“The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for
the realization of this target; this again requires a
co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This
organization of financial measures over a number of years,
according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament
program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis
for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political
leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military
means available at a given time.”
One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document:
“All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that
means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a primary
view to readiness for a war _without any alert period_.”—And
“without any alert period” is underscored in the original.
The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long
before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways.
Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat
construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain
ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in
Holland and Spain.
The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade
rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn’t forbid them
to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.
Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval
negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a
manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant
Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant
Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the
Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that
this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his
handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end.
That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-44.
It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion
of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’”
“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement
of D. and E. (defensive weapons).
“Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a
displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton
ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.
“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet
must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from
1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter
guns (like the King George class.)
“3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats
secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.”
In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the
Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put
funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.
We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and
Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the
German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is
not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and I think he
will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-45.
It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of
the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the ‘Emden’.
“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available
for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a
fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible
that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he
did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He
considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by
1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get
Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the
disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the
workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Göring and
myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the
Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if
the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from
Scandinavia.
“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have
six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political
situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the following
year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep this point in
mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the
assembling should commence.”
Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom:
“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in
the middle of June ’35 according to plan.”
The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets
was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be
able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.
We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime
Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January 1933
by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament
of the Navy.
It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as
Exhibit USA-46:
“Top Secret.
“General directions for support given by the German Navy to the
German armament industry.
“The effects of the present economic depression have led here
and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an
active participation of the German armament industry abroad,
even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no
profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting.
Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing
‘self-sufficiency’ would in any case make such participation
superfluous.
“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the
situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the
following contradictory corrective points:
“a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be
overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war
politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the
assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to
a certain extent.
“b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German
armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere.
It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and
economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the
deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be
increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over
and above our own requirements.
“c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even
those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions.
Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are
making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament
industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the
propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of
sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and
insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially
advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and
foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of
military policy.
“d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions
imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever
increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German
armament industry and preparing the way for it in every
direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the
world.
“e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to
compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of
its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our
own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be
kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the
defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to
issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage
of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem
of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has
not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may
become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always
possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new
better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate
after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that
we should be technically well to the fore in any really
fundamental matters, than that less important points should be
kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.
“f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing
the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy,
even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the
purchasers are not made confident that something better is being
offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the
competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the
requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”
This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the
Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is
illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval
Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed
construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes
be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for
immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number—that is,
permitted under the Treaty—at a given time, and storing them after
satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective
S-boats was constantly increased.
We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with
the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10 February 1932.”
Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47,
the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from
the first paragraph of the text:
“In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament
Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat
half-flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly
similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a
formation of torpedo-carrying boats”—the German word being
“Torpedoträger”—“and it is not intended to count these S-boats
against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us.
“I therefore order:
“1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Lürssen,
Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily
removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for
torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.”—a
translator’s note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I.
(Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining)—“In agreement with the
Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its
torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for
fitting on another boat.
“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval
Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the
torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a
short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only
one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public
consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of
temporary trials by the T.V.A.”
—I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator’s
note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.—
“It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of
the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type.
The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the
torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.
“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon
as the situation of the political control allows it.”
Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written
in 1932, was talking about “as soon as the situation of the political
control allows it.” The seizure of power was the following year.
Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed
preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of
‘Transport Ships 0’. The preparations under this order were to be
completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these
ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion.
We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by
our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12
March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the
Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer
it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will
admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document.
“Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers.
“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35
(AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary
cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign
waters.
“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations,
the ships will be referred to as ‘Transport Ships 0’. It is
requested that in future this designation only be used.”
The short paragraph says: “The preparations are to be arranged, so that
they can be completed by 1. 4. 35.”
Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes
kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the
German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy’s
activities and policies of which I should like to point out some
illustrations.
One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the
battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G”—whatever that is—was
actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the
British under the Treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA-49. That is a set really of three separate documents
joined together. I read from that document:
“The true displacement of the battleships
‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’ and the ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent, in
both cases, the displacement reported to the British.”
And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two
columns headed “Displacement by Type”: one column “Actual Displacement”
and the other column “Notified Displacement.”
On the “Scharnhorst” the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000
tons. On the “F”—actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the
“HI”—actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need
not read them all.
On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the
English version, is the statement:
“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Führer and
Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the
aims of his foreign policy.”
The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament
limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared
superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations.
Following a conference with the chief of “A” section, an elaborate
survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the
quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under
manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together
with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in
those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its
allotment has been exceeded.
The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under
“Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily
involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their
significance. As I understand it, the “A” section was the military
department of the Navy.
We have this very interesting document among the captured documents
identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50.
It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed “A Survey Report of
German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of ‘A’ Section”, dated
9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files.
This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to
call attention to a few of the more interesting items.
There are three columns, one headed “Measure”, one headed “Material
Measures, Details,” and the most interesting one is headed “Remarks.”
