INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The American doctrine of individual liberty had its origin in economic
conditions widely different from those which prevail to-day. The tools
of production were simple and inexpensive and their ownership widely
diffused. There was no capital-owning class in the modern sense.
Business was carried on upon a small scale. The individual was his own
employer, or, if working for another, could look forward to the time
when, by the exercise of ordinary ability and thrift, he might become an
independent producer. The way was open by which every intelligent and
industrious wage-earner could become his own master. Industrially
society was democratic to a degree which it is difficult for us to
realize at the present day. This economic independence which the
industrial classes enjoyed ensured a large measure of individual liberty
in spite of the fact that political control was in the hands of a class.
The degree of individual freedom and initiative which a community may
enjoy is not wholly, or even mainly, a matter of constitutional forms.
The actual liberty of the individual may vary greatly without any change
in the legal or constitutional organization of society. A political
system essentially undemocratic would be much less destructive of
individual liberty in a society where the economic life was simple and
ownership widely diffused than in a community possessing a wealthy
capitalist class on the one hand and an army of wage-earners on the
other. The political system reacts, it is true, upon the economic
organization, but the influence of the latter upon the individual is
more direct and immediate than that of the former. The control exerted
over the individual directly by the government may, as a matter of fact,
be slight in comparison with that which is exercised through the various
agencies which control the economic system. But the close
interdependence between the political and the business organization of
society can not be overlooked. Each is limited and conditioned by the
other, though constitutional forms are always largely the product and
expression of economic conditions.
Individual liberty in any real sense implies much more than the
restriction of governmental authority. In fact, true liberty consists,
as we have seen, not in divesting the government of effective power, but
in making it an instrument for the unhampered expression and prompt
enforcement of public opinion. The old negative conception of liberty
would in practice merely result in limiting the power of the government
to control social conditions. This would not necessarily mean, however,
the immunity of the individual from external control. To limit the power
of the government may permit the extension over the individual of some
other form of control even more irresponsible than that of the
government itself--the control which inevitably results from the
economic supremacy of a class who own the land and the capital.
The introduction of the factory system forced the great majority of
small independent producers down into the ranks of mere wage-earners,
and subjected them in their daily work to a class rule under which
everything was subordinated to the controlling purpose of the
employers--the desire for profits.
The significance of this change from the old handicraft system of
industry to present-day capitalistic production is fully understood by
all students of modern industry. Even Herbert Spencer, the great
expounder of individualism, admitted that the so-called liberty of the
laborer "amounts in practice to little more than the ability to exchange
one slavery for another" and that "the coercion of circumstances often
bears more hardly on him than the coercion of a master does on one in
bondage."[180] This dependence of the laborer, however, he regarded as
unfortunate, and looked forward to the gradual amelioration of present
conditions through the growth of co-operation in production.
Individualism as an economic doctrine was advocated in the eighteenth
century by those who believed in a larger measure of freedom for the
industrial classes. The small business which was then the rule meant the
wide diffusion of economic power. A _laissez faire_ policy would have
furthered the interests of that large body of small independent
producers who had but little representation in and but little influence
upon the government. It would have contributed materially to the
progress of the democratic movement by enlarging the sphere of
industrial freedom for all independent producers. It does not follow,
however, that this doctrine which served a useful purpose in connection
with the eighteenth-century movement to limit the power of the ruling
class is sound in view of the political and economic conditions which
exist to-day. The so-called industrial revolution has accomplished
sweeping and far-reaching changes in economic organization. It has
resulted in a transfer of industrial power from the many to the few, who
now exercise in all matters relating to production an authority as
absolute and irresponsible as that which the ruling class exercised in
the middle of the eighteenth century over the state itself. The simple
decentralized and more democratic system of production which formerly
prevailed has thus been supplanted by a highly centralized and
thoroughly oligarchic form of industrial organization. At the same time
political development has been tending strongly in the direction of
democracy. The few have been losing their hold upon the state, which has
come to rest, in theory at least, upon the wall of the many. A political
transformation amounting to a revolution has placed the many in the same
position in relation to the government which was formerly held by the
favored few.
