DEMOCRACY OF THE FUTURE
The growth of the democratic spirit is one of the most important facts
in the political life of the nineteenth century. All countries under the
influence of Western civilization show the same tendency. New political
ideas irreconcilably opposed to the view of government generally
accepted in the past are everywhere gaining recognition. Under the
influence of this new conception of the state the monarchies and
aristocracies of the past are being transformed into the democracies of
the future. We of the present day, however, are still largely in the
trammels of the old, though our goal is the freedom of the new. We have
not yet reached, but are merely traveling toward democracy. The progress
which we have made is largely a progress in thought and ideals. We have
imbibed more of the spirit of popular government. In our way of
thinking, our point of view, our accepted political philosophy, there
has been a marked change. Everywhere, too, with the progress of
scientific knowledge and the spread of popular education, the masses are
coming to a consciousness of their strength. They are circumscribing
the power of ruling classes and abolishing their exclusive privileges
which control of the state has made it possible for them to defend in
the past. From present indications we are at the threshold of a new
social order under which the few will no longer rule the many.
Democracy may be regarded, according to the standpoint from which we
view it, either as an intellectual or as a moral movement. It is
intellectual in that it presupposes a more or less general diffusion of
intelligence, and moral in that its aim is justice. It could not have
appeared or become a social force until man became a thinker and critic
of existing social arrangements. It was first necessary that he should
acquire a point of view and a habit of thought that give him a measure
of intellectual independence and enable him to regard social
institutions and arrangements as human devices more or less imperfect
and unjust. This thought can not be grasped without its correlative--the
possibility of improvement. Hence democracy everywhere stands for
political and social reform.
Democracy is modern, since it is only within recent times that the
general diffusion of knowledge has been possible. The invention of
printing, by making possible a cheap popular literature, contributed
more than any other one fact to the intellectual and moral awakening
which marks the beginning of modern times. The introduction of
printing, however, did not find a democratic literature ready for
general distribution, or the people ready for its appearance. A long
period of slow preparation followed, during which the masses were being
educated. Moreover, it is only within recent times that governments
would have permitted the creation and diffusion of a democratic
literature. For a long time after printing was invented the ruling
classes carefully guarded against any use of the newly discovered art
that might be calculated to undermine their authority. Books containing
new and dangerous doctrines were rigorously proscribed and the people
carefully protected from the disturbing influence of such views as might
shake their faith in the wisdom and justice of the existing social
order.[198]
It is perhaps fortunate for the world that the political and social
results of printing were not comprehended at the time of its
introduction. Had the ruling classes foreseen that it would lead to the
gradual shifting of political power from themselves to the masses, it is
not unlikely that they would have regarded it as a pernicious
innovation.
But, as is the case with all great inventions, its full significance was
not at first understood. Silently and almost imperceptibly it paved the
way for a social and political revolution. The gradual diffusion of
knowledge among the people prepared them for the contemplation of a new
social order. They began to think, to question and to doubt, and
thenceforth the power and prestige of the ruling classes began to
decline. From that time on there has been an unceasing struggle between
the privileged few and the unprivileged many. We see it in the peaceful
process of legislation as well as in the more violent contest of war.
After each success the masses have demanded still greater concessions,
until now, with a broader outlook and a larger conception of human
destiny, they demand the complete and untrammeled control of the state.
To the student of political science, then, the spirit and temper, the
aims and ideals of the new social order now coming into existence, are a
matter of supreme importance. That our industrial system will be
profoundly modified may be conceded. Other consequences more difficult
to foresee because less direct and immediate, but not necessarily less
important, may be regarded as not unlikely. That our ideas of right and
wrong, our conception of civic duty, and human character itself will be
modified as a result of such far-reaching changes in social relations,
may be expected. But while the more remote and indirect consequences of
democracy may not be foreseen, some of its immediate results are
reasonably certain.
The immediate aim of democracy is political. It seeks to overthrow every
form of class rule and bring about such changes in existing governments
as will make the will of the people supreme. But political reform is
regarded not as an end in itself. It is simply a means. Government is a
complex and supremely important piece of social machinery. Through it
the manifold activities of society are organized, directed and
controlled. In a very real sense it is the most important of all social
institutions, since from its very nature it is the embodiment of social
force, asserting and maintaining a recognized supremacy over all other
social institutions and agencies whatever, modifying and adapting them
to suit the purposes and achieve the ends of those who control the
state.
The form or type of government is all-important, since it involves the
question as to the proper end of government as well as the proper means
of attaining it. Our notion of what constitutes the best political
system depends on our general theory of society--our conception of
justice, progress and social well-being. As government by the few
inevitably results in the welfare of the few being regarded as the chief
concern of the state, the widest possible diffusion of political power
is the only guarantee that government will seek the welfare of the many.
The advocate of democracy does not think that it will be a perfect
government, but he does believe that it will in the long run be the
best, most equitable and most progressive which it is possible to
establish. Government by the few and government by the many stand for
widely divergent and irreconcilable theories of progress and social
well-being. As the methods, aims, and social ideals of an aristocracy
are not those of which a democratic society would approve, it
necessarily follows that the purposes of democracy can be accomplished
only through a government which the people control.
Modern science has given a decided impetus to the democratic movement by
making a comfortable existence possible for the many. It has explored
the depths of the earth and revealed hidden treasures of which previous
ages did not even dream. Inventions and discoveries far-reaching in
influence and revolutionary in character have followed each other in
rapid succession. With the progress of the sciences and mechanical arts,
man's power to control and utilize the forces and materials which nature
has so bountifully provided has been enormously increased; and yet, much
as has been accomplished in this field of human endeavor, there is
reason to believe that the conquest of the material world has but just
begun. The future may hold in store for us far greater achievements
along this line than any the world has yet seen.
It is not surprising, then, that the masses should feel that they have
received too little benefit from this marvelous material progress. For
just in proportion as the old political system has survived, with its
privileged classes, its checks on the people and its class ascendency in
government, the benefits of material progress have been monopolized by
the few. Against this intrusion of the old order into modern society the
spirit of democracy revolts. It demands control of the state to the end
that the product of industry may be equitably distributed. As the
uncompromising enemy of monopoly in every form, it demands first of all
equality of opportunity.
Democracy, however, is not a mere scheme for the redistribution of
wealth. It is fundamentally a theory of social progress. In so far as it
involves the distribution of wealth, it does so as a necessary condition
or means of progress, and not as an end in itself.
Democracy would raise government to the rank and dignity of a science by
making it appeal to the reason instead of the fear and superstition of
the people. The governments of the past, basing their claims upon divine
right, bear about the same relation to democracy that astrology and
alchemy do to the modern sciences of astronomy and chemistry. The old
political order everywhere represented itself as superimposed on man
from above, and, thus clothed with a sort of divine sanction, it was
exalted above the reach of criticism. The growth of intelligence has
dispelled one by one the crude political superstitions upon which the
old governmental arrangements rested. More and more man is coming to
look upon government as a purely human agency which he may freely modify
and adapt to his purposes. The blind unthinking reverence with which he
regarded it in the past is giving way to a critical scientific spirit.
Nor has this change in our point of view in any way degraded government.
In stripping it of the pretence of divine authority, it has in reality
been placed upon a more enduring basis. In so far as it can no longer
claim respect to which it is not entitled we have a guarantee that it
can not persistently disregard the welfare of the people.
