An idea has also gone forth, and it is fomented by the disaffected,

that France wishes, from interested views, to monopolise the

fisheries; or, at least to exclude all other competitors but Great

Britain. Those, who have attended to the disinterested conduct of

France during the war, oppose to this sentiment the honor and good

faith of their ally, the little interest that he can have in excluding

a people from a right, which would not interfere with his, since

France does little more than supply herself; and the New England

fishery, for the most part, only supplies the continent and islands of

America. They see the care with which France has endeavored to

cultivate a good understanding between that Kingdom and these States,

and they are persuaded so inconsiderable an object will not be put in

competition with the harmony, which ought to subsist between them, or

administer food to those unworthy jealousies. And so much does this

sentiment prevail in Congress, that their prospects have not induced

them to alter your instructions; more particularly as they have

received through the Minister of France assurances, that his Majesty

was pleased with the proof Congress had given him of their confidence,

and that he would in no event make any sacrifices of their essential

interests, which necessity should not compel him to do; that he had no

reason to apprehend from the events of the war, that such necessity

would exist. These events have become so much more favorable since the

date of the letter, which contained these assurances, that Congress

persuade themselves his Majesty will not be driven to make sacrifices

equally painful to him and injurious to us; but that, as we owe our

success in war to his magnanimity and generosity, we may be equally

indebted to his justice and firmness for an honorable peace.

It is not improbable, that Great Britain will endeavor to make some

stipulations in favor of their American partisans, who have been

banished the country, or whose property has been forfeited. You will

doubtless be sensible of the inconvenience and danger, to which their

return will subject us, and the injustice of restoring to them what

they have so justly forfeited; while no compensation is made to us

for the loss of property, and the calamities they have occasioned.

There can be little doubt, that every society may rightfully banish

from among them those, who aim at its subversion, and forfeit the

property, which they can only be entitled to by the laws, and under

the protection of the society, which they attempt to destroy. Without

troubling you, therefore, on the point of right, I will just mention a

few of the consequences that would result from a stipulation in their

favor.

In the first place, it will excite general dissatisfaction and

tumults. They are considered here as the authors of the war. Those who

have lost relations and friends by it, those who have been insulted by

them while starving in prisons and prison-ships, those who have been

robbed and plundered, or who have had their houses burned and their

families ill treated by them, will, in despite of all law, or

treaties, avenge themselves, if the real or supposed authors of these

calamities ever put themselves in their power; nor will the government

be able to prevent what the feeling of the body of the people will

justify.

Should they be permitted to reside among us, they will neglect no

means to injure and subvert our constitution and government, and to

sow divisions among us in order to pave the way for the introduction

of the old system. They will be dangerous partisans of the enemy,

equally unfriendly to France and to us, and will show themselves such

upon every occasion. To restore their property in many instances is

now become impossible. It has been sold from hand to hand; the money

arising from it has been sunk by depreciation in the public treasury.

To raise the value by taxes, or to wrest the lands from the hands of

the proprietors, is equally unjust and impossible. Many of the very

people, who would demand the restitution, have grown rich by the spoil

and plunder of this country. Many others, who were beggars at the

beginning of this war, owe their present affluence to the same cause.

So that at least the account between the two nations should be

liquidated, before any claim can be set up by the aggressors. How far

it will be possible to obtain a compensation for the injuries wantonly

done by the enemy, you will be best able to judge; be assured that it

is anxiously desired.

Give me leave to mention to you the necessity of stipulating for the

safe delivery of all records, and other papers of a public and private

nature, which the enemy have possessed themselves of; particularly of

the records of New York, which Mr Tryon sent to England; and the

private papers of many gentlemen of the law in different parts of the

continent, by which the rights of individuals may be materially

affected.

Thus, Sir, I have touched upon the principal points, that America

wishes to attain in the peace, which must end this bloody war. Perhaps

in so doing I have given both you and myself unnecessary trouble,

since I have urged nothing but what your own knowledge of the country,

and that of the other gentlemen in the commission, would have

suggested to you. However, conceiving that circumstances might render

it necessary for you to declare, that you spoke nothing more than the

prevailing sentiments of your Court, this letter will serve to vouch

for the assertion.

