HERBERT HOOVER

One reads in the press daily of Hughes and Hoover, or Mellen and

Hoover, or Davis and Hoover, or Wallace and Hoover. If it is a

question of foreign relations, it is the Secretary of State and

Hoover. If it has to do with using our power as a creditor nation

to compel the needy foreigners to buy here, in spite of the tariff

wall we are going to erect against their selling here, it is the

Secretary of the Treasury and Hoover. If strikes threaten, it is

the Secretary of Labor and Hoover. If the farmers seek more direct

access to the markets, it is the Secretary of Agriculture and

Hoover.

It is always "and Hoover." What Mr. Hughes does not know about

international affairs--and that is considerable--Mr. Hoover does.

What Mr. Mellen does not know about foreign finance--and that is

less--Mr. Hoover does. What Mr. Davis does not know about labor--and

that is everything--Mr. Hoover does. What Mr. Wallace does not

know about farm marketing--and that is nothing--Mr. Hoover does.

Herbert Hoover is the most useful supplement of the administration.

He possesses a variety of experiences, gained in making money

abroad, in administering the Belgian relief, in husbanding the

world's food supply after our entrance into the War, in helping

write the peace treaty, which no one else equals. He is as handy as

a dictionary of dates or a cyclopedia of useful information,

invaluable books, which never obtain their just due; for no one

ever signs his masterpiece with the name of its coauthor, thus, by

"John Smith and the Cyclopedia of Useful Information."

A bad particle to ride into fame behind, that word "and," begetter

of much oblivion! Who can say what goes after the "and" which

follows the name McKinley, or Hayes, or Cleveland, or even

Roosevelt? Who has sufficient "faith in Massachusetts" to remember

long the decorous dissyllable connected by "and" with the name

Harding? The link, "and," is not strong enough to hold. You recall

the "and"; that is all; as in the case of that article of food,

origin of many "calories," to use Mr. Hoover's favorite word, in

the quick-serve resorts of the humble, where it supplements ably

and usefully, but without honorable mention, slender portions of

beef, pork, and ham.

To describe briefly, in a phrase, what has happened to Hoover; two

years ago, it was "Hoover"; to-day, it is "and Hoover."

Why the connective? Because, to put it bluntly, however great his

other gifts are--and they are remarkable--he lacks political

intelligence. He reminds one now of a great insect caught in the

meshes of a silken web. He struggles this way and that. He flutters

his wings, and the web of politics fastens itself to him with a

hundred new contacts.

Facing possible elimination from public life, he accepted a dull

and unromantic department under President Harding. He was told that

he could "make something of it." Modern Greeks bearing gifts always

bring you an opportunity which "you, and you alone, can make

something of." He is trying to make something of it, something more

than Mr. Harding and the party advisers intended when they gave him

the Secretaryship of Commerce. He is trying to dramatize some turn

of fate and be once more a "big figure." He is tireless. He arrives

at his office fabulously early. Clerks drop in their tracks before

he leaves at night. He has time to see everyone who would see him;

for he can never tell when "the man with the idea" will knock at

his door. Unlike the British naval officer charged with the duty of

examining inventions to win the War, who is described by Guedalla as

sitting like an inverted Micawber "waiting for something to turn

down," he is waiting for something to turn up. He does more than

wait; he works twenty hours a day trying to turn something up.

And he will turn something up. The chances are that he will do as

much for the infant foreign trade of this country as Alexander

Hamilton did for the infant finances of this country. He promises

to be the most useful cabinet officer in a generation. But this is

less than his ambition. If he were an unknown man, it would be

enough; but you measure him by the stature of Hoover of the Belgian

Relief. Like the issue of great fathers, he is eclipsed by a

preceding fame. As well be the son of William Shakespeare as the

political progeny of Hoover, The Food Administrator!

The War spoiled life for many men; for Wilson, for Baruch, for

Hoover. After its magnificent amplifications of personality, it is

hard to descend to every day, and be not a tremendous figure, but a

successful secretary of an unromantic department.

He might concentrate with advantage to his future fame. A brief

absence from front pages, under the connective "and," would cause

the public heart to grow fonder when he did "make something" of his

own department.

But two disqualifications stand in his way;--his lack of political

intelligence, and his consequent inability to make quick decisions

in a political atmosphere. His present diffusion of his energies

springs, I think, from indecision; for in politics he can not make

up his mind, as he can in business, where the greatest profit lies.

