such more than patience under this accusation, let us see what was his
conduct when the scene was changed. General Clavering, fatigued and
broken down by the miseries of his situation, soon afterwards lost a
very able and affectionate colleague, Colonel Monson, (whom Mr. Hastings
states to be one of the bitterest of his accusers,) a man one of the
most loved and honored of his time, a person of your Lordships' noble
blood, and a person who did honor to it, and if he had been of the
family of a commoner, well deserved to be raised to your distinction.
When that man died,--died of a broken heart, to say nothing else,--and
General Clavering felt himself in a manner without help, except what he
derived from the firmness, assiduity, and patience of Mr. Francis,
sinking like himself under the exertion of his own virtues, he was
resolved to resign his employment. The Court of Directors were so
alarmed at this attempt of his to resign his employment, that they wrote
thus: "When you conceived the design of quitting our service, we imagine
you could not have heard of the resignation of Mr. Hastings ... your
zeal and ability."[3]
My Lords, in this struggle, and before he could resign finally, another
kind of resignation, the resignation of Nature, took place, and Sir John
Clavering died. The character that was given Sir John Clavering at that
time is a seal to the whole of his proceedings, and the use that I shall
make of it your Lordships will see presently. "The abilities of General
Clavering, the comprehensive knowledge he had attained of our affairs
... to the East India Company."[4]
And never had it a greater loss. There is the concluding funeral
oration made by his masters, upon a strict, though by no means partial,
view of his conduct. My Lords, here is the man who is the great accuser
of Mr. Hastings, as he says. What is he? a slight man, a man of mean
situation, a man of mean talents, a man of mean character? No: of the
highest character. Was he a person whose conduct was disapproved by
their common superiors? No: it was approved when living, and ratified
when dead. This was the man, a man equal to him in every respect, upon
the supposed evil motives of whom alone was founded the sole
justification of Mr. Hastings.
But be it, then, that Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr.
Francis were all of them the evil-minded persons that he describes them
to be, and that from dislike to them, from a kind of manly resentment,
if you please, against such persons, an hatred against malicious
proceedings, and a defiance of them, he did not think proper, as he
states, to make his defence during that period of time, and while
oppressed by that combination,--yet, when he got rid of the two former
persons, and when Mr. Francis was nothing, when the whole majority was
in his hand, and he was in full power, there was a large, open, full
field for inquiry; and he was bound to re-institute that inquiry, and to
clear his character before his judges and before his masters. Mr.
Hastings says, "No: they have threatened me with a prosecution, and I
reserve myself for a court of justice."
Mr. Hastings has now at length taken a ground, as you will see from all
his writings, which makes all explanation of his conduct in this
business absolutely impossible. For, in the first place, he says, "As a
prosecution is meditated against me, I will say nothing in explanation
of my conduct, because I might disclose my defence, and by that means do
myself a prejudice." On the other hand, when the prosecution is dropped,
as we all know it was dropped in this case, then he has a direct
contrary reason, but it serves him just as well: "Why, as no prosecution
is intended, no defence need be made." So that, whether a prosecution is
intended or a prosecution dropped, there is always cause why Mr.
Hastings should not give the Court of Directors the least satisfaction
concerning his conduct, notwithstanding, as we shall prove, he has
reiteratedly promised, and promised it in the most ample and liberal
manner. But let us see if there be any presumption in his favor to rebut
the presumption which he knew was irresistible, and which, by making no
defence for his conduct, and stopping the inquiry, must necessarily lie
upon him. He reserves his defence, but he promises both defence and
explanation.
Your Lordships will remark that there is nowhere a clear and positive
denial of the fact. Promising a defence, I will admit, does not directly
and _ex vi termini_ suppose that a man may not deny the fact, because it
is just compatible with the defence; but it does by no means exclude the
admission of the fact, because the admission of the fact may be attended
with a justification: but when a man says that he will explain his
conduct with regard to a fact, then he admits that fact, because there
can be no explanation of a fact which has no existence. Therefore Mr.
Hastings admits the fact by promising an explanation, and he shows he
has no explanation nor justification to give by never having given it.
Goaded, provoked, and called upon for it, in the manner I have
mentioned, he chooses to have a feast of disgrace, (if I may say so,) to
have a riot of infamy, served up to him day by day for a course of
years, in every species of reproach that could be given by his
colleagues, and by the Court of Directors, "from whom," he says, "I
received nothing but opprobrious and disgraceful epithets," and he says
"that his predecessors possessed more of their confidence than he had."
Yet for years he lay down in that sty of disgrace, fattening in it,
feeding upon that offal of disgrace and excrement, upon everything that
could be disgustful to the human mind, rather than deny the fact and put
himself upon a civil justification. Infamy was never incurred for
nothing. We know very well what was said formerly:--
"Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca."
