When the ancient nobility, the great princes, (for such I ma

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THE WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE

IN TWELVE VOLUMES

VOLUME THE TENTH

[Illustration: Burke Coat of Arms.]

LONDON

JOHN C. NIMMO

14, KING WILLIAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.

MDCCCLXXXVII

CONTENTS OF VOL. X.

SPEECHES IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,

LATE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

SPEECH IN OPENING THE IMPEACHMENT.

THIRD DAY: MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1788 3

FOURTH DAY: TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19 99

SPEECH ON THE SIXTH ARTICLE OF CHARGE.

FIRST DAY: TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1789 149

SECOND DAY: SATURDAY, APRIL 25 240

THIRD DAY: TUESDAY, MAY 5 306

FOURTH DAY: THURSDAY, MAY 7 396

SPEECHES

IN

THE IMPEACHMENT

OF

WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE

LATE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

SPEECH IN OPENING.

(CONTINUED.)

FEBRUARY, 1788.

SPEECH

IN

OPENING THE IMPEACHMENT.

THIRD DAY: MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1788.

My Lords,--The gentlemen who are appointed by the Commons to manage this

prosecution, have directed me to inform your Lordships, that they have

very carefully and attentively weighed the magnitude of the subject

which they bring before you with the time which the nature and

circumstances of affairs allow for their conducting it.

My Lords, on that comparison, they are very apprehensive, that, if I

should go very largely into a preliminary explanation of the several

matters in charge, it might be to the prejudice of an early trial of the

substantial merits of each article. We have weighed and considered this

maturely. We have compared exactly the time with the matter, and we have

found that we are obliged to do as all men must do who would manage

their affairs practicably, to make our opinion of what might be most

advantageous to the business conform to the time that is left to perform

it in. We must, as all men must, submit affairs to time, and not think

of making time conform to our wishes; and therefore, my Lords, I very

willingly fall in with the inclinations of the gentlemen with whom I

have the honor to act, to come as soon as possible to close fighting,

and to grapple immediately and directly with the corruptions of

India,--to bring before your Lordships the direct articles, to apply the

evidence to the articles, and to bring the matter forward for your

Lordships' decision in that manner which the confidence we have in the

justice of our cause demands from the Commons of Great Britain.

My Lords, these are the opinions of those with whom I have the honor to

act, and in their opinions I readily acquiesce. For I am far from

wishing to waste any of your Lordships' time upon any matter merely

through any opinion I have of the nature of the business, when at the

same time I find that in the opinion of others it might militate against

the production of its full, proper, and (if I may so say) its immediate

effect.

It was my design to class the crimes of the late Governor of Bengal,--to

show their mutual bearings,--how they were mutually aided and grew and

were formed out of each other. I proposed first of all to show your

Lordships that they have their root in that which is the origin of all

evil, avarice and rapacity,--to show how that led to prodigality of the

public money,--and how prodigality of the public money, by wasting the

treasures of the East India Company, furnished an excuse to the

Governor-General to break its faith, to violate all its most solemn

engagements, and to fall with a hand of stern, ferocious, and

unrelenting rapacity upon all the allies and dependencies of the

Company. But I shall be obliged in some measure to abridge this plan;

and as your Lordships already possess, from what I had the honor to

state on Saturday, a general view of this matter, you will be in a

condition to pursue it when the several articles are presented.

My Lords, I have to state to-day the root of all these

misdemeanors,--namely, the pecuniary corruption and avarice which gave

rise and primary motion to all the rest of the delinquencies charged to

be committed by the Governor-General.

My Lords, pecuniary corruption forms not only, as your Lordships will

observe in the charges before you, an article of charge by itself, but

likewise so intermixes with the whole, that it is necessary to give, in

the best manner I am able, a history of that corrupt system which

brought on all the subsequent acts of corruption. I will venture to say

there is no one act, in which tyranny, malice, cruelty, and oppression

can be charged, that does not at the same time carry evident marks of

pecuniary corruption.

I stated to your Lordships on Saturday last the principles upon which

Mr. Hastings governed his conduct in India, and upon which he grounds

his defence. These may all be reduced to one short word,--_arbitrary

power_. My Lords, if Mr. Hastings had contended, as other men have often

done, that the system of government which he patronizes, and on which he

acted, was a system tending on the whole to the blessing and benefit of

mankind, possibly something might be said for him for setting up so

wild, absurd, irrational, and wicked a system,--something might be said

to qualify the act from the intention; but it is singular in this man,

that, at the time he tells you he acted on the principles of arbitrary

power, he takes care to inform you that he was not blind to the

consequences. Mr. Hastings foresaw that the consequences of this system

was corruption. An arbitrary system, indeed, must always be a corrupt

one. My Lords, there never was a man who thought he had no law but his

own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but his own profit.

