nature of a temporary convention, on the basis of the Memorial, which
I had the honor of giving lately to you, bearing date 19th of May,
1783, no time need be lost in finishing this business; but with this
explanation, that although it is proposed, that the commerce between
the United States and the British West Indies should be free with
regard to their respective productions, yet, that we are not bound to
admit the importation of West India commodities into Great Britain in
American vessels. Believe me, Gentlemen, that this restriction does
not proceed from any invidious disposition towards the American
States. It is imposed by indispensable prudence and necessity upon the
British Ministers, who, in the present state of things, could not be
justified to their own country, to go hastily to a larger extent of
concession. This point is not to be looked upon merely as commercial,
but as affecting fundamentally the great political system of British
navigation; and you are to consider, that the principle, upon which
the whole of our proposed temporary convention is to stand, is, that
the _commerce_ between the two countries is to be revived nearly upon
the old footing; but that each nation is to keep in its own hands, the
power of making such regulations respecting _navigation_, as shall
seem fit. I assure you, that this point has been discussed by the
Ministers of the British cabinet with infinite candor, and with every
possible disposition of amity and favor towards your country; but the
more they have inquired upon this subject, the more they are overborne
by conviction, that the prejudices upon this matter (if that be the
name these opinions deserve) are so strong, that such a measure as a
relaxation of the act of navigation, in this instance, never can be
taken, but upon such a full and solemn Parliamentary inquiry, as it is
impossible to go into at this time of the year, and in this stage of
the session. I cannot, therefore, Gentlemen, help flattering myself,
that you, who are so well acquainted with difficulties, which must
embarrass an English administration in a business of this sort, will
rather endeavor to remove them, than to increase them; and I am sure,
that such a plan, on your part, would ultimately be most conducive to
your own objects. When an amicable intercourse is once opened, and
when conciliatory confidence comes to take place of those jealousies,
which have lately subsisted, you may easily conceive in how different
a manner the whole of this matter will be considered. I am confident
that this will be the case, but if it is not, the provisions being
only temporary, it will be in the power of the United States, to take
up any hostile mode of proceeding, by restraints and prohibitions, &c.
whenever they may think fit.
I have made use above of the word _prejudices_ in speaking of the
principles of the British act of navigation. I hope you will accept
that term from me, as proceeding so far in compliance towards the
future consideration of the points now between us, as to keep the
question open and free for discussion. If Great Britain should, in any
case, throw down the barriers of her act of navigation towards
America, she should be very secure against the possible case of future
enmity, or alliance against her. Such considerations as these, lead to
objects far beyond our present scope or powers. But I must still add
one word more upon this article of _prejudices_. Such prejudices (if
they are so) are not confined to Great Britain. By your commercial
treaty with France, Article 4th, you are only entitled to an European
trade with that kingdom, and not, even by that treaty, to any direct
commerce between their West India Islands and the ports of the
American States; much less to the immediate communication between the
French Islands and the dominions of the Crown of France in Europe.
Every public proceeding in England, since the commencement of our
present negotiation for opening the intercourse and commerce between
our two countries, will, I am sure, support me in saying, that we have
very liberally taken the lead; that we have not waited for any
assurance of reciprocity, but have given orders for almost a universal
admission of American articles, before we even know that any vessel
from Great Britain will find admission into any American ports. What
do we ask in return? No more than this; that while we gratuitously,
and without stipulation, give advantages and favors to the American
States, which we deny to all other nations, they would so far justify
our liberal way of proceeding, as to receive us in the same manner as
other nations, which are foreign, and to permit us to carry to North
America, what it is evidently for their interest that we should carry
thither.