And never did a man submit to infamy for anything but its true reward,
_money_. Money he received; the infamy he received along with it: he was
glad to take his wife with all her goods; he took her with her full
portion, with every species of infamy that belonged to her; and your
Lordships cannot resist the opinion that he would not have suffered
himself to be disgraced with the Court of Directors, disgraced with his
colleagues, disgraced with the world, disgraced upon an eternal record,
unless he was absolutely guilty of the fact that was charged upon him.
He frequently expresses that he reserves himself for a court of justice.
Does he, my Lords? I am sorry that Mr. Hastings should show that he
always mistakes his situation; he has totally mistaken it: he was a
servant, bound to give a satisfactory account of his conduct to his
masters, and, instead of that, he considers himself and the Court of
Directors as litigant parties,--them as the accusers, and himself as the
culprit. What would your Lordships, in private life, conceive of a
steward who was accused of embezzling the rents, robbing and oppressing
the tenants, and committing a thousand misdeeds in his stewardship, and
who, upon your wishing to make inquiry into his conduct, and asking an
explanation of it, should answer, "I will give no reply: you may intend
to prosecute me and convict me as a cheat, and therefore I will not give
you any satisfaction": what would you think of that steward? You could
have no doubt that such a steward was a person not fit to be a steward,
nor fit to live.
Mr. Hastings reserves himself for a court of justice: that single
circumstance, my Lords, proves that he was guilty. It may appear very
odd that his guilt should be inferred from his desire of trial in a
court in which he could be acquitted or condemned. But I shall prove to
you from that circumstance that Mr. Hastings, in desiring to be tried in
a court of justice, convicts himself of presumptive guilt.
When Mr. Hastings went to Bengal in the year 1772, he had a direction
exactly similar to this which he has resisted in his own case: it was to
inquire into grievances and abuses. In consequence of this direction, he
proposes a plan for the regulation of the Company's service, and one
part of that plan was just what you would expect from him,--that is, the
power of destroying every Company's servant without the least
possibility of his being heard in his own defence or taking any one
step to justify himself, and of dismissing him at his own discretion:
and the reason he gives for it is this. "I shall forbear to comment upon
the above propositions: if just and proper, their utility will be
self-apparent. One clause only in the last article may require some
explanation, namely, the power proposed for the Governor of recalling
any person from his station without assigning a reason for it. In the
charge of oppression," (now here you will find the reason why Mr.
Hastings wishes to appeal to a court of justice, rather than to give
satisfaction to his employers,) "though supported by the cries of the
people and the most authentic representations, it is yet impossible in
most cases to obtain legal proofs of it; and unless the discretionary
power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of
impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the board,
as, on the other hand, the fear of the consequence will restrain every
man within the bounds of his duty, if he knows himself liable to suffer
by the effects of a single control." You see Mr. Hastings himself is of
opinion that the cries of oppression, though extorted from a whole
people by the iron hand of severity,--that these cries of a whole
people, attended even with authentic documents sufficient to satisfy the
mind of any man, may be totally insufficient to convict the oppressor in
a court; and yet to that court, whose competence he denies, to that very
court, he appeals, in that he puts his trust, and upon that ground he
refuses to perform the just promise he had given of any explanation to
those who had employed him.
Now I put this to your Lordships: if a man is of opinion that no public
court can truly and properly bring him to any account for his conduct,
that the forms observable in courts are totally adverse to it, that
there is a general incompetency with regard to such a court, and yet
shuns a tribunal capable and competent, and applies to that which he
thinks is incapable and incompetent, does not that man plainly show that
he has rejected what he thinks will prove his guilt, and that he has
chosen what he thinks will be utterly insufficient to prove it? And if
this be the case, as he asserts it to be, with an under servant, think
what must be the case of the upper servant of all: for, if an inferior
servant is not to be brought to justice, what must be the situation of a
Governor-General? It is impossible not to see, that, as he had conceived
that a court of justice had not sufficient means to bring his crimes to
light and detection, nor sufficient to bring him to proper and adequate
punishment, therefore he flew to a court of justice, not as a place to
decide upon him, but as a sanctuary to secure his guilt. Most of your
Lordships have travelled abroad, and have seen in the unreformed
countries of Europe churches filled with persons who take sanctuary in
them. You do not presume that a man is innocent because he is in a
sanctuary: you know, that, so far from demonstrating his innocence, it
demonstrates his guilt. And in this case, Mr. Hastings flies not to a
court for trial, but as a sanctuary to secure him from it.
Let us just review the whole of his conduct; let us hear how Mr.