I first heard of this weakness of his when he was Food

Administrator in Washington, and when other members of the Wilson

War Administration, equal in rank with him and having to cooperate

with him, complained frequently of his slowness. He had able

subordinates, they said, the leading men in the various food

industries, and they had to make up his mind for him. I set this

charge down, at the time, to jealousy and prejudice, Mr. Hoover

being always an outsider in the Wilson administration; but the long

delay and immense difficulty he made over deciding, although all

his life a Republican, whether he was or was not a Republican in

the campaign of 1920, seemed all the proof of indecision that was

needed.

It sounds like heresy about one who has been advertised as he has;

but remember that we know little about him except what the best

press agents in history have said of him. He achieved his

professional success in the Orient, far from observation, and his

financial success far from American eyes. His public career in the

relief of Belgium and in the administration of food was the object

of world-wide good will. And, moreover, indecision in politics is

common enough among men who are strong and able in other activities.

Mr. Taft was a great judge but wrecked his administration as

President by inability to make up his mind. Senator Kellogg was a

brilliantly successful lawyer; but in public life he is so hesitant

that Minnesota politicians speak of him as "Nervous Nelly," and

even Mr. Taft, during the Treaty fight, rebuked him to his face

for lack of courage.

Mr. Hoover's face is not that of a decisive character. The brow is

ample and dominant; there is vision and keen intelligence; but the

rest of the face is not strong, and it wears habitually a wavering

self-conscious smile. This smile, as if everybody were looking at

him, makes him remind one as he comes out of a Cabinet meeting of a

small boy in a classroom carrying a bouquet of flowers up to his

teacher. He has, moreover, a strain of pessimism in his nature,

which may account for his indecision. You catch him in moods of

profound depression. He was in one just before his appointment to

the Cabinet, when his European relief work was not going to his

liking, and when the politicians, he felt, were forcing him into a

position of little scope and opportunity.

In politics, he has enough vanity and self-consciousness to be

aware constantly of forces opposed to him, covert, hostile,

unscrupulous, personal forces--forces that he does not understand.

Give him a mining problem, he can reckon with the forces of nature

that have to be overcome. Give him a problem of finance, he knows

the enmities of finance. He is in his element. In politics he is

not. He is baffled.

An illustrative incident occurred in the spring of 1920, when both

parties were talking of him as their candidate for President and he

was uncertain whether he was a Republican or not. Mr. Hearst, in

his newspapers, published an attack upon him, saying that he was

more Briton than American, and to prove it printed a list of

British corporations of which he was a director.

All his suspicions were aroused over this everyday occurrence of

politics. Where had Mr. Hearst obtained the unfortunate

information? He saw plots and treachery. Someone in his confidence

must have betrayed him for money. A careful investigation was made,

and it was discovered that the editor had drawn upon "Who's Who,"

to which Mr. Hoover himself had furnished the information before he

began thinking of the Presidency.

The politicians tricked him so completely in the preconvention

campaign of 1920 that he has the best reasons for distrusting

himself. He was always, during that campaign, a candidate for the

Republican nomination to the Presidency. At the very time when his

spokesman, Julius Barnes, was saying for him that he could not

choose between the two parties until he had seen their candidates

and read their platforms, and when the Democrats were most

seriously impressed with his availability, the manager of his paper

in Washington said to me, "This talk of Hoover for the Democratic

nomination is moonshine. He won't take it."

"Why not," I asked him.

"Because," he replied, "he does not think it is worth having," a

quite practical reason which differed wholly from the official

explanation that Mr. Hoover was waiting to see which party was

progressive so that he might oppose reaction.

His subsequent support of the more conservative candidate and the

more conservative party bore out the truth of what his newspaper

manager had said. And in reality, Mr. Hoover is as conservative as

Mr. Harding himself, being a large capitalist with all the

conservatism of the capitalist class.

A little while ago, Mr. Roosevelt had made it unfashionable to

admit that you were conservative. You wished it to be understood

that you were open-minded--"forward looking," as Mr. Wilson, who

turned reactionary at the test, called it; that you were broad,

sympathetic, free from mean prejudices, progressive, in short. Our

very best reactionaries of to-day all used to call themselves

progressive. Some still do.

The young editor of a metropolitan newspaper, born to great wealth,

and imbibing all the narrowness of the second generation, once

asked me in those bright days when everybody was thrilling over his

"liberality," "Would you call me a radical, or just a progressive?"

He was "just a progressive." In a somewhat similar sense, Mr.