As a result of these political and economic changes the policy of
government regulation of industry is likely to be regarded by the masses
with increasing favor. A society organized as a political democracy can
not be expected to tolerate an industrial aristocracy. As soon, then, as
the masses come to feel that they really control the political
machinery, the irresponsible power which the few now exercise in the
management of industry will be limited or destroyed as it has already
been largely overthrown in the state itself. In fact the doctrine of
_laissez faire_ no longer expresses the generally accepted view of state
functions, but merely the selfish view of that relatively small class
which, though it controls the industrial system, feels the reins of
political control slipping out of its hands. The limitation of
governmental functions which was the rallying-cry of the liberals a
century ago has thus become the motto of the present-day conservative.
The opponents of government regulation of industry claim that it will
retard or arrest progress by restricting the right of individual
initiative. They profess to believe that the best results for society as
a whole are obtained when every corporation or industrial combination is
allowed to manage its business with a free hand. It is assumed by those
who advocate this policy that there is no real conflict of interests
between the capitalists who control the present-day aggregations of
corporate wealth and the general public. No argument is needed, however,
to convince any one familiar with the facts of recent industrial
development that this assumption is not true.
The change in the attitude of the people toward the let-alone theory of
government is, as a matter of fact, the outcome of an intelligently
directed effort to enlarge and democratize--not abridge--the right of
initiative in its relation to the management of industry. The right of
individual initiative in the sense of the right to exercise a real
control over production was lost by the masses when the substitution of
machinery for tools made them directly dependent upon a class of
capital-owning employers. The subsequent growth of large scale
production has centralized the actual control of industry in the hands
of a small class of large capitalists. The small capitalists as
separate and independent producers are being rapidly crushed or absorbed
by the great corporation. They may still belong to the capitalist class
in that they live upon an income derived from the ownership of stock or
bonds. But they have no real control over the business in which their
capital is invested. They no longer have the power to organize and
direct any part of the industrial process. They enjoy the benefits which
accrue from the ownership of wealth, but they can no longer take an
active part in the management of industry. For them individual
initiative in the sense of an effective control over the industrial
process has disappeared almost as completely as it has in the case of
the mere wage-earner. Individual initiative even for the capital-owning
class has thus largely disappeared. It has been superseded by corporate
initiative which means the extinguishment of individual initiative
except in those cases where it is secured to the large capitalist
through the ownership of a controlling interest in the business.
The abandonment of the _laissez faire_ policy, then, in favor of the
principle of government regulation of industry is the outgrowth, not of
any hostility to individual initiative, but of the conviction that the
monopoly of industrial power by the few is a serious evil. It is
manifestly impossible to restore to the masses the right of individual
initiative. Industry is too complex and too highly organized to permit a
return to the old system of decentralized control. And since the only
substitute for the old system of individual control is collective
control, it appears to be inevitable that government regulation of
business will become a fixed policy in all democratic states.
The _laissez faire_ policy is supposed to favor progress by allowing
producers to make such changes in business methods as may be prompted by
the desire for larger profits. The doctrine as ordinarily accepted
contains at least two erroneous assumptions, viz., (1) that any
innovation in production which makes it possible for the capitalist to
secure a larger return is necessarily an improvement in the sense of
augmenting the average efficiency of labor, and (2) that policies are to
be judged solely by their economic effects. Even if non-interference
resulted in industrial changes which in all cases increase the
efficiency of labor, it would not follow that such changes are, broadly
considered, always beneficial. Before drawing any sweeping conclusion we
must consider all the consequences direct and indirect, immediate and
remote, political and social as well as economic. Hence the ordinary
test--the direct and immediate effect upon productive efficiency--is not
a satisfactory one. Moreover, many changes in the methods or
organization of business are designed primarily to alter distribution in
the interest of the capitalist by decreasing wages or by raising
prices. In so far as a policy of non-interference permits changes of
this sort, it is clearly harmful to the community at large, though
advantageous to a small class.
In all democratic countries the conservative classes are beginning to
realize that their ascendency in production is imperiled by the
ascendency of the masses in the state. It thus happens that in the hope
of checking or retarding the movement toward regulation of business in
the interest of the people generally, they have taken refuge behind that
abandoned tenet of democracy, the doctrine of non-interference.