Hastings has proceeded with regard to this whole affair. The court of
justice dropped; the prosecution in Bengal ended. With Sir Elijah Impey
as chief-justice, who, as your Lordships have seen, had a most close and
honorable connection with the Governor-General, (all the circumstances
of which I need not detail to you, as it must be fresh in your
Lordships' memory,) he had not much to fear from the impartiality of the
court. He might be sure the forms of law would not be strained to do him
mischief; therefore there was no great terror in it. But whatever terror
there might be in it was overblown, because his colleagues refused to
carry him into it, and therefore that opportunity of defence is gone. In
Europe he was afraid of making any defence, but the prosecution here was
also soon over; and in the House of Commons he takes this ground of
justification for not giving any explanation, that the Court of
Directors had received perfect satisfaction of his innocence; and he
named persons of great and eminent character in the profession, whose
names certainly cannot be mentioned without highly imposing upon the
prejudices and weighing down almost the reason of mankind. He quotes
their opinions in his favor, and argues that the exculpation which they
give, or are supposed to give him, should excuse him from any further
explanation.
My Lords, I believe I need not say to great men of the profession, many
of the first ornaments of which I see before me, that they are very
little influenced in the seat of judgment by the opinions which they
have given in the chamber, and they are perfectly in the right: because
while in the chamber they hear but one part of the cause; it is
generally brought before them in a very partial manner, and they have
not the lights which they possess when they sit deliberately down upon
the tribunal to examine into it; and for this reason they discharge
their minds from every prejudice that may have arisen from a foregone
partial opinion, and come uninfluenced by it as to a new cause. This, we
know, is the glory of the great lawyers who have presided and do preside
in the tribunals of this country; but we know, at the same time, that
those opinions (which they in their own mind reject, unless supported
afterwards by clear and authentic testimony) do weigh upon the rest of
mankind at least: for it is impossible to separate the opinion of a
great and learned man from some consideration of the person who has
delivered that opinion.
Mr. Hastings, being conscious of this, and not fearing the tribunal
abroad for the reason that I gave you, namely, his belief that it was
not very adverse to him, and also knowing that the prosecution there was
dropped, had but one thing left for his consideration, which was, how he
should conflict with the tribunal at home: and as the prosecution must
originate from the Court of Directors, and be authorized by some great
law opinions, the great point with him was, some way or other, by his
party, I will not say by what means or circumstances, but by some party
means, to secure a strong interest in the executive part of the India
House. My Lords, was that interest used properly and fairly? I will not
say that friendship and partiality imply injustice; they certainly do
not; but they do not imply justice. The Court of Directors took up this
affair with great warmth; they committed it to their solicitor, and the
solicitor would naturally (as most solicitors do) draw up a case a
little favorably for the persons that employed him; and if there was any
leaning, which upon my word I do not approve in the management of any
cause whatever, yet, if there was a leaning, it must be a leaning for
the client.
Now the counsel did not give a decided opinion against the prosecution,
but upon the face of the case they expressed great doubts upon it; for,
with such a strange, disorderly, imperfect, and confused case as was
laid before them, they could not advise a prosecution; and in my opinion
they went no further. And, indeed, upon that case that went before them,
I, who am authorized by the Commons to prosecute, do admit that a great
doubt might lie upon the most deciding mind, whether, under the
circumstances there stated, a prosecution could be or ought to be
pursued. I do not say which way my mind would have turned, upon that
very imperfect state of the case; but I still allow so much to their
very great ability, great minds, and sound judgment, that I am not sure,
if it was _res integra_, I would not have rather hesitated myself (who
am now here an accuser) what judgment to give.
It does happen that there are very singular circumstances in this
business, to which your Lordships will advert; and you will consider
what weight they ought to have upon your Lordships' minds. The person
who is now the solicitor of the Company is a very respectable man in the
profession,--Mr. Smith; he was at that time also the Company's
solicitor, and he has since appeared in this cause as Mr. Hastings's
solicitor. Now there is something particular in a man's being the
solicitor to a party who was prosecuting another, and continuing
afterwards in his office, and becoming the solicitor to the party
prosecuted. It would be nearly as strange as if our solicitor were to be
the solicitor of Mr. Hastings in this prosecution and trial before your
Lordships. It is true, that we cannot make out, nor do we attempt to
prove, that Mr. Smith was at that time actually Mr. Hastings's
solicitor: all that we shall attempt to make out is, that the case he
produced was just such a case as a solicitor anxious for the
preservation of his client, and not anxious for the prosecution, would
have made out.
My Lords, I have next to remark, that the opinion which the counsel gave
in this case, namely, a very doubtful opinion, accompanied with strong
censure of the manner in which the case was stated, was drawn from them
by a case in which I charge that there were _misrepresentation_,
_suppression_, and _falsification_.
