must be led in such vessels in time of war would very quickly
unfit men for their hazardous duties.
He points out that the effect of such a life upon the bodies and minds of
the officers and crew would be most disastrous. The want of exercise alone
would be sufficient to unfit them for the demands that service would make
upon them. He has intelligently depicted the consequences of such a life,
and his reasoning has been indorsed by the reports of French officers who
have had experience in the boats in question.
No weapon, no matter how ingenious, is of utility in warfare unless it can
be relied upon, and no vessel that is not tenantable can be expected to
render any service at sea.
From the evidence before us, we must conclude that the type of torpedo boat
under discussion is capable of making sea passages, provided it can
communicate frequently with its supply stations and secure the bodily rest
so necessary to its crew. But even in a moderate sea it is useless for
attack, and in the majority of cases will not be able even to open its
impulse tubes. Should it succeed in doing this, the rolling and yawing will
render its aim very uncertain.
An experiment conducted against the Richelieu in October last, at Toulon,
before Admiral O'Neil, the director-general of the torpedo service, has
added its testimony to the uncertainty of the Whitehead torpedo. The
Richelieu had been fitted with Bullivant nets, and the trial was made to
learn what protection they would afford.
The weather was fair, the sea moderate, and the conditions generally
favorable to the torpedo; but the Whitehead missed its mark, although the
Richelieu's speed was only three knots. Running at full speed, the torpedo
boat, even in this moderate sea, deemed it prudent to keep the launching
tube closed, and selected a range of 250 yards for opening it and firing.
Just at the moment of discharge a little sea came on board, the boat yawed,
the torpedo aim was changed more than 30 deg., and it passed astern without
touching its object.
While the Milford Haven operations have taught some valuable lessons, they
were conducted under but few of the conditions that are most likely to
occur in actual warfare; and had the defense been carried on with an
organization and command equal to that of the attack, the Navy's triumph
would, perhaps, not have been so easily secured, and the results might have
been very different.
May not the apparent deficiencies of the defense have been due to the fact
that soldiers instead of sailors are given the control of the harbor and
coast defense? Is this right? Ought they not to be organized on a naval
basis? This is no new suggestion, but its importance needs emphasis.
These operations, however, convinced at least one deeply interested
spectator, Lord Brassey, to the extent of calling attention "to the urgent
necessity for the construction of a class of torpedo vessels capable of
keeping the sea in company with an armored fleet."
There is no one in Great Britain who takes a greater interest in the
progress of the British Navy than Lord Brassey, and we take pleasure in
quoting from his letter of August 23 last to the _Times_, in which he
expressed the following opinion: "The torpedo boats ordered last year from
Messrs. Thornycroft and Yarrow are excellent in their class. But their
dimensions are not sufficient for sea-going vessels. We must accept a
tonnage of not less than 300 tons in order to secure thorough seaworthiness
and sufficient coal endurance.
"A beginning has been made in the construction of vessels of the type
required. To multiply them with no stinting hand is the paramount question
of the day in the department of construction. The boats attached to the
Channel fleet at Milford Haven will be most valuable for harbor defense,
and for that purpose they are greatly needed. Torpedo boat catchers are not
less essential to the efficiency of a fleet. The gunboats attached to the
Channel fleet were built for service in the rivers of China. They should be
reserved for the work for which they were designed.
"We require for the fleet more fast gunboats of the Curlew and Landrail
type. I trust that the next estimates for the Navy will contain an ample
provision for building gun vessels of high speed."
As torpedoes must be carried, the next point to which we would call the
attention of our readers is the very rapid progress that has been made in
the boats designed to carry automatic torpedoes.
A very few years ago the names of Thornycroft and Yarrow were almost alone
as builders of a special type of vessel to carry them. To-day, in addition,
we have Schichau, White, Herreshoff, Creusot, Thomson, and others, forming
a competitive body of high speed torpedo-boat builders who are daily making
new and rapid development--almost too rapid, in fact, for the military
student to follow.
As new types are designed, additional speed gained, or increased
seaworthiness attained, public descriptions quickly follow, and we have
ourselves recorded the various advances made so fully that it will be
unnecessary to enter into details here.
