continual waste of men in every attempt to reinforce the Southern
States, are almost insuperable objections to marching another
detachment from the army on the North River; nor do I see how it is
possible to give effectual support to those States, and avert the
evils which threaten them, while we are inferior in naval force in
these seas. It is not for me to know in what manner the fleet of his
Most Christian Majesty is to be employed in the West Indies this
summer, or to inquire at what epoch it may be expected on this coast;
but the appearance and aid of it in this quarter are of such essential
importance in any offensive operation, and so necessary to stop the
progress of the enemy's arms, that I shall be excused, I am persuaded,
for endeavoring to engage your Excellency's good offices in
facilitating an event on which so much depends. For this I have a
stronger plea, when I assure you that General Rochambeau's opinion and
wishes concur with mine, and that it is at his instance principally
that I make you this address.
If we are happy enough to find your Excellency in sentiment with us,
it will be in your power to inform the Count de Grasse of the strength
and situation of the enemy's naval and land force in this country; the
destination of the French squadron under Admiral Barras and the
intention of the allied arms, if a junction can be formed. At present,
the British fleet lies within Block Island, and about five leagues
from Point Judith.
The Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Chastellux agree perfectly
in sentiment with me, that, while affairs remain as they now are, the
West India fleet should run immediately to Sandy Hook, if there are no
concerted operations, where they may be met, with all the information
requisite, and where, most likely, it will shut in, or cut off Admiral
Arbuthnot, and may be joined by the Count de Barras. An early and
frequent communication from the Count de Grasse would lead to
preparatory measures on our part, and be a means of facilitating the
operation in hand, or any other which may be thought more advisable.
I know your Excellency's goodness, and your zeal for the common cause
too well, to offer anything more as an apology for this liberty; and I
persuade myself it is unnecessary for me to declare the respect and
attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Translation.
Philadelphia, May 25th, 1781.
Sir,
The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of France has the honor of
informing Congress, that it has been found impossible to send the
second division of the troops under the command of Count de
Rochambeau, and of the French squadron designed for the defence of the
coasts of the Thirteen States, and that it can no longer be expected
during the course of this campaign. The necessary measures have,
however, been taken for increasing the body of troops now at Rhode
Island, and, by sending some vessels of force, for putting the
squadron into a condition to enter again upon active service.
The undersigned requests Congress to be pleased to appoint a
committee, to whom he will communicate the causes which have
occasioned this change; and Congress will find in them new proofs of
the wisdom of the motives, which direct the conduct of his Majesty.
But if considerations of the greatest importance deprive him of the
satisfaction of assisting the Thirteen United States in their own
country, by sending a number of vessels and of auxiliaries, as
considerable as he had proposed, he will make no less vigorous efforts
against the enemy; and he hopes that these powerful diversions will
prevent the enemy from forming any enterprise, to which the resources
and the courage of the Thirteen States shall be unequal.
The King has, at the same time, resolved to give a new proof of his
affection and of his earnest desire to afford a remedy for the
difficulties, which they experience in procuring the funds necessary
for acting with vigor and effect during the present campaign. With
this view, the King, notwithstanding the immense expense at which he
is obliged to support the war in which he is engaged, has resolved to
dispose of a considerable fund, which shall be appropriated to the
purchase of clothing, arms, and stores, for which Dr Franklin has been
instructed to ask. The Count de Vergennes will concert measures on
this subject with the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States,
Dr. Franklin; and M. Necker proposes to take the proper precautions,
in order that the merchandise may be of a good and sound quality, and
at a price answering to its exact value.
The subsidy which the King has resolved to grant to the Thirteen
United States amounts to six millions of livres tournois, independent
of the four millions, which the Ministry have enabled Dr Franklin to
borrow for the service of the current year. It is presumed, that this
sum of six millions will not be wholly applied to the purchase of the
articles asked for; and in that case, it is his Majesty's intention
that the surplus should be reserved, that it may be at the disposal of
Congress, or of the Superintendent of the finances of the Thirteen
States, if they think proper to confide the management of it to him.
It has not been possible for the Court, by reason of the speedy
departure of the vessel which brought this intelligence to the
undersigned Minister, to determine what will be the amount of the sums
of money remaining after the purchase of the above mentioned articles,
but lest there should seem to be any delay in supplying the wants of
the Thirteen States, the Chevalier de la Luzerne takes it upon
himself, without waiting for any further orders, to fix the amount of
these sums at fifteen hundred thousand livres tournois, and if
Congress, in fact, think that they shall need this whole sum, he will
without delay inform his Court of it, in order that the necessary
measures may be taken for discharging the bills of exchange, which
shall consequently be drawn. As it is the intention of the King, that
the greatest regularity shall take place in the payments, it will be
well for the undersigned to agree with Congress, or with the
Superintendent of Finance, and fix upon the times at which these bills
shall be negotiated, and upon those at which they shall be payable. It
is necessary that these times of payment should be at sufficient
distances from each other, so that the department of finance may not
be obliged to pay considerable sums in too short intervals of time.