Corruption and arbitrary power are of natural unequivocal generation,

necessarily producing one another. Mr. Hastings foresees the abusive and

corrupt consequences, and then he justifies his conduct upon the

necessities of that system. These are things which are new in the world;

for there never was a man, I believe, who contended for arbitrary power,

(and there have been persons wicked and foolish enough to contend for

it,) that did not pretend, either that the system was good in itself, or

that by their conduct they had mitigated or had purified it, and that

the poison, by passing through their constitution, had acquired salutary

properties. But if you look at his defence before the House of Commons,

you will see that that very system upon which he governed, and under

which he now justifies his actions, did appear to himself a system

pregnant with a thousand evils and a thousand mischiefs.

The next thing that is remarkable and singular in the principles upon

which the Governor-General acted is, that, when he is engaged in a

vicious system which clearly leads to evil consequences, he thinks

himself bound to realize all the evil consequences involved in that

system. All other men have taken a directly contrary course: they have

said, "I have been engaged in an evil system, that led, indeed, to

mischievous consequences, but I have taken care, by my own virtues, to

prevent the evils of the system under which I acted."

We say, then, not only that he governed arbitrarily, but

corruptly,--that is to say, that he was a giver and receiver of bribes,

and formed a system for the purpose of giving and receiving them. We

wish your Lordships distinctly to consider that he did not only give and

receive bribes accidentally, as it happened, without any system and

design, merely as the opportunity or momentary temptation of profit

urged him to it, but that he has formed plans and systems of government

for the very purpose of accumulating bribes and presents to himself.

This system of Mr. Hastings's government is such a one, I believe, as

the British nation in particular will disown; for I will venture to say,

that, if there is any one thing which distinguishes this nation

eminently above another, it is, that in its offices at home, both

judicial and in the state, there is less suspicion of pecuniary

corruption attaching to them than to any similar offices in any part of

the globe, or that have existed at any time: so that he who would set up

a system of corruption, and attempt to justify it upon the principle of

utility, that man is staining not only the nature and character of

office, but that which is the peculiar glory of the official and

judicial character of this country; and therefore, in this House, which

is eminently the guardian of the purity of all the offices of this

kingdom, he ought to be called eminently and peculiarly to account.

There are many things, undoubtedly, in crimes, which make them frightful

and odious; but bribery, filthy hands, a chief governor of a great

empire receiving bribes from poor, miserable, indigent people, this is

what makes government itself base, contemptible, and odious in the eyes

of mankind.

My Lords, it is certain that even tyranny itself may find some specious

color, and appear as a more severe and rigid execution of justice.

Religious persecution may shield itself under the guise of a mistaken

and over-zealous piety. Conquest may cover its baldness with its own

laurels, and the ambition of the conqueror may be hid in the secrets of

his own heart under a veil of benevolence, and make him imagine he is

bringing temporary desolation upon a country only to promote its

ultimate advantage and his own glory. But in the principles of that

governor who makes nothing but money his object there can be nothing of

this. There are here none of those specious delusions that look like

virtues, to veil either the governed or the governor. If you look at Mr.

Hastings's merits, as he calls them, what are they? Did he improve the

internal state of the government by great reforms? No such thing. Or by

a wise and incorrupt administration of justice? No. Has he enlarged the

boundary of our government? No: there are but too strong proofs of his

lessening it. But his pretensions to merit are, that he squeezed more

money out of the inhabitants of the country than other persons could

have done,--money got by oppression, violence, extortion from the poor,

or the heavy hand of power upon the rich and great.

These are his merits. What we charge as his demerits are all of the same

nature; for, though there is undoubtedly oppression, breach of faith,

cruelty, perfidy, charged upon him, yet the great ruling principle of

the whole, and that from which you can never have an act free, is

money,--it is the vice of base avarice, which never is, nor ever appears

even to the prejudices of mankind to be, anything like a virtue. Our

desire of acquiring sovereignty in India undoubtedly originated first in

ideas of safety and necessity; its next step was a step of ambition.

That ambition, as generally happens in conquest, was followed by gains

of money; but afterwards there was no mixture at all; it was, during Mr.

Hastings's time, altogether a business of money. If he has extirpated a

nation, I will not say whether properly or improperly, it is because

(says he) you have all the benefit of conquest without expense; you have

got a large sum of money from the people, and you may leave them to be

governed by whom and as they will. This is directly contrary to the

principles of conquerors. If he has at any time taken any money from the

dependencies of the Company, he does not pretend that it was obtained

from their zeal and affection to our cause, or that it made their

submission more complete: very far from it. He says they ought to be

independent, and all that you have to do is to squeeze money from them.

In short, money is the beginning, the middle, and the end of every kind

of act done by Mr. Hastings: pretendedly for the Company, but really for

himself.