At the same time they strongly favor any deviation from this policy
which will benefit themselves. This is exemplified in their attitude in
this country toward our protective tariff system, which, as originally
adopted, was designed to encourage the development of our national
resources by offering the prospect of larger profit to those who would
invest their capital in the protected industries. Under a capitalistic
system development naturally follows the line of greatest profit, and
for this reason any protective tariff legislation which did not augment
the profits of the capitalist would fail to accomplish its purpose. This
was recognized and frankly admitted when the policy was first adopted.
Later, however, when the suffrage was extended and the laboring class
became an important factor in national elections the champions of
protection saw that the system would have to be given a more democratic
interpretation. Thus the Whig platform of 1844 favored a tariff
"discriminating with special reference to the protection of the domestic
labor of the country." This was, however, the only political platform in
which the labor argument was used until 1872, when the Republican party
demanded that "duties upon importations ... should be so adjusted as to
aid in securing remunerative wages to labor, and promote the industries,
prosperity, and growth of the whole country." Protection, since that
time, has been defended, not as a means of augmenting profits, but as a
means of ensuring high wages to American workers. The interests of the
wage-receiving class, however, were far from being the chief concern of
those who were seeking to maintain and develop the policy of protection.
It was to the capitalist rather than the wage-earner that the system of
protection as originally established made a direct appeal, and it was
primarily in the interest of this class that it was maintained even
after the labor argument came to be generally used in its defense. The
capitalist naturally favored a policy that would discourage the
importation of foreign goods and at the same time encourage the
importation of foreign labor. It was to his advantage to keep the labor
market open to all who might wish to compete for employment, since this
would tend to force wages down and thus give him the benefit of high
prices.
Any system of protection established in the interest of labor would have
excluded all immigrants accustomed to a low standard of living. But as a
matter of fact the immigration of cheap foreign labor was actively
encouraged by the employers in whose interest the high tariff on foreign
goods was maintained. The efforts of the wage-earning class to secure
for themselves some of the benefits of protection by organizing to
obtain an advance or prevent a reduction in wages was largely defeated
through the wholesale importation of cheap foreign labor by the large
manufacturing, mining and transportation companies. The agitation
against this evil carried on by the labor unions finally resulted in the
enactment by Congress of legislation forbidding the importation of labor
under contract of employment. This, however, did not, and even if it had
been efficiently enforced, would not have given the American workingman
any real protection against cheap foreign labor. The incoming tide of
foreign immigration has been rising and the civic quality of the
immigrant has visibly declined. The free lands which formerly attracted
the best class of European immigrants are now practically a thing of the
past, and with the disappearance of this opportunity for remunerative
self-employment the last support of high wages has been removed. With
unrestricted immigration the American laboring man must soon be deprived
of any economic advantage which he has heretofore enjoyed over the
laboring classes of other countries.
There has been one notable exception to this immigration policy. The
invasion of cheap Asiatic labor upon the Pacific coast aroused a storm
of protest from the laboring population, which compelled Congress to
pass the Chinese Exclusion Act. But this legislation, while shutting out
Chinese laborers, has not checked the immigration from other countries
where a low standard of living prevails. In fact the most noticeable
feature of the labor conditions in this country has been the continual
displacement of the earlier and better class of immigrants and native
workers by recent immigrants who have a lower standard of living and are
willing to work for lower wages. This has occurred, too, in some of the
industries in which the employer has been most effectually protected
against the competition of foreign goods.[181]
The time has certainly arrived when the policy of protection ought to be
more broadly considered and dealt with in a public-spirited and
statesman-like manner. If it is to be continued as a national policy,
the interests of employees as well as employers must be taken into
account. The chief evils of the protective system have been due to the
fact that it has been too largely a class policy, and while maintained
in the interest of a class, it has been adroitly defended as a means of
benefiting the classes who derived little or no benefit--who were,
indeed, often injured by our tariff legislation.