The intention of the King, in granting to the Thirteen States this
purely gratuitous subsidy, is to put them in a condition to act
vigorously during this campaign; and his Majesty is desirous that
Congress would be pleased to give the necessary orders, that it may be
entirely applied to this important object, which admits of no delay.
The communications, which the undersigned is instructed to make to
Congress, will convince that body of the necessity of losing no time.
LUZERNE.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Translation.
Philadelphia, May 26th, 1781.
Sir,
The underwritten, Minister Plenipotentiary of France, has received
orders to communicate to Congress some important details touching the
present situation of sundry affairs, in which the United States are
immediately interested. The most essential are in regard to some
overtures, which announce on the part of Great Britain a desire of
peace. The Empress of Russia having invited the King and the Court of
London to accept her mediation, the latter Court considered this as a
formal offer and accepted it. This Court appeared at the same time to
desire the Emperor of Austria to take part therein; and this Monarch
has in fact proposed his co-mediation to the belligerent powers in
Europe.
The King could not but congratulate himself on seeing so important a
negotiation in the hands of two mediators, whose understanding and
justice are equal. Nevertheless, his Majesty, actuated by his
affections for the United States, returned for answer, that it was not
in his power to accept the offers made to him, and that the consent of
his allies was necessary. The King wishes to have this consent before
he formally accepts the proposed mediation. But it is possible that
circumstances joined to the confidence he has in the mediators, and
the justice of his cause, and that of the United States, his allies,
may determine him to enter upon a negotiation before the answer of
Congress can reach him.
But in either case, it is of great importance, that this Assembly
should give their Plenipotentiary instructions proper to announce
their disposition to peace, and their moderation, and to convince the
powers of Europe, that the independence of the Thirteen United States,
and the engagements they have contracted with the King, are the sole
motives, which determine them to continue the war; and that whenever
they shall have full and satisfactory assurances on these two capital
points, they will be ready to conclude a peace. The manner of
conducting the negotiation, the extent of the powers of the American
Plenipotentiary, the use to be made of them, and the confidence that
ought to be reposed in the French Plenipotentiaries and the King's
Ministers, are points, which should be fully discussed with a
committee.
And the underwritten Minister entreats, that Congress would be pleased
to name a committee with whom he will have the honor to treat. He
thinks that this Assembly will be sensible, that the King could not
give a greater mark of his affection for the Thirteen United States,
or of his attachment to the principles of the alliance, than by
determining not to enter upon a negotiation before they were ready to
take part therein, although in other respects, his confidence in the
mediators, and the relation he stands in to one of them, were
sufficient motives to induce him to accept their offers. Congress are
too sensible of the uncertainty of negotiations of this sort not to
know, that the moment of opening them is that precisely when the
efforts against the enemy ought to be redoubled; and that nothing can
facilitate the operation of the negotiators so much as the success of
the arms of the allies; that a check would be productive of
disagreeable consequences to both, and that the enemy would rise in
their pretensions, their haughtiness, and obstinacy, in proportion to
the languor and slackness of the confederates.
The undersigned will have the honor to communicate to the committee
some circumstances relative to the sending Mr Cumberland to Madrid; to
the use, which Mr Adams thought he was authorised to make of his
Plenipotentiary powers; to the mission of Mr Dana; to the association
of the neutral powers; and to the present state of affairs in the
south. Congress will find new motives for relying on the good will of
the King, and on the interest he takes in favor of the United States
in general, and of each one of them in particular.
LUZERNE.
* * * * *
REPORT OF A CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH MINISTER.
In Congress, May 28th, 1781.
The committee appointed to confer with the Minister of France, report,
That the Minister communicated some parts of a despatch, which he had
received from the Count de Vergennes, dated the 9th of March, 1781.