I need hardly add, that it is of infinite importance, that some
temporary convention should be finished without loss of time. I hope
and trust that we shall not find much more difficulty in this
business. You must see the advantage of an immediate renewal of
intercourse, and from the candor of your dispositions, I am sure you
must likewise be convinced, that to give us some facility in the
outset, is the sure road to such an equitable arrangement for the
future, as you must have at heart. The reasons, which I have given in
the Memorial appear to me to be cogent and convincing, upon the
natural alliance between our two countries. And when the intercourse
has once begun, everything will go in its natural road. It is,
therefore, of infinite consequence to begin that intercourse. Great
Britain, by all public proceedings of repeals, proclamations, &c. &c.
has made the first advances, with warmth and confidence, and,
therefore, I conclude, with the fullest assurance, that you will meet
those advances with cordial reciprocity.
I have the honor to be, &c.
D. HARTLEY.
* * * * *
DAVID HARTLEY'S MEMORIAL TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
The proposition, which has been made for a universal and unlimited
reciprocity of intercourse and commerce, between Great Britain and the
American United States, requires a very serious consideration on the
part of Great Britain, for the reasons already stated in a Memorial,
dated May 19th, 1783, and for many other reasons, which in the future
discussion of the proposition will appear. To the American States,
likewise, it is a matter of the deepest importance, not only as a
proposition of commercial intercourse, which is the least part, but
most principally, as a political basis and guarantee for their newly
established constitutions. The introduction of British interests into
a communion of intercourse, will bring forward a universal guarantee
on the part of Great Britain, in the future progress of political
events, which may affect the United States of America in their
national capacity. The proposition is fertile in future prospects to
Great Britain; and America also may wisely see in it a solid
foundation for herself.
All circumstances are most fortunately disposed between Great Britain
and the American States, to render them useful friends and allies to
each other, with a higher degree of suitableness between themselves
than any other nations can pretend to. France cannot interchange
reciprocities with the American States, by reason of numberless
impediments in her system of government, in her monopolies, and her
system of commerce. France has the great disability of difference in
language to contend with; and the institution of the present French
manufactures has never, at any time heretofore, been trained or
adapted to American commerce. The only particular and pacific facility
which France ever possessed for American intercourse, has for many
years been transferred into the British scale by the cession of Canada
to Great Britain. The future commerce, between France and America,
will chiefly be regulated by such conveniences as France can draw to
herself from America, without much aptitude on the part of France, to
accommodate her manufactures and commerce to American demands. In
short, an interchange of reciprocities between France and America,
would run against the stream on both sides; and all established
habits, manners, language, together with the principles of government
and commerce, would militate against such a system.
Conformably to this reasoning, it appears, that France has not at any
time entertained any systematical design of forming any union or
consolidation of interests with America. She took up the American
cause, as instrumental to her political views in Europe. America
likewise accepted the alliance with France, for her separate views,
viz. for the establishment of her independence. The alliance,
therefore, is completed and terminated, without leaving behind it any
political principle of future permanent connexion between them.
Occasional circumstances produced a temporary alliance. Similar
circumstances may, on any future occasion, produce a similar event of
a temporary compact. Dissimilar circumstances, arising from any future
political views of the Court of France in Europe, may without any
inconsistency of principle, throw the power of that kingdom into a
scale adverse to the future interests of the American States. In such
case, therefore, where there cannot exist any permanent political
connexion between France and America, and where the commercial
attachments can be but feeble, it would be vain to expect in the
French nation any such ally, as newly established States ought to look
out for, to give maturity and firmness to their constitutions.
As to Spain, every argument which has been stated respecting diversity
of language, manners, government, monopolies, and system of commerce,
from those which prevail in the United States of America, obtains in a
superior degree. And much more to add besides, for Spain is not only
incompetent to interchange reciprocities with the American States, but
likewise her own situation in America will at all times render her
extremely jealous of her neighbors. The only activity which Spain has
exerted in the war, has been to procure a barrier against the American
States, by annexing West Florida to her former acquisition of New
Orleans; thereby embracing the mouth of the Mississippi, and by means
of that river, jointly with her landed possessions, establishing a
strong and jealous boundary against any future progress of the
American States in those parts. Spain, therefore, cannot be looked
upon by the American States as a suitable object of their election, to
become a permanent ally and friend to them. Portugal, likewise, labors
under all the disabilities of language, manners, monopolies,
government and system of commerce. Her national power and importance
would be likewise insufficient to constitute a strong and permanent
ally to the American States. All these nations will undoubtedly be
found to have many commodious qualities for participation in commerce;
but the permanent facilities necessary to constitute a firm and
permanent ally to the American States, will be found deficient in
them.
