Transcriber’s Notes:
Underscores “_” before and after a word or phrase indicate _italics_
in the original text.
Equal signs “=” before and after a word or phrase indicate =bold=
in the original text.
Small capitals have been converted to SOLID capitals.
Illustrations have been moved so they do not break up paragraphs.
Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.
CHEMICAL WARFARE
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CHEMICAL WARFARE
BY
AMOS A. FRIES
_Brigadier General, C. W. S., U. S. A.
Chief, Chemical Warfare Service_
AND
CLARENCE J. WEST
_Major, C. W. S. Reserve Corps, U. S. A.
National Research Council_
FIRST EDITION
McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, Inc.
NEW YORK: 370 SEVENTH AVENUE
LONDON: 6 & 8 BOUVERIE ST., E. C. 4
1921
COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY THE
MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.
PREFACE
Shortly after the signing of the Armistice, it was realized that the
story of Chemical Warfare should be written, partly because of its
historical value, and partly because of the future needs of a textbook
covering the fundamental facts of the Service for the Army, the Reserve
Officer, the National Guard, and even the Civilian Chemist. The present
work was undertaken by both authors as a labor of patriotism and
because of their interest in the Service.
The two years which have elapsed since the initial discussion of the
outlines of the book have thoroughly convinced us of the need of such
a work. The Engineers, the Medical Department, and most of the other
branches of the Army have their recognized textbooks and manuals.
There has been no way, however, by which the uninformed can check the
accuracy of statements regarding Chemical Warfare. The present volume
will serve, in a measure, to fill this gap. That it does not do so
more completely is due in part to the fact that secrecy must still be
maintained about some of the facts and some of the new discoveries
which are the property of the Service. Those familiar with the work of
the Chemical Warfare Service will discover, though, that the following
pages contain many statements which were zealously guarded secrets two
years ago. This enlarged program of publicity on the part of the Chief
of the Service is being justified every day by the ever increasing
interest in this branch of warfare. Where five men were discussing
Chemical Warfare two years ago, fifty men are talking about the work
and the possibilities of the Service today. It is hoped that the facts
here presented may further increase the interest in Chemical Warfare,
for there is no question but that it must be recognized as a permanent
and a very vital branch of the Army of every country. Reasons for this
will be found scattered through the pages of this book.
It should be explained that this is in no sense a complete historical
sketch of the development and personnel of the Chemical Warfare
Service. At least two more volumes are needed,—one on the Manufacture
of Poisonous Gases and one on the Tactics of Chemical Warfare. We have
purposely refrained from an attempt to give credit to individuals for
the accomplishments of the various Divisions of the Service, because
such an attempt would have made the book too voluminous, and would
have defeated the primary purpose, namely, that it should present
the information in as concise manner as possible. The published and
unpublished materials of the files of all the Divisions have been
freely drawn upon in writing the various chapters, and many old C. W.
S. men will undoubtedly recognize whole sentences which they wrote
under the stress of the laboratory or plant “battle front.” May
these few lines be an acknowledgment of their contributions. Those
who desire to consult the literature of Chemical Warfare will find a
fairly complete bibliography (to about the middle of 1919) in “Special
Libraries” for November, 1919.
Special acknowledgment is made to Dr. G. J. Esselen, Jr., for having
read the manuscript and for helpful and constructive criticisms.
Many of the figures are reproduced by permission of the Journal of
Industrial and Engineering Chemistry; those showing the Nelson cell
were furnished by the Samuel M. Green Company.
AMOS A. FRIES,
CLARENCE J. WEST.
Aug. 1, 1921.
FOREWORD
After all peaceful means of settling disputes between nations have
been resorted to and have failed, war is often declared by one of the
disputants for the purpose of imposing its will upon the other by
force. In order to accomplish this, a superiority must be established
over the adversary in trained men and in implements of war.
Men are nothing in modern war unless they are equipped with the most
effective devices for killing and maiming the enemy’s soldiers and
thoroughly trained in the use of such implements.
History proves that an effective implement of war has never been
discarded until it becomes obsolete.
It is impossible to humanize the act of killing and maiming the enemy’s
soldiers, and there is no logical grounds on which to condemn an
appliance so long as its application can be so confined. Experiments in
this and other countries during the World War completely established
the fact that gas can be so confined. The range of gas clouds is no
greater than that of artillery and the population in the area behind
the front line must, if they remain in such range, take their chance.
The danger area in the future will be known to all.
As the first Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, U. S. Army, I
speak with some experience when I say that there is no field in which
the future possibilities are greater than in chemical warfare, and no
field in which neglect to keep abreast of the times in research and
training would be more disastrous.
Notwithstanding the fact that gas was used in the World War two years
before the United States entered the fray, practically nothing was
done in this country before April, 1917, towards the development of
any chemical warfare appliances, offensive or defensive, and had it
not been for the ability of an ally to supply our troops with such
appliances, they would have been as defenseless as the Canadians were
at Ypres when the Germans sent over their first gas cloud.
This book recites the troubles and successes of this new service under
the stress of war for which it was unprepared and I trust that its
perusal will create a public opinion that will insist upon chemical
preparation for war.
I feel that this book will show that the genius and patriotism
displayed by the chemists and chemical engineers of the country were
not surpassed in any other branch of war work and that to fail to
utilize in peace times this talent would be a crime.
WILLIAM L. SIBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
Retired.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE vii
FOREWORD ix
CHAPTER
I. THE HISTORY OF POISON GASES 1
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF GAS WARFARE 10
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 31
IV. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE IN FRANCE 72
V. CHLORINE 116
VI. PHOSGENE 126
VII. LACHRYMATORS 137
VIII. CHLOROPICRIN 144
IX. DICHLOROETHYLSULFIDE (MUSTARD GAS) 150
X. ARSENIC DERIVATIVES 180
XI. CARBON MONOXIDE 190
XII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GAS MASK 195
XIII. ABSORBENTS 237
XIV. TESTING ABSORBENTS AND GAS MASKS 259
XV. OTHER DEFENSIVE MEASURES 272
XVI. SCREENING SMOKES 285
XVII. TOXIC SMOKES 313
XVIII. SMOKE FILTERS 322
XIX. SIGNAL SMOKES 330
XX. INCENDIARY MATERIALS 336
XXI. THE PHARMACOLOGY OF WAR GASES 353
XXII. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN RELATION TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS 363
XXIII. THE OFFENSIVE USE OF GAS 385
XXIV. DEFENSE AGAINST GAS 405
XXV. PEACE TIME USES OF GAS 427
XXVI. THE FUTURE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE 435
INDEX 440
CHEMICAL WARFARE
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF POISON GASES[1]
The introduction of poison gases by the Germans at Ypres in April,
1915, marked a new era in modern warfare. The popular opinion is that
this form of warfare was original with the Germans. Such, however, is
not the case. Quoting from an article in the _Candid Quarterly Review_,
=4=, 561, “All they can claim is the inhuman adoption of devices
invented in England, and by England rejected as too horrible to be
entertained even for use against an enemy.” But the use of poison gases
is even of an earlier origin than this article claims.
[Footnote 1: This chapter originally appeared in Science, Vol. =49=,
pp. 412-417 (1919).]
The first recorded effort to overcome an enemy by the generation of
poisonous and suffocating gases seems to have been in the wars of the
Athenians and Spartans (431-404 B.C.) when, besieging the cities of
Platea and Belium, the Spartans saturated wood with pitch and sulfur
and burned it under the walls of these cities in the hope of choking
the defenders and rendering the assault less difficult. Similar uses
of poisonous gases are recorded during the Middle Ages. In effect
they were like our modern stink balls, but were projected by squirts
or in bottles after the manner of a hand grenade. The legend is told
of Prester John (about the eleventh century), that he stuffed copper
figures with explosives and combustible materials which, emitted from
the mouths and nostrils of the effigies, played great havoc.
The idea referred to by the writer in the _Candid Quarterly Review_,
is from the pen of the English Lord Dundonald, which appeared in the
publication entitled “The Panmure Papers.” This is an extremely dull
record of an extremely dull person, only rendered interesting by the
one portion, concerned with the use of poison gases, which, it is said,
“should never have been published at all.”
That portion of the article from the _Candid Quarterly Review_ dealing
with the introduction of poisonous gas by the Germans, and referred to
in the first paragraph above, is quoted in full as follows:
“The great Admiral Lord Dundonald—perhaps the ablest
sea captain ever known, not even excluding Lord
Nelson—was also a man of wide observation, and no
mean chemist. He had been struck in 1811 by the deadly
character of the fumes of sulphur in Sicily; and, when
the Crimean War was being waged, he communicated to
the English government, then presided over by Lord
Palmerston, a plan for the reduction of Sebastopol
by sulphur fumes. The plan was imparted to Lord
Panmure and Lord Palmerston, and the way in which it
was received is so illustrative of the trickery and
treachery of the politician that it is worth while to
quote Lord Palmerston’s private communication upon it
to Lord Panmure:
“LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE
“‘HOUSE OF COMMONS, 7th August, 1855
“‘I agree with you that if Dundonald will go out
himself to superintend and direct the execution of
his scheme, we ought to accept his offer and try his
plan. If it succeeds, it will, as you say, save a great
number of English and French lives; if it fails _in
his hands_, we shall be exempt from blame, and if
we come in for a small share of the ridicule, we can
bear it, and the greater part will fall on him. You
had best, therefore, make arrangement with him without
delay, and with as much secrecy as the nature of things
will admit of.’
“Inasmuch as Lord Dundonald’s plans have already been
deliberately published by the two persons above named,
there can be no harm in now republishing them. They
will be found in the first volume of ‘The Panmure
Papers’ (pp. 340-342) and are as follows:
“‘(ENCLOSURE)
“‘BRIEF PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
“‘It was observed when viewing the Sulphur Kilns, in
July, 1811, that the fumes which escaped in the rude
process of extracting the material, though first
elevated by heat, soon fell to the ground, destroying
all vegetation, and endangering animal life to a great
distance, and it was asserted that an ordinance existed
prohibiting persons from sleeping within the distance
of three miles during the melting season.
“‘An application of these facts was immediately made
to Military and Naval purposes, and after mature
consideration, a Memorial was presented on the subject
to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the 12th
of April, 1812, who was graciously pleased to lay it
before a Commission, consisting of Lord Keith, Lord
Exmouth and General and Colonel Congreve (afterwards
Sir William), by whom a favorable report having been
given, His Royal Highness was pleased to order that
secrecy should be maintained by all parties.
“‘(Signed) DUNDONALD
“‘7th August, 1855’
“‘MEMORANDUM
“‘Materials required for the expulsion of the Russians
from Sebastopol: Experimental trials have shown that
about five parts of coke effectually vaporize one part
of sulphur. Mixtures for land service, where weight
is of importance, may, however, probably be suggested
by Professor Faraday, as to operations on shore I
have paid little attention. Four or five hundred tons
of sulphur and two thousand tons of coke would be
sufficient.
“‘Besides these materials, it would be necessary to
have, say, as much bituminous coal, and a couple of
thousand barrels of gas or other tar, for the purpose
of masking fortifications to be attacked, or others
that flank the assailing positions.
“‘A quantity of dry firewood, chips, shavings, straw,
hay or other such combustible materials, would also
be requisite quickly to kindle the fires, which ought
to be kept in readiness for the first favourable and
steady breeze.
“‘DUNDONALD
“‘7th August, 1855’
“‘=_Note._=—The objects to be accomplished
being specially stated the responsibility of their
accomplishment ought to rest on those who direct their
execution.
“‘Suppose that the Malakoff and Redan are the objects
to be assailed it might be judicious merely to obscure
the Redan (by the smoke of coal and tar kindled in ‘The
Quarries’), so that it could not annoy the Mamelon,
where the sulphur fire would be placed to expel
the garrison from the Malakoff, which ought to have
all the cannon that can be turned towards its ramparts
employed in overthrowing its undefended ramparts.
“‘There is no doubt but that the fumes will envelop all
the defenses from the Malakoff to the Barracks, and
even to the line of battleship, the Twelve Apostles, at
anchor in the harbour.
“‘The two outer batteries, on each side of the Port,
ought to be smoked, sulphured, and blown down by
explosion vessels, and their destruction completed by a
few ships of war anchored under cover of the smoke.’
“That was Lord Dundonald’s plan in 1855, improperly
published in 1908, and by the Germans, who thus learnt
it, ruthlessly put into practise in 1915.
“Lord Dundonald’s memoranda, together with further
elucidatory notes, were submitted by the English
government of that day to a committee and subsequently
to another committee in which Lord Playfair took
leading part. These committees, with Lord Dundonald’s
plans fully and in detail before them, both reported
that the plans were perfectly feasible; that the
effects expected from them would undoubtedly be
produced; but that those effects were so horrible that
no honorable combatant could use the means required to
produce them. The committee therefore recommended that
the scheme should not be adopted; that Lord Dundonald’s
account of it should be destroyed. How the records
were obtained and preserved by those who so improperly
published them in 1908 we do not know. Presumably they
were found among Lord Panmure’s papers. Admiral Lord
Dundonald himself was certainly no party to their
publication.”
One of the early, if not the earliest suggestion as to the use of
poison gas in shell is found in an article on “Greek Fire,” by B. W.
Richardson.[2]
[Footnote 2: _Popular Science Review_, =3=, 176 (1864).]
He says:
“I feel it a duty to state openly and boldly, that if
science were to be allowed her full swing, if society
would really allow that ‘all is fair in war,’ war
might be banished at once from the earth as a game
which neither subject nor king dare play at. Globes
that could distribute liquid fire could distribute
also lethal agents, within the breath of which no man,
however puissant, could stand and live. From the summit
of Primrose Hill, a few hundred engineers, properly
prepared, could render Regent’s Park, in an incredibly
short space of time, utterly uninhabitable; or could
make an army of men, that should even fill that space,
fall with their arms in their hands, prostrate and
helpless as the host of Sennacherib.
“The question is, shall these things be? I do not
see that humanity should revolt, for would it not be
better to destroy a host in Regent’s Park by making
the men fall as in a mystical sleep, than to let
down on them another host to break their bones, tear
their limbs asunder and gouge out their entrails with
three-cornered pikes; leaving a vast majority undead,
and writhing for hours in torments of the damned?
I conceive, for one, that science would be blessed
in spreading her wings on the blast, and breathing
into the face of a desperate horde of men prolonged
sleep—for it need not necessarily be a death—which
they could not grapple with, and which would yield them
up with their implements of murder to an enemy that in
the immensity of its power could afford to be merciful
as Heaven.
“The question is, shall these things be? I think they
must be. By what compact can they be stopped? It were
improbable that any congress of nations could agree on
any code regulating means of destruction; but if it
did, it were useless; for science becomes more powerful
as she concentrates her forces in the hands of units,
so that a nation could only act, by the absolute and
individual assent of each of her representatives.
Assume, then, that France shall lay war to England, and
by superior force of men should place immense hosts,
well armed, on English soil. Is it probable that the
units would rest in peace and allow sheer brute force
to win its way to empire? Or put English troops on
French soil, and reverse the question?
“To conclude. War has, at this moment, reached, in its
details, such an extravagance of horror and cruelty,
that it can not be made worse by any art, and can only
be made more merciful by being rendered more terribly
energetic. Who that had to die from a blow would not
rather place his head under Nasmyth’s hammer, than
submit it to a drummer-boy armed with a ferrule?”
The _Army and Navy Register_ of May 29, 1915, reports that
“among the recommendations forwarded to the Board of
Ordnance and Fortifications there may be found many
suggestions in favor of the asphyxiation process,
mostly by the employment of gases contained in bombs
to be thrown within the lines of the foe, with varying
effects from peaceful slumber to instant death. One
ingenious person suggested a bomb laden to its full
capacity with snuff, which should be so evenly and
thoroughly distributed that the enemy would be
convulsed with sneezing, and in this period of paroxysm
it would be possible to creep up on him and capture him
in the throes of the convulsion.”
That the probable use of poisonous gas has often been in the minds
of military men during recent times is evidenced by the fact that at
the Hague Conference in 1899 several of the more prominent nations of
Europe and Asia pledged themselves not to use projectiles whose only
object was to give out suffocating or poisonous gases. Many of the
Powers did not sign this declaration until later. Germany signed and
ratified it on Sept. 4, 1900, but the United States never signed it.
Further, this declaration was not to be binding in case of a war in
which a non-signatory was or became a belligerent. Admiral Mahan, a
United States delegate, stated his position in regard to the use of gas
in shell (at that time an untried theory) as follows:
“The reproach of cruelty and perfidy addressed against
these supposed shells was equally uttered previously
against fire-arms and torpedoes, although both are
now employed without scruple. It is illogical and not
demonstrably humane to be tender about asphyxiating
men with gas, when all are prepared to admit that it
is allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad
at midnight, throwing four or five hundred men into
the sea to be choked by the water, with scarcely the
remotest chance to escape.”
At the Hague Congress of 1907, article 23 of the rules adopted for war
on land states:
“It is expressly forbidden (_a_),
to employ poisons or poisonous weapons.”
Before the War suffocating cartridges were shot from the
cartridge-throwing rifle of 26 mm. These cartridges were charged with
ethyl bromoacetate, a slightly suffocating and non-toxic lachrymator.
They were intended for attack on the flanking works of permanent
fortifications, flanking casements or caponiers, into which the enemy
tried to make the cartridges penetrate through the narrow slits used
for loopholes. The men who were serving the machine guns or the cannon
of the flanking works would have been bothered by the vapor from the
ethyl bromoacetate, and the assailant would have profited by their
disturbance to get past the obstacle presented by the fortification.
The employment of these devices, not entailing death, did not
contravene the Hague conventions.
The only memorable operations in the course of which these devices were
used before the War was the attack on the Bonnet gang at Choisy-le-roi.
In connection with the suggested use of sulfur dioxide by Lord
Dundonald and the proposed use of poisonous gases in shell, the
following description of a charcoal respirator by Dr. J. Stenhouse,[3]
communicated by Dr. George Wilson in 1854, is of interest.
[Footnote 3: _Trans. Royal Scottish Soc. Arts_, =4=, Appendix O, 198
(1854).]
“Dr. Wilson commenced by stating that, having read with
much interest the account of Dr. Stenhouse’s researches
on the deodorizing and disinfecting properties
of charcoal, and the application of these to the
construction of a new and important kind of respirator,
he had requested the accomplished chemist to send one
of his instruments for exhibition to the society,
which he had kindly done. Two of the instruments were
now on the table, differing, however, so slightly in
construction, that it would be sufficient to explain
the arrangement of one of them. Externally, it had
the appearance of a small fencing-mask of wire gauze,
covering the face from the chin upwards to the bridge
of the nose, but leaving the eyes and forehead free.
It consisted, essentially, of two plates of wire
gauze, separated from each other by a space of about
one-fourth or one-eighth of an inch, so as to form a
small cage filled with small fragments of charcoal. The
frame of the cage was of copper, but the edges were
made of soft lead, and were lined with velvet, so as to
admit of their being made to fit the cheeks tightly and
inclose the mouth and nostrils. By this arrangement, no
air could enter the lungs without passing through the
wire gauze and traversing the charcoal. An aperture is
provided with a screw or sliding valve for the removal
and replenishment of the contents of the cage, which
consist of the siftings or riddlings of the lighter
kinds of wood charcoal. The apparatus is attached to
the face by an elastic band passing over the crown of
the head and strings tying behind, as in the case of
the ordinary respirator. The important agent in this
instrument is the charcoal, which has so remarkable
a power of absorbing and destroying irritating and
otherwise irrespirable and poisonous gases or vapors
that, armed with the respirator, spirits of hartshorn,
sulphuretted hydrogen, hydrosulphuret of ammonia and
chlorine may be breathed through it with impunity,
though but slightly diluted with air. This result,
first obtained by Dr. Stenhouse, has been verified by
those who have repeated the trial, among others by Dr.
Wilson, who has tried the vapors named above on himself
and four of his pupils, who have breathed them with
impunity. The explanation of this remarkable property
of charcoal is two-fold. It has long been known to
possess the power of condensing into its pores gases
and vapors, so that if freshly prepared and exposed to
these, it absorbs and retains them. But it has scarcely
been suspected till recently, when Dr. Stenhouse
pointed out the fact, that if charcoal be allowed
to absorb simultaneously such gases as sulphuretted
hydrogen and air, the oxygen of this absorbed and
condensed air rapidly oxidizes and destroys the
accompanying gas. So marked is this action, that if
dead animals be imbedded in a layer of charcoal a few
inches deep, instead of being prevented from decaying
as it has hitherto been supposed that they would be by
the supposed antiseptic powers of the charcoal, they
are found by Dr. Stenhouse to decay much faster, whilst
at the same time, no offensive effluvia are evolved.