Having said so much about the origin, the first principle, both of that

which he makes his merit and which we charge as his demerit, the next

step is, that I should lay open to your Lordships, as clearly as I can,

what the sense of his employers, the East India Company, and what the

sense of the legislature itself, has been upon those merits and demerits

of money.

My Lords, the Company, knowing that these money transactions were likely

to subvert that empire which was first established upon them, did, in

the year 1765, send out a body of the strongest and most solemn

covenants to their servants, that they should take no presents from the

country powers, under any name or description, except those things which

were publicly and openly taken for the use of the Company,--namely,

_territories_ or _sums of money_ which might be obtained by treaty. They

distinguished such presents as were taken from any persons privately,

and unknown to them, and without their authority, from subsidies: and

that this is the true nature and construction of their order I shall

contend and explain afterwards to your Lordships. They have said,

nothing shall be taken for their private use; for though in that and in

every state there may be subsidiary treaties by which sums of money may

be received, yet they forbid their servants, their governors, whatever

application they might pretend to make of them, to receive, under any

other name or pretence, more than a certain, marked, simple sum of

money, and this not without the consent and permission of the Presidency

to which they belong. This is the substance, the principle, and the

spirit of the covenants, and will show your Lordships how radicated an

evil this of bribery and presents was judged to be.

When these covenants arrived in India, the servants refused at first to

execute them,--and suspended the execution of them, till they had

enriched themselves with presents. Eleven months elapsed, and it was not

till Lord Clive reached the place of his destination that the covenants

were executed: and they were not executed then without some degree of

force. Soon afterwards the treaty was made with the country powers by

which Sujah ul Dowlah was reëstablished in the province of Oude, and

paid a sum of 500,000_l._ to the Company for it. It was a public

payment, and there was not a suspicion that a single shilling of private

emolument attended it. But whether Mr. Hastings had the example of

others or not, their example could not justify his briberies. He was

sent there to put an end to all those examples. The Company did

expressly vest him with that power. They declared at that time, that the

whole of their service was totally corrupted by bribes and presents, and

by extravagance and luxury, which partly gave rise to them, and these,

in their turn, enabled them to pursue those excesses. They not only

reposed trust in the integrity of Mr. Hastings, but reposed trust in his

remarkable frugality and order in his affairs, which they considered as

things that distinguished his character. But in his defence we have him

quite in another character,--no longer the frugal, attentive servant,

bred to business, bred to book-keeping, as all the Company's servants

are; he now knows nothing of his own affairs, knows not whether he is

rich or poor, knows not what he has in the world. Nay, people are

brought forward to say that they know better than he does what his

affairs are. He is not like a careful man bred in a counting-house, and

by the Directors put into an office of the highest trust on account of

the regularity of his affairs; he is like one buried in the

contemplation of the stars, and knows nothing of the things in this

world. It was, then, on account of an idea of his great integrity that

the Company put him into this situation. Since that he has thought

proper to justify himself, not by clearing himself of receiving bribes,

but by saying that no bad consequences resulted from it, and that, if

any such evil consequences did arise from it, they arose rather from his

inattention to money than from his desire of acquiring it.

I have stated to your Lordships the nature of the covenants which the

East India Company sent out. Afterwards, when they found their servants

had refused to execute these covenants, they not only very severely

reprehended even a moment's delay in their execution, and threatened the

exacting the most strict and rigorous performance of them, but they sent

a commission to enforce the observance of them more strongly; and that

commission had it specially in charge never to receive presents. They

never sent out a person to India without recognizing the grievance, and

without ordering that presents should not be received, as the main

fundamental part of their duty, and upon which all the rest depended, as

it certainly must: for persons at the head of government should not

encourage that by example which they ought by precept, authority, and

force to restrain in all below them. That commission failing, another

commission was preparing to be sent out with the same instructions, when

an act of Parliament took it up; and that act, which gave Mr. Hastings

power, did mould in the very first stamina of his power this principle,

in words the most clear and forcible that an act of Parliament could

possibly devise upon the subject. And that act was made not only upon a

general knowledge of the grievance, but your Lordships will see in the

reports of that time that Parliament had directly in view before them

the whole of that monstrous head of corruption under the name of

presents, and all the monstrous consequences that followed it.

Now, my Lords, every office of trust, in its very nature, forbids the

receipt of bribes. But Mr. Hastings was forbidden it, first, by his

official situation,--next, by covenant,--and lastly, by act of

Parliament: that is to say, by all the things that bind mankind, or that

can bind them,--first, moral obligation inherent in the duty of their

office,--next, the positive injunctions of the legislature of the

country,--and lastly, a man's own private, particular, voluntary act and

covenant. These three, the great and only obligations that bind mankind,

all united in the focus of this single point,--that they should take no

presents.