Democracy owes much to modern scientific research. With the advance of
knowledge we have gained a new view of the world. Physics, astronomy,
and geology have shown us that the physical universe is undergoing a
process of continual change. Biology, too, has revolutionized our notion
of life. Nothing is fixed and immutable as was once supposed, but change
is universal. The contraction of the earth's crust with its resultant
changes in the distribution of land and water, and the continual
modification of climate and physical conditions generally have
throughout the past wrought changes in the form and character of all
animal and vegetable life. Every individual organism and every species
must change as the world around it changes, or death is the penalty. No
form of life can long survive which does not possess in a considerable
degree the power of adaptation. Innumerable species have disappeared
because of their inability to adjust themselves to a constantly changing
environment. It is from this point of view of continuous adjustment that
modern science regards the whole problem of life individual and
collective.
We must not, however, assume that what is true of the lower forms of
life is equally true of the higher. In carrying the conceptions of
biology over into the domain of social science we must be careful to
observe that here the process of adapting life to its environment
assumes a new and higher phase. In the lower animal world the
life-sustaining activities are individual. Division of labor is either
entirely absent or plays a part so unimportant that we may for purposes
of comparison assume its absence. The individual animal has free access
to surrounding nature, unrestrained by social institutions or private
property in the environment. For the members of a given group there is
what may be described as equality of opportunity. Hence it follows that
the individuals which are best suited to the environment will thrive
best and will tend to crowd out the others.
But when we come to human society this is not necessarily true. Here a
social environment has been created--a complex fabric of laws, usages,
and institutions which envelopes completely the life of the individual
and intervenes everywhere between him and physical nature. To this all
his industrial activities must conform. The material environment is no
longer the common possession of the group. It has become private
property and has passed under the control of individuals in whose
interests the laws and customs of every community ancient and modern
have been largely molded. This is a fact which all history attests.
Wherever the few acquire a monopoly of political power it always tends
to develop into a monopoly of the means and agents of production. Not
content with making the physical environment their own exclusive
property, the few have often gone farther and by reducing the many to
slavery have established and legalized property in human beings
themselves. But even when all men are nominally free and legalized
coercion does not exist, the fact nevertheless remains that those who
control the means of production in reality control the rest. As Mr. W.H.
Mallock, the uncompromising opponent of democracy and staunch defender
of aristocracy, puts it: "The larger part of the progressive activities
of peace, and the arts and products of civilization, result from and
imply the influence of kings and leaders in essentially the same sense
as do the successes of primitive war, the only difference being that the
kings are here more numerous, and though they do not wear any arms or
uniforms, are incomparably more autocratic than the kings and czars who
do."[199] "Slavery, feudalism, and capitalism," he tells us, "agree with
one another in being systems under which the few"[200] control the
actions of the many.
This feature of modern capitalism--the control of the many by the
few--which constitutes its chief merit in the eyes of writers like Mr.
Mallock is what all democratic thinkers consider its chief vice. Under
such a system success or failure is no longer proof of natural fitness
or unfitness. Where every advantage that wealth and influence afford is
enjoyed by the few and denied to the many an essential condition of
progress is lacking. Many of the ablest, best, and socially fittest are
hopelessly handicapped by lack of opportunity, while their inferiors
equipped with every artificial advantage easily defeat them in the
competitive struggle.
This lack of a just distribution of opportunity under existing
industrial arrangements, the defenders of the established social order
persistently ignore. Taking no account of the unequal conditions under
which the competitive struggle is carried on in human society, they
would make success proof of fitness to survive and failure evidence of
unfitness. This is treating the complex problem of social adjustment as
if it were simply a question of mere animal struggle for existence.
Writers of this class naturally accept the Malthusian doctrine of
population, and ascribe misery and want to purely natural causes, viz.,
the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. Not only is this
pressure with its attendant evils unavoidable, they tell us, but,
regarded from the standpoint of the highest interests of the race it is
desirable and beneficent in that it is the method of evolution--the
means which nature makes use of to produce, through the continual
elimination of the weak, a higher human type. To relieve this pressure
through social arrangements would arrest by artificial contrivances the
progress which the free play of natural forces tends to bring about. If
progress is made only through the selection of the fit and the rejection
of the unfit, it would follow that the keener the struggle for existence
and the more rapid and relentless the elimination of the weak, the
greater would be the progress made. This is exactly the contention of
Kidd in his Social Evolution. He claims that if the pressure of
population on the means of subsistence were arrested, and all
individuals were allowed equally to propagate their kind, the human race
would not only not progress, but actually retrograde.[201] If we accept
this as true, it would follow that a high birth rate and a high death
rate are necessary in order that the process of selection and rejection
may go on. This is indeed a pleasant prospect for all except the
fortunate few. But the question, of course, is not whether this is
pleasant to contemplate or unpleasant, but whether it is true. Is the
evolution of a higher human type the same kind of a process as that of a
higher animal or vegetable type? Is progress achieved only through the
preservation of the fit and the elimination of the unfit? If it could be
shown that this is the case, then certainly the conditions under which
this struggle to the death is carried on would be a matter of supreme
importance. Are our social adjustments such as to facilitate, or at
least not interfere with it? Do they make the question of success or
failure, survival or elimination, depend upon individual fitness or
unfitness? This, as we have seen, is not the case, though the partisans
of the biological theory of human progress have constantly assumed it.
Mr. Mallock takes even a more extreme position than most writers of this
class, and actually says "that the social conditions of a time are the
same for all, but that it is only exceptional men who can make
exceptional use of them."[202] The unequal distribution of wealth he
seeks to justify on the ground that "the ordinary man's talents as a
producer ... have not appreciably increased in the course of two
thousand years and have certainly not increased within the past three
generations."[203]
"In the domain of modern industrial activity the many" ... he tells us,
"produce only an insignificant portion of the total, ... and in the
domain of intellectual and speculative progress the many produce or
achieve nothing."[204] If we accept his premises, we must agree with
his conclusion that democracy's indictment of our modern industrial
system falls to the ground. This view of the matter is acceptable, of
course, to those who are satisfied with present social arrangements. It
furnishes a justification for the system under which they have prospered
while others have failed. It relieves their conscience of any misgiving
and soothes them with the assurance that only through the poverty and
misery of the unfit can a higher civilization be evolved. This largely
explains the popularity among the well-to-do classes of such books as
Malthus' Principle of Population and Kidd's Social Evolution.
Such a treatment of the social problem, however, will not bear the test
of analysis, since it assumes that the present distribution of
opportunity is just. To ignore or treat as unimportant the influence of
social arrangements upon the struggle for existence between individuals,
as apologists for the existing social order are too much inclined to do,
is like ignoring the modern battle-ship as a factor in the efficiency of
the modern navy.
But while this biological theory of evolution has been made to serve the
purpose of defending existing social arrangements, it is in reality no
adequate explanation of human progress. Selection and rejection do not,
as a matter of fact, play any important part in the progress of
civilized communities. Here the struggle for existence has assumed the
form of a struggle for domination. The vanquished are no longer
eliminated as a result of the competitive struggle; for, as Mr. Spencer
says, social institutions preserve the incapables.[205] Not only are the
unsuccessful not eliminated but, as sociological students well know,
they increase more rapidly than the successful few. If, then, we accept
the biological theory of social evolution, we are forced to the
conclusion that the human race, instead of advancing, is really
retrograding. Seeing that this is not a satisfactory explanation of
human progress, Mr. Mallock supplements it with a new factor which he
describes as "the unintended results of the intentions of great
men."[206] But, like all of these writers, he makes progress depend
entirely on the biological struggle for existence or the industrial
struggle for supremacy, not recognizing the all-important part which
social ideals and conscious social choice play in human evolution.