The deodorizing powers of charcoal are thus established
in a way they never have been before; but at the
same time it is shown that the addition of charcoal
to sewage refuse lessens its agricultural value
contemporaneously with the lessening of odor. From
these observations, which have been fully verified, it
appears that by strewing charcoal coarsely powdered to
the extent of a few inches, over church-yards, or by
placing it inside the coffins of the dead, the escape
of noisome and poisonous exhalations may be totally
prevented. The charcoal respirator embodies this
important discovery. It is certain that many of the
miasma, malaria and infectious matters which propagate
disease in the human subjects, enter the body by the
lungs, and impregnating the blood there, are carried
with it throughout the entire body, which they thus
poison. These miasma are either gases and vapors or
bodies which, like fine light dust, are readily carried
through the air; moreover, they are readily destroyed
by oxidizing agents, which convert them into harmless,
or at least non-poisonous substances, such as water,
carbonic acid and nitrogen. There is every reason,
therefore, for believing that charcoal will oxidize
and destroy such miasma as effectually as it does
sulphuretted hydrogen or hydrosulphuret of ammonia, and
thus prevent their reaching and poisoning the blood.
The intention accordingly is that those who are exposed
to noxious vapors, or compelled to breathe infected
atmospheres, shall wear the charcoal respirator,
with a view to arrest and destroy the volatile
poisons contained in these. Some of the non-obvious
applications of the respirator were then referred to:
“1. Certain of the large chemical manufacturers in
London are now supplying their workmen with the
charcoal respirators as a protection against the more
irritating vapors to which they are exposed.
“2. Many deaths have occurred among those employed
to explore the large drains and sewers of London
from exposure to sulphuretted hydrogen, etc. It may
be asserted with confidence that fatal results from
exposure to the drainage gases will cease as soon as
the respirator is brought into use.
“3. In districts such as the Campagna of Rome, where
malaria prevails and to travel during night or to
sleep in which is certainly followed by an attack of
dangerous and often fatal ague, the wearing of the
respirator even for a few hours may be expected to
render the marsh poison harmless.
“4. Those, who as clergymen, physicians or legal
advisers, have to attend the sick-beds of sufferers
from infectious disorders, may, on occasion, avail
themselves of the protection afforded by Dr.
Stenhouse’s instrument during their intercourse with
the sick.
“5. The longing for a short and decisive war has led
to the invention of ‘a suffocating bombshell,’ which
on bursting, spreads far and wide an irrespirable or
poisonous vapor; one of the liquids proposed for the
shell is the strongest ammonia, and against this it
is believed that the charcoal respirator may defend
our soldiers. As likely to serve this end, it is at
present before the Board of Ordnance.
“Dr. Wilson stated, in conclusion, that Dr. Stenhouse
had no interest but a scientific one in the success of
the respirators. He had declined to patent them, and
desired only to apply his remarkable discoveries to the
abatement of disease and death. Charcoal had long been
used in filters to render poisonous water wholesome; it
was now to be employed to filter poisonous air.”
CHAPTER II
MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF GAS WARFARE
The use of toxic gas in the World War dates from April 22, 1915, when
the Germans launched the first cylinder attack, employing chlorine, a
common and well known gas. Judging from the later experience of the
Allies in perfecting this form of attack, it is probable that plans for
this attack had been under way for months before it was launched. The
suggestion that poisonous gases be used in warfare has been laid upon
Prof. Nernst of the University of Berlin (Auld, “Gas and Flame,” page
15), while the actual field operations were said to have been under
the direction of Prof. Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm Physical Chemical
Institute of Berlin. Some writers have felt that the question of
preparation had been a matter of years rather than of months, and refer
to the work on industrial gases as a proof of their statement. The fact
that the gas attack was not more successful, that the results to be
obtained were not more appreciated, and that better preparation against
retaliation had not been made, argues against this idea of a long
period of preparation, except possibly in a very desultory way. That
such was the case is most fortunate for the allied cause, for had the
German high command known the real situation at the close of the first
gas attack, or had that attack been more severe, the outcome of the war
of 1914 would have been very different, and the end very much earlier.
FIRST GAS ATTACK
The first suggestion of a gas attack came to the British Army through
the story of a German deserter. He stated that the German Army was
planning to poison their enemy with a cloud of gas, and that the
cylinders had already been installed in the trenches. No one listened
to the story, because, first of all, the whole procedure seemed so
impossible and also because, in spite of the numerous examples of
German barbarity, the English did not believe the Germans capable of
such a violation of the Hague rules of warfare. The story appeared in
the summary of information from headquarters (“Comic Cuts”) and as Auld
says “was passed for information for what it is worth.” But the story
was true, and on the afternoon of the 22nd of April, all the conditions
being ideal, the beginning of “gas warfare” was launched. Details of
that first gas attack will always be meager, for the simple reason that
the men who could have told about it all lie in Flanders field where
the poppies grow.
The place selected was in the northeast part of the Ypres salient, at
that part of the line where the French and British lines met, running
southward from where the trenches left the canal near Boesinghe. The
French right was held by the —— Regiment of Turcos, while on the
British left were the Canadians. Auld describes the attack as follows:
“Try to imagine the feelings and the condition of
the colored troops as they saw the vast cloud of
greenish-yellow gas spring out of the ground and slowly
move down wind towards them, the vapor clinging to the
earth, seeking out every hole and hollow and filling
the trenches and shell holes as it came. First wonder,
then fear; then, as the first, fringes of the cloud
enveloped them and left them choking and agonized in
the fight for breath—panic. Those who could move broke
and ran, trying, generally in vain, to outstrip the
cloud which followed inexorably after them.”
It is only to be expected that the first feeling connected with
gas warfare was one of horror. That side of it is very thrillingly
described by Rev. O. S. Watkins in the _Methodist Recorder_ (London).
After describing the bombardment of the City of Ypres from April 20th
to 22nd he relates that in the midst of the uproar came the poison gas!
[Illustration: FIG. 1.—French Gas Attack as seen from an Aeroplane.
The French front, second and third line trenches are plainly visible.
The gas is seen issuing over a wide front from the front line and
drifting towards the German lines.]
“Going into the open air for a few moments’ relief from
the stifling atmosphere of the wards, our attention was
attracted by very heavy firing to the north, where the
line was held by the French. Evidently a hot fight—and
eagerly we scanned the country with our field glasses
hoping to glean some knowledge of the progress of
the battle. Then we saw that which almost caused our
hearts to stop beating—figures running wildly and in
confusion over the fields.
“‘The French have broken,’ we exclaimed. We hardly
believed our words.... The story they told we could
not believe; we put it down to their terror-stricken
imaginings—a greenish-gray cloud had swept down upon
them, turning yellow as it traveled over the country,
blasting everything it touched, shriveling up the
vegetation. No human courage could face such a peril.
“Then there staggered into our midst French soldiers,
blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple
color—lips speechless with agony, and behind them, in
the gas-choked trenches, we learned that they had left
hundreds of dead and dying comrades. The impossible was
only too true.
“It was the most fiendish, wicked thing I have ever
seen.”
It must be said here, however, that this was true only because the
French had no protection against the gas. Indeed, it is far from being
the most horrible form of warfare, provided both sides are prepared
defensively and offensively. Medical records show that out of every
100 Americans gassed less than two died, and as far as records of
four years show, very few are permanently injured. Out of every 100
American casualties from all forms of warfare other than gas more than
25 per cent died, while from 2 to 5 per cent more are maimed, blinded
or disfigured for life. Various forms of gas, as will be shown in the
following pages, make life miserable or vision impossible to those
without a mask. Yet they do not kill.
Thus instead of gas warfare being the most horrible, it is the most
humane where both sides are prepared for it, while against savage
or unprepared peoples it can be made so humane that but very few
casualties will result.
The development of methods of defense against gas will be discussed
in a later chapter. It will suffice to say here that, in response to
an appeal from Lord Kitchener, a temporary protection was quickly
furnished the men. This was known as the “Black Veiling” respirator,
and consisted of a cotton pad soaked in ordinary washing soda solution,
and later, in a mixture of washing soda and “hypo,” to which was added
a little glycerine. These furnished a fair degree of protection to the
men against chlorine, the only gas used in the early attacks.
PHOSGENE INTRODUCED
The use of chlorine alone continued until the introduction on December
19, 1915, of a mixture of phosgene with the chlorine. This mixture
offered many advantages over the use of chlorine alone (see Chapter VI).
The Allies were able, through warning of the impending use of phosgene,
to furnish a means of protection against it. It was at this time
that the P and the PH helmets were devised, the cotton filling being
impregnated with sodium phenolate and later with a mixture of sodium
phenolate and hexamethylenetetramine. This helmet was used until the
Standard Box Respirator was developed by the late Lt. Col. Harrison.
ALLIES ADOPT GAS
For a week or two the Allies were very hesitant about adopting gas
warfare. However, when the repeated use of gas by the Germans made
it evident that, in spite of what the Hague had to say about the
matter, gas was to be a part, and as later developments showed, a very
important part of modern warfare, they realized there was no choice on
their part and that they had to retaliate in like manner. This decision
was reached in May of 1915. It was followed by the organization of a
Gas Service and intensive work on the part of chemists, engineers and
physiologists. It was September 25, 1915, however, before the English
were in a position to render a gas attack. From then on the Service
grew in numbers and in importance, whether viewed from the standpoint
of research, production, or field operations.
The Allies of course adopted not only chlorine but phosgene as well,
since both were cheap, easy of preparation and effective. They felt
during the early part of the War that they should adopt a substance
that would kill instantly, and not one that would cause men to suffer
either during the attack or through symptoms which would develop later
in a hospital. For this reason a large amount of experimental work was
carried out on hydrocyanic acid, particularly by the French. Since this
gas has a very low density, it was necessary to mix with it substances
which would tend to keep it close to the ground during the attack.
Various mixtures, all called “vincennite,” were prepared,—chloroform,
arsenic trichloride and stannic chloride being used in varying
proportions with the acid. It was some time before it was definitely
learned that these mixtures were far from being successful, both from
the standpoint of stability and of poisonous properties. While the
French actually used these mixtures in constantly decreasing quantities
on the field for a long time, they were ultimately abandoned, though
not until American chemists had also carried out a large number
of tests. However, following the recommendation of the American
Gas Service in France in December, 1917, no vincennite was ever
manufactured by the United States.
LACHRYMATORS
Almost simultaneously with the introduction of the gas wave attacks, in
which liquefied gas under pressure was liberated from cylinders, came
the use of lachrymatory or tear gases. These, while not very poisonous
in the concentrations used, were very effective in incapacitating men
through the effects produced upon their eyes. The low concentration
required (one part in ten million of some lachrymators is sufficient
to make vision impossible without a mask) makes this form of gas
warfare very economical as well as very effective. Even if a mask
does completely protect against such compounds, their use compels an
army to wear the mask indefinitely, with an expenditure of shell far
short of that required if the much more deadly gases were used. Thus
Fries estimates that one good lachrymatory shell will force wearing
the mask over an area that would require 500 to 1000 phosgene shell
of equal size to produce the same effect. While the number of actual
casualties will be very much lower, the total effect considered from
the standpoint of the expenditure of ammunition and of the objectives
gained, will be just as valuable. So great is the harassing value
of tear and irritant gases that the next war will see them used in
quantities approximating that of the more poisonous gases.
The first lachrymator used was a mixture of the chlorides and bromides
of toluene. Benzyl chloride and bromide are the only valuable
substances in this mixture, the higher halogenated products having
little or no lachrymatory value. Xylyl bromide is also effective.
Chloroacetone and bromoacetone are also well known lachrymators, though
they are expensive to manufacture and are none too stable. Because of
this the French modified their preparation and obtained mixtures to
which they gave the name “martonite.” This is a mixture of 80 per cent
bromoacetone and 20 per cent chloroacetone, and can be made with nearly
complete utilization of the halogen. Methyl ethyl ketone may also be
used, which gives rise to the “homomartonite” of the French. During
the early part of the War, when bromine was so very expensive, the
English developed ethyl iodoacetate. This was used with or without the
addition of alcohol. Later the French developed bromobenzyl cyanide,
C₆H₅CH(Br)CN. This was probably the best lachrymator developed during
the War and put into large scale manufacture, though very little
of it was available on the field of battle before the War ended.
Chloroacetophenone would have played an important part had the War
continued.
DISADVANTAGE OF WAVE ATTACKS
As will be discussed more fully in the chapters on “The Tactics of
Gas,” the wave attacks became relatively less important in 1916
through the use of gas in artillery shell. This was the result of many
factors. Cloud gas attacks, as carried out under the old conditions,
required a long time for the preliminary preparations, entailed a
great deal of labor under the most difficult conditions, and were
dangerous of execution even when weather conditions became suitable.
The difficulties may be summarized as follows:
(1) The heavy gas cylinders used required a great deal of
transportation, and not only took the time of the Infantry but
rendered surprise attacks difficult owing both to the time required
and to the unusual activity behind the lines that became, with the
development of aeroplanes, more and more readily discerned.
(2) Few gases were available for wave attacks—chlorine, phosgene and,
to a less extent, chloropicrin proving to be the only ones successfully
used by either the Allies or the Germans. Hydrogen sulfide, carbon
monoxide and hydrocyanic acid gas were suggested and tried, but were
abandoned for one reason or another.
(3) Gas cloud attacks were wholly dependent upon weather conditions.
Not only were the velocity and direction of the wind highly important
as regards the successful carrying of the wave over the enemy’s line,
but also to prevent danger to the troops making the attack due to a
possible shift of the wind, which would carry the gas back over their
own line.
(4) The use of gas in artillery shell does not require especially
trained troops inasmuch as gas shell are fired in the same manner as
ordinary shell, and by the same gun crews. Moreover, since artillery
gas shell are used generally only for ranges of a mile or more, the
direction and velocity of the wind are of minor importance. Another
factor which adds to the advantage of artillery shell in certain cases
is the ability to land high concentrations of gas suddenly upon a
distant target through employing a large number of the largest caliber
guns available for firing gas.
Notwithstanding the above named disadvantages of wave attacks it was
felt by the Americans from the beginning that successful gas cloud
attacks were so fruitful in producing casualties and were such a strain
upon those opposed to it, that they would continue. Furthermore, since
artillery shell contain about 10 per cent gas, while gas cylinders may
contain 50 per cent, or even more of the total weight of the cylinder,
the efficiency of a cloud gas attack for at least the first mile of the
enemy’s territory is far greater than that of the artillery gas attack.
It was accordingly felt that the only thing necessary to make cloud gas
attacks highly useful and of frequent occurrence in the future was the
development of mobile methods—methods whereby the gas attack could be
launched on the surface of the ground and at short notice. For these
reasons gas wave attacks may be expected to continue and to eventually
reach a place of very decided importance in Chemical Warfare.
GAS SHELL
The firing of gas in artillery shell and in bombs has another great
advantage over the wave attack just mentioned. There is a very great
latitude in the choice of those gases which have a high boiling point
or which, at ordinary temperatures, are solids. Mustard gas is an
example of a liquid with a high boiling point, and diphenylchloroarsine
an example of a gas that is ordinarily solid. For the above reason the
term “gas warfare” was almost a misnomer at the close of the War, and
today is true only in the sense that all the substances used are in a
gaseous or finely divided condition immediately after the shell explode
or at least when they reach the enemy.
PROJECTOR ATTACKS
Still another method of attack, developed by the British and first
used by them in July, 1917, was the projector (invented by Captain
Livens). This was used very successfully up to the close of the War,
and though the German attempted to duplicate it, his results were never
as effective. The projector consists of a steel tube of uniform cross
section, with an internal diameter of about 8 inches. By using nickel
steel the weight may be decreased until it is a one man load. The
projector was set against a pressed steel base plate (about 16 inches
in diameter) placed in a very shallow trench.
[Illustration: FIG. 2.—Livens’ Projector.
The Type shown is an 18 cm. German Gas Projector, captured during the
2d Battle of the Marne.]
Until about the close of the war projectors were installed by digging
a triangular trench deep enough to bring the muzzles of the projectors
nearly level with the surface of the ground. They were then protected
by sand bags or canvas covers, or camouflaged with wire netting to
which colored bits of cloth were tied to simulate leaves and shadows.
The projectors were fired by connecting them in series with ordinary
blasting machines operated by hand from a convenient point in the
rear. The digging in of the projectors in No Man’s Land or very close
to it was a dangerous and laborious undertaking. The Americans early
conceived the idea that projectors could be fired just as accurately
by digging a shallow trench just deep enough to form a support for
the base plate, and then supporting the outer ends of the projector
on crossed sticks or a light frame work of boards. This idea proved
entirely practical except for one condition. It was found necessary to
fire with a single battery all the projectors near enough together to
be disturbed by the blast from any portion of them. Inasmuch as most of
the blasting machines used for firing had a capacity of only 20 to 30
projectors, it was necessary to so greatly scatter a large projector
attack that the method was very little used. However, investigations
were well under way at the close of the War to develop portable
firing batteries that would enable the discharge of at least 100 and
preferably 500 projectors at one time. By this arrangement a projector
attack could be prepared and launched in two to four hours, depending
upon the number of men available. This enabled the attack to be decided
upon in the evening (if the weather conditions were right), and to have
the attack launched before morning, thereby making it impossible for
aeroplane observers, armed with cameras, to discover the preparation
for the projector attack. Since the bombs used in the projector may
carry as high as 30 pounds of gas (usually phosgene), some idea of the
amount of destruction may be gained when it is known that the British
fired nearly 2500 at one time into Lens.
STOKES’ MORTAR
Another British invention is the Stokes’ gun or trench mortar. The
range of this gun is about 800 to 1000 yards. It is therefore effective
only where the front lines are relatively close together. The shell
consists of a case containing the high explosive, smoke material or
gas, fitted to a base filled with a high charge of propelling powder.
The shell is simply dropped into the gun. At the bottom of the gun
there is a projection or stud that strikes the primer, setting off
the small charge and expelling the projectile. In order to obtain any
considerable concentration of gas in a particular locality, it is
necessary to fire the Stokes’ continuously (15 shots per minute being
possible under battle conditions) for two to five minutes since the
bomb contains only seven pounds of gas.
SUPERPALITE
It is believed that the first gas shell contained lachrymators or tear
gases. Although the use of these shell continued up to and even after
the introduction of mustard gas, they gradually fell off in number—the
true poison gas shell taking their place. Towards the end of 1915 Auld
states that the Germans were using chloromethyl chloroformate (palite)
in shell. In 1916, during the battle of the Somme, palite was replaced
by superpalite (trichloromethyl chloroformate, or diphosgene) which
is more toxic than palite, and about as toxic as phosgene. It has the
advantage over phosgene of being much more persistent. In spite of the
fact that American chemists were not able to manufacture superpalite
on a large scale, or at least so successfully that it would compete in
price with other war gases, the Germans used large quantities of it,
alone and mixed with chloropicrin, in shell of every caliber up to and
including the 15 cm. Howitzer.
[Illustration: FIG. 3.—Stokes’ Mortar.]
CHLOROPICRIN
The next gas to be introduced was chloropicrin, trichloronitromethane
or “vomiting gas.” It has been stated that a mixture of chloropicrin
(25 per cent) and chlorine (75 per cent) has been used in cloud
attacks, but the high boiling point of chloropicrin (112° C.) makes its
considerable use for this purpose very unlikely. The gas is moderately
toxic and somewhat lachrymatory, but it was mainly used because of
its peculiar property of causing vomiting when inhaled. Its value was
further increased at first because it was particularly difficult to
prepare a charcoal which would absorb it. Its peculiar properties are
apt to cause it to be used for a long time.
SNEEZING GAS
During the summer of 1917 two new and very important gases were
introduced, and, as before, by the Germans. One of these was
diphenylchloroarsine, “sneezing gas” or “Blue Cross.” This is a white
solid which was placed in a bottle and embedded in TNT in the shell.
Upon explosion of the shell the solid was atomized into very fine
particles. Since the ordinary mask does not remove smoke or mists,
the sneezing gas penetrates the mask and causes violent sneezing.
The purpose, of course, is to compel the removal of the mask in an
atmosphere of lethal gas. (The firing regulations prescribed its use
with phosgene or other lethal shell.) The latest type masks protect
against this dust, but as it is extraordinarily powerful, its use will
continue.
MUSTARD GAS
The second gas was dichloroethyl sulfide, mustard gas, Yellow Cross or
Yperite. Mustard gas, as it is commonly designated, is probably the
most important single poisonous substance used in gas warfare. It was
first used by the Germans at Ypres, July 12, 1917. The amount of this
gas used is illustrated by the fact that at Nieuport more than 50,000
shell were fired in one night, some of which contained nearly three
gallons of the liquid.
Mustard gas is a high boiling and very persistent material, which is
characterized by its vesicant (skin blistering) action. Men who come in
contact with it, either in the form of fine splashes of the liquid or
in the form of vapor, suffer severe blistering of the skin. The burns
appear from four to twelve hours after exposure and heal very slowly.
Ordinary clothing is no protection against either the vapor or the
liquid. Other effects will be considered in Chapter IX.
Since then there has been no important advance so far as new gases
are concerned. Various arsenic derivatives were prepared in the
laboratory and tested on a small scale. The Germans did actually
introduce ethyldichloroarsine and the Americans were considering
methyldichloroarsine. Attempts were made to improve upon mustard gas
but they were not successful.