Should the Floridas be ceded to Spain, as there is nothing Congress

have more at heart than to maintain that friendly intercourse with

them, which this revolution has happily begun, it will be essential to

fix their limits precisely, for which purpose the instructions to Mr

Adams will serve as your directions.

Affairs here are in the same state that they were when I last wrote,

except that the enemy in South Carolina have called in all their

outposts, and shut themselves up in Charleston, where they will be

closely invested when General St Clair joins, which must have happened

about the last of December. The brilliant expedition to St Eustatia

does the highest honor to the Marquis de Bouillé and the French

nation. I flatter myself that it will be of singular use to Mr Adam's

negotiations.

I have the honor to be, dear Sir, &c. &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, January 15th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I received a few days since your favor of the 2d instant, in which you

tell me, that Mr Alexander had informed you, "America was disposed to

enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain." I am persuaded, that

your strong desire for peace has misled you, and occasioned your

greatly misunderstanding Mr Alexander; as I think it scarce possible

he should have asserted a thing _so utterly void of foundation_. I

remember that you have, as you say, often urged this on former

occasions, and that it always gave me more disgust than my friendship

for you permitted me to express. But since you have now gone so far

as to carry such a proposition to Lord North, as arising from us, it

is necessary that I should be explicit with you, and tell you plainly,

that I never had such an idea, and I believe there is not a man in

America, a few _English tories_ excepted, that would not spurn at the

thought of deserting a noble and generous friend, for the sake of a

truce with an unjust and cruel enemy.

I have again read over your Conciliatory Bill, with the manuscript

propositions that accompany it, and am concerned to find, that one

cannot give vent to a simple wish for peace, a mere sentiment of

humanity, without having it interpreted as _a disposition to submit to

any base conditions_ that may be offered us, rather than continue the

war; for, on no other supposition could you propose to us a truce of

ten years, during which we are to engage not to assist France, while

you continue the war with her. A truce too, wherein nothing is to be

mentioned that may weaken your pretensions to dominion over us, which

you may therefore resume at the end of the term, or at pleasure; when

we should have so covered ourselves with infamy, by our treachery to

our first friend, as that no other nation can ever after be disposed

to assist us, however cruelly you might think fit to treat us. Believe

me, my dear friend, America has too much understanding, and is too

sensible of the value of the world's good opinion, to forfeit it all

by such perfidy. The Congress will never instruct their Commissioners

to obtain a peace on such ignominious terms; and though there can be

but few things in which I should venture to disobey their orders, yet,

if it were possible for them to give me such an order as this, I

should certainly refuse to act; I should instantly renounce their

commission, and banish myself forever from so infamous a country.

We are a little ambitious too of your esteem; and as I think we have

acquired some share of it, by our manner of making war with you, I

trust we shall not hazard the loss of it, by consenting meanly to a

dishonorable peace.

Lord North was wise in demanding of you some authorised acknowledgment

of the proposition from authorised persons. He justly thought it too

improbable to be relied on, so as to lay it before the Privy Council.

You can now inform him, that the whole has been a mistake, and that no

such proposition as that of a separate peace has been, is, or is ever

likely to be made by me; and I believe by no other authorised person

whatever in behalf of America. You may further, if you please, inform

his Lordship, that Mr Adams, Mr Laurens, Mr Jay, and myself, have long

since been empowered, by a special commission, to treat of peace

whenever a negotiation shall be opened for that purpose; but it must

always be understood, that this is to be in conjunction with our

allies, conformably to the solemn treaties made with them.