I am to mark to your Lordships, that this law and this covenant did

consider indirect ways of taking presents--taking them by others, and

such like--directly in the very same light as they considered taking

them by themselves. It is perhaps a much more dangerous way; because it

adds to the crime a false, prevaricating mode of concealing it, and

makes it much more mischievous by admitting others into the

participation of it. Mr. Hastings has said, (and it is one of the

general complaints of Mr. Hastings,) that he is made answerable for the

acts of other men. It is a thing inherent in the nature of his

situation. All those who enjoy a great superintending trust, which is to

regulate the whole affairs of an empire, are responsible for the acts

and conduct of other men, so far as they had anything to do with

appointing them, or holding them in their places, or having any sort of

inspection into their conduct. But when a Governor presumes to remove

from their situations those persons whom the public authority and

sanction of the Company have appointed, and obtrudes upon them by

violence other persons, superseding the orders of his masters, he

becomes doubly responsible for their conduct. If the persons he names

should be of notorious evil character and evil principles, and if this

should be perfectly known to himself, and of public notoriety to the

rest of the world, then another strong responsibility attaches on him

for the acts of those persons.

Governors, we know very well, cannot with their own hands be continually

receiving bribes,--for then they must have as many hands as one of the

idols in an Indian temple, in order to receive all the bribes which a

Governor-General may receive,--but they have them vicariously. As there

are many offices, so he has had various officers for receiving and

distributing his bribes; he has a great many, some white and some black

agents. The white men are loose and licentious; they are apt to have

resentments, and to be bold in revenging them. The black men are very

secret and mysterious; they are not apt to have very quick resentments,

they have not the same liberty and boldness of language which

characterize Europeans; and they have fears, too, for themselves, which

makes it more likely that they will conceal anything committed to them

by Europeans. Therefore Mr. Hastings had his black agents, not one, two,

three, but many, disseminated through the country: no two of them,

hardly, appear to be in the secret of any one bribe. He has had likewise

his white agents,--they were necessary,--a Mr. Larkins and a Mr.

Croftes. Mr. Croftes was sub-treasurer, and Mr. Larkins

accountant-general. These were the last persons of all others that

should have had anything to do with bribes; yet these were some of his

agents in bribery. There are few instances, in comparison of the whole

number of bribes, but there are some, where two men are in the secret of

the same bribe. Nay, it appears that there was one bribe divided into

different payments at different times,--that one part was committed to

one black secretary, another part to another black secretary. So that it

is almost impossible to make up a complete body of all his bribery: you

may find the scattered limbs, some here and others there; and while you

are employed in picking them up, he may escape entirely in a prosecution

for the whole.

The first act of his government in Bengal was the most bold and

extraordinary that I believe ever entered into the head of any man,--I

will say, of any tyrant. It was no more or less than a general, almost

exceptless confiscation, in time of profound peace, of all the landed

property in Bengal, upon most extraordinary pretences. Strange as this

may appear, he did so confiscate it; he put it up to a pretended public,

in reality to a private corrupt auction; and such favored landholders as

came to it were obliged to consider themselves as not any longer

proprietors of the estates, but to recognize themselves as farmers under

government: and even those few that were permitted to remain on their

estates had their payments raised at his arbitrary discretion; and the

rest of the lands were given to farmers-general, appointed by him and

his committee, at a price fixed by the same arbitrary discretion.

It is necessary to inform your Lordships that the revenues of Bengal

are, for the most part, territorial revenues, great quit-rents issuing

out of lands. I shall say nothing either of the nature of this property,

of the rights of the people to it, or of the mode of exacting the rents,

till that great question of revenues, one of the greatest which we shall

have to lay before you, shall be brought before your Lordships

particularly and specially as an article of charge. I only mention it

now as an exemplification of the great principle of corruption which

guided Mr. Hastings's conduct.

When the ancient nobility, the great princes, (for such I may call

them,) a nobility, perhaps, as ancient as that of your Lordships, (and a

more truly noble body never existed in that character,)--my Lords, when

all the nobility, some of whom have borne the rank and port of princes,

all the gentry, all the freeholders of the country, had their estates in

that manner confiscated,--that is, either given to themselves to hold on

the footing of farmers, or totally confiscated,--when such an act of

tyranny was done, no doubt some good was pretended. This confiscation

was made by Mr. Hastings, and the lands let to these farmers for five

years, upon an idea which always accompanies his acts of oppression, the

idea of _moneyed merit_. He adopted this mode of confiscating the

estates, and letting them to farmers, for the avowed purpose of seeing

how much it was possible to take out of them. Accordingly, he set them

up to this wild and wicked auction, as it would have been, if it had

been a real one,--corrupt and treacherous, as it was,--he set these

lands up for the purpose of making that discovery, and pretended that

the discovery would yield a most amazing increase of rent. And for some

time it appeared so to do, till it came to the touchstone of experience;

and then it was found that there was a defalcation from these monstrous

raised revenues which were to cancel in the minds of the Directors the

wickedness of so atrocious, flagitious, and horrid an act of treachery.