LEWISITE
It is rather a peculiar fact that so few new chemical compounds were
used as war gases. Practically all the substances were well known
to the organic chemist long before the World War. One of the most
interesting and valuable of the compounds which would have found
extensive use had the War continued, is an arsenic compound called
Lewisite from its discoverer, Capt. W. Lee Lewis, of Northwestern
University. The chemistry of this compound is discussed in Chapter X.
Because of the early recognized value of this compound, very careful
secrecy was maintained as to all details of the method of preparation
and its properties. As a result, strange stories were circulated about
its deadly powers. Characteristic of these was the story that appeared
in the _New York Times_ early in 1919. Now that the English have
published the chemical and pharmacological properties, we can say that,
although Lewisite was never proven on the battle field, laboratory
tests indicate that we have here a very powerful agent. Not only is it
a vesicant of about the same order of mustard gas, but the arsenical
penetrates the skin of an animal, and three drops, placed on the
abdomen of a mouse, are sufficient to kill within two to three hours.
It is also a powerful respiratory irritant and causes violent sneezing.
Its possible use in aeroplane bombs has led General Fries to apply the
term “The Dew of Death” to its use in this way.
CAMOUFLAGE GASES
Considerable effort was spent on the question of camouflage gases. This
involved two lines of research:
(1) To prevent the recognition of a gas when actually present on the
field, by masking its odor.
TABLE I
CHEMICAL WARFARE GASES
----------------------+-----------+--------------+------------------
Chemical |Belligerent| Effect | Means of
| | | Projection
----------------------+-----------+--------------+------------------
Acrolein | French |Lachrymatory |Hand grenades
(allylaldehyde) | |Lethal |
Arsenic chloride | |(In mixtures. |
| | See below) |
Benzyl iodide | French |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
Benzyl chloride | French |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
| | |
Bromoacetone | French |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
| |Lethal |
Bromobenzylcyanide | French |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
Bromomethylethylketone| German |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
| |Lethal |Artillery shell
| | |
Benzyl bromide | German |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
| French | |
Chlorine | German |Lethal |Cylinders
| British | | (cloud gas)
| French | |
| American | |
Chlorosulfonic acid | German |Irritant |Hand grenades,
| | | light minenwerfer
Chloroacetone | French |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
Chlorobenzene | German |Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
(as solvent) | | |
Chloropicrin | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
| French |Lachrymatory |Trench mortar
| German | | bombs
| American | |Projectors
Cyanogen bromide | Austrian | Lethal |Artillery shell
Dichloromethylether | German | Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
(as solvent) | | |
Diphenylchloroarsine | German | Sternutatory |Artillery shell
| | Lethal |
Dichloroethylsulfide | German | Vesicant |Artillery shell
| French | Lethal |
| British | Irritant |
| American | |
| | |
Ethyldichloroarsine | German | Lethal |Artillery shell
Ethyliodoacetate | British | Lachrymatory |Artillery shell,
| | |4-in. Stokes’
| | | mortars,
| | |hand grenades
Hydrocyanic acid | French | (In mixtures.|
| | See below) |
Methylchlorosulfonate | German | Irritant |Minenwerfer
Monochloromethyl- | German | Lethal |Artillery shell
chloroformate | French | Lachrymatory |
| | |
Phosgene | British | Lethal |Projectors,
| French | | trench mortars,
| German | | artillery shell,
| American | | cylinders
Phenylcarbylamine | German | Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
chloride | | Irritant |
Trichlormethyl | German | Lethal |Artillery shell
chloroformate | | |
Stannic chloride | British | Irritant |Hand grenades
| French | Cloud forming|Artillery
| American | |Projectors
| | | 4-in. Stokes’
| | | mortar bombs
Sulfuric anhydride | German | Irritant |Hand grenades,
| | | minenwerfer,
| | | artillery shell
Xylyl bromide | German | Lachrymatory |Artillery shell
----------------------+-----------+--------------+------------------
TABLE I--_Continued_
---------------------------+-----------+------------+---------------
Chemical |Belligerent| Effect |Means of
| | | Projection
---------------------------+-----------+------------+---------------
| | |
MIXTURES[4] | | |
Bromoacetone (80%) and | | |
Chloroacetone (20%) | French |Lachrymatory|Artillery shell
| |Lethal |
| | |
Chlorine (50%) and | British |Lethal |Cylinders
Phosgene (50%) | German | |
| | |
Chlorine (70%) and | British |Lethal |Cylinders
Chloropicrin (30%) | |Lachrymatory|
| | |
Chloropicrin (65%) and | British |Lethal |Cylinders
Hydrogen sulfide (35%) | |Lachrymatory|
| | |
Chloropicrin (80%) and | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
Stannic chloride (20%) | French |Lachrymatory|Trench mortar
| | | bombs
| American |Irritant |Projectors
Chloropicrin (75%) and | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
Phosgene (25%) | |Lachrymatory|Trench mortar
| | | bombs,
| | | projectors
Dichloroethyl sulfide (80%)| German |Vesicant |Artillery shell
and | French |Lethal |
Chlorobenzene (20%) | British | |
| American | |
Ethyl carbazol (50%) and | German |Sternutatory|Artillery shell
Diphenylcyanoarsine (50%) | |Lethal |
| | |
Ethyldichloroarsine (80%) | German |Lethal |Artillery shell
and | |Lachrymatory|
Dichloromethylether (20%) | | |
| | |
Ethyliodoacetate (75%) and | British |Lachrymatory|Artillery shell,
Alcohol (25%) | | | 4-in. Stokes’
| | | mortars,
| | | hand grenades
| | |
Hydrocyanic acid (55%) | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
Chloroform (25%) and | | |
Arsenious chloride (20%) | | |
| | |
Hydrocyanic acid (50%), | French |Lethal |Artillery shell
Arsenious chloride (30%), | | |
Stannic chloride (15%) and | | |
Chloroform (5%) | | |
| | |
Phosgene (50%) and | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
Arsenious chloride (50%) | | |
| | |
Dichloroethyl sulfide (80%)| German |Vesicant |Artillery shell
and | French |Lethal |
Carbon tetrachloride (20%) | British | |
| American | |
| | |
Phosgene (60%) and | British |Lethal |Artillery shell
Stannic chloride (40%) | French |Irritant |
| | |
Methyl sulfate (75%) and | French |Lachrymatory|Artillery shell
Chloromethyl sulfate (25%) | |Irritant |
---------------------------+-----------+------------+---------------
[Footnote 4: In the mixtures the percentages indicate proportions by
weight.]
(2) To simulate the presence of a toxic gas. This may be done either by
using a substance whose odor in the field strongly suggests that of the
gas in question, or by so thoroughly associating a totally different
odor with a particular “gas” in normal use that, when used alone, it
still seems to imply the presence of that gas. This use of imitation
gas would thus be of service in economizing the use of actual “gas” or
in the preparation of surprise attacks.
While there was some success with this kind of “gas,” very few such
attacks were really carried out, and these were in connection with
projector attacks.
GASES USED
Table I gives a list of all the gases used by the various armies, the
nation which used them, the effect produced and the means of projection
used.
Table II gives the properties of the more important war cases (compiled
by Major R. E. Wilson, C. W. S.).
The gases used by the Germans may also be classified by the names
of the shell in which they were used. Table III gives such a
classification.
MARKINGS FOR AMERICAN SHELL
In selecting markings for American chemical shell, red bands were used
to denote persistency, white bands to denote non-persistency and lethal
properties, yellow bands to denote smoke, and purple bands to denote
incendiary action. The number of bands indicates the relative strength
of the property indicated; thus, three red bands denote a gas more
persistent than one red band.
The following shell markings were actually used:
1 White Diphenylchloroarsine
2 White Phosgene
1 White, 1 red Chloropicrin
1 White, 1 red, 1 white 75% Chloropicrin, 25% Phosgene
1 White, 1 red, 1 yellow 80% Chloropicrin, 20% Stannic Chloride
1 Red Bromoacetone
2 Red Bromobenzylcyanide
3 Red Mustard Gas
1 Yellow White Phosphorus
2 Yellow Titanium Tetrachloride
TABLE II
PHYSICAL CONSTANTS OF IMPORTANT WAR GASES
----------------------+---------------+-----------+----------
| | | Liquid
| | | Density
Name of Gas | Formula | Molecular | at 20° C.
| | Weight | under
| | | Own
| | | Pressure
----------------------+---------------+-----------+----------
Bromoacetone | C₃H₅BrO | 136.98 | 1.7(?)
Carbon monoxide | CO | 28.00 | (Gas)
Cyanogen bromide | BrCN | 106.02 | 2.01
Cyanogen chloride | ClCN | 61.56 | 1.186
Chlorine | Cl₂ | 70.92 | 1.408
Chloropicrin | Cl₃C(NO₂) | 164.39 | 1.654
Dichloroethyl sulfide | (CH₃CHCl₂)S | 169.06 | 1.274
Diphenylchloroarsine | (C₆H₅)₂AsCl | 264.56 | 1.422
Hydrocyanic acid | HCN | 27.11 | .697
Phenyldichloroarsine | C₆H₅AsCl₂ | 210.96 | 1.640
Phosgene | COCl₂ | 98.92 | 1.38
Stannic chloride | SnCl₄ | 260.54 | 2.226
Superpalite | CCl₃COOCl | 197.85 | 1.65
Xylyl bromide |( CH₃)C₆H₄CH₂Br| 185.03 | 1.381
----------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------
----------------------+---------+---------+----------
| | |
| | | Vapor
Name of Gas | Melting | Boiling | Pressure
| point, | point, | at 20° C.
| °C. | °C. | (mm. Hg)
| | |
----------------------+---------+---------+----------
Bromoacetone | - 54 | 126 | 9(?)
Carbon monoxide | -207 | -190 | (Gas)
Cyanogen bromide | 52 | 61.3 | 89
Cyanogen chloride | - 6 | 15 | 1002
Chlorine | -101.5 | 33.6 | 5126
Chloropicrin | - 69.2 | 112 | 18.9
Dichloroethyl sulfide | 12.5 | 216 | .06
Diphenylchloroarsine | 44 | 333 | .0025
Hydrocyanic acid | - 14 | 26.1 | 603
Phenyldichloroarsine | ... | 253 | .022
Phosgene | ... | 8.2 | 1215
Stannic chloride | - 33 | 114 | 18.58
Superpalite | ... | 128 | 10.3
Xylyl bromide | - 2 | 214.5 | ...
----------------------+---------+---------+----------
TABLE III
GERMAN SHELL
-----------------------+-----------------------------+------------
Name of Shell | Shell Filling | Nature of
| | Effect
-----------------------+-----------------------------+------------
B-shell [K₁ shell | Bromoketone (Bromo- | Lachrymator
(White B or BM)] | methylethyl ketone) |
| |
Blue Cross | (_a_) Diphenylchloroarsine | Sternutator
| (_b_) Diphenylcyanoarsine | Sternutator
| (_c_) Diphenylchloroarsine, |
| Ethyl carbazol |
| |
C-shell (Green Cross) | Superpalite | Asphyxiant
(White C) | |
| |
D-shell (White D) | Phosgene | Lethal
| |
Green Cross | (_a_) Superpalite | Asphyxiant
| (_b_) Phenylcarbylamine |
| chloride |
| |
Green Cross 1 | Superpalite 65%, | Asphyxiant
| Chloropicrin 35% |
| |
Green Cross 2 | Superpalite, |
| Phosgene, |
| Diphenylchloroarsine | Asphyxiant
| |
Green Cross 3 | Ethyldichloroarsine, | Asphyxiant
(Yellow Cross 1) | Methyldibromoarsine, |
| Dichloromethyl ether |
| |
K-shell (Yellow) | Chloromethyl | Lachrymator
| chloroformate (Palite) | Asphyxiant
| |
T-shell | Xylyl bromide, | Lachrymator
(Black or green T) | Bromo ketone |
| |
Yellow Cross | Mustard gas, | Vesicant
| Diluent (CCl₄, C₆H₅Cl, |
| C₆H₅NO₂) |
| |
Yellow Cross 1 | See Green Cross 3 |
-----------------------+-----------------------------+------------
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
Modern chemical warfare dates from April 22, 1915. Really, however, it
may be said to have started somewhat earlier, for Germany undoubtedly
had spent several months in perfecting a successful gas cylinder and a
method of attack. The Allies, surprised by such a method of warfare,
were forced to develop, under pressure, a method of defense, and then,
when it was finally decided to retaliate, a method of gas warfare.
“Offensive organizations were enrolled in the Engineer Corps of the two
armies and trained for the purpose of using poisonous gases; the first
operation of this kind was carried out by the British at the battle of
Loos in September, 1915.
“Shortly after this the British Army in the field amalgamated all the
offensive, defensive, advisory and supply activities connected with
gas warfare and formed a ‘Gas Service’ with a Brigadier General as
Director. This step was taken almost as a matter of necessity, and
because of the continually increasing importance of the use of gas in
the war (Auld).”
At once the accumulation of valuable information and experience was
started. Later this was very willingly and freely placed at the
disposal of American workers. Too much cannot be said about the hearty
co-operation of England and France. Without it and the later exchange
of information on all matters regarding gas warfare, the progress of
gas research in all the allied countries would have been very much
retarded.
While many branches of the American Army were engaged in following the
progress of the war during 1915-1916, the growing importance of gas
warfare was far from being appreciated. When the United States declared
war on Germany April 6, 1917, there were a few scattered observations
on gas warfare in various offices of the different branches, but there
was no attempt at an organized survey of the field, while absolutely no
effort had been made by the War Department to inaugurate research in
a field that later had 2,000 men alone in pure research work. Equally
important was the fact that no branch of the Service had any idea of
the practical methods of gas warfare.
The only man who seemed to have the vision and the courage of his
convictions was Van H. Manning, Director of the Bureau of Mines. Since
the establishment of the Bureau in 1908 it had maintained a staff
of investigators studying poisonous and explosive gases in mines,
the use of self-contained breathing apparatus for exploring mines
filled with noxious gases, the treatment of men overcome by gas, and
similar problems. At a conference of the Director of the Bureau with
his Division Chiefs, on February 7, 1917, the matter of national
preparedness was discussed, and especially the manner in which the
Bureau could be of most immediate assistance with its personnel and
equipment. On February 8, the Director wrote C. D. Walcott, Chairman
of the Military Committee of the National Research Council, pointing
out that the Bureau of Mines could immediately assist the Navy and
the Army in developing, for naval or military use, special oxygen
breathing apparatus similar to that used in mining. He also stated that
the Bureau could be of aid in testing types of gas masks used on the
fighting lines, and had available testing galleries at the Pittsburgh
experiment station and an experienced staff. Dr. Walcott replied on
February 12 that he was bringing the matter to the attention of the
Military Committee.
A meeting was arranged between the Bureau and the War College, the
latter organization being represented by Brigadier General Kuhn
and Major L. P. Williamson. At this conference the War Department
enthusiastically accepted the offer of the Bureau of Mines and agreed
to support the work in every way possible.
The supervision of the research on gases was offered to Dr. G. A.
Burrell, for a number of years in charge of the chemical work done by
the Bureau in connection with the investigation of mine gases and
natural gas. He accepted the offer on April 7, 1917. The smoothness
with which the work progressed under his direction and the importance
of the results obtained were the result of Colonel Burrell’s great
tact, his knowledge of every branch of research under investigation and
his imagination and general broad-mindedness.
Once, however, that the importance of gas warfare had been brought to
the attention of the chemists of the country, the response was very
eager and soon many of the best men of the university and industrial
plants were associated with Burrell in all the phases of gas research.
The staff grew very rapidly and laboratories were started at various
points in the East and Middle West.
It was immediately evident that there should be a central laboratory
in Washington to co-ordinate the various activities and also to
considerably enlarge those activities under the joint direction of
the Army, the Navy and the Bureau of Mines. Fortunately a site was
available for such a laboratory at the American University, the use
of the buildings and grounds having been tendered President Wilson on
April 30, 1917. Thus originated the American University Experiment
Station, later to become the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare
Service.
Meanwhile other organizations were getting under way. The procurement
of toxic gases and the filling of shell was assigned to the Trench
Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department. In June, 1917, General
Crozier, then Chief of the Ordnance Department, approved the general
proposition of building a suitable plant for filling shell with toxic
gas. In November, 1917, it was decided to establish such a plant at
Gunpowder Neck, Maryland. Owing to the inability of the chemical
manufacturers to supply the necessary toxic gases, it was further
decided, in December, 1917, to erect at the same place such chemical
plants as would be necessary to supply these gases. In January, 1918,
the name was changed to Edgewood Arsenal, and the project was made a
separate Bureau of the Ordnance Department, Col. William H. Walker, of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, being soon afterwards put in
command.
While, during the latter part of the War, gas shell were handled
by the regular artillery, special troops were needed for cylinder
attacks, Stokes’ mortars, Livens’ projectors and for other forms of gas
warfare. General Pershing early cabled, asking for the organization and
training of such troops, and recommended that they be placed, as in the
English Army, under the jurisdiction of the Engineer Corps. On August
15, 1917, the General Staff authorized one regiment of Gas and Flame
troops, which was designated the “30th Engineers,” and was commanded by
Major (later Colonel) E. J. Atkisson. This later became the First Gas
Regiment, of the Chemical Warfare Service.
About this time (September, 1917) the need of gas training was
recognized by the organization of a Field Training Section, under the
direction of the Sanitary Corps, Medical Department. Later it was
recognized that neither the Training Section nor the Divisional Gas
Officers should be under the Medical Department, and, in January, 1918,
the organization was transferred to the Engineer Corps.
All of these, with the exception of the Gas and Flame regiment, were
for service on this side. The need for an Overseas force was recognized
and definitely stated in a letter, dated August 4, 1917. On September
3, 1917, an order was issued establishing the Gas Service, under
the command of Lt. Col. (later Brigadier General) A. A. Fries, as a
separate Department of the A. E. F. in France. In spite of a cable on
September 26th, in which General Pershing had said
“Send at once chemical laboratory, complete
equipment and personnel, including physiological and
pathological sections, for extensive investigation of
gases and powders....”
it was not until the first of January, 1918, that Colonel R. F. Bacon
of the Mellon Institute sailed for France with about fifty men and a
complete laboratory equipment.
Meantime a Chemical Service Section had been organized in the United
States. This holds the distinction of being the first recognition of
chemistry as a separate branch of the military service in any country
or any war. This was authorized October 16, 1917, and was to consist
of an officer of the Engineers, not above the rank of colonel, who was
to be Director of Gas Service, with assistants, not above the rank of
lieutenant colonel from the Ordnance Department, Medical Department
and Chemical Service Section. The Section itself was to consist of 47
commissioned and 95 non-commissioned officers and privates. Colonel C.
L. Potter, Corps of Engineers, was appointed Director and Professor
W. H. Walker was commissioned Lieutenant Colonel and made Assistant
Director of the Gas Service and Chief of the Chemical Service Section.
This was increased on Feb. 15, 1918 to 227 commissioned and 625
enlisted men, and on May 6, 1918 to 393 commissioned and 920 enlisted
men. Meanwhile Lt. Col. Walker had been transferred to the Ordnance and
Lt. Col. Bogert had been appointed in his place.
At this time practically every branch of the Army had some connection
with Gas Warfare. The Medical Corps directed the Gas Defense
production. Offense production was in the hands of the Ordnance
Department. Alarm devices, etc., were made by the Signal Corps. The
Engineers contributed their 30th Regiment (Gas and Flame) and the Field
Training Section. The Research Section was still in charge of the
Bureau of Mines, in spite of repeated attempts to militarize it. And
in addition, the Chemical Service Section had been formed primarily
to deal with overseas work. While the Director of the Gas Service was
expected to co-ordinate all these activities, he was given no authority
to control policy, research or production.
In order to improve these conditions Major General Wm. L. Sibert, a
distinguished Engineer Officer who built the Gatun Locks and Dam of the
Panama Canal and who had commanded the First Division in France, was
appointed Director of the Chemical Warfare Service on May 11, 1918.
Under his direction the Chemical Warfare Service was organized with the
following Divisions:
Overseas Brigadier General Amos A. Fries
Research Colonel G. A. Burrell
Development Colonel F. M. Dorsey
Gas Defense Production Colonel Bradley Dewey
Gas Offense Production Colonel Wm. H. Walker
Medical Colonel W. J. Lyster
Proving Lt. Col. W. S. Bacon
Administration Brigadier General H. C. Newcomer
Gas and Flame Colonel E. J. Atkisson
The final personnel authorized, though never reached owing to the
signing of the Armistice, was 4,066 commissioned officers and 44,615
enlisted men; this was including three gas regiments of eighteen
companies each.
General Sibert brought with him not only an extended experience in
organizing and conducting big business, but a strong sympathy for the
work and an appreciation of the problem that the American Army was
facing in France. He very quickly welded the great organization of
the Chemical Warfare Service into a whole, and saw to it that each
department not only carried on its own duties but co-operated with
the others in carrying out the larger program, which, had the war
continued, would have beaten the German at his own game.