As to the Italian States, or any other powers in the Mediterranean,
they are certainly not adequate to any competition of political
alliance with the rising States of America. They will also form very
commodious links and connexions in the general circuit of commerce;
but beyond these considerations, they have no share in the present
question. The several States in the Germanic body are in the same
predicament.
As to the Northern powers, viz. those in the Baltic, they are not
favored either by vicinity, or climate, for a frequent or facile
intercourse of commerce with America. And even respecting several
material articles of commerce, jealousies and competitions might
arise. As to political alliances, there are no such in prospect from
them to the American States. Even if there were any superfluity of
force in any of them beyond the necessities of their respective
domestic situations, the extreme distance would be conclusive against
any possible application of such power, as a political alliance
favorable to the establishment and conformation of the American
States.
The only maritime state on the continent of Europe remaining to be
discussed, as a competent candidate for commerce, or connexion with
America, is the Republic of the United Netherlands, commonly called
Holland. In respect to American commerce, the Dutch have among
themselves every facility combined, which the separate States of
Europe, possess distinctly in their own concerns, or nearly. Their
industry, frugality, and habits of commerce, may even carry them so
far, as to make them rivals to the Americans themselves, in the
transportation of European merchandise to America. These faculties of
commerce would have been of infinite importance to the American
States, if the war had continued between Great Britain and them. But
upon the event of peace, it becomes a matter of the most perfect
indifference to America, whether each European State navigates its own
commerce into the ports of America, which will open to all, or whether
the commercial faculties of Holland enable her to exceed in rivalship
her European neighbors, and thereby to navigate European goods to
America beyond the proportion of her national share. The faculties of
a nation of carriers may be fortunate for the marine of that nation;
but considered in themselves, and with respect to other nations, they
are but secondaries in commerce. They give no ground of reciprocities,
or participation. That one nation should say to another, you shall
navigate all our rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, if we may
do the same in yours, is a proposition of reciprocity; but that
Holland should say to America, we will bring European goods to you, or
you may be your own carriers, is neither concession nor reciprocity.
Holland is not a nation of rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places,
for the distribution of goods and manufactures for internal
consumption, and, therefore, her reciprocities must be very scanty.
Holland is the market-place of Europe, and the Dutch seamen are the
carriers appertaining to that market-place. The admission of American
ships to that market-place, freely to import and to export, is,
undoubtedly, an act of reciprocity on the part of Holland as far as it
goes, but in no degree adequate to the unlimited participation of
American commerce throughout the rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and
places of that vast continent. The commercial reciprocities of
Holland, therefore, being inferior, on her part, towards America, the
next point of view in which Holland is to be considered, as relevant
to this question, is, as a nation of power, capable of becoming an
effectual and permanent ally and guarantee to the American States, for
that is the great object, which America, as a wise nation, recently
arisen into independence, ought to keep in view. Holland has certainly
been a nation of great and celebrated naval force. She remains so
still; but having for many years suspended her exertions of force, and
having directed the faculties of her people into the commercial line,
she seems not to have any superfluity of force beyond the necessity of
providing for her own security; and, certainly, no such redundance of
power, as to extend to the protection of distant nations, as allies or
guarantees. It appears, therefore, upon the whole of this argument,
that Holland, although a commercial nation, cannot even interchange
commercial reciprocities with America upon an equal footing, and that
her faculties of force are inadequate to those, which America ought to
expect in the permanent allies and guarantees of her country.
The independence of the American States being established, their first
consideration ought to be, to determine with what friendships and
alliances they will enter into the new world of nations. They will
look round them, and cast about for some natural, permanent, and
powerful ally, with whom they may interchange all cementing
reciprocities, both commercial and political. If such an ally be to be
found anywhere for them, it is still in Great Britain; at least, it
is certain, that, in looking round Europe, no other is to be found.