At the end of five years what do you think was the failure? No less than

2,050,000_l._ Then a new source of corruption was opened,--that is, how

to deal with the balances: for every man who had engaged in these

transactions was a debtor to government, and the remission of that debt

depended upon the discretion of the Governor-General. Then the persons

who were to settle the composition of that immense debt, who were to see

how much was recoverable and how much not, were able to favor, or to

exact to the last shilling; and there never existed a doubt but that not

only upon the original cruel exaction, but upon the remission

afterwards, immense gains were derived. This will account for the manner

in which those stupendous fortunes which astonish the world have been

made. They have been made, first by a tyrannous exaction from the people

who were suffered to remain in possession of their own land as

farmers,--then by selling the rest to farmers at rents and under hopes

which could never be realized, and then getting money for the relaxation

of their debts. But whatever excuse, and however wicked, there might

have been for this wicked act, namely, that it carried upon the face of

it some sort of appearance of public good,--that is to say, that sort of

public good which Mr. Hastings so often professed, of ruining the

country for the benefit of the Company,--yet, in fact, this business of

balances is that _nidus_ in which have been nustled and bred and born

all the corruptions of India, first by making extravagant demands, and

afterwards by making corrupt relaxations of them.

Besides this monstrous failure, in consequence of a miserable exaction

by which more was attempted to be forced from the country than it was

capable of yielding, and this by way of experiment, when your Lordships

come to inquire who the farmers-general of the revenue were, you would

naturally expect to find them to be the men in the several countries who

had the most interest, the greatest wealth, the best knowledge of the

revenue and resources of the country in which they lived. Those would be

thought the natural, proper farmers-general of each district. No such

thing, my Lords. They are found in the body of people whom I have

mentioned to your Lordships. They were almost all let to Calcutta

banians. Calcutta banians were the farmers of almost the whole. They

sub-delegated to others, who sometimes had sub-delegates under them _ad

infinitum_. The whole formed a system together, through the succession

of black tyrants scattered through the country, in which you at last

find the European at the end, sometimes indeed not hid very deep, not

above one between him and the farmer, namely, his banian directly, or

some other black person to represent him. But some have so managed the

affair, that, when you inquire who the farmer is,--Was such a one

farmer? No. Cantoo Baboo? No. Another? No,--at last you find three deep

of fictitious farmers, and you find the European gentlemen, high in

place and authority, the real farmers of the settlement. So that the

zemindars were dispossessed, the country racked and ruined, for the

benefit of an European, under the name of a farmer: for you will easily

judge whether these gentlemen had fallen so deeply in love with the

banians, and thought so highly of their merits and services, as to

reward _them_ with all the possessions of the great landed interest of

the country. Your Lordships are too grave, wise, and discerning, to make

it necessary for me to say more upon that subject. Tell me that the

banians of English gentlemen, dependants on them at Calcutta, were the

farmers throughout, and I believe I need not tell your Lordships for

whose benefit they were farmers.

But there is one of these who comes so nearly, indeed so precisely,

within this observation, that it is impossible for me to pass him by.

Whoever has heard of Mr. Hastings's name, with any knowledge of Indian

connections, has heard of his banian, Cantoo Baboo. This man is well

known in the records of the Company, as his agent for receiving secret

gifts, confiscations, and presents. You would have imagined that he

would at least have kept _him_ out of these farms, in order to give the

measure a color at least of disinterestedness, and to show that this

whole system of corruption and pecuniary oppression was carried on for

the benefit of the Company. The Governor-General and Council made an

ostensible order by which no collector, or person concerned in the

revenue, should have any connection with these farms. This order did not

include the Governor-General in the words of it, but more than included

him in the spirit of it; because his power to protect a farmer-general

in the person of his own servant was infinitely greater than that of any

subordinate person. Mr. Hastings, in breach of this order, gave farms to

his own banian. You find him the farmer of great, of vast and extensive

farms. Another regulation that was made on that occasion was, that no

farmer should have, except in particular cases, which were marked,

described, and accurately distinguished, a greater farm than what paid

10,000_l._ a year to government. Mr. Hastings, who had broken the first

regulation by giving any farm at all to his banian, finding himself

bolder, broke the second too, and, instead of 10,000_l._, gave him farms

paying a revenue of 130,000_l._ a year to government. Men undoubtedly

have been known to be under the dominion of their domestics; such

things have happened to great men: they never have happened justifiably

in my opinion. They have never happened excusably; but we are acquainted

sufficiently with the weakness of human nature to know that a domestic

who has served you in a near office long, and in your opinion

faithfully, does become a kind of relation; it brings on a great

affection and regard for his interest. Now was this the case with Mr.