More detailed accounts will now be given of the various Divisions of
the Chemical Warfare Service.
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION
The Administration Division was the result of the development which has
been sketched in the preceding pages. It is not necessary to review
that, but the organization as of October 19, 1918 will be given:
Director Major General Wm. L. Sibert
Staff:
Medical Officer Colonel W. J. Lyster
Ordnance Officer Lt. Col. C. B. Thummel
British Military Mission Major J. H. Brightman
Assistant Director Colonel H. C. Newcomer
Office Administration Major W. W. Parker
Relations Section Colonel M. T. Bogert
Personnel Section Major F. E. Breithut
Contracts and Patents Section Captain W. K. Jackson
Finance Section Major C. C. Coombs
Requirements and Progress Section Capt. S. M. Cadwell
Confidential Information Section Major S. P. Mullikin
Transportation Section Captain H. B. Sharkey
Training Section Lt. Col. G. N. Lewis
Procurement Section Lt. Col. W. J. Noonan
The administrative offices were located in the Medical Department
Building. The function of most of the sections is indicated by their
names.
The Industrial Relations Section was created to care for the interests
of the industrial plants which were considered as essential war
industries. Through its activity many vitally important industries
were enabled to retain, on deferred classification or on indefinite
furlough, those skilled chemists without which they could not have
maintained a maximum output of war munitions.
In the same way the University Relations Section cared for the
educational and research institutions. In this way our recruiting
stations for chemists were kept in as active operation as war
conditions permitted.
Another important achievement of the Administration Section was to
secure the order from The Adjutant General, dated May 28, 1918, that
read:
“Owing to the needs of the military service for a
great many men trained in chemistry, it is considered
most important that all enlisted men who are graduate
chemists should be assigned to duty where their
special knowledge and training can be fully utilized.
* * * * *
“Enlisted men who are graduate chemists will not
be sent overseas unless they are to be employed on
chemical duties....”
While this undoubtedly created a great deal of feeling among the men
who naturally were anxious to see actual fighting in France, it was
very important that this order be carried out in order to conserve our
chemical strength. The following clipping from the September, 1918,
issue of _The Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_ shows
the result of this order.
“CHEMISTS IN CAMP
“As the result of the letter from The Adjutant General
of the Army, dated May 28, 1918, 1,749 chemists have
been reported on. Of these the report of action to
August 1, 1918, shows that 281 were ordered to remain
with their military organization because they were
already performing chemical duties, 34 were requested
to remain with their military organization because they
were more useful in the military work which they were
doing, 12 were furloughed back to industry, 165 were
not chemists in the true sense of the word and were,
therefore, ordered back to the line, and 1,294 now
placed in actual chemical work. There were being held
for further investigation of their qualifications on
August 1, 1918, 432 men. The remaining 23 men were
unavailable for transfer, because they had already
received their overseas orders.
“The 1,294 men, who would otherwise be serving in a
purely military capacity and whose chemical training is
now being utilized in chemical work, have, therefore,
been saved from waste.
“Each case has been considered individually, the man’s
qualifications and experience have been studied with
care, the needs of the Government plants and bureaus
have been considered with equal care, and each man has
been assigned to the position for which his training
and qualifications seem to fit him best.
“Undoubtedly, there have been some cases in which
square pegs have been fitted into round holes, but, on
the whole, it is felt that the adjustments have been as
well as could be expected under the circumstances.”
RESEARCH DIVISION
The American University Experiment Station, established by the Bureau
of Mines in April, 1917, became July 1, 1918 the Research Division
of the Chemical Warfare Service. For the first five months work was
carried out in various laboratories, scattered over the country. In
September, 1917, the buildings of the American University became
available; a little later portions of the new chemical laboratory
of the Catholic University, Washington, were taken over. Branch
laboratories were established in many of the laboratories of the
Universities and industrial plants, of which Johns Hopkins, Princeton,
Yale, Ohio State, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard,
Michigan, Columbia, Cornell, Wisconsin, Clark, Bryn Mawr, Nela Park and
the National Carbon Company were active all through the war.
At the time of the signing of the armistice the organization of the
Research Division was as follows:
Col. G. A. Burrell Chief of Research Division
Dr. W. K. Lewis In Charge of Defense Problems
Dr. E. P. Kohler[5] In Charge of Offense Problems
Dr. Reid Hunt Advisor on Pharmacological Problems
Lt. Col. W. D. Bancroft In Charge of Editorial Work and Catalytic
Research
Lt. Col. A. B. Lamb[6] In Charge of Defense Chemical Research
Dr. L. W. Jones[7] In Charge of Offense Chemical Research
Major A. C. Fieldner In Charge of Gas Mask Research
Major G. A. Richter In Charge of Pyrotechnic Research
Capt. E. K. Marshall[8] In Charge of Pharmacological Research
Dr. A. S. Loevenhart[9] In Charge of Toxicological Research
Major R. C. Tolman In Charge of Dispersoid Research
Major W. S. Rowland[10] In Charge of Small Scale Manufacture
Major B. B. Fogler[11] In Charge of Mechanical Research and
Development
Captain G. A. Rankin In Charge of Explosive Research
Major Richmond Levering In Charge of Administration Section
[Footnote 5: Succeeded Dr. John Johnson who went to the National
Research Council.]
[Footnote 6: At first Lt. Col. J. F. Norris was in charge of all
chemical research. About December, 1917, it was divided into Offense
and Defense, and Lt. Col. Lamb was placed in charge of Defense. When
Col. Norris went to England as Liaison Officer, Dr. Jones took his
place.]
[Footnote 7: At first Lt. Col. J. F. Norris was in charge of all
chemical research. About December, 1917, it was divided into Offense
and Defense, and Lt. Col. Lamb was placed in charge of Defense. When
Col. Norris went to England as Liaison Officer, Dr. Jones took his
place.]
[Footnote 8: At first Lt. Col. J. F. Norris was in charge of all
chemical research. About December, 1917, it was divided into Offense
and Defense, and Lt. Col. Lamb was placed in charge of Defense. When
Col. Norris went to England as Liaison Officer, Dr. Jones took his
place.]
[Footnote 9: In the early organization of the Bureau of Mines, Dr.
Yandall Henderson was in charge of the Medical Sciences. Associated
with him were Dr. F. P. Underhill, in charge of Therapeutic Research;
Major M. C. Winternitz, in c of Pathological Research and Captain
E. K. Marshall in charge of Pharmacological Research. About May 1,
1918, Pharmacological Research became so extensive that the Section
was made into two, with Marshall and Loevenhart in charge, while Dr.
Hunt was appointed special adviser on pharmacological problems. When
the transfer to the War Department was made, Henderson, Underhill,
Winternitz and Marshall were transferred to the Medical Division.]
[Footnote 10: Lt. Col. McPherson was formerly in charge, and was later
transferred to Ordnance.]
[Footnote 11: This Section was originally under H. H. Clark. Later
it was split into two, with Clark and Fogler in charge, and finally
consolidated under Fogler.] The chief functions of the Research
Division were:
1. To prepare and test compounds which might be of value in gas
warfare, determining the properties of these substances and the
conditions under which they might be effective in warfare.
2. To develop satisfactory methods of making such compounds as seemed
promising (Small Scale).
3. To develop the best methods of utilizing these compounds.
4. To develop materials which should absorb or destroy war gases,
studying their properties and determining the conditions under which
they might be effective.
5. To develop satisfactory methods of making such absorbents as might
seem promising.
6. To develop masks, canisters, protective clothing, etc.
7. To develop incendiaries, smokes, signals, etc., and the best methods
of using the same.
[Illustration: FIG. 4.—American University Experiment Station, showing
Small Scale Plants.]
8. To co-operate with the manufacturing divisions in regard to
difficulties arising during the operations of manufacturing war gases,
absorbents, etc.
9. To co-operate with other branches of the Government, civil and
military, in regard to war problems.
10. To collect and make available to the Director of the Chemical
Warfare Service all information in regard to the chemistry of gas
warfare.
The relation of the various sections may best be shown by outlining the
general procedure used when a new toxic substance was developed.
The substance in question may have been used by the Germans or the
Allies; it may have been suggested by someone outside the station; or
the staff may have thought of it from a search of the literature, from
analogy or from pure inspiration. The Offense Research Section made the
substance. If it was a solid it was sent to the Dispersoid Section,
where methods of dispersing it were worked out. When this had been
done, or, at once, if the compound was a liquid or vapor, it was sent
to the Toxicological Section to be tested for toxicity, lachrymatory
power, vesicant action, or other special properties. If these tests
proved the compound to have a high toxicity or a peculiar physiological
behavior, it was then turned over to a number of different sections.
The Offense Research Section tried to improve the method of
preparation. When a satisfactory method had been found, the Chemical
Production or Small Scale Manufacturing Section endeavored to make it
on a large scale (50 pounds to a ton) and worked out the manufacturing
difficulties. If further tests showed that the substance was valuable,
the manufacture was then given to the Development Division or the Gas
Offense Production Division for large scale production.
Meanwhile the Analytical Section had been working on a method for
testing the purity of the material and for analyzing air mixtures,
and the Gas Mask Section had run tests against it with the standard
canisters. If the protection afforded did not seem sufficient, the
Defense Chemical Section studied changes in the ingredients of the
canister or even developed a new absorbent or mixture of absorbents to
meet the emergency. If a change in the mechanical construction of the
canister was necessary, this was referred to the Mechanical Research
Section; this work was especially important in case the material was to
be used as a toxic smoke.
The compound was also sent to the Pyrotechnic Section, which studied
its behavior when fired from a shell, or, if suitable, when used in a
cylinder. If it proved stable on detonation, large field tests were
then made by the Proving Division, in connection with the Pyrotechnic
and Toxicological Sections of the Research Division, to learn the
effect when shell loaded with the compound were fired from guns on
a range, with animals placed suitably in or near the trenches. The
Analytical Section worked out methods of detecting the gas in the
field, wherever possible.
The Medical Division, working with the Toxicological and
Pharmacological Sections, studied pathological details, methods of
treating gassed cases, the effect of the gas on the body, and in some
cases even considered other questions, such as the susceptibility of
different men.
If the question of an ointment or clothing entered into the matter
of protection, these were usually attacked by several Sections from
different points of view.
Out of the 250 gases prepared by the Offense Chemical Research Section,
very few were sufficiently valuable to pass all of these tests and
thus the number of gases actually put into large scale production were
less than a dozen. This had its advantages, for it made unnecessary a
large number of factories and the training of men in the manufacturing
details of many gases. As one British report stated, “The ultimate
object of chemical warfare should be to produce two substances only;
one persistent and the other non-persistent; both should be lethal and
both should be penetrants.” They might well have added that both should
be instantly and powerfully lachrymatory.
Since most of the work of the Research Division will be covered in
detail in later chapters, only a brief summary of the principal
problems will be given here.
The first and most important problem was the development of a gas mask.
This was before Sections had been organized and was the work of the
entire Division. After comparing the existing types of masks it was
decided that the Standard Box Respirator of the British was the best
one to copy. Because we were entirely new at the game that meant work
on charcoal, soda-lime, and the various mechanical parts of the mask,
such as the facepiece, elastics, eyepieces, mouthpiece, noseclip, hose,
can, valves, etc. The story of the “first twenty thousand” is very well
told by Colonel Burrell.[12]
[Footnote 12: _J. Ind. Eng. Chem._, =11=, 93 (1919).]
“THE FIRST TWENTY THOUSAND
“About the first of May, 1917, Major L. P. Williamson,
acting as liaison officer between the Bureau of
Mines and the War Department, put the last ounce of
‘pep’ into the organization by asking us to build
20,000 gas masks for shipment overseas. 20,000 masks
did not seem like a very large order. We did not
fully appreciate all the conditions which a war gas
mask had to encounter, so we readily and willingly
accepted the order. Then began a struggle with can
manufacturers, buckle makers, manufacturers of straps,
rubber facepieces, eyepieces, knapsacks, etc. The
country was canvassed from the Atlantic Coast to the
Mississippi River for manufacturers who could turn out
the different parts acceptably and in a hurry.
“Charcoal was made from red cedar by the Day Chemical
Co. of Westline, Pennsylvania; soda-lime permanganate
was manufactured by the General Chemical Company;
knapsacks by the Simmons Hardware Company in St.
Louis; facepieces by the Goodrich and Goodyear Rubber
Companies at Akron; canisters by the American Can
Company; and the assembly made at one of the plants of
the American Can Company in Long Island City.
“The writer cannot recall all the doubts, fears,
optimism, and enthusiasm felt in turn by different
members of the organization during the fabrication
of those first 20,000 masks. We were performing an
important task for the War Department. Night became
day. Dewey, Lewis, Henderson, Gibbs, and others stepped
from one train to another, and we used the telephone
between Washington and St. Louis or Boston as freely as
we used the local Washington telephone.
“We thought we could improve on the English box
respirator on various points. We made the canister
larger, and have been glad ever since that we did.
We thought the English mouthpiece was too flexible
and too small, and made ours stiff and larger, and
were sorry we made the change. We tested the fillings
against chlorine, phosgene, prussic acid, etc., and
had a canister that was all that was desired for
absorbing these gases. But, alas, we did not know
that chloropicrin was destined to be one of the most
important war gases used by the various belligerents.
Further, it was not fully appreciated that the
rubberized cloth used in making the facepiece had to
be highly impermeable against gases, that hardness as
much as anything else was desired in the make-up of
the soda-lime granules in order to withstand rough
jolting so that the fines would not clog the canister,
and raise the resistance to breathing to a prohibitive
figure. Neither was it appreciated at that time by any
of the allies, that the gas mask really should be a
be a fighting instrument, one that men could work hard
in, run in, and wear for hours, without too serious
discomfort.
“The first 20,000 masks sent over to England were
completed by the Research Division in record time.
As compared with the French masks, they were far
superior, giving greater protection against chlorine,
phosgene, superpalite, prussic acid, xylyl bromide,
etc. The French mask was of the cloth type, conforming
to the face, and consisting of twenty layers of
cheesecloth impregnated with sodium phenate and
hexamethylenetetramine. Chloropicrin went through this
like a shot. Just before the masks were sent abroad,
we received disturbing rumors of the contemplated
use of large quantities of chloropicrin. The French,
apparently, had no intention of changing the design
of their mask, and did not do so for months to come.
We therefore released the masks, they were sent
abroad, and an anxious research group on this side
of the water waited expectantly for the verdict. It
came. A brief cablegram told us what our English
cousins thought of us. It was a subject they had been
wrestling with for two years and a half. They had had
battlefield experience; they had gone through the grief
of developing poor masks into better ones, knew the
story better than we did, and after a thorough test
‘hammered’ the American design unmercifully.
“This experience put the Research Division on its
mettle. Our first attempt had given us the necessary
preliminary experience; cablegrams and reports traveled
back and forth; an expert or two eventually came to
this country from England in response to previous
appeals for assistance, and we turned with adequate
information to the development of a real mask.”
The story of mustard gas is given later. It probably occupied more time
and thought on the part of the Research Division, as well as that of
Edgewood Arsenal and the Development Division, than any other gas.
Diphenylchloroarsine led to the preparation of a series of arsenic
compounds, some more easily prepared and more or less effective.
Cyanogen chloride and cyanogen bromide, reported by the Italians as
having been used by the Germans, were extensively studied.
The Inorganic Section was early interested in special incendiary
materials which were developed for bombs, shells, darts and grenades,
and which were later taken over by the Pyrotechnic Section, and finally
adopted by the Ordnance Department.
In discussing the work one can very well start with the Offense
Section. This Section had two aims in view always, to develop methods
of making the gases used by the Germans more economically than they
were making them, and to develop better gases if possible. When we
entered the war, chlorine, phosgene and chloropicrin were the lethal
gases used, while bromoacetone and xylyl bromide were the lachrymators.
It was not a difficult matter to prepare these. But the introduction
of mustard gas in the summer of 1917 and of diphenylchloroarsine in
the autumn of the same year, not only made our chemists ponder over
a manufacturing method, but also so revised our notions of warfare
that the possibility of using other substances created the need for
extensive research. The development of bromobenzylcyanide by the French
likewise opened a new field among lachrymatory substances.
Colored rockets and smokes were developed for the Navy and Army.
The smoke box was also studied but the work was taken over by the
Pyrotechnic Section.
A large amount of pure inorganic research on arsine and arsenides,
fluorine, hydrofluoric acid and fluorides, cyanides, cyanogen sulfide
and nitrogen tetroxide was carried out, sometimes successfully and at
other times with little or no success.
The Analytical Section not only carried out all routine analyses but
developed methods for many new gases.
The Offense Section worked in very close contact with the Small Scale
Manufacturing Section (Chemical Production Section). Often it happened
that a method, apparently successful in the laboratory, was of no
value in the plant. Small scale plants were developed for mustard gas,
hydrocyanic acid, cyanogen chloride, arsenic trichloride, arsenic
trifluoride, magnesium arsenide, superpalite and bromobenzylcyanide.
The Chemical Defense Section, organized January, 1918, was occupied
with problems relating to protection, such as charcoal, soda-lime, and
special absorbents, eyepieces, smoke filters, efficiency of absorbents,
and special work with mustard gas.
Charcoal demanded extensive research. Raw materials required a
world-wide search, carbonizing methods had to be developed, and
impregnating agents were thoroughly studied. This story is told in
Chapter XIII.
Soda-lime was likewise a difficult problem. Starting with the British
formula, the influence of the various factors was studied and a balance
between a number of desirable qualities, absorptive activity, capacity,
hardness, resistance to abrasion, chemical stability, etc., obtained.
The final product consisted of a mixture of lime, cement, kieselguhr,
sodium permanganate and sodium hydroxide.
Equally valuable work was performed in the perfection of two carbon
monoxide absorbents for the Navy. The better of these consisted of a
mixture of suitably prepared oxides which acts catalytically under
certain conditions, and causes the carbon monoxide to react with the
oxygen of the air. Since there are color changes connected with the
iodine pentoxide reaction (the first absorbent) it has been possible
to develop this so as to serve as a very sensitive detector for the
presence of carbon monoxide in air.
While the question of smoke filters was so important that it occupied
the attention of several Sections, the Defense Section developed, as a
part of its work, a standard method of testing and comparing filters,
and did a great deal of work on the preparation of paper for this
purpose.
Various problems related to mustard gas were also studied. The question
of a protective ointment was solved as successfully as possible under
the circumstances, but was dropped when it appeared doubtful if under
battlefield conditions of concentration and length of exposure, any
ointment offered sufficient protection to pay for the trouble of
applying it. The removal of mustard gas from clothing was investigated,
especially by the accelerating effect of turkey red oil. Another phase
of the work concerned the destruction of mustard gas on the ground,
while a fourth phase related to the persistency of mustard (and other
gases) on the field of battle.
The Gas Mask Research Section concerned itself largely with developing
methods of testing canisters and with routine tests. When one
considers the number of gases studied experimentally, the large
number of experimental canisters developed, all of which were tested
against two or more gases, and further that the Section assisted in the
control of the production at Long Island City, it is seen that this
was no small job. In addition, the effect of various conditions, such
as temperature, humidity, ageing, size of particles, were studied in
their relation to the life of absorbents and canisters. Man tests and
mechanical tests will be discussed in a later chapter. Other studies
were concerned with weathering tests of gas mask fabrics, mustard gas
detector, and covering for dugout entrances (dugout blankets), which
were impregnated with a mixture of mineral and vegetable oils. In
studying the course of gases through a canister the “wave front” method
was of great value in detecting defects in canister design and filling.
The Pyrotechnic Section was composed of a number of units, each with
its own problem. The gas shell was studied, with special reference
to the stability of gases and toxic solids, both on storage and on
detonation. Extensive work was carried out on smoke screens—a Navy
funnel, an Army portable smoke apparatus, using silicon tetrachloride,
a grenade, a Livens, and various shell being developed for that
purpose. The smoke screen was adapted to the tank and the airplane as
well as to the funnel of a ship. Several types of incendiary bombs
and darts were perfected. The liquid fire gun was studied but the
results were never utilized because of the abandonment as useless of
that form of warfare. Various forms of signal lights, flares, rockets
and colored smokes were studied and in most cases specifications were
written. Extensive studies were also carried out on gas shell linings,
from which a lead and an enamel lining were evolved. Many physical
properties of war gases and their mixtures were determined.
The Dispersoid Section studied the production of smokes or mists from
various solid and liquid substances. Apparatus were developed to study
the concentration of smoke clouds and their rate of settling. The
efficiency of various filters and canisters was determined, and among
other things, a new smoke candle was perfected.
Mechanical research at first was related to design and construction of
a canister and mask, based on the English type. During the latter part
of 1917 the Tissot type of mask was studied and then turned over to
the Gas Defense Division. A Navy Head Mask and canister was perfected.
The horse mask was developed along the lines of the British type, and
also a dog mask of the same general nature. Horse boots were also
constructed, though they never were used at the front. Many Ordnance
and Pyrotechnic problems were also successfully completed, not the
least of which was a noiseless gas cylinder. This section developed the
first special poison gas suit, composed of an oilcloth suit, a mask and
helmet and a special canister.