Now, my Lords, in making this charge I am in a very awkward and
unpleasant situation; but it is a situation in which, with all the
disagreeable circumstances attending it, I must proceed. I am, in this
business, obliged to name many men: I do not name them wantonly, but
from the absolute necessity, as your Lordships will see, of the case. I
do not mean to reflect upon this gentleman: I believe, at the time when
he made this case, and especially the article which I state as a
_falsification_, he must have trusted to some of the servants of the
Company, who were but young in their service at that time. There was a
very great error committed; but by whom, or how, your Lordships in the
course of this inquiry will find. What I charge first is, that the case
was improperly stated; secondly, that it was partially stated; and that
afterwards a further report was made upon reference to the same officer
in the committee. Now, my Lords, of the three charges which I have made,
the two former, namely, the misrepresentation and suppression, were
applicable to the case; but all the three, misrepresentation,
suppression, and falsification, were applicable to the report.
This I say in vindication of the opinions given, and for the
satisfaction of the public, who may be imposed upon by them. I wish the
word to be understood. When I say _imposed_, I always mean by it the
weight and authority carried: a meaning which this word, perhaps, has
not got yet thoroughly in the English language; but in a neighboring
language _imposing_ means, that it weighs upon men's minds with a
sovereign authority. To say that the opinions of learned men, though
even thus obtained, may not have weight with this court, or with any
court, is a kind of compliment I cannot pay to them at the expense of
that common nature in which I and all human beings are involved.
He states in the case the covenants and the salary of Mr. Hastings, and
his emoluments, very fairly. I do not object to any part of that. He
then proceeds to state very partially the business upon which the
Committee of Circuit went, and without opening whose conduct we cannot
fully bring before you this charge of bribery. He then states, "that, an
inquiry having been made by the present Supreme Council of Bengal
respecting the conduct of the members of the last administration,
several charges have been made, stating moneys very improperly received
by Mr. Hastings during the time of the late administration: amongst
these is one of his having received 150,000 rupees of Munny Begum, the
guardian of the Nabob, who is an infant."
In this statement of the case everything is put out of its true place.
Mr. Hastings was not charged with receiving a lac and a half of rupees
from Munny Begum, the guardian of the Nabob,--for she was not then his
guardian; but he was charged with receiving a lac and a half of rupees
for removing the Nabob's own mother, who was his natural guardian, and
substituting this step-mother, who was a prostitute, in her place;
whereas here it supposes he found her a guardian, and that she had made
him a present, which alters the whole nature of the case. The case, in
the recital of the charge, sets out with what every one of your
Lordships knows now not to be the truth of the fact, nor the thing that
in itself implies the criminality: he ought to have stated that in the
beginning of the business. The suppressions in the recital are amazing.
He states an inquiry having been made by the Supreme Council of Bengal
respecting the conduct of the members of the last administration. That
inquiry was made in consequence of the charge, and not the charge
brought forward, as they would have it believed, in consequence of the
inquiry. There is no mention that that inquiry had been expressly
ordered by the Court of Directors; but it is stated as though it was a
voluntary inquiry. Now there is always something doubtful in voluntary
inquiries with regard to the people concerned. He then supposes, upon
this inquiry, that to be the charge which is not the charge at all. The
crime, as I have stated, consisted of two distinct parts, but both
inferring the same corruption: the first, two lac of rupees taken
expressly for the nomination of this woman to this place; and the other,
one lac and a half of rupees, in effect for the same purpose, but under
the name and color of an entertainment. The drawer of the case, finding
that in the one case, namely, the two lac of rupees, the evidence was
more weak, but that no justification could be set up,--finding in the
other, the lac and a half of rupees, the proof strong and not to be
resisted, but that some justification was to be found for it, lays aside
the charge of the two lac totally; and the evidence belonging to it,
which was considered as rather weak, is applied to the other charge of a
lac and a half, the proof of which upon its own evidence was
irresistible.
My speech I hope your Lordships consider as only pointing out to your
attention these particulars. Your Lordships will see it exemplified
throughout the whole, that, when there is evidence (for some evidence is
brought) that does belong to the lac and a half, it is entirely passed
by, the most material circumstances are weakened, the whole strength and
force of them taken away. Every one knows how true it is of evidence,
_juncta juvant_: but here everything is broken and smashed to pieces,
and nothing but disorder appears through the whole. For your Lordships
will observe that the proof that belongs to one thing is put as
belonging to another, and the proof of the other brought in a weak and
imperfect manner in the rear of the first, and with every kind of
observation to rebut and weaken it; and when this evidence is produced,
which appears inapplicable almost in all the parts, in many doubtful,
confused, and perplexed, and in some even contradictory, (which it will
be when the evidence to one thing is brought to apply and bear upon
another,) good hopes were entertained in consequence that that would
happen which in part did happen, namely, that the counsel, distracted
and confused, and finding no satisfaction in the case, could not advise
a prosecution.