Hoover was quite unconsciously "just a progressive"--a belated

follower of a pleasant fashion, having lived abroad too long when

he made his announcement to note the subtle changes that had taken

place in our thinking--the rude shock that Russia had given to our

"liberality."

But living abroad, it is only fair to add, has created a difference

between his conservatism and that, let us say, of Judge Gary. He

has grown used to labor unions and even to labor parties, so that

they do not frighten him. His is conservatism, none the less,

definite conservatism, if more enlightened than the obscurant

American variety.

His hesitation and indecision in the spring of 1920 thus did not

spring from doubt of the Republican party's progressiveness. He

always desired the Republican nomination; but his vanity would

suffer by the open seeking of it and the defeat which seemed

likely; and his sensitiveness would suffer from the attacks, like

that of Mr. Hearst, which an open candidacy would entail; for he is

at once vain and thin-skinned.

Springing thus from reluctance to make up his mind, the

announcement was received as the evidence of a very large mind.

Among the public, Mr. Hoover was taken for a man who cared more for

principle than for party or for politics. Among the politicians, he

assumed the proportions of a portent, with a genius for politics

second only to that of Roosevelt himself, who in a difficult

situation could take the one position and say the one thing that

might force his nomination.

The Democrats pricked up their ears. Mr. Wilson, sick and

discouraged, began to entertain hopes of a candidate who would save

the Democracy from ruin. Homer Cummings, National Chairman of Mr.

Wilson's party, began to regard Mr. Hoover's possible nomination

favorably. The Republican managers became alarmed. They knew from

Mr. Hoover's friends that he, as his Washington newspaper manager

had said, thought the Democratic nomination not worth having; but

they feared lest by the course he was pursuing he might make it

worth having, might take it, and might rob them of the election

which they felt safely theirs. If they could induce him to declare

his Republicanism, the Democrats would drop him, the public would

cease to be interested in him as a dramatic personality too big for

party trammels, and they themselves could ignore him.

It was decided to have him read out of the Republican party as a

warning to him of how he was imperiling his hopes of the only

nomination he valued, and at the same time have Republican leaders

go to him or his friends and advise him and them that if he would

only declare his Republicanism, a popular demand would force his

nomination at Chicago.

Senator Penrose was chosen as the Republican whose pontifical

damnation would most impress Mr. Hoover. The late W. Murray Crane,

whom I have heard described at Mr. Roosevelt's dinner table as "the

Uriah Heap of the Republican party," was the emissary who would

advise Mr. Hoover to confess the error of his ways and seek the

absolution of Penrose. A diary kept at Republican National

Headquarters in New York reveals the visits there at the time the

plan was made of Mr. Crane and others who took part in the

enterprise. Mr. Penrose got up from a sick bed and thundered: under

no circumstances would he permit the nomination of Mr. Hoover.

The plot succeeded. In a few days, Mr. Hoover declared that he

would not take the Democratic nomination. The Democrats dropped

him. The public was bewildered by his finding out that he was a

Republican after saying that he could not tell whether he was one

or not until he had seen the Republican candidate and the platform.

At the Chicago Convention he received the support of Mr. Crane,

Governor Miller, of New York, and, on the last ballot, of William

Allen White, who having voted for Harding on the just previous

ballot, said he wanted to "leave the bandwagon and ride with the

undertaker."

This guilelessness of Mr. Hoover in politics will prevent him from

realizing his larger ambitions; but is a source of strength to him

in his present position, with American business men who have

learned to distrust politicians. At any rate, he is no politician;

he thinks as business men think; his interests are their interests;

and when he comes to them bearing gifts,--the aid and cooperation

of the United States Government in their efforts to win foreign

trade,--they do not take him for a Greek.

He possesses great special knowledge which they desire: he knows

much about economics and enjoys the advantage of believing that he

knows all; he has immense prestige, as a result of all the

advertising he received during the War; they come to Washington and

sit at his feet like children; he gives them fatherly lectures,

even upon the morals of their business, which must be clean, to

enter this foreign trade of his, with the Government behind it.

They make mental resolutions of reform. To no politician, to no

one, even with an instinct for politics, would they listen as they

listen to him. He speaks to American business with immense

authority. His selection is an example of that unusual instinct for

putting the right man in the right place which President Harding

has, when he chooses to exercise it.