There is, then, as we have seen, ample justification for the hostility
to privilege which the democratic movement everywhere exhibits. In
making equality of opportunity a feature of the new social order, the
advocates of reform are proceeding in harmony with the teaching of
modern science. Such changes must be brought about in the organization
of industry, the laws of property, the scope and character of public and
private activities, as will sweep away entirely the whole ancient system
of special privileges, and by placing all individuals upon the same
footing, make success the unfailing reward of merit. To accomplish this
is to solve the monopoly problem. Some progress has been made in this
direction, but it consists for the most part in discovering that such a
problem exists. Just how posterity will deal with it, it is impossible
to foresee; but of one thing we may be sure--this new conception of
justice will exert a profound influence upon the legislation of the
future.
The attention of the democratic movement has up to the present time been
occupied almost exclusively with the question of a just distribution of
opportunity; yet this is not the only problem which democracy will have
to solve. Indeed, it is but the first step in a continuous process of
conscious social readjustment. This fact many writers on social science
have not fully grasped. There is still a tendency to regard society as a
sort of divinely ordered mechanism, which, if properly started, will
automatically work out the process of social evolution. * * * * From
this point of view it is easy to conclude that "whatever is, is right."
* * * * If we accept this belief in the beneficent and progressive
character of all natural processes, the conclusion is irresistible that
nature's methods should not be interfered with.
This is largely the point of view of the earlier English political
economists, and it partly explains their belief in the policy of
non-interference. The best and most comprehensive statement of this view
of social progress is found in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. In this
work he attempted to show that legislative interference with industry is
unnecessary. Therefore he advocated the repeal of all laws which
interfered with or in any way restricted the liberty of the individual.
He believed that the natural principle of competition would of itself
effectually regulate industrial life. The desire of each individual to
pursue his own interests made state interference, in his opinion,
unnecessary. In the absence of legal restraints industrial matters would
spontaneously regulate themselves. The varied economic activities of
individuals in society would be adequately controlled and harmonized
with the general interests of society, if statute or human law did not
interfere with natural or divine law. Reliance on competition would
ensure order, harmony and continuous progress in society, just as in the
realm of matter the influence of gravitation has transformed by a
long-continued development the original chaos into an orderly universe.
Each individual acting in obedience to this law would be "led by an
invisible hand to promote"[207] the well-being of society, even though
he was conscious only of a selfish desire to further his own ends.
Such was the industrial philosophy of Adam Smith. It was in harmony with
and the natural outcome of the movement which had already revolutionized
religious and philosophic thought. In every department of human activity
emphasis was being put on the individual. Liberty was the watchword of
society--the panacea for all social ills. The Western world was breaking
through the old system of restraints under which the individual had been
fettered in religion, politics and business. A new conception of the
state, its duties and its functions, had been evolved. Mere human law
was being discredited. Philosophers, distrusting the coercive
arrangements of society, were looking into the nature of man and the
character of the environment for the principles of social organization
and order. Belief in the curative power of legislation was being
supplanted by a growing faith in the sufficiency of natural law.
The underlying motives for advocating the _laissez faire_ policy were,
however, mainly political and economic.[208] The ready acceptance of
this doctrine must be attributed largely to the fact that it offered a
plausible ground for opposing the burdensome restraints of the old
system of class rule.
This is the origin of our modern doctrine of _laissez faire_ which has
so profoundly influenced our political and economic life. But as
movements of this character are likely to do, it carried society too far
in the opposite direction. This is recognized by that most eminent
expounder of the let-alone theory of government, Mr. Herbert Spencer,
who, in the third volume of his Principles of Sociology, admits that
"there has been a change from excess of restriction to deficiency of
restriction."[209] This means that in our accepted political and
economic philosophy we have overvalued the organizing power of
unregulated natural law, and have consequently undervalued the state as
an agency for controlling and organizing industrial forces.
All new ideas have to be harmonized with much that is old. As at first
accepted they are only partially true. A new philosophy requires time
before its benefits can be fully realized. It must pass through a
process of adaptation by which it is gradually modified, broadened and
brought into orderly relations with life in general.
The theory of industrial freedom has during the nineteenth century been
passing through just such a stage of development. The contention of Adam
Smith and his followers that the mere desire for gain would of itself
ensure adequate regulation of industry is certainly not true under
existing conditions. Natural law is not, as he assumed, always
beneficent in its operation. It is just as liable to produce harm as
benefit unless it is regulated, controlled and directed by appropriate
human agencies. It needs no argument to convince one that this is true
so far as the forces of the physical world are concerned. Gravitation,
steam and electricity contributed nothing to human progress until man
discovered the means whereby they could be harnessed and controlled.
Material civilization means nothing else but the development of control
over and the consequent utilization of the materials and forces of the
physical world. The important part played by mere human agencies is the
only feature that distinguishes civilization from barbarism. Everything
which in any way contributes to material progress augments the power of
man to control, modify and adapt his environment.
And though it may not be so obvious, this general principle is just as
true in the moral and spiritual world as in the physical. All progress,
material and moral, consists in the due subordination of natural to
human agencies. Laws, institutions and systems of government are in a
sense artificial creations, and must be judged in relation to the ends
which they have in view. They are good or bad according as they are well
or poorly adapted to social needs. Civilization in its highest sense
means much more than the mere mastery of mind over inanimate nature; it
implies a more or less effective social control over individual conduct.
Certain impulses, instincts and tendencies must be repressed; others
must be encouraged, strengthened, and developed.
It is a mistake to suppose that the unrestrained play of mere natural
forces ensures progress. Occasional advance is the outcome, but so also
is frequent retrogression. There is no scientific basis for the belief
in a natural order that everywhere and always makes for progress.
Competition or the struggle for existence ensures at most merely the
survival of the fittest; but survival of the fittest does not always
mean survival of the best. Competition is nature's means of adapting
life to its environment. If the environment is such as to give the more
highly organized individuals the advantage, progress is the result. But
if it is such as to place them at a disadvantage, retrogression, not
progress, is the outcome. The higher types of character, no less than
the higher organic forms, presuppose external conditions favorable to
their development. Competition is merely the means through which
conformity to these external conditions is enforced. It eliminates alike
that which is better than the environment and that which is worse. It is
indifferent to good or bad, to high or low. It simply picks out,
preserves and perpetuates those types best suited to environing
conditions. Both progress and retrogression are a process of adaptation,
and their cause must be sought, not in the principle of competition
itself, but in the general external conditions to which it enforces
conformity. Success, then, is a matter of adaptation to the environment,
or the power to use it for individual ends--not the power to improve and
enrich it. The power to take from, is nature's sole test of fitness to
live; but the power to enrich is a higher test, and one which society
must enforce through appropriate legislation.
Laws, institutions and methods of trade which make it possible for the
individual to take from more than he adds to the general resources of
society tend inevitably toward general social deterioration. Competition
is wholesome only when all our social arrangements are such as to
discourage and repress all individual activities not in harmony with the
general interests of society. This is the point of view from which all
social and industrial questions must be studied. The problem which
democracy has to solve is the problem of so organizing the environment
as to assure progress through the success and survival of the best.
[Footnote 1: Sebohm, English Village Community, Ch. III; Traill, Social
England, Vol. I, p. 240; Ashley, English Economic History, Vol. I, p.
17.]
[Footnote 2: Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol.
I, Ch. I; Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 265.]
[Footnote 3: Work and Wages, p. 398.]