There is no inherent impossibility to prevent such a connexion from
taking place; it must depend on the free will and common interest of
the parties. There are all possible faculties on both sides, to give
and to receive all adequate and beneficial reciprocities, which are
practicable and more likely to be permanent between independent
parties, than between two parties, of which one is dependent on the
other. Great Britain is, undoubtedly, the first of European nations,
in riches, credit, faculties, industry, commerce, manufactures,
internal consumption, and foreign export, together with civil liberty,
which is the source of all, and naval power, which is the support of
all. The dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain are
large and fertile; its Colonies still extensive, and in close vicinity
to the American States, Great Britain being an American, as well as an
European power, and all her empire connected by her naval force.
The territories of the American States, from the Atlantic ocean to the
Mississippi, contain an inexhaustible source of riches, industry, and
future power. These will be the foundations of great events in the new
page of life. Infinite good, or infinite evil, may arise according to
the principles upon which the intercourse between Great Britain and
America shall be arranged in its foundation. Great Britain and America
must be still inseparable, either as friends or foes. This is an awful
and important truth. These are considerations not to be thought of
slightly; not to be prejudged in passion, nor the arrangements of them
to be hastily foreclosed. Time given for consideration may have
excellent effects on both sides. The pause of peace, with friendly
intercourse, returning affection, and dispassionate inquiry, can
alone decide these important events, or do justice to the anxious
expectations of Great Britain and America.
* * * * *
THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
Philadelphia, June 16th, 1783.
Gentlemen,
I am sorry to inform you, that by the resignation of Mr Livingston as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, it has become necessary that you should
receive the resolutions of Congress, relative to your mission through
my hands. The disadvantage arising from this necessity, until a
successor to that worthy gentleman is appointed, will be yours, as it
is impossible for me to do more than barely to transmit the acts of
Congress necessary for your information.
Enclosed you have one of the 1st of May last, and another of the 12th
instant, which I hope will get safe to hand time enough for your
government. The commission and instructions referred to in the first,
not being ready, it was thought best to forward the resolution without
delay, that you might know what was intended in the present important
period of your negotiation. We have been much surprised, that we have
not received any communications from you since the cessation of
hostilities, except a letter of the 5th of April, from Mr Laurens.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ELIAS BOUDINOT, _President_.
* * * * *
HENRY LAURENS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
London, June 17th, 1783.
Gentlemen,
I had the honor of addressing you on the 10th, immediately after my
landing at Dover. As early as possible after my arrival here, I
obtained an interview with Mr Secretary Fox, who was pleased to read
to me part of his latest despatches to Mr Hartley, which he supposed
would reach Paris on the 14th. It is probable, therefore, that before
this time, as much of the contents as is proper for your knowledge has
been communicated.
"Reciprocity," since the 10th of April, has undergone a certain degree
of refinement. The definition of that term appears now to be
possession of advantages on one side, and restrictions on the other.
"The navigation act is the vital of Great Britain, too delicate to
bear a touch." The sudden and unexpected, perhaps illicit, arrival of
ships and cargoes from America, may have caused this change of tone.
But you have heard in detail, and are more competent to judge.
From a desire of forming an opinion, I asked Mr Fox, whether he
thought I might venture for a few days, to take the benefit of Bath,
and yet be in time enough at Paris for the intended commercial
agreement? He replied, "I rather think you may." One need not be a
conjurer to draw an inference; you will either have finished the
business before I could travel to Paris, or without being missed there
I may go to Bath and repair my nerves.
In this state of uncertainty, when it is easy to perceive affections
are not as we could wish them, nor quite so warm as we had been taught
to believe, it would not be wise to commit the United States;
wherefore I shall rest the business till I hear from you, or until a
more favorable prospect; flattering myself with hopes of your
surmounting the late seeming difficulties. An inconvenience on your
side is preferable to the hazard of a disgrace.