The large capitalist may grow eloquent in defense of that broad
humanitarian policy under which the weak, the oppressed, and the
ignorant of all nations are invited to come among us and share in the
economic and political opportunities and privileges of American
citizens. Such high-sounding and professedly disinterested
cosmopolitanism appeals to a certain class of sentimental believers in
democracy. It does not appeal, however, to any one who fully understands
present-day industrial and political conditions. This capitalistic
sympathy for the weak and the oppressed of other nations may be regarded
by some as the expression of a broader patriotism, but its tap-root is
class selfishness--the desire to secure high profits through maintaining
active competition among laborers. As a matter of fact, all legislation
does, and always must, appeal to the interest of those without whose
influence and support it could not be enacted, and nothing is ever
gained for true progress by making the pretence of disinterested love
for humanity the cloak for class greed.
The desire of the employing class for cheap labor has been responsible
for the greatest dangers which menace this country to-day. It was the
demand for cheap labor which led to the importation of the African slave
and perpetuated the institution of slavery until, with the voluntary
immigration of foreign labor, it was no longer an economic necessity
from the standpoint of the employing class. Indeed the very existence of
slavery, by discouraging immigration, tended to limit the supply of
labor, and by so doing, to cripple all enterprises in which free labor
was employed. In this sense the abolition of slavery was the result of
an economic movement. It was to the advantage of the employing class as
a whole who found in the free labor hired under competitive conditions a
more efficient and cheaper instrument of production than the slave whom
they had to buy and for whose support they were responsible.
Had it not been for this eagerness on the part of the employing class to
secure cheap labor at first through the importation of the African slave
and later through the active encouragement of indiscriminate foreign
immigration, we would not now have the serious political, social and
economic problems which owe their existence to the presence among us of
vast numbers of alien races who have little in common with the better
class of American citizens. This element of our population, while
benefiting the employing class by keeping wages down, has at the same
time made it more difficult to bring about that intelligent political
co-operation so much needed to check the greed of organized wealth.
The limitation of governmental powers in the Constitution of the United
States was not designed to prevent all interference in business, but
only such as was conceived to be harmful to the dominant class. The
nature of these limitations as well as the means of enforcing them
indicate their purpose. The provision relating to direct taxes is a good
example. The framers of the Constitution were desirous of preventing any
use of the taxing power by the general government that would be
prejudicial to the interests of the well-to-do classes. This is the
significance of the provision that no direct taxes shall be laid unless
in proportion to population.[182] The only kind of a direct tax which
the framers intended that the general government should have power to
levy was the poll tax which would demand as much from the poor man as
from the rich. This was indeed one of the reasons for opposing the
ratification of the Constitution.
"Many specters," said Hamilton, "have been raised out of this power of
internal taxation to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets
of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations,
and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain....
"As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition [poll-taxes], I
still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it
ought to exist in the Federal government. There are certain emergencies
of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things
ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the
government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have
the option of making use of them."[183]
It is interesting to observe that Hamilton's argument in defense of the
power to levy poll-taxes would have been much more effective if it had
been urged in support of the power to levy a direct tax laid in
proportion to wealth. But this kind of a tax would, in the opinion of
the framers, have placed too heavy a burden upon the well-to-do. Hence
they were willing to deprive the general government of the power to levy
it even at the risk of crippling it in some great emergency when there
might be urgent need of a large revenue.
This is not strange, however, when we remember that it was the
property-owning class that framed and secured the adoption of the
Constitution. That they had their own interests in view when they
confined the general government practically to indirect taxes levied
upon articles of general consumption, and forbade direct taxes levied in
proportion to wealth, seems highly probable. It appears, then, that the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court declaring the Federal
Income Tax unconstitutional merely gave effect to the original spirit
and purpose of this provision.
The disposition to guard the interests of the property-holding class
rather than to prevent legislation for their advantage is also seen in
the interpretation which has been given to the provision forbidding the
states to pass any laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The
framers of the Constitution probably did not have in mind the extended
application which the courts have since made of this limitation on the
power of the states. Perhaps they intended nothing more than that the
states should be prevented from repudiating their just debts. But
whatever may have been the intention of the framers themselves, the
reactionary movement in which they were the recognized leaders, finally
brought about a much broader and, from the point of view of the
capitalist class, more desirable interpretation of this provision.
There is evidence of a desire to limit the power of the states in this
direction even before the Constitutional Convention of 1787 assembled.