[Footnote 4: Tyler, The Literary History of the American Revolution,
Vol. I, p. 300.]
[Footnote 5: Tyler, The Literary History of the American Revolution,
Vol. I, p. 301.]
[Footnote 6: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and
Virginia.]
[Footnote 7: Delaware, Maryland and North Carolina.]
[Footnote 8: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Maryland.]
[Footnote 9: Delaware, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Virginia.]
[Footnote 10: Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, New York and Delaware.]
[Footnote 11: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland, Delaware, South
Carolina and Pennsylvania.]
[Footnote 12: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.]
[Footnote 13: Macdonald's Select Charters, Vol. I, pp. 94-101.]
[Footnote 14: Schouler's Constitutional Studies, pp. 70-78, Macdonald's
Select Charters, Vol. I.]
[Footnote 15: "Who would have thought, ten years ago, that the very men
who risked their lives and fortunes in support of republican principles,
would now treat them as the fictions of fancy?" M. Smith in the New York
Convention held to ratify the Constitution, Elliot's Debates, Second
Edition, Vol. II, p. 250.]
[Footnote 16: Simeon E. Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, pp. 83
and 84.]
[Footnote 17: Critical Period of American History, p. 226.]
[Footnote 18: S.F. Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United
States, pp. 84-85.]
[Footnote 19: McMaster, With the Fathers, pp. 112-113.]
[Footnote 20: "They [the framers of the Constitution] represented the
conservative intelligence of the country very exactly; from this class
there is hardly a name, except that of Jay, which could be suggested to
complete the list." Article by Alexander Johnston on the Convention of
1787 in Lalor's Cyclopaedia of Pol. Science, Pol. Econ. and U.S. Hist.]
[Footnote 21: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 557.]
[Footnote 22: Ibid., p. 138.]
[Footnote 23: "By another [rule] the doors were to be shut, and the
whole proceedings were to be kept secret; and so far did this rule
extend, that we were thereby prevented from corresponding with gentlemen
in the different states upon the subjects under our discussion.... So
_extremely solicitous_ were they that their proceedings should not
transpire, that the members were prohibited even from taking copies of
resolutions, on which the Convention were deliberating, or extracts of
any kind from the Journals without formally moving for and obtaining
permission, by a vote of the Convention for that purpose." Luther
Martin's Address to the Maryland House of Delegates. Ibid., Vol. I, p.
345.
"The doors were locked, and an injunction of strict secrecy was put upon
everyone. The results of their work were known in the following
September, when the draft of the Federal Constitution was published. But
just what was said and done in this secret conclave was not revealed
until fifty years had passed, and the aged James Madison, the last
survivor of those who sat there, had been gathered to his fathers."
Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, p. 229. McMaster, With
the Fathers, p. 112.]
[Footnote 24: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, pp. 119-127.]
[Footnote 25: Elliot's Debates, Vol. II, p. 470.]
[Footnote 26: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 422.]
[Footnote 27: Ibid., p. 450.]
[Footnote 28: Book 5, Ch. I, Part II.]
[Footnote 29: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 160.]
[Footnote 30: Ibid., p. 137.]
[Footnote 31: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 450.]
[Footnote 32: Ibid., pp. 421-422.]
[Footnote 33: Ibid., p. 475.]
[Footnote 34: No. 10.]
[Footnote 35: In Massachusetts and New Hampshire the constitutions
framed during the Revolutionary period were submitted to popular vote.
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 contained the declaration "that, when
any government shall have been found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes [the purposes enumerated in the Bill of Rights], a majority of
the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right
to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the public weal." The Revolutionary constitution of
Pennsylvania contained a similar declaration. Poore, Charters and
Constitutions.]
[Footnote 36: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, pp. 48-50.]
[Footnote 37: Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. This book gives a list of the amendments proposed during
the first one hundred years of our history under the Constitution.
During the fifteen years from 1889 to 1904, four hundred and thirty-five
amendments were proposed. These figures are taken from a thesis
submitted for the LL.B. degree at the University of Washington by
Donald McDonald, A.B.
It is interesting to observe that this is one of the few important
features of the Constitution not copied by the Confederate States at the
outbreak of the Civil War. The constitution which they adopted provided
an easier method of amendment. Any three states could suggest amendments
and require Congress to summon a convention of all the states to
consider them. To adopt a proposed amendment ratification by
legislatures or conventions in two-thirds of the states was necessary.]
[Footnote 38: Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 151.]
[Footnote 39: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. III.]
[Footnote 40: Second Edition, Vol. I, Appendix, Note on Constitutional
Conventions.]
[Footnote 41: Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, p. 328.]
[Footnote 42: McMaster, With the Fathers, p. 71.]
[Footnote 43: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 423.]
[Footnote 44: Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, p. 12.]
[Footnote 45: The vote in Massachusetts was 187 to 168 in favor of
ratification; in New York, 30 to 27; in Virginia, 89 to 79.]
[Footnote 46: No. 81.]
[Footnote 47: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. XXXII.]
[Footnote 48: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 49: Roosevelt in 1904 received less than 56.4 per cent. of the
total popular vote.]
[Footnote 50: In 1904 Roosevelt carried thirty-two states--two more than
two-thirds.]
[Footnote 51: Poore, Charters and Constitutions.]
[Footnote 52: A. Lawrence Lowell, Essays on Government, p. 40.]
[Footnote 53: _The Federalist_, No. 78.]
[Footnote 54: "The object of the Act of Parliament was to secure the
judges from removal at the mere pleasure of the Crown; but not to render
them independent of the action of Parliament." Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution, Sec. 1623.]
[Footnote 55: Works (Ford's Edition), Vol. X, p. 38.]
[Footnote 56: Cf. supra p. 21.]
[Footnote 57: The Jeffersonian System, pp. 112-113.]
[Footnote 58: Referring to Hamilton's defence of the judicial veto,
Jefferson says "If this opinion be sound, then indeed is our
Constitution a complete _felo de se_. For intending to establish three
departments, coordinate and independent, that they might check and
balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to one of
them alone, the right to prescribe rules for the government of the
others, and to that one too, which is unelected by, and independent of
the nation." Ford's Edition of his works, Vol. X, p. 141.]
[Footnote 59: _The Federalist_, No. 78.]
[Footnote 60: _The Federalist_, No. 85.]
[Footnote 61: Elliot's Debates, Vol I, p. 421.]
[Footnote 62: Ibid., Vol. V, Appendix No. 5.]
[Footnote 63: Brinton Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional
Legislation, p. 165. The reader is referred to this work for a
discussion of this and other cases.]
[Footnote 64: The constitutions of Massachusetts, Maryland, New
Hampshire, North Carolina and Virginia contained provisions expressly
declaring that no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws,
should be exercised unless by the legislature, or by authority derived
from it. The Vermont constitution of 1786 also contained a similar
provision.]
[Footnote 65: Commonwealth v. Caton, Hopkins and Lamb. Quoted from Coxe,
p. 221.]
[Footnote 66: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 193, n.
and Thorpe, A Short Constitutional History of the United States, p.
238.]
[Footnote 67: Quoted in Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional
Legislation, p. 252.]
[Footnote 68: _Ibid._, p. 263.]
[Footnote 69: Burgess, Pol. Sci. and Const. Law, Vol. II, p. 364.]
[Footnote 70: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 507.]
[Footnote 71: Ibid., Vol. V, p. 429.]
[Footnote 72: Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 151, 344, 345, 346, 347.]
[Footnote 73: _Federalist_, No. 78.]
[Footnote 74: Elliot's Debates, Vol. II, p. 196.]