The Manufacturing Development Section had general charge of the defense
problems, and really acted as an emergency section, filling in as
occasion demanded. They developed mustard gas clothing and a horse
mask. They constructed a hydrogen plant at Langley Field, assisted in
solving the difficulties relating to Batchite charcoal at Springfield,
Mass., and co-operated in the study of paper and felt as filtering
materials for smokes. Towards the close of the war the Section was
interested in the application of the gas mask to the industries.
The Physiological work is discussed under the Medical Division.
The Editorial Section received reports from all the other Sections,
from which a semi-monthly report was written, and distributed to
authorized representatives of the Army and Navy and to our Allies.
Reports were also received from abroad and the information thus
received was made available to the Research Division. As the number of
reports increased the work was collected together into monographs on
the various war gases, absorbents, smokes, etc. After the signing of
the armistice these were revised and increased in number, so that about
fifty were finally turned over to the Director of the Chemical Warfare
Service.
GAS DEFENSE DIVISION
The story of the Gas Defense Division is largely the story of the
gas mask. Colonel (then Mr.) Bradley Dewey was in charge of the
“first twenty thousand.” Soon after that work was undertaken, he was
commissioned Major in the Gas Defense Division of the Sanitary Corps
and was placed in charge of the entire manufacturing program. The work
of the Division included the development and manufacture as well as the
testing and inspection of gas masks, and other defense equipment. The
magnitude of the work is seen from the following record of production:
5,692,000 completed gas masks, 3,614,925 of which were produced at the
Long Island City Plant, while the remainder were assembled at the Hero
Manufacturing Company’s Plant at Philadelphia, 377,881 horse masks,
191,388 dugout blankets, 2,450 protective suits and 1,773 pairs of
gloves, 1,246 tons of protective ointment, 45,906 gas warning signals
(largely hand horns), 50,549 trench fans and many oxygen inhalators.
[Illustration: FIG. 5.—The Defective Gas Mask.
Successfully used by the Gas Defense Division to stimulate care in
every part of the operation of the manufacture of Gas Masks.]
The story of the “first twenty thousand” has already been told on page
43. That these masks were far from satisfactory is no reflection upon
the men who made them. Even with the standard design of the British as
a pattern, it was impossible to attain all the knowledge concerning gas
masks in two months. The experience gained in this struggle enabled
the Army to take up the manufacture of gas masks, in July, 1917, with
a more complete realization of the seriousness of the task. The masks
were not lost, either, for they were sent to the various camps as
training masks and served a very useful purpose.
The first order after this was for 1,100,000 masks, to be completed
within a year from date. For this production there was authorized
one major, two captains, and ten lieutenants. How little the problem
was understood is evident when we realize that in the end there were
12,000 employees in the Gas Defense Plant at Long Island City, N. Y.
The first attempts were to secure these through existing concerns.
The Hero Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia undertook the work and
carried on certain portions of it all through the War. Experience soon
showed, however, that because of the necessity for extreme care in
the manufacture and inspection of the mask, the ordinary commercial
organization was not adapted to carry on their manufacture on the scale
necessitated by the Army program. Consequently, on Nov. 21, 1917, the
Secretary of War authorized the establishment of a government operated
plant, and experienced officials were drawn from New York, Chicago,
Boston and other manufacturing centers to carry on the work. Buildings
in Long Island City, not far from the chemical plant (charcoal and soda
lime) at Astoria, were taken over by the officers of the Gas Defense
Service, until in July, 1918, five large buildings were occupied,
having a total floor space of 1,000,000 square feet (23 acres). The
organization grew from the original thirteen officers until it included
some 12,000 employees of whom about 8,500 were women. Because of the
care required in all the work, attempt was made to secure, as far as
possible, those who had relatives with the A. E. F. The thought was
that their personal interest in the work would result in greater care
in manufacture and inspection. The personnel was unique in that the
authority was apparently divided between civilian and military, but
there was no friction because of this. The efficiency of the entire
organization is shown by the fact that the masks manufactured at Long
Island City cost fifty cents less per mask than those manufactured
under contract.
The first actual shipment (overseas) of box respirators was made from
the Gas Defense Plant on March 4, 1918. From this date the production
increased by leaps and bounds. As mentioned above, between this date
and November 26, when the last mask was manufactured, 3,146,413 masks
of the box respirator type were passed through final inspection in the
plant. The greatest daily production, 43,926 masks, was reached on
October 26, 1918. The process of manufacture will be discussed under
the chapter on the Gas Mask.
During the last half of 1918 the Kops Tissot mask was manufactured.
This mask had been perfected during the months preceding August,
1918, when its manufacture was started. Considerable difficulty was
encountered in its production, but the first mask was completed on
September 14, and between that time and the Armistice, 189,603 masks of
this type had been manufactured.
Along with this manufacturing development went the building up of
an elaborate procurement force charged with the responsibility of
providing parts to be assembled at the Gas Defense Plant and at the
Hero Manufacturing Company. This Section faced a hard and intricate
task, but, though there were instances where the shortage of parts
temporarily caused a slowing down of production, these were remarkably
rare. Not only had the parts to be standardized, and specifications
written, but a field inspection force had to be trained in order that
the finished parts might be suitable for the final assembly plant.
The problem was further complicated by the fact that the design was
constantly changing, as improvement followed improvement. Officers,
trained in inspection in a day, were sent out to train inspectors in
the industrial centers.
In February, 1918, shortly before the German drive commenced,
requisitions were received for sample lots of oiled mittens and oiled
union suits as protection against mustard gas. These were prepared in
quantity and sent to the front, as was also a considerable amount of
chloride of lime for neutralizing the mustard gas in the field.
Another phase of the work consisted of the Field Testing Section, which
was organized to provide field testing conditions for the regular
product and for the development organization. Later there were added
a preliminary course of training for officers for overseas duty in
chemical warfare, the military training of the Gas Defense officers
located in and near New York and the training of boat crews engaged in
carrying offensive gas supplies. The Field Testing Section rendered
valuable service in pointing out weaknesses of designs as developments
took place and especially those uncomfortable features of the masks
which were apparent only through long wear. During the course of this
work the section built a complete trench system in the Pennsylvania
Railroad yards with an elaborate dugout, the equal of any of the famous
German quarters on the Western front.
The chapters on Charcoal, Soda-Lime and the Gas Mask must be read
in this connection to gain an idea of the work carried out by this
Division. It is summed up in the statement that American soldiers were
provided with equipment which neutralized the best effects of German
chemical knowledge as evidenced by the offensive methods and materials
employed.
The organization of the Gas Defense Division, as of Nov. 11, 1918, was
as follows:
Colonel Bradley Dewey Officer in Charge
Lieut. Col. A. L. Besse Asst. Officer in Charge
Major M. L. Emerson Administration Section
Major H. P. Schuit Comptrolling Section
Mr. R. Skemp Procurement Section
Major C. R. Johnson Technical Director
Capt. K. Atterbury Field Testing Section
Major J. C. Woodruff Chemical Manufacturing and Development
Mr. R. R. Richardson Manager, Gas Defense Plant
Capt. H. P. Scott Officer in Charge, Hero Manufacturing Co.
Major L. W. Cottman Engineering Branch
Major T. L. Wheeler Chemical Development
Major I. W. Wilson Astoria Branch
Capt. W. E. Brophy San Francisco Branch
Lt. E. J. Noble Cleveland Branch
Lt. L. Merrill Springfield Branch
EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
The Ordnance Department, in making plans for a shell filling plant,
thought to interest existing chemical firms in the manufacture of the
required toxic materials. As plans developed, however, difficulties
arose in carrying out this program. The manufacture of such material
at private plants necessitated its shipment to the filling plant at
Edgewood. The transportation of large quantities of highly toxic gases
seemed attended with great danger. The Director General of Railroads
ruled that all such shipments must be made by special train, a very
expensive method of transportation. Still more serious objections were
encountered in the attempt to enlist the co-operation of existing
firms. They recognized that the manufacture of such material would be
attended by very great danger; that the work would be limited to the
duration of the war; and that the processes involved, as well as the
plants necessary for carrying out their processes, would have little
post-war value. Moreover, such firms as had the personnel and equipment
were already over-worked. With a few exceptions (notably the American
Synthetic Color Company, the Oldbury Electro-Chemical Co., Zinsser &
Co., and the Dow Chemical Company) they were unwilling to undertake
work of this character on any terms whatever.
Early in December, 1917, therefore, it was decided to erect, on
the site of the shell filling plant, such chemical plants as would
be necessary to furnish the toxic materials required for filling
the shell. The Arsenal is situated in an isolated district, twenty
miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and
comprises 3,400 acres. Since the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad
runs on one side of the tract, while on another is the Bush River,
only a few miles from its mouth in Chesapeake Bay, the tract was
ideally situated for shipping. This site was referred to, at first, as
“Gunpowder Reservation,” but on May 4, 1918, the name was officially
changed to “Edgewood Arsenal.”
[Illustration: FIG. 6.—Edgewood Arsenal.
The upper view shows the site as it appeared Oct. 24, 1917. The lower
view shows the same as it appeared nine months later.]
Some idea of the extent of the work may be gained from the following
facts. On October 1, 1918, there were 233 officers, 6,948 enlisted men
and 3,066 civilians engaged in work at Edgewood. 86 cantonments were
built, accommodating about 8,500 men, while the five officers’ barracks
provided accommodations for 290. The completed hospital unit consisted
of 34 buildings, accommodating 420 patients under ordinary conditions.
The total number of buildings erected on the Arsenal grounds was 550.
14.8 miles of improved roads were built, and 21 miles of standard gauge
and 15 miles of narrow gauge railway. A system furnishing 9.5 million
gallons of salt water and another furnishing two millions of fresh
water daily were successfully installed. Large power plants were built
in connection with the shell filling plants and the chlorine plant.
Plants for phosgene, chloropicrin, mustard gas, chlorine and sulfur
chloride were built and placed in successful operation. Most of the raw
materials, with the exception of sulfur chloride, were obtained from
commercial firms. The other gases and manufactured materials used, such
as phosphorus, tin and silicon tetrachlorides, bromobenzylcyanide and
arsenic derivatives were supplied by various plants scattered through
the East and Middle West States.
The raw materials used by the Arsenal in 1918 were as follows:
Salt 17,358,000 pounds
Bleach 42,384,000 “
Picric acid 3,718,000 “
Alcohol 3,718,000 “
Sulfur 24,912,000 “
Sulfur chloride 6,624,000 “
Bromine 238,000 “
Benzyl chloride 26,000 “
The production of toxic materials and the amount shipped overseas in
bulk follow:
-----------------------+-------------+-------------
| Production, | Shipped in
| Pounds | Bulk, Pounds
-----------------------+-------------+-------------
Chlorine: | |
Liquid | 5,446,000 | 2,976,000
Gaseous | 2,208,000 |
Chloropicrin | 5,552,000 | 3,806,000
Phosgene | 3,233,070 | 840,000
Mustard gas | 1,422,000 | 380,000
Bromobenzyl cyanide | 10,000 |
White phosphorus | 2,012,000 | 342,000
Tin tetrachloride | 2,012,000 | 212,000
Titanium tetrachloride | 362,000 |
-----------------------+-------------+-------------
For nearly a month previous to the signing of the Armistice, the
various plants at the Arsenal had shut down or were operated only to
an extent sufficient to maintain the machinery and equipment in good
working order, on account of the lack of shell into which to fill
the gas, so that the above figures do not at all represent maximum
productive capacity.
These plants will be described in the appropriate chapters.
The shell filling plant was really composed of several small
plants, each of which was made up of units radiating from a central
refrigeration plant which would serve all the units. Each unit could
then be fitted with machinery adapted for filling shell of a different
size, and for a particular gas. Moreover, an accident in one of the
units would in no way impair the working of the remainder.
The problem involved in the filling of a shell with toxic material
(which is always a liquid or a solid and never a gas under the
conditions in which it is loaded in the shell) is similar in a way
to that of filling bottles with carbonated water. In the development
of plans for the filling plant, many suggestions were obtained from
a study of the apparatus used in commercial bottling plants. It was
necessary to keep in mind not only the large number of shell to be
filled, but also the highly toxic character of the filling material to
be used. It was essential that the work of filling and closing the
shell should be done by machinery in so far as that was possible, and
that the operation should be carried out in a thoroughly ventilated
room or tunnel, arranged so that the machinery contained in the tunnel
could be operated from the outside. Special care was taken in closing
the shell, the closing being accomplished by motors actuated by
compressed air, which, in the closing process were driven until they
stalled. In this way a uniform closing torque was obtained. The final
results secured were admirable, as is evidenced by the fact, reported
by the Quartermaster Officer at Vincennes on November 15, 1918, that
not a single leaky shell had been found among the 200,000 shell
received up to that date.
[Illustration: FIG. 7.—A Typical Shell filling Plant at Edgewood
Arsenal.]
Details of the filling process will be found in the chapter on Phosgene.
Besides the ordinary gas filling plants (of which one was completed
and two were 80 per cent completed) there was a plant for stannic
chloride grenades, one for white phosphorus grenades, and one for smoke
shell also filled with phosphorus and a plant for filling incendiary
bombs.
Shell are designated by their diameter in inches or millimeters. The
approximate amount of toxic gas required for filling each type of shell
(10.5 per cent void) is as follows:
---------+-----------+-----------+-------------
Shell | Phosgene, | N. C.,[13] | Mustard Gas,
| Pounds | Pounds | Pounds
---------+-----------+-----------+-------------
75 mm | 1.32 | 1.75 | 1.35
4.7 inch | 4.27 | 6.20 | 4.20
155 mm | 11.00 | 15.40 | 10.35
8 inch | 22.00 | 30.30 | 21.60
Livens | 30.00 | |
---------+-----------+-----------+-------------
[Footnote 13: N.C. is a mixture of 80 per cent chloropicrin and 20 per
cent stannic chloride.]
The gas grenades held 0.446 pound of stannic chloride, and the smoke
grenades held 0.67 pound of white phosphorus.
The only type of shell filled was the 75 mm. variety, because either
the shell of the other sizes or the accompanying boosters (bursting
charges) were not available.
The work done by the filling plant is shown by the following figures,
representing the number of shell, grenades, etc.
_75 mm. Shell_
------------------+---------+---------
| Filled | Shipped
| | Overseas
------------------+---------+---------
Phosgene | 2,009 |
N. C. | 427,771 | 300,000
Mustard gas | 155,025 | 150,000
------------------+---------+---------
_Livens Drum_
------------------+---------+---------
Phosgene | 25,689 | 18,600
------------------+---------+---------
_Grenades_
------------------+---------+---------
White phosphorus | 440,153 | 224,984
Tin tetrachloride | 363,776 | 175,080
------------------+---------+---------
_Incendiary Drop Bomb_
------------------+---------+---------
Mark I. | 542 |
Mark II. | 2,104 |
------------------+---------+---------
The total monthly capacity of the filling plants at the date of the
Armistice was as follows:
Pounds
75 mm. shell 2,400,000
4.7 inch shell 450,000
155 mm. shell 540,000
6 inch shell 180,000
Gas grenade 750,000
Smoke grenade 480,000
Livens drum 30,000
One point relating to the casualties resulting from the work should
perhaps be mentioned here. The number of casualties should change the
mind of anyone who feels that men chose this work as being “safe”
instead of going to France. During the six months from June to December
there were 925 casualties, of which three were fatal, two being due to
phosgene and one to mustard gas. These were divided among the different
gases as follows:
Mustard gas 674
Stannic chloride 50
Phosgene 50
Chloropicrin 44
Chlorine 62
Other material 45
Of these 279 occurred during August, 197 during September and 293
during October. Since production stopped early in November, there were
only 14 during that month and three during December.
The Staff at Edgewood Arsenal at the signing of the Armistice was as
follows:
Commanding Officer Colonel Wm. H. Walker
{ Lt. Colonel George Cahoon, Jr.
Administrative Officers { Lt. Col. Edward M. Ellicott
{ Lt. Col. Wm. C. Gallowhur
{ Lt. Col. Wm. McPherson
In Charge of Outside Plants { Major Adrian Nagelvoort
{ Major Charles R. Wraith
{ Captain John D. Rue
Shell Filling Plant Lt. Col. Edwin M. Chance
Chlorine Plant Lt. Col. Charles Vaughn
Chemical Plants Major Dana J. Demorest
Chemical Laboratory Major William L. Evans
As the work of the Arsenal expanded it was necessary to manufacture
certain of the chemicals at outside plants. The men in charge of these
plants were:
Bound Brook, N. J. Lt. William R. Chappell
Stamford, Conn. Lt. V. E. Fishburn
Hastings-on-Hudson, N. Y. Major F. G. Zinnsser
Niagara Falls, N. Y. Major A. Nagelvoort
Buffalo, N. Y. Lt. A. W. Davison
Kingsport, Tenn. Lt. E. M. Hayden
Charleston, W. Va. Lt. M. R. Hoyt
Midland, Mich. Major M. G. Donk
Croyland, Pa. Capt. A. S. Hulburt
After the Armistice, Edgewood Arsenal was selected as the logical home
of the Chemical Warfare Service, and all the outside activities of the
Service were gradually closed up and the physical property and files
moved to Edgewood. At first the command of the Arsenal was in the hands
of Lt. Col. Fries, but when he was appointed Chief of the Service,
Major E. J. Atkisson, who had so successfully commanded the First Gas
Regiment, A. E. F., was happily chosen his successor. At the present
time (July 1, 1921), the organization of Edgewood Arsenal is as follows:
Commanding Officer Major E. J. Atkisson
Executive Officer Major R. C. Ditto
Technical Director Dr. J. E. Mills
Chemical Division Mr. D. B. Bradner
Mechanical Division Mr. S. P. Johnson
Plant Division Capt. E. G. Thompson
Chemical Warfare School Major O. R. Meredith
Property Major A. M. Heritage
First Gas Regiment Major C. W. Mason
Mask Production Division Lt. L. A. Elliott
Medical Department Major T. L. Gore
Pathological Division Lt. H. A. Kuhn
Quartermaster Department Capt. H. L. Hudson
Finance Department Capt. C. R. Insley
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
The Development Division had its origin in the research laboratories
of the National Carbon Company and of the National Lamp Works of the
General Electric Company. Both of these companies knew charcoal, and
they were asked to produce a satisfactory absorbent charcoal. The
success of this undertaking will be seen in the chapter on Absorbents.
After a short time all the laboratory work was taken over by the
National Carbon Co., while the developmental work was assigned to
the National Lamp Works. When the final organization of the Chemical
Warfare Service took place, the National Carbon Laboratory became part
of the Research Division, while the National Lamp Works became the
Defense Section of the Development Division.
The Development Division may be considered as having been composed of
the following sections:
1. Defense
2. Offense
3. Midland
4. Willoughby
5. Special Investigation.
The work of the Defense Section consisted of the development of a
charcoal suitable for use in gas masks, and its manufacture. While the
details will be given later, it may be mentioned here that three weeks
after the organization of the Section (April 28, 1917) the furnaces
of the National Carbon Company were turning out cedar charcoal, using
a straight distillation procedure. Cedar was selected from a large
variety of materials as giving the highest absorptive value against
chlorine. But phosgene and chloropicrin were also being used, and it
was found that the cedar charcoal was not effective against either.
Proceeding on a definite hypothesis, fifty materials were investigated
to find the charcoal with the highest density. Cocoanut hulls furnished
the raw material, which yielded the most active charcoal. By a
process of air activation a charcoal was obtained which possessed
high absorptive power for such gases as chloropicrin and phosgene.
Later this air process was changed to one in which steam is used;
the cocoanut shell charcoal activated with steam was given the name
“Dorsite.”
Complete apparatus for this air process was installed at the plant of
the Astoria Light, Heat & Power Company, Long Island City, and the
first charcoal was prepared during September, 1917. This was followed
by a large amount of experimental work, relating to the raw material,
the method of activation, and the type of furnace used. Because of the
shortage of cocoanut hulls, it later became necessary to use a mixture
of cocoanuts with cohune nuts, apricot and peach pits, cherry pits and
vegetable ivory. Another substitute for cocoanut charcoal was found
in a steam activated product from high grade anthracite coal, called
“Batchite.”
The Offense Section and the Midland Section were concerned with the
manufacture of mustard gas. This work was greatly delayed because
of the unsatisfactory nature of the so-called chlorohydrin process.
Another difficulty was the development of a satisfactory ethylene
furnace. Finally in February, 1918, Pope in England discovered the
sulfur chloride method of making mustard gas. At once all the energies
of the Research Division were concentrated on this process, and
in March steps were taken to put this process into production. An
experimental plant was established at Cleveland; no attempt was made
to manufacture mustard gas on a large scale, but the results obtained
in the experimental studies were immediately transmitted to the
manufacturing plants at Edgewood Arsenal, the Hastings-on-Hudson plant,
the National Aniline & Chemical Company (Buffalo) plant, and the Dow
Chemical Company (Midland) plant. The details of the work on mustard
gas will be given in a later chapter.