The post was disappointing to Mr. Hoover; but it was the one in

which he will be most useful. Not a lawyer, he would hardly have

done for Secretary of State, in spite of his exceptional knowledge

of foreign conditions. Not a banker, he lacked the technical

equipment for Secretary of the Treasury. Not a politician, he

should have, and he has a place in which there are the least

possible politics. Mr. Harding denatured him politically by giving

him the one business department in the Cabinet. Even Hiram Johnson

may come no longer to hate him.

For his present task, besides his special knowledge, his remarkable

industry, his tireless application to details, he has one great

gift, his extraordinary talent for publicity. There is no one in

Washington, not even Mr. Hughes, who knows so well as he does how

to advertise what he is doing.

As business recovers and foreign trade develops, the magazine pages

will blossom with articles about what American enterprise is

achieving in foreign lands, about the cooperation between American

business and the American government, and, once more, about Mr.

Hoover. Finding markets for American wares all over the earth will

be made a romance only second in interest to the feeding of

Belgium.

It was not an accident that he was better advertised than any

general, admiral, or statesman of the War. It was not all due to

the good will of the public, to the work which he did in Belgium

and in this country, nor to the extraordinary press agents whose

services he was able to command because of that good will. Back of

it all was his own instinct for publicity, his sense of what

interests the people, his assiduous cultivation of editors and

reporters. He has magazine and newspaper contacts only exceeded by

those of Roosevelt in his time, and a sense of the power of

publicity only exceeded by Roosevelt's.

When he was threatening to win the Democratic nomination for the

Presidency in spite of the fact that he was not a Democrat, a

supporter of McAdoo complained bitterly to me, "Confound him! He

has a genius for self-advertising. He is not half the man McAdoo

is. He hasn't McAdoo's courage, optimism, force, or general

statesmanship; but he has this infernal talent for getting himself

in the papers. There is not much to him but press agenting; but how

can you beat that?"

But though his own name has come to count for more than the causes

he represents, so that the best way to obtain aid is to ask for it

with "Hoover" in big letters and with the suffering children of

Central Europe in small letters, still he remains only a name to

the American people. They know that he always wears a blue suit of

clothes cut on an invariable model, which he adopted years ago.

They know that he worked his way through college as a waiter. They

know that he grew rich as a mining engineer in the East. That is

all. They think of him as a symbol of efficiency, as one who may

save their money, as one who may find markets for them and develop

their trade, as one who may help the world upon its feet again

after the War, as a superman, if you will; but not as a man, not as

a human being.

All his advertising has made him appeal to the American

imagination, but not to the American heart. He is a sort of

efficiency engineer, installing his charts and his systems into

public life,--and who loves an efficiency engineer? There are no

stories about him which give him a place in the popular breast. It

is impossible to interest yourself in Hoover as Hoover; in Hoover

as the man who did this, or the man who did that, or the man who

will do this or that, yes,--but not in Hoover, the person.

The reason is that he has little personality. On close contact, he

is disappointing, without charm, given to silence, as if he had

nothing for ordinary human relations which had no profitable

bearing on the task in hand. His conversation is applied efficiency

engineering; there is no lost motion, though it is lost motion

which is the delight of life. At dinner, he inclines to bury his

face in his plate until the talk reaches some subject important to

him, when he explodes a few facts, and is once more silent.

Had he a personality with his instinct for publicity, he would be

another Roosevelt. But he is a bare expert.

I doubt if he really thinks of human beings as human beings; on the

contrary, some engineering graph represents humanity in his mind.

It is characteristic of him that he always speaks of the relief of

starving populations not in terms of human suffering, but in terms

of chemistry. The people, of whatever country he may be feeding,

have so many calories now, last month they had so many calories; if

they had ten calories more, they could maintain existence. Many

times have I heard this formula. It is a weakness in a democracy to

think of people in terms of graphs, and their welfare in terms of

calories; that is, if you hope to be President of that democracy--

not if you are content to be its excellent Secretary of Commerce.

When he came to Washington as a Food Administrator, he brought with

him an old associate, a professor from California. A few days later

the professor's wife arrived and went to live at the same house

where Mr. Hoover and her husband resided. Mr. Hoover knew her well.

She and her husband had long been his friends. He met her in the

hall, shook hands with her, welcomed her and then lapsed into

silence. After some moments, he said, "Well,--" and hesitated.

"Mr. Hoover," she said, "I know you are a busy man. You don't have

to stand here trying to think of something to say to me. I know you

well enough not to be offended if you don't talk to me at all while

I am here."

He laughed and took her at her word. He had the habit of too great

relevancy to be human. If he could have said more than "Well" to

that woman, he might have been President.

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