[Footnote 75: Elliot's Debates, Vol. II, p. 489.]
[Footnote 76: Ibid., Vol. III, p. 553.]
[Footnote 77: 3 Dallas.]
[Footnote 78: "'You have made a good Constitution,' said a friend to
Gouverneur Morris after the adjournment of the Convention. 'That,'
replied Morris, 'depends on how it is construed.'" Gordy, Political
Parties in the United States, Vol. I, p. 114. This was clearly
understood by the framers of the Constitution and by all the leading
Federalists.]
[Footnote 79: Rutledge, Wilson, Blair, Patterson, and Ellsworth.]
[Footnote 80: Jay, Rutledge, Wilson, Blair, Iredell, Johnson, Chase,
Ellsworth, Cushing, Washington, and Marshall.]
[Footnote 81: Wilson, Ellsworth, and Marshall.]
[Footnote 82: Supra, p. 89.]
[Footnote 83: Alfred Moore.]
[Footnote 84: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, pp. 324-325.]
[Footnote 85: Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p.
365.]
[Footnote 86: Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol.
II, p. 365.]
[Footnote 87: Infra, pp. 119-122.]
[Footnote 88: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, pp. 117-118 (Eng.
Trans.).]
[Footnote 89: Referring to the power of the Supreme Court in our scheme
of government, Jefferson said "It is a misnomer to call a government
republican, in which a branch of the supreme power is independent of the
nation." Works, Vol. X, p. 199.]
[Footnote 90: Lee, Source Book of English History, p. 336.]
[Footnote 91: Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
sec. 1399; cf. Infra pp. 321-325.]
[Footnote 92: Constitutional History as Seen in American Law, p. 80.]
[Footnote 93: _Ibid._, p. 258.]
[Footnote 94: For a list of these cases see United States Supreme Court
Reports, Vol. 131. Appendix CCXXXV. Banks and Brothers Edition.]
[Footnote 95: Dissenting opinion Inter-State Commerce Commission, v.
Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 United States, 144.]
[Footnote 96: For a discussion of these cases see "The Legal Tender
Decisions" by E.J. James, Publications of the American Economic
Association, Vol. III.]
[Footnote 97: Report of the Am. Bar Association, 1895, p. 246.]
[Footnote 98: For a discussion of this recent use of the injunction by
our Federal Courts see Annual Address of the President of the Georgia
Bar Association, John W. Akin, on "Aggressions of the Federal Courts,"
1898; W.H. Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," Economic Studies, Vol.
III; Stimson, Handbook of Am. Labor Laws.]
[Footnote 99: "We should like to see the law so changed that any man
arrested for contempt of court, for an act not performed in the presence
of the court and during judicial proceedings, should have a right to
demand trial by jury before another and an impartial tribunal. It is not
safe, and therefore it is not right, to leave the liberties of the
citizens of the United States at the hazard involved in conferring such
autocratic power upon judges of varied mental and moral caliber as are
conferred by the equity powers which our courts have inherited through
English precedents." Editorial in the _Outlook_, Vol. LXXIV, p. 871.]
[Footnote 100: C.H. Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United States,
Vol. II, p. 347.]
[Footnote 101: Art. III, sec. 2.]
[Footnote 102: The constitutions of Maine (since 1820), Rhode Island
(since 1842), Florida (since 1875), and Missouri (constitution of 1865,
but omitted in constitution of 1875 and since).
A provision of this kind is also found in the Massachusetts constitution
of 1780, from which it was copied in the New Hampshire constitution of
1784. Its purpose in these two constitutions, however, was not to guard
against the subsequent exercise of the judicial veto, since the latter
was then unknown, but to make the judges of the Supreme Court an
advisory body to the legislature.]
[Footnote 103: Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 9.]
[Footnote 104: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, p. 218.]
[Footnote 105: Works, Vol. I, p. 29. Cralle's Ed.]
[Footnote 106: Supra, p. 18.]
[Footnote 107: Infra p. 239.]
[Footnote 108: Pennsylvania and Georgia had only a single legislative
body.]
[Footnote 109: "There was certainly no intention of making the
appointment of the Presidential electors subject to popular election. I
think it is evident that the framers were anxious to avoid this."
Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p. 219.
According to Fiske, "electors were chosen by the legislature in New
Jersey till 1816; in Connecticut till 1820; in New York, Delaware, and
Vermont, and with one exception in Georgia, till 1824; in South Carolina
till 1868. Massachusetts adopted various plans, and did not finally
settle down to an election by the people until 1828." The Critical
Period of American History, p. 286.]
[Footnote 110: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 421.]
[Footnote 111: Madison, Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 450.]
[Footnote 112: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 158.]
[Footnote 113: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 91 (Eng.
Trans.).
See also Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 254.]
[Footnote 114: Previous to Andrew Johnson's administration but six
measures were passed over the President's veto. Up to 1889 the veto
power of the President had been exercised four hundred and thirty-three
times, and in but twenty-nine instances had it been overridden by the
required two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. Fifteen
measures vetoed by Andrew Johnson were passed over his veto--more than
in the case of all other Presidents combined. Mason, The Veto Power, p.
214.]
[Footnote 115: Mason, The Veto Power, p. 214.]
[Footnote 116: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 151. Hamilton's statement,
which was made in support of a motion to give the President an absolute
veto on acts of Congress, was not correct. William III vetoed no less
than four acts of Parliament, and his successor used the veto power for
the last time in 1707. Medley, English Constitutional History, p. 315.]
[Footnote 117: Supra, p. 19.]
[Footnote 118: Infra, p. 231.]
[Footnote 119: Senate in South Carolina and Maryland (constitutions of
1776) exceptions, Infra p. 239.]
[Footnote 120: Constitution, Art. II. Sec. I.]
[Footnote 121: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 503.]
[Footnote 122: Ibid., p. 494.]
[Footnote 123: For a discussion of this feature of our government see
the following chapter.]
[Footnote 124: Under the Articles of Confederation the Congress of the
United States was required to "publish the journal of their proceedings
monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or
military operations as in their judgment require secrecy." Art. IX.]
[Footnote 125: The Revolutionary constitutions of New York and
Pennsylvania provided that the doors of the legislature should be kept
open at all times for the admission of the public except when the
welfare of the state should demand secrecy.]
[Footnote 126: Cf. Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p.
63.]
[Footnote 127: Quoted from Article on Reporting in Encyclopedia
Brittanica.]
[Footnote 128: Vol. XIV, p. 62. See also Porritt, The Unreformed House
of Commons, Vol. I, pp. 590-596.]
[Footnote 129: Greene, The Provincial Governor, pp. 198-199.]
[Footnote 130: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp.
514-516.]
[Footnote 131: Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maryland.]
[Footnote 132: Art. V.]
[Footnote 133: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 181 and Vol. V, p. 132.]
[Footnote 134: Constitutional History of the United States, Vol. I, p.
79.]
[Footnote 135: No. 46.]
[Footnote 136: No. 45.]
[Footnote 137: Von Holst, Vol. I, p. 88.]
[Footnote 138: Ford's Ed. Jefferson's Works, Vol. VII, p. 301.]
[Footnote 139: Works, Vol. I, p. 169.]
[Footnote 140: Works, Vol. I, p. 242.]
[Footnote 141: Sept., 24, 1789. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. I.]
[Footnote 142: Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 4.]
[Footnote 143: Art. I, Sec. 4.]
[Footnote 144: The states of Maine, Oregon and Vermont still elect their
representatives to Congress before the general November election. Maine
holds her election on the second Monday in September, Oregon on the
first Monday in June and Vermont on the first Tuesday in September next
preceding the general November election.]