The legislature of Pennsylvania in 1785 passed a bill repealing an act
of 1782 which granted a charter to the Bank of North America. James
Wilson, who is said to have suggested the above-mentioned clause of the
Federal Constitution, made an argument against the repeal of the
charter, in which he claimed that the power, or at least the right of
the legislature, to modify or repeal did not apply to all kinds of
legislation. It could safely be exercised, he thought, in the case of "a
law respecting the rights and properties of all the citizens of the
state."
"Very different," he says, "is the case with regard to a law, by which
the state grants privileges to a congregation or other society.... Still
more different is the case with regard to a law by which an estate is
vested or confirmed in an individual: if, in this case, the legislature
may, at discretion, and without any reason assigned, divest or destroy
his estate, then a person seized of an estate in fee-simple, under
legislative sanction, is, in truth, nothing more than a solemn tenant at
will....
"To receive the legislative stamp of stability and permanency, acts of
incorporation are applied for from the legislature. If these acts may be
repealed without notice, without accusation, without hearing, without
proof, without forfeiture, where is the stamp of their stability?... If
the act for incorporating the subscribers to the Bank of North America
shall be repealed in this manner, a precedent will be established for
repealing, in the same manner, every other legislative charter in
Pennsylvania.... Those acts of the state, which have hitherto been
considered as the sure anchors of privilege and of property, will become
the sport of every varying gust of politics, and will float wildly
backwards and forwards on the irregular and impetuous tides of party and
faction."[184]
In 1810 the case of Fletcher v. Peck[185] was decided in the Supreme
Court of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the
opinion of the court, said:
"The principle asserted is that one legislature is competent to repeal
any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one
legislature can not abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature. The
correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation,
can never be controverted. But if an act be done under a law, a
succeeding legislature can not undo it....
"When then a law is in the nature of a contract, when absolute rights
have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law can not devest
those rights; ...
"It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; ...
"It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court, that, in this case,
the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained,
either by general principles, which are common to our free institutions,
or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the
premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and
rendered null and void."
It is evident from this opinion that the court would have been disposed
at that time to declare state laws impairing property rights null and
void, even if there had been nothing in the Constitution of the United
States to justify the exercise of such a power. Justice Johnson, in a
separate opinion, said:
"I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of
revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on
the Deity....
"I have thrown out these ideas that I may have it distinctly understood
that my opinion on this point is not founded on the provision in the
Constitution of the United States, relative to laws impairing the
obligation of contracts."
It was contended in this case that the state of Georgia had the right to
revoke the grant on the ground that it was secured by corrupt means.
This argument evidently failed to appeal to the court. It was referred
to by Justice Johnson who said "as to the idea that the grants of a
legislature may be void because the legislature are corrupt, it appears
to me to be subject to insuperable difficulties.... The acts of the
supreme power of a country must be considered pure...."
It is interesting to observe that the Federalist judges in the early
years of our history under the Constitution did not deem it necessary to
find a constitutional ground for decisions of this sort. But with the
overthrow of the Federalist party and the progress of belief in popular
government, there is an evident disposition on the part of the court to
extend the protection of the Federal Constitution to all the powers
which it claimed the right to exercise. Thus in the Dartmouth College
case, decided in 1819, the United States Supreme Court appears to have
abandoned its earlier position and to have recognized the Constitution
as the source of its power to annul state laws.
"It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College
case," says Judge Cooley, "that the most enormous and threatening powers
in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy
corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large,
and upon the legislation of the country than the states to which they
owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right
conferred--no matter by what means or on what pretence--being made
inviolable by the Constitution, the government is frequently found
stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by unwise,
careless, or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the Federal
Constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and
just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil."[186]
Any government framed and set up to guard and promote the interests of
the people generally ought to have full power to modify or revoke all
rights or privileges granted in disregard of the public welfare. But the
Supreme Court, while permitting the creation or extension of property
rights, has prevented the subsequent abridgment of such rights, even
when the interests of the general public demanded it. The effect of this
has been to make the corporations take an active part in corrupting
state politics. Special legislation was not prohibited. In fact, it was
a common way of creating property rights. If a bank, an insurance
company, or a railway corporation was organized, it was necessary to
obtain a charter from the legislature which defined its powers and
privileges. The corporation came into existence by virtue of a special
act of the legislature and could exercise only such powers and enjoy
only such rights and privileges as that body saw fit to confer upon it.