Hastings and Cantoo Baboo? Mr. Hastings was just arrived at his

government, and Cantoo Baboo had been but a year in his service; so that

he could not in that time have contracted any great degree of friendship

for him. These people do not live in your house; the Hindoo servants

never sleep in it; they cannot eat with your servants; they have no

second table, in which they can be continually about you, to be

domesticated with yourself, a part of your being, as people's servants

are to a certain degree. These persons live all abroad; they come at

stated hours upon matters of business, and nothing more. But if it had

been otherwise, Mr. Hastings's connection with Cantoo Baboo had been but

of a year's standing; he had before served in that capacity Mr. Sykes,

who recommended him to Mr. Hastings. Your Lordships, then, are to judge

whether such outrageous violations of all the principles by which Mr.

Hastings pretended to be guided in the settlement of these farms were

for the benefit of this old, decayed, affectionate servant of one year's

standing: your Lordships will judge of that.

I have here spoken only of the beginning of a great, notorious system of

corruption, which branched out so many ways and into such a variety of

abuses, and has afflicted that kingdom with such horrible evils from

that day to this, that I will venture to say it will make one of the

greatest, weightiest, and most material parts of the charge that is now

before you; as I believe I need not tell your Lordships that an attempt

to set up the whole landed interest of a kingdom to auction must be

attended, not only in that act, but every consequential act, with most

grievous and terrible consequences.

My Lords, I will now come to a scene of peculation of another kind:

namely, a peculation by the direct sale of offices of justice,--by the

direct sale of the successions of families,--by the sale of

guardianships and trusts, held most sacred among the people of India: by

the sale of them, not, as before, to farmers, not, as you might imagine,

to near relations of the families, but a sale of them to the unfaithful

servants of those families, their own perfidious servants, who had

ruined their estates, who, if any balances had accrued to the

government, had been the cause of those debts. Those very servants were

put in power over their estates, their persons, and their families, by

Mr. Hastings, for a shameful price. It will be proved to your Lordships,

in the course of this business, that Mr. Hastings has done this in

another sacred trust, the most sacred trust a man can have,--that is, in

the case of those _vakeels_, (as they call them,) agents, or attorneys,

who had been sent to assert and support the rights of their miserable

masters before the Council-General. It will be proved that these vakeels

were by Mr. Hastings, for a price to be paid for it, put in possession

of the very power, situation, and estates of those masters who sent them

to Calcutta to defend them from wrong and violence. The selling offices

of justice, the sale of succession in families, of guardianships and

other sacred trusts, the selling masters to their servants, and

principals to the attorneys they employed to defend themselves, were all

parts of the same system; and these were the horrid ways in which he

received bribes beyond any common rate.

When Mr. Hastings was appointed in the year 1773 to be Governor-General

of Bengal, together with Mr. Barwell, General Clavering, Colonel Monson,

and Mr. Francis, the Company, knowing the former corrupt state of their

service, (but the whole corrupt system of Mr. Hastings at that time not

being known or even suspected at home,) did order them, in discharge of

the spirit of the act of Parliament, to make an inquiry into all manner

of corruptions and malversations in office, without the exception of any

persons whatever. Your Lordships are to know that the act did expressly

authorize the Court of Directors to frame a body of instructions, and to

give orders to their new servants appointed under the act of Parliament,

lest it should be supposed that they, by their appointment under the

act, could supersede the authority of the Directors. The Directors,

sensible of the power left in them over their servants by the act of

Parliament, though their nomination was taken from them, did, agreeably

to the spirit and power of that act, give this order.

The Council consisted of two parties: Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, who

were chosen and kept there upon the idea of their local knowledge; and

the other three, who were appointed on account of their great parts and

known integrity. And I will venture to say that those three gentlemen

did so execute their duty in India, in all the substantial parts of it,

that they will serve as a shield to cover the honor of England, whenever

this country is upbraided in India.

They found a rumor running through the country of great peculations and

oppressions. Soon after, when it was known what their instructions were,

and that the Council was ready, as is the first duty of all governors,

even when there is no express order, to receive complaints against the

oppressions and corruptions of government in any part of it, they found

such a body (and that body shall be produced to your Lordships) of

corruption and peculation in every walk, in every department, in every

situation of life, in the sale of the most sacred trusts, and in the

destruction of the most ancient families of the country, as I believe in

so short a time never was unveiled since the world began.

Your Lordships would imagine that Mr. Hastings would at least ostensibly

have taken some part in endeavoring to bring these corruptions before

the public, or that he would at least have acted with some little

management in his opposition. But, alas! it was not in his power; there

was not one, I think, but I am sure very few, of these general articles

of corruption, in which the most eminent figure in the crowd, the

principal figure as it were in the piece, was not Mr. Hastings himself.