[Footnote 145: John F. Shafroth, When Congress Should Convene; North Am.
Rev., Vol. 164. The writer of this article makes the common but
erroneous assumption that the fundamental principle of our government is
majority rule. From the standpoint of democracy, however, his argument
is unassailable.]
[Footnote 146: A modification of this check on public opinion has been
incorporated in the charter of one of our new Western cities. In
Spokane, Washington, one-half of the councilmen take their seats
immediately after the regular municipal election, and the other half,
though elected at the same time, do not enter upon the discharge of
their duties until one year later.]
[Footnote 147: Art. I, Sec. 2.]
[Footnote 148: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. 15.]
[Footnote 149: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. 15.]
[Footnote 150: The Conduct of Business in Congress, North Am. Rev., Vol.
CXXVIII, p. 121.]
[Footnote 151: _Ibid._, p. 122.]
[Footnote 152: For instances of the exercise of this power see Follett,
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ch. IX.]
[Footnote 153: Senator Hoar's Article.]
[Footnote 154: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, pp. 98-99.]
[Footnote 155: Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political
Parties, Vol. I, p. 20.]
[Footnote 156: _Federalist_, No. 10.]
[Footnote 157: For a discussion of the causes of present-day corruption,
see an article by Professor Edward A. Ross in _The Independent_, July
19, 1906, on "Political Decay: An Interpretation."]
[Footnote 158: In the enabling acts for the admission of Nebraska and
Nevada (1864), Colorado (1875), North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and
Washington (1889), and Utah (1896), we find the provision that the state
constitution shall not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.]
[Footnote 159: See Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. VI, p. 469.]
[Footnote 160: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, p. 20.]
[Footnote 161: Municipal Problems, p. 9.]
[Footnote 162: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, p. 23.]
[Footnote 163: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, pp. 24-26.]
[Footnote 164: Tacoma Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Tacoma, 14 Wash.]
[Footnote 165: The employment of the special fund device for municipal
ownership purposes has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Washington.
See Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, and Faulkner v. Seattle, 19 Wash.
320.]
[Footnote 166: Const., Art. I, sec. 2 and Art. II, sec. 1.]
[Footnote 167: Abstract of the Twelfth Census, p. 133.]
[Footnote 168: Constitution of Colorado, Art. X, Sec. 3.]
[Footnote 169: These figures concerning municipally owned waterworks as
well as those in the following paragraph relating to electric light
plants, are based on the data contained in the Fourteenth Annual Report
of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor on Water, Gas and Electric Light
Plants.]
[Footnote 170: Water, Gas and Electric Light Plants, 1899.]
[Footnote 171: Abstract of the Twelfth Census, p. 133.]
[Footnote 172: Ibid, p. 28.]
[Footnote 173: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 282, n.]
[Footnote 174: The Shame of the Cities, p. 5.]
[Footnote 175: Bryce, Vol. I, p. 663.]
[Footnote 176: Willoughby, The Nature of the State, p. 416.]
[Footnote 177: Pol. Sci. and Const. Law, Vol. I, p. 197.]
[Footnote 178: Ford's ed. of _The Federalist_, Introduction, p. xiii.]
[Footnote 179: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 155.]
[Footnote 180: Principles of Sociology, Vol. III, p. 525.]
[Footnote 181: In the year 1857 over 37 per cent. of the immigrants
arriving in the United States were from Germany, and over 39 per cent.
were from Great Britain and Ireland. The bulk of our foreign immigration
continued to come from these two countries until about 1886 or 1887. In
1890 these countries together contributed but little more than 47 per
cent. of our foreign immigrants, and in 1904 but 17 per cent. Italy,
including Sicily and Sardinia, supplied but 6 per cent. of the total
number of immigrants in 1886 and 23 per cent. in 1904. The Russian
Empire and Finland furnished only 5 per cent. of the total number in
1886 and about 18 per cent. in 1904. In 1886 the immigration from
Asiatic countries was insignificant, but in 1904 it had increased to
26,186. See Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1904.]
[Footnote 182: Art. I, sec. 9.]
[Footnote 183: _Federalist_, No. 36.]
[Footnote 184: Considerations, on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of
North America, Works, Vol. I.]
[Footnote 185: 6 Cranch, 87.]
[Footnote 186: Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 335-336, n.]
[Footnote 187: Money and Banking, p. 327. See also Myers, The History of
Tammany Hall, pp. 113-116.]
[Footnote 188: "Over and over again our government has been saved from
complete breakdown only by an absolute disregard of the Constitution,
and most of the very men who framed the compact would have refused to
sign it, could they have foreseen its eventual development." Ford's
Federalist, Introduction, p. vii.]
[Footnote 189: This was true of Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic
candidate in 1876.]
[Footnote 190: Supra p. 56.]
[Footnote 191: Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 1st sess., 30th
Cong., p. 94.]
[Footnote 192: Vol. I, p. 520.]
[Footnote 193: _Outlook_, Vol. 79, p. 163.]
[Footnote 194: Popular Government, p. 181.]
[Footnote 195: Politics and Administration, p. 9.]
[Footnote 196: This was one of the objects of the Oregon Direct Primary
Law, which was enacted by the people of that state upon initiative
petition at the general election held June 6, 1904. Under this law the
elector seeking nomination for the office of senator or representative
in the legislative assembly is expected to sign and file, as part of his
petition for nomination, one of the two following statements:
No. 1. "I further state to the people of Oregon as well as to the people
of my legislative district, that during my term of office, I will always
vote for that candidate for United States Senator in Congress who has
received the highest number of the people's votes for that position at
the general election next preceding the election of a Senator in
Congress, without regard to my individual preference."
No. 2. "During my term of office I shall consider the vote of the people
for United States Senator in Congress as nothing more than a
recommendation, which I shall be at liberty to wholly disregard if the
reason for doing so seems to me to be sufficient."]
[Footnote 197: Pure Sociology, p. 487.]
[Footnote 198: "The art of printing, in the hands of private persons,
has, until within a comparatively recent period, been regarded rather as
an instrument of mischief, which required the restraining hand of the
government, than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged....
The government assumed to itself the right to determine what might or
might not be published; and censors were appointed without whose
permission it was criminal to publish a book or paper upon any subject.
Through all the changes of government, this censorship was continued
until after the Revolution of 1688, and there are no instances in
English history of more cruel and relentless persecution than for the
publication of books which now would pass unnoticed by the
authorities....
"So late as 1671, Governor Berkeley, of Virginia, expressed his
thankfulness that neither free schools nor printing were introduced in
the Colony, and his trust that these breeders of disobedience, heresy,
and sects, would long be unknown....
"For publishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the
printer was arrested and put under bonds until the King's pleasure could
be known, and the King's pleasure was declared that no printing should
be allowed in the Colony. There were not wanting instances of the public
burning of books as offenders against good order. Such was the fate of
Elliot's book in defense of unmixed principles of popular freedom, and
Calef's book against Cotton Mather, which was given to the flames at
Cambridge." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 513-515.]
[Footnote 199: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 58.]
[Footnote 200: Ibid. p. 377.]
[Footnote 201: Social Evolution, p. 39.]
[Footnote 202: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 105.]
[Footnote 203: Ibid p. 218.]
[Footnote 204: Ibid p. 219.]
[Footnote 205: Principles of Biology, Vol. I, p. 469.]
[Footnote 206: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 105.]
[Footnote 207: Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Ch. 2.]