The legislature might refuse to grant a charter, but having granted it,
it became a vested right which could not be revoked. The charter thus
granted by the legislature was a special privilege. In many instances it
was secured as a reward for political services by favorites of the party
machine, or through the corrupt expenditure of money or the equally
corrupt distribution of stock in the proposed corporation among those
who controlled legislation. Not only did this system invite corruption
in the granting of such charters, but it also created a motive for the
further use of corrupt means to keep possible competitors from securing
like privileges. It was worth the while to spend money to secure a
valuable privilege if when once obtained the legislature could not
revoke it. And it was also worth the while to spend more money to keep
dangerous competitors out of the field if by so doing it could enjoy
some of the benefits of monopoly. By thus holding that a privilege
granted to an individual or a private corporation by special act of the
legislature was a contract which could not be revoked by that body, the
courts in their effort to protect property rights opened the door which
allowed corporation funds to be brought into our state legislatures
early in our history for purposes of corruption.
But little attention has been given as yet to this early species of
corruption which in some of the states at least assumed the proportions
of a serious political evil.
"During the first half century banking in New York," says Horace White,
"was an integral part of the spoils of politics. Federalists would grant
no charters to Republicans, and Republicans none to Federalists. After a
few banks had been established they united, regardless of politics, to
create a monopoly by preventing other persons from getting charters.
When charters were applied for and refused, the applicants began
business on the common-law plan. Then, at the instigation of the favored
ones, the politicians passed a law to suppress all unchartered banks.
The latter went to Albany and bribed the legislature. In short,
politics, monopoly, and bribery constitute the key to banking in the
early history of the state."[187]
The intervention of the courts which made the conditions above described
possible, while ostensibly limiting the power of the state legislature,
in reality enlarged and extended it in the interest of the
capital-owning class. It gave to the state legislature a power which up
to that time it had not possessed--the power to grant rights and
privileges of which the grantees could not be deprived by subsequent
legislation. Before the adoption of the Federal Constitution no act of
the legislature could permanently override the will of the qualified
voters. It was subject to modification or repeal at the hands of any
succeeding legislature. The voters of the state thus had what was in
effect an indirect veto on all legislative acts--a power which they
might exercise through a subsequent legislature or constitutional
convention. But with the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States the Federal courts were able to deprive them of this power where
it was most needed. This removed the only effective check on corruption
and class legislation, thus placing the people at the mercy of their
state legislatures and any private interests that might temporarily
control them.
The power which the legislatures thus acquired to grant charters which
could not be amended or repealed made it necessary for the people to
devise some new method of protecting themselves against this abuse of
legislative authority. The outcome of this movement to re-establish some
effective popular check on the legislature has taken the form in a
majority of the states of a constitutional amendment by which the right
is reserved to amend or repeal all laws conferring corporate powers.
Such constitutional changes provide no remedy, however, for the evils
resulting from legislative grants made previous to their adoption. The
granting of special charters is now also prohibited in many states, the
constitution requiring that all corporations shall be formed under
general laws. These constitutional changes may be regarded as in the
interest of the capitalist class as a whole, whose demand was for a
broader and more liberal policy--one which would extend the advantages
of the corporate form of organization to all capitalists in every line
of business. But even our general corporation laws have been enacted too
largely in the interest of those who control our business undertakings
and without due regard to the rights of the general public.
A study of our political history shows that the attitude of the courts
has been responsible for much of our political immorality. By protecting
the capitalist in the possession and enjoyment of privileges unwisely
and even corruptly granted, they have greatly strengthened the motive
for employing bribery and other corrupt means in securing the grant of
special privileges. If the courts had all along held that any proof of
fraud or corruption in obtaining a franchise or other legislative grant
was sufficient to justify its revocation, the lobbyist, the bribe-giver,
and the "innocent purchaser" of rights and privileges stolen from the
people, would have found the traffic in legislative favors a precarious
and much less profitable mode of acquiring wealth.