Special investigations were undertaken to develop a booster casing and
adapter for 75 mm. gas shell, and to duplicate the French process of
lining gas shell with glass.
The organization of the Development Division at the signing of the
Armistice was as follows:
Colonel F. M. Dorsey Chief of the Division
Major L. J. Willien Supt., Offense Section
Capt. O. L. Barnebey Supt., Defense Section
Lt. Col. W. G. Wilcox Supt., Experimental Station
Capt. Duncan MacRae Special Investigation Section
Dr. A. W. Smith Midland Section
Capt. J. R. Duff Administrative Section
PROVING DIVISION
The Proving Division had its origin in the decision to build an
Experimental Ground for gas warfare under the direction of the Trench
Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department. While this decision was
reached about September, 1917, actual work on the final location
(Lakehurst, N. J.) was not started until March 26, 1918, and the
construction work was not completed until August 1, 1918. However,
firing trials were started on April 25, 1918, and in all 82 were
carried out.
The Proving Division was created to do two things: To experiment
with gas shell before they reached the point where they could be
manufactured safely in large numbers for shipment overseas; and to
prove gas shell, presumably perfect and ready for shipment, to guard
against any mechanical inaccuracies in manufacture or filling. It
is evident that the second proposition is dependent upon the first.
Shell can not be proved to ascertain the effect of gases under various
conditions and concentrations until the mechanical details of the
shell itself, purely an Ordnance matter, have been standardized.
Unfortunately many of the tests carried out had to do with this very
question of testing Ordnance.
For field concentration work two complete and separate lines of
trenches were used and also several impact grounds. The trenches were
built to simulate the trenches actually used in warfare. Each line of
trench contained several concrete shell-proof dugouts and was also
equipped with shelves into which boxes could be placed for holding
the sample bottles. At intervals of one yard throughout the trenches
there were electrical connections available for electrical sampling
purposes. The various impact grounds were used for cloud gas attacks,
and experiments with mustard gas or in many cases for static trials.
The samples were collected by means of an automatic sampling apparatus.
The work of the Division consisted in the first instance of determining
the proper bursting charge. While a great deal of this work had been
carried out in Europe, American gas shell were enough different to
require that tests be carried out on them. The importance of this work
is obvious, since phosgene, a substance with a low boiling point, would
require a smaller bursting charge to open the shell and allow the
substance to vaporize than would mustard gas, where the bursting charge
must be not only sufficient to fragment the shell but also to scatter
the liquid so that it would be atomized over the largest possible area.
In the case of low boiling liquids it was necessary that the charge be
worked out very carefully as a difference of one or two grams would
seriously affect the concentration. Too small a charge would allow a
cup to be formed by the base of the shell which would carry some of the
liquid into the ground, while too great an amount of explosive tended
to throw the gas too high into the air.
After the bursting charge had been determined a large number of shell
were repeatedly fired into the trenches, wooded areas, rolling and
level ground, and the concentration of gas produced and the effect upon
animals placed within the area ascertained. From the results of these
experiments the Proving Division was able to furnish the artillery
with data regarding how many shell of given caliber should be used,
with corrections for ranges, wind velocities, temperatures, ground
conditions, etc. Trials were also held to determine how many high
explosive (H.E.) shell could be fired with gas shell on the same area
without unduly affecting the concentration. This was important, because
H.E. shell were useful in disguising gas bombardments. Gas shell can
usually be distinguished by the small detonation on bursting.
Experiments were performed to determine the decomposition of various
gases on detonation. The shell were fired at a large wooden screen and
burst on impact. Samples of gas were taken immediately and analyzed.
Co-operative tests were carried out with the Gas Defense Division to
determine the value of given masks under field conditions. Companies of
infantry, fully equipped for the field, would wear masks for hours at
a time digging trenches, cutting timber, drilling, etc., and imitating
in every way, as far as possible, actual field conditions. During
these activities tons of gas in cylinders were released in such a way
that the men were enveloped in a far higher concentration than would
probably ever be the case in actual battle. These tests gave valuable
data for criticizing gas mask construction.
Another line of activity consisted of a study of the persistency and
relative effectiveness of various samples of mustard gas, in which the
liquid was distributed uniformly upon the surface of grassy zones one
to three feet in width, which formed the periphery of circular areas 14
to 21 feet in diameter, the central part of each circle being occupied
by animals.
The work of the Proving Division was brought to an end (by the
Armistice) just at the time when it had reached its greatest
usefulness. Not only were the physical properties and personnel of the
Division developed to the maximum degree, but the production of gas
shell in this country for shipment to France had just reached the stage
where the Proving Ground could have been used to its fullest extent in
their proving.
TRAINING DIVISION
From the standpoint of the man at the front the Training Division
is one of the most important. To him gas warfare is an ever present
titanic struggle between poisonous vapors that kill on one side, and
the gas mask and a knowledge of how and when to wear it, on the other.
Because of this it is rather surprising that we did not hear more about
this branch of the Service. It did exist, however, and credit must be
given to those camp gas officers who remained in the United States
performing an inconspicuous and arduous duty in the face of many local
obstacles.
[Illustration: FIG. 8.]
The Field Training Division of the Gas Defense Service in the United
States was organized in September, 1917, and consisted of Major J. H.
Walton and 45 first lieutenants, all chemists. These men were given a
three months’ military training at the American University. The arrival
of Major (now Colonel) Auld during this time was very helpful, as he
was able to give the Section first-hand knowledge. About 12 of the 45
men wore sent to France, while the remainder, together with British Gas
Officers, were assigned to various Divisions still in training. There
was little idea at that time as to what constituted real gas training.
No one knew how much gas training would be received in France, and
since little was often received due to lack of time, many men went
into action with no idea of what this training really meant. Moreover,
an order that the gas officers should not go to France with their
Divisions had, as was only natural, a discouraging effect upon the men
and upon gas training and discipline generally.
In January, 1918, the gas officers were transferred to the Engineers,
and designated as the 473d Engineers. Later an Army Gas School was
established at Camp Humphreys. Because of the rapidly changing
personnel, owing to overseas assignments, the policy was adopted of
sending specialized gas officers only to Divisional Camps and the
larger training centers. The need of a larger unit and increased
authority was recognized by all intimately associated with the work,
but little was accomplished until the transfer to the Chemical Warfare
Service. Upon the appointment of Brigadier General H. C. Newcomer as
Assistant Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, he was placed in
charge of all military affairs of the Service, and the administrative
officers of the Training Section became his “military assistants.” A
few weeks later the Training Section of the Administration Division,
C.W.S. was formed.
At this time new duties fell to the lot of this Section, among the more
important being:
(1) The organization of gas troops and casual
detachments for overseas duty;
(2) The establishment of a Chemical Warfare Training
Camp;
(3) The procurement and training of officers for
overseas duty.
For this purpose a training camp was established near the Proving
Ground (Camp Kendrick) to hold 1300 officers and men. Line officers
were sent from the larger camps for training, the best of whom might
later be transferred to the Chemical Warfare Service for duty as Gas
Officers.
The work of the Section eventually grew to such proportions that it was
recognized as the Training Division of the Chemical Warfare Service. It
differed from other Divisions in that all administrative routine was
carried on through the offices of the Director, and with the assistance
and co-operation of its various Sections.
Because of the formation of the Chemical Warfare Service and the
apparent need for officers, the office was soon flooded with
applications for commissions. These were carefully examined and the
men were sent first, by courtesy of the Chief of Engineers, to Camp
Humphreys for a month’s course of military training. At the end of this
period they were sent to Camp Kendrick as students of the Army Gas
School. Toward the last of October all the officers and enlisted men
were transferred to Camp Kendrick where an Officers’ Training Battalion
was organized.
It is obvious that the gas training of troops was the most responsible
duty of the Training Division. There was constantly in mind an ideal
of supervised and standardized training for all troops in the United
States, and the Division, at the time of the Armistice, for the first
time found itself with a nearly adequate corps of officers through whom
this ideal could be realized.
MEDICAL DIVISION
Dr. Yandell Henderson of Yale University was the logical man to
inaugurate the medical work of the Bureau of Mines, because of his
experience with oxygen rescue apparatus. A member of the first
committee of the Bureau, he secured, in July, 1917, an appropriation
for the study of toxic gases at Yale. This was in charge of Doctors
Underhill, therapy; Marshall, pharmacology; and Winternitz, pathology.
When the American University Station was opened Marshall was given
charge of the pharmacology. About the same time a factory protection
unit was organized under the direction of Doctors Bradley, Eyster
and Loevenhart. At first this committee reported to the Ordnance
Department, but later the work was transferred to the Gas Defense
Service.
In December, 1917, the Medical Advisory Board was organized. This
included all the men who were carrying on experimental work of a
medical nature. This board had as its object the correlation of
all medical work; new work was outlined and attempts were made to
secure the co-operation of scientific men throughout the country.
The following groups of workers assisted in this effort: At Yale,
Underhill studied therapy, turning his animals over to Winternitz
for pathological study. Henderson was specially interested in the
physiology of aviation. At the American University Marshall carried
on pharmacological research, specially as regards mustard gas, the
toxicology being covered by Loevenhart. A pathological laboratory
was also started, under Winternitz, where many valuable studies
were made.[14] At Cleveland Sollmann was busy with mustard gas and
protective agents. Pearce, working in co-operation with Dr. Geer of
the Goodrich Rubber Company, perfected the Goodrich Lakeside Mask. His
study was very valuable as concerning the physiology of the gas mask.
At Ann Arbor Warthin and Weller[15] were studying the physiology and
pathology of mustard gas. Wells, Amberg, Helmholz and Austin of the
Otho Sprague Memorial Institute were interested in protective clothing,
while at Madison, Eyster, Loevenhart and Meek were engaged in a study
of the chronic effect of long exposures to low concentrations, and
later expanded their work to protective ointments and certain problems
in pathology.
[Footnote 14: See the Pathology of War Gas Poisoning, 1920, Yale Press.]
[Footnote 15: See Medical Aspects of Mustard Gas Poisoning, 1919, C. O.
Mosby Co.]
In the spring of 1918 many of these men were commissioned into the Gas
Defense Service of the Sanitary Corps, and were later transferred to
the Chemical Warfare Service as the Medical Division, with Colonel W.
J. Lyster, M.C., in charge.
One of the most important functions of this Division was the daily
testing of a large number of compounds for toxicity, lachrymatory or
vesicant properties. The accuracy of these tests might and probably did
save a large amount of unnecessary experimental work on the part of the
Research Division. These tests are described in a later chapter.
Very interesting and likewise valuable was the study of mustard gas by
Marshall, Lynch and Smith. They were able to work out the mechanism of
its action and the varying degrees of susceptibility in individuals
(see page 171).
Another interesting point was the fact that in the case of certain
gases there is a cumulative effect. With superpalite and mustard gas
the lethal concentration (that concentration which is fatal after a
given exposure) is lower on longer exposures. On the other hand there
is no cumulative effect with hydrocyanic acid. Whether the action is
cumulative or not depends on the rate at which the system destroys or
eliminates the poison.
LIAISON OFFICERS
This chapter should not be closed without reference to the Liaison
Service that was established between the United States and her Allies,
especially England.
During the early days no one in the States was familiar with the
details of gas warfare. At the request of the Medical Corps, upon the
urgent representations of the Gas Service, A.E.F., Captain (now Major)
H. W. Dudley was sent to this country (Sept., 1917) to assist in the
development and manufacture of gas masks. For some time he was the
Court of Appeal on nearly all technical points regarding matters of
defense. Dudley’s continual insistence on the need for maintaining the
highest possible standard of factory inspection was one of the factors
resulting in the excellent construction of the American Mask. In March,
1918, Lieut. Col. Dewey and Captain Dudley made a trip to England
and France, during which the idea of a liaison between the defense
organizations of the two countries originated. Dudley was transferred
to the Engineers, promoted and placed in charge of the Liaison service.
While the time until the Armistice was too short to really test the
idea, enough was accomplished to show the extreme desirability of some
such arrangement.
Probably the best known liaison officer from the British was Colonel
S. J. M. Auld, also sent upon the urgent representations of the Gas
Service, A.E.F. He arrived in this country about the middle of October,
1917, in charge of 28 officers and 28 non-commissioned officers, who
were to act as advisers in training and many other military subjects
besides gas warfare. Since Auld had had personal experience with gas
warfare as then practiced at the front, his advice was welcomed most
heartily by all the different branches of the Army then handling gas
warfare. On questions of general policy Auld was practically the sole
foreign adviser. The matter of gas training was transferred from the
Medical Corps to the Engineers, and was greatly assisted by four
pamphlets on Gas Warfare issued by the War College, which were prepared
by Major Auld with the assistance of Captain Walton and Lieut. Bohnson.
Later Auld gave the American public a very clear idea of gas warfare
in his series of articles appearing in the Saturday Evening Post, and
re-written as “Gas and Flame.”
Major H. R. LeSueur, who was at Porton previous to his arrival in this
country in December, 1917, rendered valuable aid in establishing the
Experimental Proving Ground and in its later operations.
Towards the close of the war the British War Office had drawn up a
scheme for a Gas Mission, which was to correlate all the gas activities
of England and America. This was never carried through because of the
signing of the Armistice.
The French representatives, M. Grignard, Capt. Hanker and Lt. Engel
furnished valuable information as to French methods, but they were
handicapped by the fact that French manufacturers did not disclose
their trade secrets even to their own Government.
About August, 1918, Lieut. Col. James F. Norris opened an office in
London. His duties were to establish cordial and intimate relations not
only with the various agencies of the British Government which were
connected with gas warfare, but also with the various laboratories
where experiments were being conducted, that important changes might be
transmitted to America with the least possible delay. The English made
Colonel Norris a member of the British Chemical Warfare Committee. Here
again the signing of the Armistice prevented a full realization of the
importance of this work.
CHAPTER IV
THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE IN FRANCE
It is worth noting here that the Chemical Warfare Service was organized
as a separate service in the American Expeditionary Forces nearly ten
months before it was organized in the United States, and that the
organization in the United States as heretofore described was patterned
closely on that found so successful in France.
Very soon after the United States declared war against the Central
Powers, a commission was sent abroad to study the various phases of
warfare as carried on by the Allies, and as far as possible by the
enemy. Certain members of this commission gave attention to chemical
warfare. One of those who did this was Professor Hulett of Princeton
University. He, with certain General Staff officers, gathered what
information they could in England and France concerning the gases
used and methods of manufacturing them, and to a very slight extent
the methods of projecting those gases upon the enemy. Some attention
was paid to gas masks, but there being nobody on the General Staff,
or anywhere else in the Regular Army, whose duty it was to look out
particularly for chemical warfare materials, these studies produced no
results.
As has already been stated, the Medical Department started the
manufacture of masks, and the Bureau of Mines, under the leadership
of the Director, Mr. Manning, began studies upon poisonous gases and
the methods of manufacturing them just before or shortly after war was
declared.
Nevertheless, although American troops left for France in May, 1917,
it was not until the end of August—the 17th to be exact—that definite
action was taken toward establishing a Chemical Warfare Service, or,
as it was then known, a Gas Service in the American Expeditionary
Forces. On that date a cablegram was sent to the United States to the
effect that it was desired to make Lieut. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of
Engineers, Chief of the Gas Service, and requesting that no assignments
to the regiment of gas troops authorized in the United States be made
which would conflict with this appointment. On August 22d, Lieut. Col.
Fries entered upon his duties as Chief of the Gas Service.
There were then in France about 30 miles from the German lines, some
12,000 American troops without any gas masks or training whatever in
Chemical Warfare. Immediate steps were taken to teach the wearing of
the masks, and English and French gas masks were obtained for them at
the earliest possible moment. At the same time efforts were made to
obtain officer personnel for the C. W. S., and to have sent to France
a laboratory for making such emergency researches, experiments, and
testing as might become necessary. From that time to the end of the war
the C. W. S. continued to develop on broad lines covering research,
development, and manufacture; the filling of shell and other containers
with poisonous gases, smoke and incendiary materials; the purchase
of gas masks and other protective devices, as well as the handling
and supply of these materials in the field; the training of the Army
in chemical warfare methods, both in offense and defense; and the
organization, equipment and operation of special gas troops.
This gave an ideal organization whereby research was linked with the
closest possible ties to the firing line, and where the necessities
of the firing line were brought home to the supply and manufacturing
branches and to the development and research elements of the Service
instantly and with a force that could not have been obtained in any
other manner. The success of the C. W. S. in the field and at home was
due to this complete organization. To the Commander-in-Chief, General
Pershing, is due the credit for authorizing this organization and for
backing it up whenever occasion demanded. Other details of this work
will be considered under the following heads: Administrative; Training;
Chemical Warfare Troops; Supply; Technical; Intelligence; and Medical.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES
The duties of administration covered those necessary for a general
control of research, of supply, of training, and the operation of
special gas troops. At first the Chief of the Gas Service comprised the
whole of the Service since he was without personnel, material, rules,
regulations, or anything else of a chemical warfare nature.
The experience in getting together this organization should be
sufficient to insure that the United States will never place on any
other man’s shoulders the burden of organizing a new and powerful
service in the midst of war, 4,000 miles from home, without precedent,
material, or anything else on which to base action. It is true the
Americans had available the experience of the English and the French,
and it should be said to the credit of both of these nations that
they gave of their experience, their time, and their material with
the greatest freedom and willingness, but just as Americans are
Americans and were Americans in 1917, just so the methods of the French
and English or of the enemy were not entirely suitable to American
conditions.
If there is any one thing needed in the training of U. S. Army leaders
of today and for the future, it is vision—vision that can foresee the
size of a conflict and make preparations accordingly. We do not mean
vision that will order, as happened in some cases, ten times as much
material as could possibly be used by even 5,000,000 troops, but the
sort of vision that could foresee in the fall of 1917 that 2,000,000
men might be needed in France and then make preparations to get
materials there for those troops by the time they arrived.
In order to cover the early formative period of the C. W. S. in France
and to show some of the difficulties encountered, the following running
account is given of some of the early happenings without regard to the
subdivisions under which they might properly be considered.
=Assignment of Chief of the Gas Service.= Sailing from the United
States on the 23d of July, 1917, Fries arrived in Paris on the morning
of August 14, 1917, and was immediately assigned the task of organizing
a highway service for the American Expeditionary Forces. Five days
later and before the highway order was issued, he was asked what he
would think if his orders were changed so as to make him Chief of the
newly proposed Gas Service. Being given one night to think it over he
told the General Staff he would undertake the work. The road work was
immediately closed up and on the 22d of August the organization of a
Gas Service was actively started.
At that time some information concerning gases and gas troops had been
gathered by Colonel Barber of the General Staff. Likewise, Colonel
(later Brigadier General) Hugh A. Drum had made a rough draft of
an order accompanied by a diagram for the establishment of the Gas
Service. This information was turned over to Fries who was told to
complete the draft of the order, together with an organization chart,
for the action of the Commander-in-Chief. After one and a half days
had been put on this work the draft and chart were considered in good
enough shape to submit to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief.
=First Trip to British Gas Headquarters.= Noting that the proposed
organization provided for the handling of 4-inch Stokes’ mortars by
gas troops, General Pershing asked why this work could not be done
by regular trench mortar companies. He was told that gas operations
were too technical and dangerous to be intrusted to any but especially
trained troops, and that, furthermore, it was understood that 4-inch
Stokes’ mortars were used only by the British troops. General Pershing
said, “You had better beat it to the British Gas Headquarters in the
field and settle definitely that and certain other minor points.”
Fries told him he was only too glad to do this, and, having completed
preparations, left on the morning of August 25th with Colonel Church
and Captain Boothby, both of the Medical Department, for St. Omer,
Headquarters of the British Gas Service in the Field.
Colonel Church of the Medical Department had been in France nearly
one and a half years prior to the entry of the United States into the
war, and had taken sufficient interest in Gas Warfare to collect
considerable information and a number of documents from French sources
bearing on the defensive side of the subject. Captain Boothby had done
the same with the British, including a course in a British Gas Defense
School. On this trip they took up the defensive side with the British,
while Fries took up the offensive side of the Service. The latter
included gases used, gas troops, and ammunition and guns used in Gas
Warfare by the Artillery and other branches of the Service. The trip
included a brief visit to the headquarters of the First British Army in
the vicinity of Lens, where the British Gas Service had a large depot
of offensive gas material.
=Order Forming Service.= Returning on the 28th of August the order,
together with a chart organizing the Service, was completed and
submitted to the General Staff. This was published as G. O. 31,
September 3, 1917. As a result of a study of the information submitted
by Colonel Barber and General Drum, together with his own observations
of British organization and work, Fries decided it was advisable to
make the Service cover as complete a scope as possible and to make
the order very general, leaving details to be worked out as time and
experience permitted. This proved to be a very wise decision, because
the entire absence of gas knowledge among Americans either in France
or the United States made it necessary to build from the bottom up
and do it rapidly. At that time, and at all times since, it was found
utterly impossible to separate the defensive side from the offensive
side. Indeed, many of the worst troubles of the British with their Gas
Service throughout nearly the whole war arose from such a division of
duties in their Service. Thus, the development of masks must be kept
parallel with the development of gases and methods of discharging
them. Otherwise a new gas invented may penetrate existing masks and
preparations be carried far towards using it before the development of
masks are undertaken to care for the new gas. Obviously a gas which our
own masks will not take care of cannot be safely used by our own troops
until new masks are developed to protect against it.