[Footnote 208: Supra, chapters XI and XII.]
[Footnote 209: P. 534.]
INDEX
Alien and sedition laws, 166.
Amendment, Articles of Confederation, 57;
Australia, 62;
England, 62;
France, 62;
Revolutionary state constitutions, 59;
state constitutions after 1787, 235;
Switzerland, 63;
checks on undemocratic, 63. See Constitution of the United States.
American colonies, government of, 12.
American government, aristocratic, 79, 103, 126.
See Checks and Balances,
Constitution of the United States,
House of Representatives,
President,
Senate,
Supreme Court.
American revolution, change in the spirit of, 13;
results of, 27.
Anarchism. See Checks and Balances.
Articles of Confederation, democratic tendency of, 25, 57;
weakness of, 23.
Baldwin, Simeon E., on the source of the Constitution, 28.
Bank of North America, repeal of the charter of, 321.
Boutmy, Emile, on the powers of the Supreme Court, 98;
on the relation of the House of Representatives to treaties, 138;
on hasty voting in the House, 202;
on the sovereignty of the majority in France, 301.
Bryce, James, on the opposition of the masses to the ratification of the
Constitution, 49;
on the ratification of the last three amendments, 54;
on the committee system, 196.
Budget. See House of Representatives.
Burgess, John W., on the difficulty of amending the Constitution, 47;
on the veto power of the Supreme Court, 90;
on the desire of the framers to avoid popular choice of Presidential
electors, 134 note;
on the protection of private property by the Supreme Court, 299.
Butler, C.H., on the attitude of the Supreme Court toward treaties, 119.
Calhoun, John C., on popular government, 132;
on state rights, 178.
Channing, Edward, on removal of judges, 71.
Checks and balances, American system of artificial, 130;
anarchism an extreme application of, 132;
belief of framers in, 125;
in early state constitutions, 21;
in English government, 8;
limitation of power of the people under, 129;
origin of, 126;
Poland an example of, 131;
practical limit to extension of, 130;
relation of, to _laissez faire_, 131;
subordination of House of Representatives not in accord with, 147.
See Constitution of the United States.
Chinese exclusion act, 315.
Common law, influence of the ruling class upon, 11.
Constitutional convention of 1787. See Constitution of the United States.
Constitutional government, origin of, 3;
relation to democracy, 3.
Constitution of the United States, a product of 18th century thought, 28;
change in the attitude of the people toward, 184;
germs of national government in, 161;
influence of the Federalists upon the development of, 164;
limitation of the taxing power in, 318;
no provision for political parties in, 205;
numerical majority not recognized in, 176;
power of minority to modify, 167;
protection of property in, 298;
purpose of, misrepresented by the framers, 77;
relation of, to individual liberty, 297;
relation of, to the doctrine of nullification, 169;
responsible for the state rights controversy, 163;
significance of, economic, 299;
states not expressly subordinated in, 161;
substitutes for monarchy and aristocracy in, 132;
vote in the conventions ratifying, 53 note;
an insignificant minority may prevent amendment of, 46;
Patrick Henry's objection to the amendment feature of, 44;
number of amendments proposed, 47;
power of two-thirds of the states to call a constitutional convention,
346;
importance of this provision, 346;
difficulty of securing the co-operation of the smaller states, 347;
the first ten amendments, 53;
the eleventh amendment, 53;
the twelfth amendment, 53;
the last three amendments, 54.
See House of Representatives. President, Senate, Supreme Court.
Contracts, laws impairing the obligation of, 320-325.
Cooley, T.M., on the difference between judicial and political power, 107;
on the attitude of the fathers toward publicity, 156;
on the evils of legislative interference in municipal affairs, 284;
on the influence of the Dartmouth College decision upon the growth of
corporate power, 325;
on government censorship of printing, 381 note.
Coxe, Brinton, on the judicial veto in England, 85;
on the judicial veto in the early state governments, 88, 89.
Dartmouth College case, 325.
Declaration of Independence, 14, 33, 219.
Democracy, immediate aim of, political, 388;
influence of economic progress on, 384;
influence of printing on growth of, 380;
reaction against, 27;
relation of, to reform, 380.
Direct primary, 350;
adoption of, in Oregon, 357 note.
Electoral college, influence of democracy on, 332.
See President.
English Bill of Rights, 152;
abuse of, by Parliament, 153.
Federal elections, 188.
Federalists, 165.
Federal judiciary. See Supreme Court.
Fiske, John, on the conservatism of the framers, 29;
on the secrecy of the debates on the Constitution, 34 note;
on the election of Presidential electors by state legislatures, 134 note.
Ford, Paul L., on the protection of the minority by the Supreme Court, 299;
on the rigidity of the Constitution, 331 note.
Framers of the Constitution, attitude of, toward criticism of public
officials, 152-159;
character of, 32;
deliberations of, secret, 34.
Free land, influence of, on wages, 314.
Free speech, in American colonies, 155.
Goodnow, F.J., on the freedom of New York City from legislative
interference in the early years of our history, 253;
on the abuses of legislative interference in municipal affairs, 257.
Governor, limited powers of, under early state constitutions, 19;
small executive power of, 244;
veto power of, 19, 244. See Impeachment, State constitutions after 1787.
Government, but two functions of, 344;
distinction between national and federal, 159;
influence of the minority upon, 370;
kinds of, 128;
ultimate source of authority in, 296.
Government of England, control of, by the landlord class in the 18th
century, 204;
change in the character of, 207.
Government by injunction, 116-119.
Great Charter, the political significance of, 4.
Great Council, 4;
separation of, into lords and commons, 6.
Greene, E.B., on free speech in the colonies, 155.
Hamilton, Alexander, on life tenure of judges, 66;
on the right of the courts to declare legislative acts null and void,
73-75;
his effort to mislead the public, 77;
his defense of poll taxes, 319;
his policy as Secretary of the Treasury, 164;
his reasons for supporting the Constitution, 82;
kind of government favored by, 79.
Henry Patrick, on amending the Constitution, 44;
on the right of judges to oppose acts of the legislature, 96;
offer of the Chief Justiceship to, 95.
Hoar, George F., on law-making in the House of Representatives, 197,
198, 200.
House of Commons, character of, in the 18th century, 10, 153, 204.
House of Representatives, an irresponsible body during the second regular
session, 189;
a subordinate branch of the government, 136;
influence of the committee system on, 192;
relation of, to taxation and expenditure, 148.
See President, Senate, Speaker of the House.
Immigration, decline in the quality of, 314.
Impeachment, by a majority of the legislature, 142;
changes in state constitutions relating to, 231;
of judges, 20;
reason for making difficult, 142;
relation of, to executive and judicial veto, 143.
See Judges, President, Senate.
Income Tax decision, 114, 222, 320.
Industry, control of, by the few, 307.
Initiative and referendum, 352.
Iredell, James, judicial veto defended by, as a means of limiting the
power of the majority, 89.
James I, on the divine right of kings, 104.
Jefferson, Thomas, on the independence of Federal judges, 68, 73 note,
100 note;
on the right of a state to nullify a federal law, 173.
Johnson, Alexander, on the conservatism of the Federal Convention, 33 note.
Judges, reason for advocating the independence of, 67;
removal of, under the early state constitutions, 71.
See Impeachment, Judicial Veto, Supreme Court.
Judicial infallibility, 115, 344.
Judicial veto, effort to revive, 87;
how conferred, 92;
in England, 85;
relation of, to the executive veto, 85;
relation of, to popular government, 99, 356;
significance of, 97.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 182;
why not incorporated in the Constitution, 183.