There were a great many others involved; for all departments were

corrupted and vitiated. But you could not open a page in which you did

not see Mr. Hastings, or in which you did not see Cantoo Baboo. Either

the black or white side of Mr. Hastings constantly was visible to the

world in every part of these transactions.

With the other gentlemen, who were visible too, I have at present no

dealing. Mr. Hastings, instead of using any management on that occasion,

instantly set up his power and authority, directly against the majority

of the Council, directly against his colleagues, directly against the

authority of the East India Company and the authority of the act of

Parliament, to put a dead stop to all these inquiries. He broke up the

Council, the moment they attempted to perform this part of their duty.

As the evidence multiplied upon him, the daring exertions of his power

in stopping all inquiries increased continually. But he gave a credit

and authority to the evidence by these attempts to suppress it.

Your Lordships have heard that among the body of the accusers of this

corruption there was a principal man in the country, a man of the first

rank and authority in it, called Nundcomar, who had the management of

revenues amounting to 150,000_l._ a year, and who had, if really

inclined to play the small game with which he has been charged by his

accusers, abundant means to gratify himself in playing great ones; but

Mr. Hastings has himself given him, upon the records of the Company, a

character which would at least justify the Council in making some

inquiry into charges made by him.

First, he was perfectly competent to make them, because he was in the

management of those affairs from which Mr. Hastings is supposed to have

received corrupt emolument. He and his son were the chief managers in

those transactions. He was therefore perfectly competent to it.--Mr.

Hastings has cleared his character; for though it is true, in the

contradictions in which Mr. Hastings has entangled himself, he has

abused and insulted him, and particularly after his appearance as an

accuser, yet before this he has given this testimony of him, that the

hatred that had been drawn upon him, and the general obloquy of the

English nation, was on account of his attachment to his own prince and

the liberties of his country. Be he what he might, I am not disposed,

nor have I the least occasion, to defend either his conduct or his

memory.

It is to no purpose for Mr. Hastings to spend time in idle objections to

the character of Nundcomar. Let him be as bad as Mr. Hastings represents

him. I suppose he was a caballing, bribing, intriguing politician, like

others in that country, both black and white. We know associates in dark

and evil actions are not generally the best of men; but be that as it

will, it generally happens that they are the best of all discoverers. If

Mr. Hastings were the accuser of Nundcomar, I should think the

presumptions equally strong against Nundcomar, if he had acted as Mr.

Hastings has acted.--He was not only competent, but the most competent

of all men to be Mr. Hastings's accuser. But Mr. Hastings has himself

established both his character and his competency by employing him

against Mahomed Reza Khân. He shall not blow hot and cold. In what

respect was Mr. Hastings better than Mahomed Reza Khân, that the whole

rule, principle, and system of accusation and inquiry should be totally

reversed in general, nay, reversed in the particular instance, the

moment he became accuser against Mr. Hastings?--Such was the accuser. He

was the man that gave the bribes, and, in addition to his own evidence,

offers proof by other witnesses.

What was the accusation? Was the accusation improbable, either on

account of the subject-matter or the actor in it? Does such an

appointment as that of Munny Begum, in the most barefaced evasion of his

orders, appear to your Lordships a matter that contains no just

presumptions of guilt, so that, when a charge of bribery comes upon it,

you are prepared to reject it, as if the action were so clear and proper

that no man could attribute it to an improper motive? And as to the

man,--is Mr. Hastings a man against whom a charge of bribery is

improbable? Why, he owns it. He is a professor of it. He reduces it into

scheme and system. He glories in it. He turns it to merit, and declares

it is the best way of supplying the exigencies of the Company. Why,

therefore, should it be held improbable?--But I cannot mention this

proceeding without shame and horror.

My Lords, when this man appeared as an accuser of Mr. Hastings, if he

was a man of bad character, it was a great advantage to Mr. Hastings to

be accused by a man of that description. There was no likelihood of any

great credit being given to him.

This person, who, in one of those sales of which I have already given

you some account in the history of the last period of the revolutions of

Bengal, had been, or thought he had been, cheated of his money, had made

some discoveries, and been guilty of that great irremissible sin in

India, the disclosure of peculation. He afterwards came with a second

disclosure, and was likely to have odium enough upon the occasion. He

directly charged Mr. Hastings with the receipt of bribes, amounting

together to about 40,000_l._ sterling, given by himself, on his own

account and that of Munny Begum. The charge was accompanied with every

particular which could facilitate proof or detection,--time, place,

persons, species, to whom paid, by whom received. Here was a fair

opportunity for Mr. Hastings at once to defeat the malice of his enemies

and to clear his character to the world. His course was different. He

railed much at the accuser, but did not attempt to refute the

accusation. He refuses to permit the inquiry to go on, attempts to

dissolve the Council, commands his banian not to attend. The Council,

however, goes on, examines to the bottom, and resolves that the charge

was proved, and that the money ought to go to the Company. Mr. Hastings

then broke up the Council,--I will not say whether legally or illegally.

