The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato,
in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly
exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain
and boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his
own clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of
seal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is
of a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than
the two great Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character
with them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of
Socrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he
gets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with
difficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras,
Callicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed).
Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues,
citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended
Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is
easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends
to show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar
inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles
unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it
better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying
on the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter
of the two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of
Plato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side
of truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is
also in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous
than 'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were
reasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive
the natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they
read. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles,
and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us
of the interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of
similar reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancies
which Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great
as those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric
poems...
At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary
and involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the
same labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would
make upon him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be
in a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible
of the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no
longer go to the wise and be taught by them.
It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1)
that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in
the other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more
palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns
of thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other
dialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or
against the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question
which will have to be answered differently in different cases. For that
a writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and
Plato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full
of repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already
remarked, are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue
is the work of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with
the other dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias
sketches the programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to
attend and bring any friends with him who may be competent judges), are
more than suspicious:--they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot
suppose to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more
resembles the Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurably
inferior to it. The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than the
Greater, and to be more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias is
the same in both dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even more
exaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His art of memory is specially
mentioned in both. He is an inferior type of the same species as
Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol.). Some passages in which the Lesser
Hippias may be advantageously compared with the undoubtedly genuine
dialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp.: compare Republic
(Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches (Socrates' feeling about
arguments): compare Republic (Socrates not unthankful): compare Republic
(Socrates dishonest in argument).
The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be
reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1)
of considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with
Aristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of
Plato's other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning
paradox (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the
Sophists at their own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear
the better cause'; or merely as a dialectical experiment)--are not
sufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.
EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display
which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words,
if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in
commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because
we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly
claim to take part in a philosophical discussion.
SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning
of what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father,
Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the
Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus;
Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and
Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no
objection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which
of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the
course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and
divers other poets.
EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything
which you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a
question, will you answer him?
HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I
refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up
from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes
were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of
the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which
any one had to ask.
SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every
Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom
when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be
so fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia,
as you are in offering your mind.
HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first
entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my
superior in anything. (Compare Gorgias.)
SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom
be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you
of Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what
particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting
and there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did
not like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present,
and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But
now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask,
I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so
that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them?
HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more
clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other
heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men
who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.
SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find
a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times
over? Please to answer me kindly and gently.
HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who
teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you,
answer in a civil and agreeable manner.
SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you
meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest
of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you
said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I
could not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I
shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily?
HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of
mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the
passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to
Odysseus:--
'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out
plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will,
I believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who
thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be
accomplished.'
Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men;
he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and
false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these
lines.
SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you
say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?
HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is
represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey.
SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is
not the same as the false?
HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias?
HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other?
SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what
he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a
willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you
declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?
HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like.
SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do
things, or that they have the power to do things?
HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in
particular to deceive mankind.
SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are
they not?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their
simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort
of prudence?
HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly.
SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose?
HIPPIAS: So they are--very.
SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what
they do?
HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do
mischief to others.
SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they
wise?
HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive.
SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you
not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise
in those things about which they are false?
HIPPIAS: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false are
the very opposite of each other?
HIPPIAS: That is my view.
SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are
to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?
HIPPIAS: Assuredly.
SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so
far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power
of uttering their falsehoods if they like?
HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power.
SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the
power to speak falsely?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is
ignorant cannot be false?
HIPPIAS: You are right.
SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the
time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he
is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking
generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name
when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and
arithmetician?
HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.
SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3
multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if
you pleased?
HIPPIAS: certainly I should.
SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in
these matters?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these
matters of calculation, are you not also the best?
HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.
SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth
about these matters, would you not?
HIPPIAS: Yes, I should.
SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I
must beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and
magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to
ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the
best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power
of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same
matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly?
Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters
of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes
stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did
not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie
would always and consistently lie?
HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right.
SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about
number, or when he is making a calculation?
HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about
other things.
SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who
are false about calculation and number?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is
false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember,
that he who is unable to be false will not be false?
HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said.
SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to
speak falsely about calculation?
HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said.
SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about
calculation?
HIPPIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly
about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--the
arithmetician?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation?
Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the
true man.
HIPPIAS: That is evident.
SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true
about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the
false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as
you were just now imagining.
HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly.
SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances?
HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed.
SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry?
HIPPIAS: I am.
SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is
not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about
diagrams; and he is--the geometrician?
HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it?
HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else.
SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the
highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the
good man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is
unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted.
HIPPIAS: True.
SOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of the
astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still
greater proficient than in the preceding--do you not?
HIPPIAS: Yes, I am.
SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy?
HIPPIAS: True, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely
he will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak
falsely, for he has no knowledge.
HIPPIAS: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?
HIPPIAS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all
the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold.
I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you
boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were
setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said
that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you
had on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which
was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings;
and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and
a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also
that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak
and the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and
a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said,
was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving;
moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic,
and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds;
and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which
I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and
harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a
great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten
to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory,
and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was
saying, only look to your own arts--and there are plenty of them--and to
those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which
you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any
description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the
true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, of
any. But you cannot.
HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but
then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.
HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless
because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the
present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying:
were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and
wily?
HIPPIAS: I was.
SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to
be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if
Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to
one another, but they are alike.
HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument,
selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead
of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will
demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs,
that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful
man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many
untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall
make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the
better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will
know which of us is the better speaker.
SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I
have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention
to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having
a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and
put together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the
speaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or
trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I
deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise
man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him,
in order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help
remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in
which Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you
must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is
never found to tell a lie; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own
showing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words,
which you just now repeated,--
'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and
says another:'--
And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by
Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,--
'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods,
having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and
then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care
to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont,
and my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the
earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile
Phthia.'