As late as October, 1885, an able writer said: "The two most celebrated
builders of torpedo boats in the world are Thornycroft and Yarrow, in
England. Each is capable of producing a first class torpedo boat, from 100
ft. to 130 ft. long, and with 10 ft. to 14 ft. beam, that will steam at the
rate of from 18 knots to 22 knots per hour for 370 knots, or at the rate of
10 knots per hour for 3000 miles. A second class torpedo boat is from 40
ft. to 60 ft. long, and with 6 ft. or 8 ft. beam.
The use of these boats is gradually being abandoned in Europe except for
use from sea-going ships; but in Europe the harbors are very small, and it
has been found that practically every torpedo boat for coast defense must
be able to go to sea. The tendency is, therefore, to confinement to the
first class boats."
In a paper on "Naval Torpedo Warfare," prepared in January, 1886, for a
special committee of the American Senate, by Lieutenant Jaques of the
American Navy, we find the following reference to the progress in torpedo
boat construction: "The development in torpedo boats has been phenomenal,
the last year alone showing an advance from a length of 120 ft. and a speed
of 19 knots, which were considered remarkable qualities in a first class
boat, to a length of 140 ft. and a speed of 23 knots loaded (carrying 15
tons), and 25 knots light, together with the introduction of novel features
of importance.
"Although Messrs. Yarrow and Thornycroft have brought the second class
boats to a very high standard in Europe, I believe they will soon be
abandoned there even for sea-going ships (very few are now laid down), and
that the great development will be in overcoming the disadvantages of
delicacy and weakness by increasing their size, giving them greater
maneuvering power and safety by the introduction of two engines and twin
screws, and steel plate and coal protection against rapid firing
ammunition. Yarrow and Co. have already laid down some boats of this
character that give promise of developing a speed of from 23 to 25 knots."
In the Russian boat recently built at Glasgow, progress in this direction
is also seen in the 148 ft. length, 17 ft. beam, the maneuvering powers and
safety element of the twin screws. But while the boat is fitted for the 19
ft. torpedo, a weapon of increased range and heavier explosive charge, it
suffers from the impossibility of broadside fire and the disadvantages that
Gallwey has named: "The great length of this torpedo, however, makes it a
very unhandy weapon for a boat, besides which its extra weight limits the
number which can be carried."
While perhaps Messrs. Thomson have been the first to show the performance
of a twin screw torpedo boat in England, the one completed in June last by
Yarrow for the Japanese government recalls the intelligence that Japan has
exercised in the selection of types.
Commencing as far back as nine years ago, the Japanese were probably the
first to introduce sea-going boats, and they have been the first power to
initiate the armor type, one of which was shipped last summer to be put
together in Japan. As before stated, it was built by Messrs. Yarrow and
Co., was 166 ft. long, 19 ft. beam, with twin screws, 1 in. steel armor,
double engines, with bow and broadside torpedo guns, the latter so arranged
as to greatly increase their efficiency.
While the advances are not restricted to the English builders, a glance at
the points to which Thornycroft and Yarrow have brought their improvements
up to the present time will indicate that their achievements are not only
equal to but greater than those of any other builders.
The former has boats under construction 148 ft. long, 15 ft. beam, to make
420 revolutions with 130 lb. of steam, the guaranteed speed being 23 knots
on a continuous run of two hours' duration, with a load of 15 tons. They
will have triple-expansion or compound direct-acting surface-condensing
engines and twin screws, Thornycroft's patent tubular boilers, double
rudders, electric search lights, three masts and sails.
While the armaments of the various boats differ, Thornycroft is prepared to
fit the launching tubes with either air or powder impulse, to mount the
tubes forward or on deck, and also the fittings for machine and rapid
firing guns.
Yarrow and Co. have contracted for boats varying in length from 117 ft. to
166 ft., with fittings and armament as may be required. They have obtained
excellent results in their last English boat of the Admiralty type. They
are, in fact, prepared to guarantee a speed of 23 knots in a length of 125
ft. and 25 knots in a length of 140 ft., carrying in both causes a mean
load corresponding to fuel and armament of 10 tons.
And so the progress goes on, but it will not stop here; it has already
incited a marked development in ship construction, and the endeavors to
withstand torpedo attack have improved the defense against gun fire also.
In quoting a German opinion on the development of the Russian torpedo
fleet, Charmes refers to the type which will, no doubt, be most successful
upon the sea, namely, the torpedo cruisers, and it is to this type, more
than for any other, that we may expect torpedo boats to be adapted.
Already, writers have dropped the phrase "torpedo boats" for "torpedo
vessels."--_Engineering_.
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