The Company's law counsel thought he might legally do it; but he

corruptly did it, and left mankind no room to judge but that it was done

for the screening of his own guilt: for a man may use a legal power

corruptly, and for the most shameful and detestable purposes. And thus

matters continued, till he commenced a criminal prosecution against this

man,--this man whom he dared not meet as a defendant.

Mr. Hastings, instead of answering the charge, attacks the accuser.

Instead of meeting the man in front, he endeavored to go round, to come

upon his flanks and rear, but never to meet him in the face, upon the

ground of his accusation, as he was bound by the express authority of

law and the express injunctions of the Directors to do. If the bribery

is not admitted on the evidence of Nundcomar, yet his suppressing it is

a crime, a violation of the orders of the Court of Directors. He

disobeyed those instructions; and if it be only for disobedience, for

rebellion against his masters, (putting the corrupt motive out of the

question,) I charge him for this disobedience, and especially on account

of the principles upon which he proceeded in it.

Then he took another step: he accused Nundcomar of a conspiracy,--which

was a way he then and ever since has used, whenever means were taken to

detect any of his own iniquities.

And here it becomes necessary to mention another circumstance of

history: that the legislature, not trusting entirely to the

Governor-General and Council, had sent out a court of justice to be a

counter security against these corruptions, and to detect and punish any

such misdemeanors as might appear. And this court I take for granted has

done great services.

Mr. Hastings flew to this court, which was meant to protect in their

situations informers against bribery and corruption, rather than to

protect the accused from any of the preliminary methods which must

indispensably be used for the purpose of detecting their guilt,--he flew

to this court, charging this Nundcomar and others with being

conspirators.

A man might be convicted as a conspirator, and yet afterwards live; he

might put the matter into other hands, and go on with his information;

nothing less than _stone-dead_ would do the business. And here happened

an odd concurrence of circumstances. Long before Nundcomar preferred his

charge, he knew that Mr. Hastings was plotting his ruin, and that for

this purpose he had used a man whom he, Nundcomar, had turned out of

doors, called Mohun Persaud. Mr. Hastings had seen papers put upon the

board, charging him with this previous plot for the destruction of

Nundcomar; and this identical person, Mohun Persaud, whom Nundcomar had

charged as Mr. Hastings's associate in plotting his ruin, was now again

brought forward as the principal evidence against him. I will not enter

(God forbid I should!) into the particulars of the subsequent trial of

Nundcomar; but you will find the marks and characters of it to be these.

You will find a close connection between Mr. Hastings and the

chief-justice, which we shall prove. We shall prove that one of the

witnesses who appeared there was a person who had been before, or has

since been, concerned with Mr. Hastings in his most iniquitous

transactions. You will find, what is very odd, that in this trial for

forgery with which this man stood charged, forgery in a private

transaction, all the persons who were witnesses or parties to it had

been, before or since, the particular friends of Mr. Hastings,--in

short, persons from that rabble with whom Mr. Hastings was concerned,

both before and since, in various transactions and negotiations of the

most criminal kind. But the law took its course. I have nothing more to

say than that the man is gone,--hanged justly, if you please; and that

it did so happen,--luckily for Mr. Hastings,--it so happened, that the

relief of Mr. Hastings, and the justice of the court, and the resolution

never to relax its rigor, did all concur just at a happy nick of time

and moment; and Mr. Hastings, accordingly, had the full benefit of them

all.

His accuser was supposed to be what men may be, and yet very competent

for accusers, namely, one of his accomplices in guilty actions,--one of

those persons who may have a great deal to say of bribes. All that I

contend for is, that he was in the closest intimacy with Mr. Hastings,

was in a situation for giving bribes,--and that Mr. Hastings was proved

afterwards to have received a sum of money from him, which may be well

referred to bribes.

This example had its use in the way in which it was intended to operate,

and in which alone it could operate. It did not discourage forgeries:

they went on at their usual rate, neither more nor less: but it put an

end to all accusations against all persons in power for any corrupt

practice. Mr. Hastings observes, that no man in India complains of him.

It is generally true. The voice of all India is stopped. All complaint

was strangled with the same cord that strangled Nundcomar. This murdered

not only that accuser, but all future accusation; and not only defeated,

but totally vitiated and reversed all the ends for which this country,

to its eternal and indelible dishonor, had sent out a pompous embassy of

justice to the remotest parts of the globe.

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