You have, my dear friend, a strong desire to promote peace, and it is

a most laudable and virtuous desire. Permit me then to wish, that you

would, in order to succeed as a mediator, avoid such invidious

expressions as may have an effect in preventing your purpose. You tell

me that no stipulation for our independence must be in the treaty,

because you "verily believe, so deep is the jealousy between England

and France, that England would fight for a straw, to the last man and

the last shilling, rather than be _dictated to_ by France." And again,

that, "the nation would proceed to every extremity, rather than be

brought to a formal recognition of independence at the _haughty

command_ of France." My dear Sir, if every proposition of terms for

peace, that may be made by one of the parties at war, is to be called

and considered by the other as _dictating_, and a _haughty command_,

and for that reason rejected, with a resolution of fighting to the

last man rather than agree to it, you see that in such case no treaty

of peace is possible.

In fact we began the war for independence on your government, which we

found tyrannical, and this before France had anything to do with our

affairs; the article in our treaty whereby the "two parties engage,

that neither of them shall conclude either truce or peace with Great

Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and

mutually engage, not to lay down their arms until the independence of

the United States shall have been formally or _tacitly_ assured, by

the treaty or treaties, that shall terminate the war," was an article

inserted at our instance, being in our favor. And you see, by the

article itself, that your great difficulty may be easily got over, as

a formal acknowledgment of our independence is not made necessary. But

we hope by God's help to enjoy it; and I suppose we shall fight for it

as long as we are able.

I do not make any remarks upon the other propositions, because I think

that unless they were made by authority, the discussion of them is

unnecessary and may be inconvenient. The supposition of our being

disposed to make a separate peace I could not be silent upon, as it

materially affected our reputation and its essential interests. If I

have been a little warm on that offensive point, reflect on your

repeatedly urging it, and endeavor to excuse me.

Whatever may be the fate of our poor countries, let you and me die as

we have lived, in peace with each other.

Assuredly I continue, with great and sincere esteem, my dear friend,

yours most affectionately,

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Passy, January 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to

me this day enclosing a Memorial,[28] which relates to the interests

of some subjects of the Emperor, residing at Ostend, who allege that a

ship of theirs has been taken by an American privateer, and carried

into Boston, on pretence that the property was English, &c. I shall

immediately transmit the Memorial to Congress, as desired. But there

being Courts of Admiralty established in each of the United States, I

conceive, that the regular steps to be taken by the complainants would

be an application for justice to those Courts by some person on the

spot, duly authorised by them as their agents, and in case the

judgment of the Court is not satisfactory, that then they appeal to

the Congress, which cannot well take cognisance of such matters in the

first instance.

[28] See this Memorial in Franklin's Works, Vol. V p. 122

The merchants of Ostend may possibly not have as yet correspondents

established in all the States, but any merchant of credit in the

country would transact such business on receiving their request, with

the proper power of attorney; or if His Imperial Majesty should think

fit to appoint a Consul General to reside in those States, such an

officer might at all times assist his compatriots with his counsels

and protection, in any affairs that they might have in that country. I

am the more particular in mentioning this to your Excellency, because

I apprehend these cases may hereafter be frequent, and if the

complaints are to be addressed to you and me, we are likely to have a

great deal of trouble, as I am informed that it is become a daily

practice for outward bound English ships to put into Ostend, make a

formal pretended sale of ship and cargo to a merchant of the place,

who furnishes imperial papers for the voyage under his own name, and

receives a certain sum per cent for the operation.

This is said to be a branch of great profit to the Flemish merchants,

and that a very great number of English ships are now at sea with such

papers, and I suspect even from their own manner of stating the

transaction, that the ship and cargo reclaimed by the complainants are

of that kind. This seems to me an abuse of the neutrality, as these

fictitious profits are added to the advantage of real carriage for the

belligerent nations, they make it too much the interest of neutral

neighbors to foment wars and obstruct peace, that such profits may

continue. And if it is to be understood as a settled point, that such

papers are to protect English property, the fitters out of privateers

from France, Spain, Holland, and America, will in another year be all

ruined, for they will find none but Flemish ships upon the ocean.

