APPENDIX I.

It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings

of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is

of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of

a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the

Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty

concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to

him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato,

and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are

taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular

author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the

genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are

more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous

designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as

epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than

others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the

ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise,

or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be

detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really

occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while

there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery,

which combines excellence with length. A really great and original

writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the

forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the

Gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to

balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not

forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of

his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the

next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and

mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in

the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and

without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding,

or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed

to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once

appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to

blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars.

To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was

not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the

Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature

which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the

question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost

literature had been preserved to us.

These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of

genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle

attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)

great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of

the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always

be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various

degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning

Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the

Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They

may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in

the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible;

those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective

in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that

Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars

in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more

important work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was

living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during

the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all

his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes

any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And

lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the

Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian

(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)

length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit

of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the

genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads

only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of

evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.

Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion

that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been

ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of

them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by

the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute,

Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and

external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there

still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either

that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth,

or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly

the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some

contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of

Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to

imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy

we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority

of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered

decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to

himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not

Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the

formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings

are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with

the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during

a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age

of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary

transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated

from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation

as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.

The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and

which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic

writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the

First Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration

are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the

Rhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his

citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the

extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by

Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second

dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a

Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does

to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very

clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain

anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student

of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading

thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is

no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an

undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the

genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic

spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and

treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will

detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning

upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is

ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last

point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the

author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely

following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion

is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier

dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras,

and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with

certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more

may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.

The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is

interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators

praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and

dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history.

It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and

was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the

proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The

satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to

the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work,

like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by

a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of

Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have

suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to

be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to

Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages

in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be

founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody

appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the

Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.

To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First

Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the

greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not

verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance

with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates

and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be

compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may,

perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades

describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the

disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue

there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson

imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted

dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite

thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed

current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates

and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for

the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as

trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of

poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have

express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing

the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the

genuineness of the extant dialogue.

Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an

absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of

Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may

have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there

are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The

traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have

formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the

same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates,

although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato,

unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with

the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite

form, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which

we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may

be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether

spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor

can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and

the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged

against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)

of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can

we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually

rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be

genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require

more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and

with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we

can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as

genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained

and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but

should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor

disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are

as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the

Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine.

On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under

the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients

themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly

doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change

and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That

twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment

of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some

interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance

to the general reader.

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