=American and British Masks.= Just prior to Fries’s assignment as
Chief of the Gas Service twenty thousand American-made masks or box
respirators were received from the United States. Through the energy
of Captain Boothby several of these had been sent at once to the
British for test. The test showed that the granules in the canisters
were entirely too soft, the charcoal of poor quality, and more than
all else, the fabric of the face piece was so pervious to gases that
chloropicrin became unbearable to the eyes in less than a minute
under the standard test used by the British. A cable containing this
information had been framed and sent to the United States just prior to
Fries’s appointment as Chief of the Service.
August 23d, the day after Fries took charge, it was decided to adopt
the British mask or box respirator as the principal mask and the French
M-2 as an emergency, both to be carried by the soldier, the French M-2,
however, to be used only when the British mask became lost or unfit
for use. A requisition for one hundred thousand of each was at once
submitted and very shortly approved by the General Staff.
=Getting Gas Supplies.= It should be stated here that inasmuch as
no Gas Service had been organized in the United States, no money
appropriation had been made for it, thereby making it necessary for
the Gas Service to obtain all its supplies through other departments
ordinarily handling the same or similar materials. Thus defensive
supplies were obtained through the Medical Department and offensive
supplies through the Ordnance Department, while other miscellaneous
equipment was obtained through the Engineer Department, the
Quartermaster Department, or the Signal Corps. This procedure proved
exceedingly embarrassing, cumbersome and inefficient. To begin with it
was necessary to get some agreement between the departments as to what
each would supply. This was very difficult, resulting in delays and
consumption of time which was urgently needed on other work.
Not only was there trouble in getting orders accepted and started on
the way but following them up became practically impossible. None of
the Departments furnishing the materials were especially interested in
them nor in many instances did they realize the vital nature of them.
Accordingly in order to get any action it was necessary to continually
follow up all orders and doing this through another department created
friction and misunderstanding. Officers of these departments took
the attitude that the whole question of obtaining supplies should be
left to them, once the requisition was turned in. This could not be
done. The Chief of the Gas Service was absolutely responsible for gas
supplies, and he fully realized that no excuses would be accepted,
no matter who stood in the way. It was necessary to get action.
Finally the matter was settled, some six months after the Service was
organized, by giving the Chemical Warfare Service the right of direct
purchase.
=Purchase of Offensive Gas Supplies.= Realizing the difficulty that
would probably be encountered in getting supplies at all times from
the British and French, two requisitions for offensive gas supplies to
be purchased from the British were submitted on September 8th and 10th
respectively. It would seem proper to state here that investigation
showed the British gas organization to be far superior to the French.
Indeed, the latter practically had no organization.
Consequently it was determined to purchase complete equipment for gas
troops and for the defensive side of the service from the British and
to make no attempt to produce new materials, methods or equipment
until ample supplies of the standard equipment of the British were
at hand or in process of manufacture or delivery. This was another
exceedingly wise conclusion. No supplies of any kind were received from
the United States for the next eight months, and then only masks and
certain defensive supplies. Indeed, no cylinders, mortars, projectors
or artillery shell containing gas were received from the United States
until just before the Armistice, though gas had been available in the
United States for months in large quantities, over 3,600 tons having
been shipped in one ton containers to the English and French. The
Ordnance material was what was lacking.
=Obtaining Personnel.= On September. 8, Colonel R. W. Crawford was
assigned to duty with the Gas Service. This matter of obtaining
personnel became immediately, and continued for almost a year to be,
one of the most serious difficulties facing the new Gas Service. The
troubles here again were the same as those in respect to supplies. None
of the old departments were especially interested in gas and hence none
of them desired to let good officers be transferred.
Officers were scarce in the early days in France in every department
of the Service, consequently a new department with no organization in
the United States and no precedents or opportunities for promotion made
the obtaining of officers almost a matter of impossibility. Further
than this, while the Engineer Department was at first supposed to
furnish most of the officer personnel, it failed to do so, apparently
looking upon the Gas Service as an unimportant matter when compared
with the regular work of the Engineers. It was necessary to make
direct application to the Chief of Staff to obtain Colonel Crawford
and shortly thereafter to cable directly to the United States for
officers. A year later enough officers were obtained but only after the
organization of a separate Service in the United States.
=Supplies for Gas Troops.= Colonel Crawford was at once put in Charge
of all supplies for the Gas Service, including the location and
construction of separate depots for that Service. Prior to this the
General Staff had decided to have chemical supplies stored in depots
separate from those of other supplies on account of the poisonous
nature of the gases which might prove very annoying if leakage occurred
near any other class of supplies. Colonel Crawford took hold of this
work with zeal and energy and so conducted it as to relieve the Chief
of the Gas Service of all anxiety in that matter. As before stated,
on the 10th of September a requisition for a very large quantity
of offensive supplies for gas troops was submitted to the General
Staff for approval. Inasmuch as this involved approximately 50,000
gas cylinders, 50,000 Liven’s drums, with at least 20,000 Liven’s
projectors and a large number of Stokes’ mortars and bombs, there was
considerable difficulty in getting it approved. Finally Colonel Malone
of the Training Section, who took an active interest in the Chemical
Warfare Service, got it approved. Then began the difficulty of getting
the order placed and of trying to expedite the filling of the order on
time. These difficulties were never overcome until after the entire
purchase of supplies was, as previously related, taken care of by the
Gas Service.
=First Inter-allied Gas Conference.= The first inter-allied gas
conference was held in Paris on September 16th, and consisted of
American, British, French, Italian, and Belgian delegates. The
conference busied itself mainly with questions of the medical treatment
of gassed cases and of defense against gas.
=Mustard Gas.= The principal topic under consideration at this
conference was the effects of the new mustard gas first used at Ypres
against the British on the nights of the 11th and 12th of July, 1917.
The British suffered nearly 20,000 casualties from this gas during the
first six weeks of its use, and were so worried over it that the start
of the attacks carried out later in the fall of 1917 against Ypres were
delayed several days. The casualties were particularly heavy because
the smell of the gas was entirely new and not unpleasant and because
of the delayed action of the gas, whereby men got no indication of its
seriousness until 4 to 8 hours after exposure. For these reasons men
simply took shelter from the bombardment without putting on masks or
taking other precautions. As a result of the Paris conference a long
cable was sent to the United States asking among other things that
immediate report be made on the possibilities of producing ethylene
chlorhydrin, one of the essentials in the manufacture of mustard gas by
the only method then known.
Within two weeks after this conference, there occurred an incident
which illustrates the very great danger in taking the views of any one
man unless certain that he is in a position to be posted on all sides
of the question under discussion. A high British official was asked
what he had heard in regard to the new mustard gas, and what and how it
was considered. He said with emphasis that the British had no further
fear of it since they had learned what it was and how to take care of
themselves and that it had ceased to be any longer a problem with them.
Fries, knowing what he did, was convinced that this did not represent
the attitude of the British authorities who knew what the gas was
doing, and the statement was not allowed to influence the American Gas
Service in the least. This was a very fortunate thing as events later
proved. It should also be added that a quite similar report was made by
a French officer in regard to mustard gas some time in the month of
October. The French officer had more reason for his attitude than the
British officer as up to that time mustard gas had not been largely
used against the French. However, both cases simply emphasize the
danger of accepting the views of any man who has seen but one angle of
a problem so complicated as gas in war.
TRAINING
=Training in Gas Defense.= In the latter part of October seventeen
young engineer officers, who had just arrived in France, were assigned
to the Gas Service and were promptly sent to British Gas Schools for
training in mask inspection, salvage and repair and in training men
to wear masks and take other necessary precautions against gas in the
field. It was also necessary at this time to establish gas training in
the First Division, and Captain Boothby was assigned to that work.
[Illustration: FIG. 9.—Destroying Mustard Gas on the Battle Field.]
It is important to note that the Gas Service had to begin operations
immediately upon its organization although it had almost no facilities
of any kind to work with. At one and the same time it was necessary
to decide upon the kinds of masks to be used and then to obtain them;
to decide upon methods of training troops in gas defense and start at
once to do it; to decide upon gases to be used and manufactured in the
United States and then obtain and send the necessary data and finally
to decide what weapons gas troops were to use and to purchase those
weapons, since none of them existed in the United States. Worse still
no one in the United States was taking any interest in them.
=New Mask.= About November 1, Major Karl Connell of the Medical
Department, National Guard of New York, reported for duty in response
to a cablegram that had been sent asking for him by name. It was
intended to send him to a British School to learn the art of teaching
gas defense. However, learning after a short talk with him that he had
been interested in making masks for administering anæsthesia, there
was at once turned over to him samples of all the masks in use by both
the Allies and the Germans, with a view to getting his ideas for a new
mask. Within two or three hours he suggested a new mask having a metal
face piece with sponge rubber against the face and with a canister to
be carried on the back of the head.
At that early date it was realized that a new mask must be invented
which would be far more comfortable and give better vision than the
British respirators adopted for use. Connell, thirty-six hours after
reporting, had so far developed his idea that he was sent to Paris to
make the first model, which he succeeded in doing in about three weeks.
This first mask was good enough to risk testing in a high concentration
of chlorine and while it leaked to some extent it indicated that the
idea was sound. The problem then was to perfect the mask and determine
how it could be produced commercially on the large scale necessary to
equip an army.
Since the British at this time and practically throughout the war were
much ahead of the French in all phases of gas warfare, Connell was
sent to London. There he succeeded in getting additional models in
such shape that one of them was sent to the United States during the
first few days of January, 1918. Connell’s work and experiments were
continued so successfully that after a model had been submitted to the
General Staff, as well as to General Pershing himself, one thousand
were ordered to be made early in May with a view to an extensive field
test preparatory to their adoption for general use in the United States
Army.
In this connection, during November, 1917, a letter was written to the
United States stating that while the Gas Service in France insisted
on the manufacture of British respirators exactly as the British
were making them, they desired to have experiments pushed on a more
comfortable mask to meet the future needs of the Army.
The following four principles were set down in that letter: (_a_)
That the mask must give protection and that experience had shown that
suitable protection could only be obtained by drawing the air through a
box filled with chemicals and charcoal. (_b_) That there must be clear
vision and that experience to date indicated that the Tissot method of
bringing the inspired air over the eyepieces was by far the best, (_c_)
That the mask must be as comfortable as compatible with reasonable
protection, and that this meant the mouthpiece and noseclip must be
omitted. (_d_) That the mask must be as nearly fool proof as it could
be made. That is, it should be of quick and accurate adjustment, in the
dark or in the trenches, and be difficult to disarrange or injure once
in position.
=Gas Training and Battle of Picardy Plains.= On March 21, 1918, as is
known to everyone, the Germans began their great drive from Cambrai
across the Picardy Plains to Amiens. While the battle was expected
it came as a complete surprise so far as the tactics used, and the
extent and force of the attack, were concerned. Lieutenant Colonel
G. N. Lewis, who had been sent about March 1 to British Gas Schools,
and had been assigned to one of the schools run by the Canadians, was
thus just on the edge of the attack. This gave him an opportunity to
actually observe some of that attack and to learn from eye-witnesses
a great deal more. The school, of course, was abandoned hurriedly and
the students ordered back to their stations. Lewis submitted two brief
reports covering facts bearing on the use of gas and smoke by the
Germans. These reports exhibited such a grasp of gas and smoke battle
tactics that he was immediately ordered to headquarters as assistant on
the Defense side of gas work, that is, on training in gas defense. Up
to that time no one had been able to organize the Defensive side of gas
work in the way it was felt it must be organized if it were to prove
a thorough success. A month later he was put at the head of the Gas
Defense Section, and in two months he had put the Defense Division on a
sound basis. He was then ordered to the United States to help organize
Gas Defense Training there.
[Illustration: FIG. 10.—Close Burst of a Gas Shell. The 6th Marines in
the Sommediene Sector near Verdun, April 30, 1918.]
=Cabled Report on Picardy Battle.= Based partly on Colonel Lewis’s
written and oral reports, and also on information contained in
Intelligence dispatches and the newspapers, a cablegram of more than
300 words was drafted reciting the main features of the battle so far
as they pertained to the use of gas. This cablegram ended with the
statement that “the above illustrates the tremendous importance of
comfort in a mask” and that “the future mask must omit the mouthpiece
and noseclip.”
=Keeping the General Staff Informed of Work.= In the early part of
May, 1918, the Americans arrived in the vicinity of Montdidier, south
of Amiens, on the most threatened point of the western front. It was
on May 18, 1918, that the Americans attacked, took, and held against
several counter-attacks the town of Cantigny. Shortly afterward they
were very heavily shelled with mustard gas and suffered in one night
nearly 900 casualties. Investigation showed that these casualties were
due to a number of causes more or less usual, but also to the fact that
the men had to wear the mask 12 to 15 hours if they were to escape
being gassed. Such long wearing of the British mask with its mouthpiece
and noseclip is practically an impossibility and scores became gassed
simply through exhaustion and inability to wear the mask.
An inspector from General Headquarters in reporting on supplies and
equipment in the First Division, stated that one of the most urgent
needs was a more comfortable mask. The First Division suggested a mask
on the principles of the new French mask which was then becoming known
and which omitted the mouthpiece and noseclip. The efforts of the
American Gas Service in France to perfect a mask without a mouthpiece
and noseclip were so well known and so much appreciated that they did
not even call upon the Gas Service for remark. The assistant to the
Chief of Staff who drew up the memorandum to the Chief simply said the
matter was being attended to by the Gas Service. This illustrates the
value of keeping the General Staff thoroughly informed of what is being
done to meet the needs of the troops on the firing line.
Then, as always, it was urged that a reasonably good mask was far more
desirable than the delay necessary to get a more perfect one. Based on
these experiences with mask development, the authors are convinced that
the whole tendency of workers in general, in laboratories far from the
front, is to over-estimate the value of perfect protection based on
laboratory standards. It is difficult for laboratory workers to realize
that battle conditions always require a compromise between perfection
and getting something in time for the battle. It was early evident to
the Gas Service in France that we were losing, and would continue to
lose, vastly more men through removal of masks of the British type, due
to discomfort and exhaustion, than we would from a more comfortable
but less perfect mask. In other words when protection becomes so much
of a burden that the average man cannot or will not stand it, it is
high time to find out what men will stand, and then supply it even at
the expense of occasional casualties. Protection in battle is always
relative. The only perfect protection is to stay at home on the farm.
The man who cannot balance protection against legitimate risks has no
business passing on arms, equipment or tactics to be used at the Front.
As early as September, 1917, gas training was begun in the First
Division at Condrecourt. This training school became the First Corps
School. Later a school was established at Langres known as the Army
Gas School while two others known as the Second and Third Corps Gas
Schools were established elsewhere. The first program of training for
troops in France provided for a total period of three months. Of this,
two days were allowed the Gas Service. Later this was reduced to six
hours, notwithstanding a vigorous protest by the Gas Service. However,
following the first gas attacks against the Americans with German
projectors in March, 1918, followed a little later by extensive attacks
with mustard gas, the A. E. F. Gas Defense School was established at
the Experimental Field. Arrangements were made for the accommodation
of 200 officers for a six-day course. The number instructed actually
averaged about 150, due to the feeling among Division Commanders that
they could not spare quite so many officers as were required to furnish
200 per week.
This school was conducted under the Commandant of Hanlon Field,
Lieutenant Colonel Hildebrand, by Captain Bush of the British Service.
This Gas Defense School became one of the most efficient schools in
the A. E. F., and was developing methods of teaching that were highly
successful in protecting troops in the field.
=Failure of German Gas.= The losses of the Americans from German gas
attacks fluctuated through rather wide limits. There were times in the
early days during training when this reached 65 per cent of the total
casualties. There were other times in battle, when due to extremely
severe losses from machine gun fire in attacks, that the proportion of
gas losses to all other forms of casualties was very small. On the
whole the casualties from gas reached 27.3 of all casualties. This
small percentage was due solely to the fact that when the Americans
made their big attacks at San Mihiel and the Argonne, the German supply
of gas had run very low. This was particularly true of the supply of
mustard gas.
[Illustration: FIG. 11.—German Gas Alarms.]
Fries was at the front visiting the Headquarters of the First Army and
the Headquarters of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Corps from two days before
the beginning of the battle of the Argonne to four days afterwards. He
watched reports of the battle on the morning of the attack at the Army
Headquarters and later at the 1st, 5th and 3d Corps headquarters in
the order named. No reports of any gas casualties were received. This
situation continued throughout the day. It was so remarkable that he
told the Chief of Staff he could attribute the German failure to use
gas to only one of two possible conditions; first, the enemy was out of
gas; second, he was preparing some master stroke. The first proved to
be the case as examination after the Armistice of German shell dumps
captured during the advance revealed less than 1 per cent of mustard
gas shell. Even under these circumstances the Germans caused quite a
large number of gas casualties during the later stages of the fighting
in the Argonne-Meuse sector.
Evidently the Germans, immediately after the opening of the attack, or
more probably some days before, began to gather together all available
mustard gas and other gases along the entire western battle front,
and ship them to the American sector. This conclusion seems justified
because the enemy never had a better chance to use gas effectively than
he did the first three or four days of the Argonne fight, and knowing
this fact he certainly would never have failed to use the gas if it had
been available. Had he possessed 50 per cent of his artillery shell in
the shape of mustard gas, our losses in the Argonne-Meuse fight would
have been at least 100,000 more than it was. Indeed, it is more than
possible we would never have succeeded in taking Sedan and Mezieres in
the fall of 1918.
=Officers’ Training Camp.= The first lot of about 100 officers were
sent to France in July, 1918, with only a few days’ training, and in
some cases with no training at all. Accordingly, arrangements were made
to train these men in the duties of the soldier in the ranks, and then
as officers. Their training in gas defense and offense followed a month
of strenuous work along the above mentioned lines.
This camp was established near Hanlon (Experimental) Field, at a
little town called Choignes. The work as laid out included squad and
company training for the ordinary soldier, each officer taking turns in
commanding the company at drill. They were given work in map reading as
well as office and company administration.
This little command was a model of cleanliness and military discipline,
and attracted most favorable comment from staff officers on duty at
General Headquarters less than two miles distant. Just before the
Armistice arrangements were made to transfer this work to Chignon,
about 25 miles southeast of Tours, where ample buildings and grounds
were available to carry out not alone training of officers but of
soldiers along the various lines of work they would encounter, from the
handling of a squad, to being Chief Gas Officer of a Division.
=Educating the Army in the Use of Gas.= As has been remarked before,
the Medical Department in starting the manufacture of gas masks and
other defensive appliances, and the Bureau of Mines in starting
researches into poisonous gases as well as defensive materials, were
the only official bodies who early interested themselves in gas
warfare. Due to this early work of the Bureau of Mines and the Medical
Department in starting mask manufacture as well as training in the
wearing of gas masks, the defensive side of gas warfare became known
throughout the army very far in advance of the offensive side. On the
other hand, since the Ordnance Department, which was at first charged
with the manufacture of poisonous gases, made practically no move for
months, the offensive use of gas did not become known among United
States troops until after they landed in France.
Moreover, no gas shell was allowed to be fired by the artillery in
practice even in France, so that all the training in gas the artillery
could get until it went into the line was defensive, with lectures on
the offensive.
The work of raising gas troops was not begun until the late fall of
1917 and as their work is highly technical and dangerous, they were not
ready to begin active work on the American front until June, 1918.
By that time the army was getting pretty well drilled in gas defense
and despite care in that respect were getting into a frame of mind
almost hostile to the use of gas by our own troops. Among certain staff
officers, as well as some commanders of fighting units, this hostility
was outspoken and almost violent.
Much the hardest, most trying and most skillful work required of
Chemical Warfare Service officers was to persuade such Staffs
and Commanders that gas was useful and get them to permit of a
demonstration on their front. Repeatedly Chemical Warfare Service
officers on Division staffs were told by officers in the field that
they had nothing to do with gas in offense, that they were simply
defensive officers. And yet no one else knew anything about the use of
gas. Gradually, however, by constantly keeping before the General Staff
and others the results of gas attacks by the Germans, by the British,
by the French, and by ourselves, headway was made toward getting our
Armies to use gas effectively in offense.
But so slow was this work that it was necessary to train men
particularly how to appeal to officers and commanders on the subject.
Indeed the following phrase, used first by Colonel Mayo-Smith,
became a watchword throughout the Service in the latter part of the
war—“Chemical Warfare Service officers have got to go out and sell gas
to the Army.” In other words we had to adopt much the same means of
making gas known that the manufacturer of a new article adopts to make
a thing manufactured by him known to the public.