With the greatest respect, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, January 23d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

An express just going to the Chesapeake, gives me an opportunity of

sending by the Hermione, a resolution passed yesterday. My letters by

this conveyance are so long, that they leave me nothing to add, unless

it be, that we have just received letters from Mr Deane, (copies are

enclosed) which confirm the authenticity of those published in his

name by Mr Rivington, mentioned in my former letters. In one of those

publications he expressly advises a return to the government of Great

Britain; and, as this could not be effected through Congress, that it

should be done by committees, which the people should choose for that

express purpose. These, of which I now send you copies, were delivered

here by the person to whom Mr Deane gave them, so that there can be no

doubt of their authenticity.

We have nothing new except what you will learn from the papers

herewith transmitted. As I doubt not you are upon the most

confidential terms with the Marquis de Lafayette, I could wish him to

see my last letter. You will observe, that I have omitted (for

reasons, that you will easily conceive) to make use of the arguments,

which may be derived from the 11th and 12th articles of our treaty

with France. The Commissioners will exercise their own discretion in

applying them, when a negotiation shall be opened.

We were much surprised at not receiving a single line by the frigate,

which lately arrived at the Chesapeake, from any one of our foreign

Ministers. It is upwards of three months since we have had a letter

of intelligence from Europe. Congress complains of these neglects,

(for such they consider them) and I flatter myself, that in future, as

a channel is now open through this office for a regular

correspondence, this cause of complaint will be removed, and that

letters and papers will be lodged with our consuls to go by every

conveyance.

Be persuaded, Sir, that I shall omit no opportunity to give you every

information, which may contribute to your private amusements or the

public benefit.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

_P. S._ I have this moment received resolutions from Congress, (copies

of which I enclose), which serve to show their sense of the importance

of the fisheries and their western extent, and add new weight to the

arguments which I had the honor to urge. You will be pleased to

transmit copies of them to Mr Jay and Mr Adams.

* * * * *

DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, January 24th, 1782.

My Dear Sir,

I received yours of the 15th instant this day. I must take the

earliest opportunity of setting you right in one mistake, which runs

through your whole letter, and which to you, under that mistake, must

be a very delicate point. You seem to apprehend that America has been

stated in the proposition to Lord North, as "disposed to enter into a

separate treaty with Great Britain;" but you meet the condition, viz.

in the words immediately following, "_and that their allies were

disposed to consent to it_." There cannot possibly be any supposition

of treachery to allies, in any proposition to which they may

_consent_. A separate treaty, with the _consent_ of the allies of

America, was the proposition communicated to me by Mr Alexander, and

which I laid before the Minister, and which I reported back again to

Mr Alexander in writing, when I showed him the paper entitled

"Conciliatory Propositions," which I took care to reduce to writing,

with a view of avoiding mistakes; therefore, I have not

_misunderstood_ Mr Alexander. I have since seen Mr A. many times, and

he has always stated one and the same proposition, viz. that America

was disposed to enter into a separate treaty, because their _allies

were disposed to consent that they should_; therefore there cannot

exist a suspicion of treachery. It occurred to me once while I was

writing, to bar against that misconstruction, but having specified the

_consent of the allies of America_ in the same sentence, I could not

conceive such a misconstruction to have been possible.

You have mistaken another point greatly. You say, "a truce for _ten_

years." There is not in the bill any such disposition or thought; on

the contrary, it is specified in the enclosed paper that it is kept

_indefinite_, for the sole purpose of avoiding the suspicion which you

have suggested. The truce may be for twenty, or fifty, or one hundred

years; in my opinion the longer the better. But in any case, what I

mean now to state is the _indefinite_ term in the bill. The articles

of intercourse are only proposed for ten years certain, just to strew

the way with inviting and conciliatory facilities, in the hope that _a

little time given for cooling_ would confirm a perpetual peace. If I

were permitted to be the mediator, I should certainly propose the

truce for twenty years; but if no more than ten years could be

obtained, I would certainly not refuse such a ground of pacification

and treaty. I refer you to several of my letters two or three years

ago, for the justification of my sentiments on that head.