The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the
violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer
to the numbers:
“Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.”—Then
figures are given. Remarks—“Further mines are in part ordered,
in part being delivered.”
“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area
for Baltic artillery batteries.”—In the remarks
column—“Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper
repairs.”
“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The
offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact
that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This
justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.”
“Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal
batteries.” The explanation: “Possible justification is that,
though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less.”
“Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance
against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve
stores, have been temporarily installed only for training
purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality
of rights).”
—Here is one that is rather amusing—“Number 13. Exceeding the number
of machine guns _et cetera_, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light
of.”
“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” This remark is quite
characteristic: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be
denied.”
“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning
shots. Make little of it.”—And so on throughout the list.
I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for
negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the
position that they might take.
Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that “On
14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament
Conference and the League of Nations.”
That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the
international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an
issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other
countries. At the same time Germany attached so much importance to this
action, that they considered the possibility of the application of
sanctions by other countries. Anticipating the probable nature of such
sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for
military preparations for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the
air, in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the
Head of the Army High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command
Raeder, and the Reichsminister of Air Göring.
We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October 1933, 11
days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League
of Nations.
“1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of
the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against
Germany.
“2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and
the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in
accordance with the following points:
“(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no
facts become known to the outside world from which preparation
for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is
incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere
of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If
necessary, the preparations must take second place to this
necessity.”
I think that makes the point without further reading. One of the
immediate consequences of the action was that following the withdrawal
from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was still further
increased.
I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, so that is
already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph 5. That,
as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934.
“5) Owing to the speed of military political development, since
Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of the Army,
the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years.
The third ‘A’ phase lasts accordingly from 1. 4. 34 to 31. 3.
36.”
Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal please: “On
10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was building a
military air force.”
That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial
notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Göring would not
dispute it.
We have a copy of the German publication known as _Das Archiv_—the
number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I refer, and I would
offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number 2292-PS; I offer it
as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement concerning the German Air
Force:
“The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Göring,
in his talk with the special correspondent of the _Daily Mail_,
Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air
Force.
“General Göring said:
“‘In the extension of our national defenses’”—Sicherheit—“‘it
was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of
defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted
myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line
of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which
would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a
military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any
time, attacks on Germany.’”
Then, at the end of that section of the article in _Das Archiv_:
“In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German Air
Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany.
General Göring replied to that exactly as follows:
“‘The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with
the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is
convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to
threaten the peace of other nations.’”
As I said; I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of that kind
from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed from showing
that they had different intentions from those announced.
The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the law for
compulsory military service, universal military service.
Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training
of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for aggressive war
was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be
done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the
world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for
universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the
Versailles Treaty.
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_, which is the official compilation of laws, in the
Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at Page 369 and I
think I need not offer the book or the law in evidence.
The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. It is
right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our Document
Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it:
“In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the
following law:
“Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.
“The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is
herewith promulgated:
“Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon
compulsory military duty.
“Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including the
police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps and
36 divisions.”—There is a typographical error in the English
version of that. It says “16 divisions”, but the original German
says 36 divisions.—
“Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty
of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on
compulsory military duty.”
Signed: “Berlin, 16 March 1935.”
It is signed first by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and
then many other officials, including the following defendants in this
case:
Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Göring, Hess, Frank.
Does the Court contemplate a short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, on
tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving pictures and
in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to see them before they
are offered in evidence—and in response to their request made to the
Tribunal some time ago—the showing of these films for Defense Counsel
will be held in this court room this evening at 8 o’clock, for the
Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached now Paragraph
IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges:
“On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent
to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they
would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles
Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact.”
As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible enemy
states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby
tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus on the
same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the
Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government
to respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno.
I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38, our Document
2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag
on that date. In that speech he said:
“Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely
respect all other articles pertaining to the
cooperation”—Zusammenleben, really meaning the living together
in harmony—“of the various nations, including territorial
agreements. Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by
it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.
“The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to
sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill.
However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even
if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore,
it will in particular adhere to all the obligations under the
Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the Pact also
adhere to it.”
For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and
Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16
October 1925, Article 1:
“The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally,
guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the
maintenance of the territorial _status quo_, resulting from the
frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and
France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed
by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at
Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the
stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty,
concerning the demilitarized zone.”
That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.
Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42:
“Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any
fortifications, either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the
right bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the
East of the Rhine.
“Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the
assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and
military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all
permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way
forbidden.”
The next allegation of the Indictment (f):
“On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland,
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of
Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world
that ‘we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.’”
The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore wound with
the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World War I. Not only was
this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective
strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In
the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military
action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany, east of
the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore,
any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations or for
any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and
refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations
for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.
We have a document, a German captured document, in German script, which
we identify as C-139, and which appears to be signed by the handwriting
of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-53.
The document deals with what is called “Operation Schulung”, which means
schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and even refers to prior
Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It is addressed to the
Chief of the Army Command, who at that time, I believe, was Fritsch, the
Chief of the Navy High Command, Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air,
Göring.
It does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to
it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the military
reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles
and the Rhine Pact of Locarno.