'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam,
illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons,
slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about
my tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the
battle, will nevertheless stay his hand.'
Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been
the pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have
carried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing
liars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to
Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and
that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom
he regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of
him by his own cunning and falsehood?
HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that
Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in
the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely
or truly, speaks always with a purpose.
SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than
Achilles?
HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be
better than the involuntary?
HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and
voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who
err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be
made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of
harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe
on those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil
involuntarily.
SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious
I am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only
good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong
in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that
when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom
all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For
speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything
which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to
differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my
salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very
grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful
thanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend
that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and
proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what
you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my
own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to
be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what
you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind,
and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far
than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the
opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a
condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be
in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to
me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind
is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in
general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do
wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and
not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you
cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of
disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long
oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow
you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a
great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse
yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for
you incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not
answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.
EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any
entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer
no man.--Did you not say so, Hippias?
HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome
in an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias;
Republic.)
SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did,
it would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would
argue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as
you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.
EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that
you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.
HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you
like.
SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to
which are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if
you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching
the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good
runners?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And there are bad runners?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is
a bad runner?
HIPPIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs
well?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and
slowness is an evil quality?
HIPPIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly
voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily.
SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing?
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in
a race?
HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly.
SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action
voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred.
SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a
race than he who does them voluntarily?
HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race.
SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler,
he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.
SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to
fall, or to throw another?
HIPPIAS: To fall.
SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base
and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them
involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not he
who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which
is weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that when
he does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does them
voluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily.
HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength.
SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is
better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures
voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: True.
SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the
bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?
HIPPIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer
the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?
HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune.
SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils?
HIPPIAS: Goods.
SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or
involuntarily lame?
HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame.
SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might
voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily
blink?
HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.
SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts
ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?
HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention.
SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of
all the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired,
as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be
desired as being good?
HIPPIAS: I agree.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the better
sort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man acts
ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a
rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill
voluntarily.
SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute
and all other things?
HIPPIAS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you
may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.
SOCRATES: That would be the better horse?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be
produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who
voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?
HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses.
SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind
which errs voluntarily?
HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the
mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the
involuntary?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all
arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does
what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse
that which does so involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: That is evident.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we
not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes,
and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them
involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best
state possible?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make
mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that
those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong
involuntarily!
SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference.
HIPPIAS: I do not think so.
SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once
more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice,
at all events, be one of these?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has
the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater
power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.
HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved.
SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster
soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not
the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that
which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so?
HIPPIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom
also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and
art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?
HIPPIAS: That seems to be true.
SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is
to do well?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do
wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?
HIPPIAS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man
is he who has the bad?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man
involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?
HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has.
SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful
things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?
HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you.
SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be
the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from
our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in
perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary
man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men
also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the
matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.