Kentucky resolutions, 172.
Kidd, Benjamin, on social progress, 391.
Labor, free trade in, 314.
_Laissez faire_, opposition of the masses to, 308;
relation of, to progress, 309, 311, 398.
Law, lack of respect for, 376-378.
Lawyers, virtually a ruling class, 300-302.
Lecky, W.E.H., on the purpose of the framers, 129.
Liberty, class control of industry destructive of, 306;
democratic conception of, 293;
eighteenth century economic conditions favorable to, 304;
eighteenth century view of, negative, 291;
survival of the old view in our legal literature, 301-303.
Lincoln, Abraham, on the right of the majority to overthrow minority
government, 335;
a minority president, 334.
Lowell, A. Lawrence, on the importance of the judiciary in our scheme
of government, 65.
Madison, James, on the evils of American government, 42;
on the power of a state to oppose the Federal government, 170;
on the danger of government by a majority, 205.
Maine, Henry S., on the success of the Senate in opposing democracy, 337.
Mallock, W.H., on the benefits and justice of minority control, 389,
392, 394.
Marshall, John, on the judicial veto, 93, 322.
Martin, Luther, on the precautions against publicity in the Federal
Convention, 34 note.
McMaster, J.B., on the character of the framers, 32;
on the political immorality of the fathers, 50.
Miller, S.F., on the relation of the people to the government, 31.
Morality, change in the standard of, 361;
effect of change in theological beliefs on, 364;
influence of class rule on, 366-378.
Municipal government, a creature of the legislature, 252;
attitude of the courts toward, 254;
evils of, attributed to the rule of the masses, 251, 284;
examples of legislative interference, 258-263;
extension of legislative authority over, 254;
fear of majority rule in, 277;
financial powers of, limited, 271-273;
franchise granting power in, 288-290;
home rule movement, 265;
retarded by the extension of the suffrage, 287;
hostility of the courts to home rule, 268, 270;
legislative control a source of corruption, 256;
limitation of the power of the majority, 266-268;
municipal ownership under class rule, 280;
origin of municipal charters, 253;
origin of restrictions on the borrowing power, 274-276;
prohibition of special legislation, 261;
survival of property qualifications, 279;
source of corruption in, 288;
twofold character of, 256.
See Special Fund.
Oath of office. See President.
Opportunity, equality of, indispensable, 390;
but will not ensure progress, 395.
Ostrogorski, M., on class control of the House of Commons, 204.
Parliament, control of taxing power by, 6;
four distinct constituencies represented in, 7.
See English Bill of Rights, Government of England, House of Commons,
Suffrage.
Party government, attitude of the framers toward, 135, 205.
Poland. See Checks and Balances.
Political parties, attitude of, on the money question, 221;
monopolies, 222;
control of nominations by minority, 218;
erroneous view of the Constitution promulgated by, 219-221;
evils of, due to checks on the majority, 214;
influence of the Constitution on, 208;
lack of power to control the government, 209;
largely representative of private interests, 216;
purpose of the party platform, 218;
reason for lack of interest in, 210.
Poll tax. See Hamilton.
Popular government, effort to discredit the theory of, 212, 251, 284.
President, administrative veto of, 145;
difficulty of passing measures over his veto, 139;
effort of the framers to preclude the election of a popular favorite,
135;
election of, by a minority, 56;
growth of veto power of, 141;
limited term of, 133;
not obligated by his oath of office to enforce the acts of Congress, 145;
minority election of, a source of danger, 334-336.
See Impeachment.
Press, influence of corporate wealth upon, 376.
Printing, minority control of, in the past, 381.
Property qualifications. See Suffrage.
Protective tariff, defended as a means of raising wages, 313;
maintained in the interest of the capitalist class, 313-317;
relation of, to _laissez faire_, 312.
Publicity, lack of adequate provision for, in the Constitution, 150;
relation of, to democracy, 372;
should extend to political contributions and the record of candidates,
372-373;
would cure many business evils, 374-375.
Public opinion, control of the organs of, by corporate wealth, 375.
Recall of public officials, 351.
Rogers, J.E.T., on the attitude of the English government toward the
laborer, 11.
Senate, difficulty of reforming by constitutional amendment, 338-340;
Direct nomination of the members of, 357;
disadvantages of equal representation of the states in, 339;
election of, by state legislatures an evil, 335;
long term of office of, 338;
influence of, on state politics, 358;
its large powers, 339;
members of, can not be impeached, 144;
opposition of to democratic legislation, 337.
Serfs, numerical importance of, 5.
Shafroth, J.F., on how to make the House of Representatives more
responsive to public opinion, 189.
Slavery, 317.
Smith, Adam, on civil government as a means of protecting the rich
against the poor, 37.
Social progress, influence of theological beliefs upon the accepted
theory of, 395-398;
relation of government to, 399-402.
Speaker of the House, veto of, on legislation, 199.
Special fund, for local improvements, 274;
for municipal ownership purposes, 276.
Spencer, Herbert, on the wage system as a form of slavery, 306;
on the need of more restriction, 399.
State constitutions after 1787, adoption of direct election and limited
term for judges, 240;
administrative power decentralized, 242;
change from annual to biennial sessions, 233;
development of the judicial veto, 230;
direct election of the governor, 239;
influence of democracy on, 239-242;
local administrative veto on state laws, 243;
majority deprived of power to amend, 235;
term of members of the legislature extended, 232.
State constitutions of the Revolutionary period, movement toward
democracy seen in, 16-21.
State legislatures, administrative veto of, 246;
distrust of, 352-355;
limitation of the power of, by the courts a cause of corruption, 325-330.
See Contracts.
State rights. See Calhoun, Constitution of the United States.
Steffens, Lincoln, on the wealthy business man as a corruptor of
municipal politics, 289.
Story, Joseph, on the independence of judges in England, 67 note;
on the right of courts to veto laws, 105.
Suffrage, limitation of in England in the 18th century, 10;
property qualifications for, 25, 43, 333;
universal, does not ensure popular government, 369.
Supreme Court, attitude toward, a survival of monarchy, 103-105;
cases in which it has exercised the veto power, 111;
decline of faith in, 113-117;
Federalist appointments, 94-99, 342;
freedom from criticism, 110;
influence of, upon legislation, 111-113;
non-interference with treaties, 119-123;
political and judicial powers, 107-110;
possibility of controlling, 341;
significance of powers claimed by, 105;
the controlling branch of the government, 102.
See Contracts, Hamilton, Impeachment, Jefferson, Judges, Judicial
Infallibility, Judicial Veto.
Taft, W.H., on the movement to confiscate private property under the
guise of reform, 115.
Taxes, limitation of the power to impose, 318.
Treaty making power, importance of, 137.
Tyler, M.C., on the number and character of the opponents of the
Revolution, 15.
Vested rights, an obstacle to reform, 299;
means of enforcing, 300.
Veto power. See Judicial Veto, President.
Virginia resolutions, 172.
Von Holst, H., on the origin of the doctrine of nullification, 169, 171.
Ward, L.F., on deception in business, 374.
Waterworks, public ownership of, 280.
White, Horace, on favoritism in granting bank charters in New York, 327.
Willoughby, W.W., on the tyranny of majority rule, 295.
Wilson, James, on amending the Articles of Confederation, 35;
argument of, against the right of a legislature to revoke privileges
granted, 321.
Wilson, Woodrow, on the Constitution as the outcome of a ruling class
movement, 51;
on the deification of the Constitution, 185.