That the resolves of Congress, which had been adopted on the
association of the neutral powers, were found very wise by the Council
of the King, and that it was thought they might be of service in the
course of the negotiation. The French Ministry did not doubt but they
would be very agreeable to the Empress of Russia. But they were not of
the same opinion with respect to the appointment of Mr Dana, as a
Minister to the Court of Petersburg. The reason is, that Catharine the
Second has made it a point until now to profess the greatest
impartiality between the belligerent powers. The conduct she pursues
on this occasion is a consequence of the expectation she has, that
peace maybe re-established by her mediation; therefore, she could by
no means take any step, which might show on her side the least
propension in favor of the Americans, and expose her to the suspicion
of partiality towards America, and of course exclude her from the
mediation. The appointment of Mr Dana, therefore, appears to be at
least premature, and the opinion of the Council is, that this deputy
ought not to make any use of his powers at this moment. In case he
applies to the Count de Vergennes for advice, he shall be desired to
delay making any use of his powers. The Count observes, it would be
disagreeable to Congress that their Plenipotentiary should meet with a
refusal, that their dignity would be offended, and that such a
satisfaction ought not to be given to the Court of London, especially
when negotiations of a greater moment are about to commence. However,
the French Minister had orders to assure the committee, that his Court
would use all their endeavors in proper time, to facilitate the
admissions of the Plenipotentiary of Congress.
The Minister communicated to the committee several observations
respecting the conduct of Mr Adams; and in doing justice to his
patriotic character, he gave notice to the committee, of several
circumstances, which proved it necessary that Congress should draw a
line of conduct to that Minister, of which he might not be allowed to
lose sight. The Minister dwelt especially on a circumstance already
known to Congress, namely, the use which Mr Adams thought he had a
right to make of his powers to treat with Great Britain. The Minister
concluded on this subject, that if Congress put any confidence in the
King's friendship and benevolence; if they were persuaded of his
inviolable attachment to the principle of the alliance, and of his
firm resolution constantly to support the cause of the United States,
they would be impressed with the necessity of prescribing to their
Plenipotentiary a perfect and open confidence in the French Ministers,
and a thorough reliance on the King, and would direct him to take no
step without the approbation of his Majesty; and after giving him, in
his instructions, the principal and most important outlines for his
conduct, they would order him, with respect to the manner of carrying
them into execution, to receive his directions from the Count de
Vergennes, or from the person who might be charged with the
negotiation in the name of the King.
The Minister observed, that this matter is the more important,
because, being allied with the United States, it is the business of
the King to support their cause with those powers with whom Congress
have no connexion, and can have none, until their independence is in a
fair train to be acknowledged. That the King would make it a point of
prudence and justice to support the Minister of Congress; but in case
this Minister, by aiming at impossible things, forming exorbitant
demands, which disinterested mediators might think ill-founded, or
perhaps by misconstruing his instructions, should put the French
negotiators under the necessity of proceeding in the course of the
negotiation without a constant connexion with him, this would give
rise to an unbecoming contradiction between France and the Thirteen
United States, which could not but be of very bad effect in the course
of the negotiation.
In making these observations, the Minister remarked, that it was
always to be taken for granted, that the most perfect independency is
to be the foundation of the instructions to be given to Mr Adams, and
that without this there would be no treaty at all. The Count de
Vergennes observes, that it is of great importance that the
instructions aforesaid be given as soon as possible to Mr Adams. And
the Minister desired the committee to press Congress to have this done
with all possible despatch.
He communicated to the committee the following particulars, as a proof
that this matter admits of no delay, and that it is probable the
negotiation will very soon be opened. He told the committee that the
English Ministry, in the false supposition that they might prevail on
the Court of Madrid to sign a separate peace, had begun a secret
negotiation with that Court, by the means of Mr Cumberland, but
without any success. That the Court of Spain had constantly founded
her answer on her engagements with his Most Christian Majesty. That on
the other side, the King of France had declared to the King, his
cousin, that the independence of the United States, either in fact, or
acknowledged by a solemn treaty, should be the only foundation of the
negotiations of the Court of France with that of London. That the
British Court not seeming to be disposed to grant the independency, it
appeared the negotiation of Mr Cumberland was superfluous. However,
this English emissary continued, and still continues, his residence at
Madrid, although he cannot have any expectation of obtaining the
object of his commission. That this direct negotiation was known to
all Europe, and that it seemed to render every mediation useless.
That, however, the Empress of Russia, excited by motives of friendship
to the belligerent powers, and in consequence of the share, which the
association of the neutral powers had given her in the general
emergency, has invited the king of France and the Court of London to
require her mediation. That the Court of London has accepted the
invitation with a kind of eagerness, and at the same time desired the
Emperor of Germany to take a part in it. That the answer of the King
of France to the overtures of the Court of Petersburg was, that he
should be glad to restore peace by the mediation of Catharine, but
that it was not in his power immediately to accept her offers, as he
had allies whose consent was necessary for that purpose.