Another point; look at all my letters since 1778, and see if I have at

any time suggested any breach of treaty or of honor; on the contrary,

I think a faithless nation, if exterminated, would not deserve the

pity of mankind. I speak of all I know in the treaty between America

and France, and what I think reasonable upon the case itself. If

America is further bound than we know of, they must abide by it. I

speak to the apparent and public foundation of the treaty, article

second, with the provision of _tacitly_, from article eighth; and now

I refer you to my letter to you, as long ago as April 10th, 1779; "If

beyond this essential and directed end, and upon grounds totally

unconnected with that alliance, not upon motives of magnanimity _for

the relief of an innocent people_, but from distinct and unconnected

motives of private European sentiments, America should be dragged into

the consequence of a general European war, she may apply to France the

apostrophe of the poet, speaking in the person of Helen to Paris, _non

hoc pollicitus tuæ_." You see, therefore, that our sentiments have

been uniform, and as I think, reasonable, because I still remain in

those sentiments.

Suppose, for instance, (and you may call it the case of a straw if you

please) that Great Britain and France should continue the war for ten

years, on the point of a commissary at Dunkirk, aye or no;--would it

be _reasonable_, or a _casus foederis_, that America should be

precluded from a separate treaty for ten years, and therefore

involved in the consequential war, after the _essential and direct

ends_ of the treaty of February 6th, 1778, were accomplished? As far

as my judgment goes, upon the knowledge of such facts as are public, I

should think it was neither _reasonable_ nor a _casus foederis_. This

is the breviate of the argument, in which there is no thought or

suggestion of any breach of faith or honor. I did conclude that France

was disposed to give their _consent_, because Mr Alexander informed me

so, and because I thought it reasonable that France should consent,

and reasonable that America should enjoy the benefit of that consent.

I transmitted it to Lord North, as a proposition temperate and pacific

on the part of America, and consented to by their allies, and on no

other ground did I transmit or propose it. All that your letter tells

me, is, "that America will not break with her allies, and that her

Commissioners will not entertain such a thought;" but give me leave to

add, that they, as honest men, cannot disdain such a thought more than

I do; every honest man ought to disdain the office, or the thought of

proposing a breach of faith to them. I have often told you, that such

an office or such a thought shall never be mine.

But you have not told me that France would not be disposed to consent

to a separate treaty of peace, for that ally whose peace was the

original declared object of the alliance, in the case supposed, viz.

of certain supposed or real punctillios between two proud and

belligerent nations, which might possibly involve America for years in

a war totally unconnected with the objects of the alliance. Besides,

if any rubs should occur in the road to a general peace, France is too

proud a nation to say, that beyond the _policy_ of contributing to the

separation of America from Great Britain in any contest of rivalship,

they cannot meet their rivals in war, without the assistance of

America. I cannot conceive that the Minister of a great belligerent

nation could entertain such a thought, as affecting their own sense of

honor, or be so unreasonable to their allies, as to withhold consent

to their peace, when _the essential and direct ends_ of the alliance

were satisfied. Observe, I do not contend against a general peace; on

the contrary, I mean to recommend the most prudent means for producing

it. But, as an anxious lover of peace, I feel terrors which dismay me,

and I consider the dangers which may obstruct a general peace, arising

from the pride and prejudices of nations, which are not to be

controlled in their heat by arguments of reason or philosophy.

Can any man in reason and philosophy tell me, why any two nations in

the world are called natural enemies, as if it were the ordinance of

God and nature? I fear it is too deeply engraved in the passions of

man, and for that reason I would elude and evade the contest with such

passions. I would strew the road to peace with flowers, and not with

thorns. _Haughty_, and _dictating_, and _commands_, are no words of

mine; I abhor them, and I fear them. I would elude their force by

gentle means, and step by step. In article eighth, there are the

following words; "By the treaty or treaties that shall terminate the

war." Let us have one treaty begun, and I think the rest would follow.

I fear when contending passions are raised, lest we should lose all by

grasping at too much.

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