I am, with great regard and respect, &c.
HENRY LAURENS.
* * * * *
THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS TO B. FRANKLIN.
Philadelphia, June 18th, 1783.
Sir,
I have the honor of enclosing you an official letter, directed to our
Ministers Plenipotentiary at Paris.
The resignation of the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, (occasioned
by his preference of the Chancellorship of the State of New York,
which he could not hold longer and retain his Secretaryship,) has cast
the business of his office on me, till a successor is elected, which I
hope will speedily take place.
As part of the resolution of Congress of the 12th instant, enclosed in
that letter, is of a secret nature, I have written it in cyphers, but
not having that of Mr Livingston's, I thought it best to use Mr
Morris's to you, which he has obligingly supplied me with; so that the
Ministers will be indebted for your decyphering it.
Your letter to Mr Livingston of the 15th of April, enclosing the two
medals, came to hand this morning. I am sorry to find, that you have
cause for similar complaints to those we have been making for two
months past, on the subject of want of intelligence. We have not heard
from any of our Commissioners at Paris, since February, excepting a
letter from Mr Laurens, though our anxiety and expectations have been
wound up to the highest pitch.
I feel myself much indebted for your polite compliment of the medal;
it is thought very elegant, and the device and workmanship much
admired. You will be pleased, Sir, to accept my acknowledgments on
this occasion. As I doubt not but the copper one was designed for Mr
Livingston personally, I shall send it to him by the first convenient
opportunity. He is a worthy deserving character, and the United States
will suffer greatly by his resignation, though I think him justified
in attending to the calls of his private affairs.
You will receive herewith a number of our late newspapers, in which
are inserted many resolves, associations, &c. from all parts of the
country, which I earnestly wish could be kept out of sight. But the
truth is, that the cruelties, ravages, and barbarisms of the refugees
and loyalists, have left the people so sore, that it is not yet time
for them to exercise their good sense and cooler judgment. And that
cannot take place, while the citizens of New York are kept out of
their city, and despoiled daily of their property, by the sending off
their negroes by hundreds, in the face of the treaty. It has been
exceedingly ill judged in the British to retain New York so long, and
to persist in sending away the negroes, as it has irritated the
citizens of America to an alarming degree.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ELIAS BOUDINOT.
* * * * *
HENRY LAURENS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
London, June 20th, 1783.
Gentlemen,
Permit me to refer to what I had the honor of writing to you the 17th.
You will recollect my suggestions, as soon as we perceived the falling
off from those warm assurances, which had been pressed in March and
April. They were not ill founded. I delayed a week in hopes of
intelligence, and left you with reluctance; the temper of the times
forbids even an essay.
What a happy country is this, where everything pertaining to the
public is rendered to them in public newspapers. See the enclosed,
containing nearly as accurate an account of certain recent
occurrences, as if it had been penned by one of the parties. It might
indeed have been made a little stronger. Modest men are sometimes
restrained from attempting a public good, from a dread of the effects
of envy, of being held up in an invidious light. It would be cruel to
disturb them.
I have heard nothing from America, save what you may have read in the
prints. Tomorrow I shall proceed to Bath, and be waiting for
intelligence, as well from yourselves as from Congress. Some
consolation arises from reflecting, that while I am endeavoring to
mend my health, you suffer no inconvenience from my absence.
With sincere regard and respect,
HENRY LAURENS.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Passy, June 28th, 1783.
Sir,
Mr Grand, banker to the Congress, having laid before us the annexed
state of their affairs in his hands, we conceive ourselves
indispensably obliged to communicate the same to your Excellency, as
some important interests of both countries are concerned.[15]
Before the peace was known in America, and while Mr Morris had hopes
of obtaining the five per cent duty and a larger loan from his
Majesty, the immediate urgent necessities of the army obliged him to
draw bills, and sell them to the merchants, to raise money for the
purchase of provisions, to prevent their starving or disbanding.