To the same application made by the Court of Petersburg to that of
Madrid, this Court answered, that having entered into a direct
negotiation with the Court of London, by the means of Mr Cumberland,
it thought proper to wait the issue of it before it had recourse to a
mediation. The Emperor, as has already been observed, having been
desired by the Court of London to take part in the mediation,
immediately informed the King of France, as well as his Catholic
Majesty, of this circumstance, offering his co-mediation to both the
allied Monarchs. To this, the King of France gave the same answer,
which he had given to the Empress of Russia. As to the King of Spain,
he again expressed his surprise at the English Ministry's requesting a
mediation, after having entered into a direct negotiation; and he
declared, that unless this negotiation should be broken off by the
English themselves, it would be impossible for him to listen to a
mediation, which, in any other circumstance, would be infinitely
agreeable to him.
These answers, though of a dilatory nature, may be looked upon as an
eventual acceptation of the mediation. The Minister observed, that it
will be, in effect, difficult to avoid it. That a refusal will not be
consistent with the dignity of the two powers, that had offered their
interposition. That the King is obliged, from friendship and good
policy, to treat them with attention. He further observed, that the
demands of the King of France will be so just and so moderate, that
they might be proposed to any tribunal whatever. That the only reason
the King could have to suspend a formal acceptation is, that, at the
time the offer was made, he was not acquainted with the intentions of
his allies, namely, Spain and the United States.
The Minister observed to the committee, that in his opinion this
conduct must afford Congress a new proof of the perseverance of the
King in the principles of the alliance, and of his scrupulous
attention to observe his obligations; he added, that, however, it is
not without inconveniency, that this dilatory plan has been adopted.
The distance between the allied powers of France and the United
States, has obliged the Court of Versailles to adopt that plan, though
liable to inconveniences, in order to conform to the engagements made
by the treaties, to determine nothing into a negotiation without the
participation of Congress. Besides, several States being invaded by
the enemy, the French Council thought it inconvenient to begin a
negotiation under these unfavorable circumstances. And being in hopes
that the diversions made by the King's arms, will prevent the British
from making very great exertions against the Thirteen United States,
the French Ministry expected, that during the course of the present
campaign they might be enabled to present the situation of their
allies in a more favorable light to the Congress, that might assemble
for peace. These delays, however, cannot with propriety take place for
any long time, and it was the opinion of the French Ministry, that it
would be contrary to decency, prudence, and the laws of sound policy,
again to refuse listening to the propositions of peace made by
friendly powers; for which reason, the Chevalier de la Luzerne was
directed to lay all these facts confidentially before Congress.
The Minister informed the committee, that it was necessary, that the
King should know the intentions of the United States with regard to
the proposed mediation, and that his Majesty should be authorised by
Congress to give notice of their dispositions to all the powers, who
would take part in the negotiation for a pacification. The Minister
delivered his own opinion, that he saw no inconveniency arising from
the Congress imitating the example of the King, by showing themselves
disposed to accept peace from the hands of the Emperor of Germany and
the Empress of Russia. He added, that Congress should rely on the
justice and wisdom of those two Sovereigns; and at the same time, he
renewed the assurances, that his Majesty will defend the cause of the
United States as zealously as the interests of his own Crown.
He informed the committee, that according to all accounts, the British
Ministry were removing as far as possible, in this negotiation, every
idea of acknowledging the independence of what they call their
Thirteen Colonies; and he said, that Congress would judge by
themselves, that the Court of London would debate with the greatest
energy and obstinacy the articles relating to America. He availed
himself of this reflection to impress the committee with the necessity
Congress are under, of securing in their favor the benevolence and
good will of the mediating powers, by presenting their demands with
the greatest moderation and reserve, save independence, which will not
admit of any modification. He further observed, that it was possible
the difficulty of making a definitive peace might engage the mediators
to propose a truce; and that it was necessary, therefore, to
authorise eventually the Plenipotentiary of the United States to
declare their intention thereon.
He further observed, that whatever might be the resolution of
Congress, they would do well to recommend to their Plenipotentiary to
adopt a line of conduct, that would deprive the British of every hope
of causing divisions between the allies, and to assume a conciliating
character, as much as can be consistent with the dignity of his
constituents, and to show such a confidence in the Plenipotentiary of
his Most Christian Majesty, as is due to a power so much interested to
support the dignity and honor of a nation, whose independence they
have acknowledged.
The Minister told the committee, that whatever might be the resolution
of Congress, respecting a peace or a truce, it was necessary to carry
on the war with the utmost vigor. He urged reasons too well known to
Congress to be related.