[Illustration: FIG. 12.—A Typical Shell Dump near the Front.]
This work was exceedingly trying, requiring great skill, great
patience and above all a most thorough knowledge of the subject. As
illustrating some of these difficulties, the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3 (Operations) of a certain American Corps refused to consider a
recommendation to use gas on a certain point in the battle of the
Argonne unless the gas officer would state in writing that if the gas
was so used it could not possibly result in the casualty of a single
American soldier. Such an attitude was perfectly absurd.
The Infantry always expects some losses from our own high explosive
when following a barrage, and though realizing the tremendous value of
gas, this staff officer refused to use it without an absolute guarantee
in writing that it could not possibly injure a single American soldier.
Another argument often used was that a gas attack brought retaliatory
fire on the front where the gas was used. Such objectors were narrow
enough not to realize that the mere fact of heavy retaliation indicated
the success of the gas on the enemy for everyone knows an enemy does
not retaliate against a thing which does not worry him.
But on the other hand, when the value of gas troops had become fully
known, the requests for them were so great that a single platoon had to
be assigned to brigades, and sometimes even to whole Divisions. Thus
it fell to the Lieutenants commanding these platoons to confer with
Division Commanders and Staffs, to recommend how, when and where to use
gas, and do so in a manner which would impress the Commanding General
and the Staff sufficiently to allow them to undertake the job. That no
case of failure has been reported is evidence of the splendid ability
of these officers on duty with the gas troops. Efficiency in the big
American battles was demanded to an extent unheard of in peace, and had
any one of these officers made a considerable failure, it certainly
would have been reported and Fries would have heard of it.
Equally hard, and in many cases even more so, was the work of the gas
officers on Division, Corps and Army Staffs, who handled the training
in Divisions, and who also were required to recommend the use of gas
troops, the use of gas in artillery shell and in grenades, and the
use of smoke by the infantry in attack. However, the success of the
Chemical Warfare Service in the field with these Staff officers was
just as great as with the Regiment.
To the everlasting credit of those Staff Officers and the Officers of
the Gas Regiment from Colonel Atkisson down, both Staff Gas officers
and officers of the Gas Regiment worked together in the fullest harmony
with the single object of defeating the Germans.
CHEMICAL WARFARE TROOPS
Chemical Warfare troops were divided into two distinct divisions—gas
regiments and staff troops.
[Illustration: FIG. 13.—Firing a 155-Millimeter Howitzer.
The men are wearing gas masks to keep out the enemy gas fired at them
in Oct., 1918.]
=Staff Troops.= The staff troops of the Chemical Warfare Service
performed all work required of gas troops except that of actual
fighting. They handled all Chemical Warfare Service supplies from
the time they were unloaded from ships to the time they were issued
to the fighting troops at the front, whether the fighting troops
were Chemical Warfare or any other. They furnished men for clerical
and other services with the Army, Corps and Division Gas Officers,
and they manufactured poisonous gases, filled gas shells and did all
repairing and altering of gas masks. Though these men received none of
the glamour or glory that goes with the fighting men at the front, yet
they performed services of the most vital kind and in many cases did
work as dangerous and hair raising as going over the top in the face of
bursting shell and screaming machine gun bullets.
Think of the intense interest these men must have felt when carrying
from the field of battle to the laboratory or experimental field,
shell loaded with strange and unheard of compounds and which might any
moment burst and end forever their existence! Or watch them drilling
into a new shell knowing not what powerful poison or explosive it might
contain or what might happen when the drill “went through”!
And again what determination it took to work 12 or 16 hours a day way
back at the depots repairing or altering masks, and, as was done at
Chateroux, alter and repair 15,000 masks a day and be so rushed that
at times they had a bare day’s work of remodeled masks ahead. But they
kept ahead and to the great glory of these men no American soldier ever
had to go to the front without a mask. And what finer work than that
of these men who, in the laboratory and testing room, toyed with death
in testing unknown gases with American and foreign masks even to the
extent of applying the gases to their own bodies.
Heroic, real American work, all of it and done in real American style
as part of the day’s work without thought of glory and without hope of
reward.
=The First Gas Regiment.= In the first study of army organization made
by the General Staff it was decided to recommend raising under the
Chief of Engineers one regiment of six companies of gas troops.
Shortly after the cable of August 17, 1917, was sent stating that
Lieut. Colonel Fries would be made Chief of the Gas Service, the War
Department promoted him to be Colonel of the 30th Engineers which
later became the First Gas Regiment. At almost the same time, Captain
Atkisson, Corps of Engineers, was appointed Lieut. Col. of the
Regiment. Although Colonel Fries remained the nominal Commander of the
regiment, he never acted in that capacity, for his duties as Chief of
the Gas Service left him neither time nor opportunity. All the credit
for raising, training, and equipping the First Gas Regiment belongs to
Colonel E. J. Atkisson and the officers picked by him.
Immediately upon the formation of the Gas Service, the Chief urged
that many more than six companies of gas troops should be provided.
These recommendations were repeated and urged for the next two months
or until about the first of November, when it became apparent that an
increase could not be obtained at that time and that any further urging
would only cause irritation. The matter was therefore dropped until a
more auspicious time should arrive. This arrived the next spring when
the first German projector attack against United States troops produced
severe casualties, exactly as had been forecasted by the Gas Service.
About the middle of March, 1918, an increase from two battalions to
six battalions (eighteen companies) was authorized. A further increase
to three regiments of six battalions each (a total of fifty-four
companies) was authorized early in September, 1918, after the very
great value of gas troops had been demonstrated in the fight from the
Marne to the Vesle in July.
[Illustration: FIG. 14.—Receiving and Transmitting Data for Firing Gas
Shell while Wearing Gas Masks. Battlefield of the Argonne, October,
1918.]
=No Equipment for Gas Troops.= About the first of December a
cablegram was received from the United States stating that due to
lack of equipment the various regiments of special engineers recently
authorized, including the 30th (Gas and Flame) would not be organized
until the spring of 1918. An urgent cablegram was then sent calling
attention to the fact that gas troops were not service of supply troops
but first line fighting troops, and consequently that they should be
raised and trained in time to take the field with the first Americans
going into the line. At this same time the 30th regiment was given
early priority by the General Staff, A. E. F., on the priority lists
for troop shipments from the United States. The raising of the first
two companies was then continued under Colonel Atkisson at the American
University in Washington.
About January 15 word was received that the Headquarters of the
regiment and the Headquarters of the First Battalion together with
Companies A and B of the 30th Engineers (later the First Gas Regiment)
were expected to arrive very soon. Some months prior General Foulkes,
Chief of the British Gas Service in the field, had stated that he would
be glad to have the gas troops assigned to him for training. It was
agreed that the training should include operations in the front line
for a time to enable the American Gas Troops to carry on gas operations
independently of anyone else and with entire safety to themselves and
the rest of the Army.
Due to the fact that the British were occupying their gas school,
the British General Headquarters were a little reluctant to take the
American troops Feb. 1. However, General Foulkes made room for the
American troops by moving his own troops out. He then placed his best
officers in charge of their training and at all times did everything
in his power to help the American Gas Troops learn the gas game and
get sufficient supplies to operate with. Colonel Hartley, Assistant to
General Foulkes, also did everything he could to help the American Gas
Service. These two officers did more than any other foreign officers in
France to enable the Chemical Warfare Service to make the success it
did.
=Second Battle of the Marne.= The Chief of the Gas Service, following
a visit to the British Gas Headquarters, and the Headquarters of the
American 2d Corps then operating with the British, arrived on the
evening of July 17, 1918, at 1st Corps Headquarters at La Ferte sous
Jouarre about 10 miles southeast of Château-Thierry.
Two companies of the First Gas Regiment would have been ready in 48
hours to put off a projector attack against an excellent target just
west of Belleau Wood had not the 2d battle of the Marne opened when
it did. It is said that General Foch had kept this special attack so
secret that the First American Corps Commander knew it less than 48
hours prior to the hour set for its beginning. Certainly the Chief of
the Gas Service knew nothing of it until about 9:00 P.M., the night of
July 17th. Consequently the gas attack was not made. At that time so
little was known of the usefulness of gas troops that they were started
on road work. At Colonel Atkisson’s suggestion that gas troops could
clean out machine gun nests, he was asked to visit the First Corps
headquarters and take up his suggestion vigorously with the First Corps
Staff.
=Attacking Machine Gun Nests.= Thereupon the Gas troops were allowed
to try attacking machine gun nests with phosphorus and thermite. This
work proved so satisfactory that not long afterwards the General Staff
authorized an increase in gas troops from 18 companies to 54 companies,
to be formed into three regiments of two battalions each. The 6
companies in France did excellent work with smoke and thermite during
all the second battle of the Marne to the Vesle river, where by means
of smoke screens they made possible the crossing of that river and the
gaining of a foothold on the north or German side.
With the assembling of American troops in the sector near Verdun in
September, 1918, the gas troops were all collected there with the
exception of one or two companies and took a very active part in
the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. It was at this battle that
the Chemical Warfare Service really began to handle offensive gas
operations in the way they should be handled. Plans were drawn for
the use of gas and smoke by artillery and gas troops both. The use of
high explosives in Liven’s bombs was also planned. Those plans were
properly co-ordinated with all the other arms of the service in making
the attack. Gas was to be used not alone by gas troops but by the
artillery. Plans were made so that the different kinds of gases would
be used where they would do the most good. While these plans and their
execution were far from perfect, they marked a tremendous advance and
demonstrated to everyone the possibilities that lay in gas and smoke
both with artillery and with gas troops.
Following the attack on the St. Mihiel salient, came the battle of the
Argonne, where plans were drawn as before, using the added knowledge
gained at St. Mihiel. The work was accordingly more satisfactory.
However, the attempt to cover the entire American front of nine
divisions with only six companies proved too great a task. Practically
all gas troops were put in the front line the morning of the attack.
Due to weather conditions they used mostly phosphorus and thermite
with 4 inch Stokes’ mortars. Having learned how useful these were in
taking machine gun nests, plans were made to have them keep right up
with the Infantry. This they did in a remarkable manner considering the
weight of the Stokes’ mortar and the base plates and also that each
Stokes’ mortar bomb weighed about 25 pounds. There were cases where
they carried these mortars and bombs for miles on their backs, while in
other cases they used pack animals.
[Illustration: FIG. 15.—Setting Up a Smoke Barrage with Smoke Pots.]
Not expecting the battle to be nearly continuous as it was for three
weeks, the men, as before stated, were all put in the front line
the morning of the attack. This resulted in their nearly complete
exhaustion the first week, since they fought or marched day and night
during nearly the whole time. Taking a lesson from this, in later
attacks only half the men were put in the line in the first place, no
matter if certain sectors had to be omitted. Fully as good results were
obtained because, as the men became worn out, fresh ones were sent
in and the others given a chance to recuperate. Officers relate many
different occurrences showing the discipline and character of these gas
troops. On one occasion where a battalion of infantry was being held up
by a machine gun nest, volunteers were called for. Only two men, both
from the gas regiment, volunteered though they were joined a little
later by two others from the same regiment, and these four took the
guns. While it was not considered desirable for gas troops to attempt
to take prisoners, yet the regiment took quite a number, due solely
to the fact that they were not only with the advancing infantry but
at times actually in front of it. On another occasion a gas officer,
seeing a machine gun battalion badly shot up and more or less rattled,
took command and got them into action in fine shape.
At this stage the Second Army was formed to the southeast of Verdun
and plans were drawn for a big attack about November 14. The value of
gas troops was appreciated so much that the Second Army asked to have
British gas troops assigned to them since no American gas troops were
available. Accordingly in response to a request made by the American
General Headquarters, the British sent 10 companies of their gas
troops. These reached the front just before the Armistice, and hence
were unable to carry out any attacks there.
This short history of the operations of the First Gas Regiment
covers only the high spots in its organization and work. It covers
particularly its early troubles, as those are felt to be the ones most
important to have in mind if ever it be necessary again to organize
C. W. S. troops on an extensive scale. The Regiment engaged in nearly
200 separate actions with poisonous gases, smoke and high explosives,
and took part in every big battle from the second battle of the Marne
to the end of the War. They were the first American troops to train
with the British, and were undoubtedly the first American troops
to take actual part in fighting the enemy as they aided the British
individually and as entire units in putting off gas attacks, in
February and March, 1918. It would be a long history itself to recite
the actions in which the First Gas Regiment took part and in which it
won distinction.[16]
[Footnote 16: Story of the First Gas Regiment, James T. Addison.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919.]
No better summary of the work of this Regiment can be written than that
of Colonel Atkisson in the four concluding paragraphs of his official
report written just after the Armistice:
“The First Gas Regiment was made up largely of
volunteers—volunteers for this special service. Little
was known of its character when the first information
was sent broadcast over the United States, bringing
it to the attention of the men of our country. The
keynote of this information was a desire for keen,
red-blooded men who wanted to fight. They came into it
in the spirit of a fighting unit, and were ready, not
only to develop, but to make a new service. No effort
was spared to make the organization as useful as the
strength of the limited personnel allowed.
“The first unit to arrive in France moved to the
forward area within eight weeks of its arrival, and,
from that time, with the exception of four weeks, was
continuously in forward areas carrying on operations.
The third and last unit moved forward within six weeks
of its arrival in France, and was continuously engaged
until the signing of the Armistice.
“That the regiment entered the fight and carried the
methods developed into execution where they would be of
value, is witnessed by the fact that over thirty-five
percent of the strength of the unit became casualties.
“It is only fitting to record the spirit and true
devotion which prompted the officers and men who
came from civil life into this Regiment, mastered
the details of this new service, and, through their
untiring efforts and utter disregard of self, made
possible any success which the Regiment may have had.
It was truly in keeping with the high ideals which have
prompted our entire Army and Country in this conflict.
They made the motto of ‘Service,’ a real, living,
inspiring thing.”
SUPPLY
As previously stated it was decided early that the Chemical Warfare
Service should have a complete supply service including purchase,
manufacture, storage and issue, and accordingly separate supply depots
were picked out for the Gas Service early in the fall by Col. Crawford.
Where practicable these were located in the same area as all other
depots though in one instance the French forced the Gas Service to
locate its gas shell and bomb depot some fifteen miles from the general
depots through an unreasonable fear of the gas.
=Manufacture of Gases.= Due to the time required and the cost of
manufacturing gases, an early decision became imperative as to what
gases should be used by the Americans, and into what shells and bombs
they should be filled. As there was no one else working on the subject
the sole responsibility fell upon the Chief of the Gas Service. The
work was further complicated by the fact that the British and French
did not agree upon what gases should be used. The British condemned
viciously Vincennite (hydrocyanic acid gas with some added ingredients)
of the French, while the French stated that chloropicrin, used by the
British principally as a lachrymator, was worthless. Fries felt the
tremendous responsibility that rested upon him and finally after much
thought and before coming to any conclusion, wrote the first draft of
a short paper on gas warfare. In that paper he took up the tactical
uses to which gases might be put and then studied the best and most
available gases to meet those tactical needs.
Without stating further details it was decided to recommend the
manufacture and use of chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, bromoacetone
and mustard gas. As the gas service was also charged with handling
smoke and incendiary materials, smoke was prescribed in the proportion
of 5 per cent of the total chemicals to be furnished. The smoke
material decided upon was white phosphorus.
The paper on Gas Warfare was then re-drafted and submitted to the
French and British and written up in final form prescribing the gases
above mentioned on October 26. Following this a cable was drawn and
submitted to the General Staff. After many conferences and some delay
the cable went forward on November 3.
CABLE 268, NOVEMBER 4, 1917
Paragraph 12. For chief of Ordnance. With reference to
paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, desire prompt information
as to whether recommendation is approved that phosgene,
chloropicrin, hydrocyanic acid, and chlorine be
purchased in France or England and filling plants
established in France for filling shells and bombs with
those gases.
Subparagraph A. Reference to your telegram 253,
recommend filling approximately 10 per cent all shells
with gases as given below, but that filling plants
and gas factories be made capable of filling a total
of 25 per cent. Unless ordinary name is given, gases
are designated by numbers in chemical code War Gas
investigations. Of 75 millimeter shells fill 1 per cent
Vincennite, 4 per cent phosgene or trichloromethyl
chloroformate, 2 per cent chloropicrin, 2½ per cent
mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per
cent with smoke material. According to French 75
millimeter steel shells should not be filled with
Vincennite more than three months before being used.
No trouble with other gases or other sized shells
except that bromoacetone must be in glass lined shells.
Of 4.7 inch shells fill 5 per cent with phosgene
or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent with
chloropicrin, 2½ per cent with mustard gas, ½ per cent
with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material.
Provide same percentage for all other shells up to and
including 8 inch caliber as for 4.7 inch shells. 4 inch
Stokes’ mortar will use same gases and smoke shells and
in addition thermit. 8 inch projector bombs will use
the same as the Stokes’ mortar and also oil to break
into flame on _bursting_. Cloud gas cylinders
will be filled with 50 or 60 per cent phosgene, mixed
with 40 to 50 per cent chlorine, or phosgene and some
other gas. Renew recommendation that filling plants be
established in France to provide sudden shifts in gas
warfare of all kinds, as well as for filling all 4 inch
Stokes’ mortar bombs, 8 inch projector bombs and cloud
gas cylinders. It is strongly recommended that efforts
be made to produce white phosphorus on large scale for
its usefulness both as smoke screens and to produce
casualties.
Subparagraph B. For the Adjutant General of the Army.
With reference to paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, desire
information as to whether recommendation is approved
that an engineer officer assisted by Professor Hulett
be assigned to Gas Service in Washington to handle all
orders and correspondence concerning gas.
Subparagraph C. For Surgeon General. With reference to
paragraph 2 your cablegram 205, and paragraph 2, my
cablegram 181, what is status of chemical laboratory
for France? Also have the 12 selected Reserve Officers
for training in gas defense sailed for France?
Subparagraph D. With reference to paragraph 17 your
cablegram 165 and paragraph 2 my cablegram 181,
Tissot has constructed simpler model of his mask for
attachment to any box. Have ordered 6 which will be
completed in two weeks, 3 of which will be forwarded
at once. A simple type such as this may prove useful
for large number of troops. Letter of permission to
manufacture Tissot masks being forwarded.
Subparagraph E. With reference to paragraph 8 your
cablegram 143, and paragraph 4 your cablegram 247, in
considering charcoal and other fillers for canister of
box respirator it should be remembered that the front
is very damp, the air being nearly saturated during
greater part of winter, fall and spring.
This cable is given in full to show that not later than November 4,
1917, it was known in the United States not only what gases would be
required but also in what shells, bombs, guns and mortars each would
be used. While a small quantity of Vincennite was recommended in this
cable, another cable sent within a month requested that no Vincennite
whatever be manufactured. This decision as to gases and guns in which
they were to be used, while very progressive, proved entirely sound
and remained unchanged, with slight exceptions due to new discoveries,
until the end of the war. Without a thorough understanding of tactics a
proper choice of gases could not have been made. This fact emphasizes
the necessity of having a trained technical army man at the head of any
gas service.
Due to the absence of a Chemical Warfare Service in the United States
at this time, a very great deal of the information sent from France,
whether by cable or by letter, never reached those needing it.
=Smoke.= About the first of December after a study of results obtained
by the British and the Germans in the use of smoke in artillery shells
for screening purposes, the Gas Service decided that much more smoke
than had been stated in cable 268 to the United States was desirable.
The General Staff, however, refused to authorize any increase, but did
allow to be sent in a cable a statement to the effect that a large
increase in smoke materials might be advisable for smoke screens, and
that accordingly the amount of phosphorus needed in a year of war would
probably be three or four times the one and a half million pounds of
white phosphorus stated to have been contracted for by the Ordnance
Department in the United States. This advanced position of the Gas
Service in regard to smoke proved sound in 1918, when every effort was
made to increase the quantity of white phosphorus available and to
extend its use in artillery shells including even the 3 inch Stokes’
mortar.
[Illustration: FIG. 16.—Troops Advancing Behind a Smoke Barrage
(Phosphorus).]
=Overseas Repair Section No. 1.= During the latter part of November,
1917, Overseas Repair Section No. 1, under the command of Captain
Mayo-Smith, Sanitary Corps, with four other officers and 130 men,
arrived in France. Since mask development and manufacture in the United
States was still under the Medical Department, this mask repair section
was organized as a part of the Sanitary Corps. As there were at that
time no masks to be repaired and no laboratory equipment or buildings
for that purpose on hand and none likely to be for months to come,
Captain Mayo-Smith was assigned to duty under Colonel Crawford, Chief
Gas Officer with the Line of Communication, in Paris. A site for a mask
repair plant was located at Châteauroux, and a site for a gas depot at
Gievres was investigated. Inasmuch as there was at that time greater
need for men to learn the handling of poisonous gases than to repair
masks, some 40 or 50 of the company were put in gas shell filling
plants at Aubervilliers and Vincennes in the suburbs of Paris, while
later still others were assigned to Pont de Claix near Grenoble. The
remainder of the company were used in the Gas Depot at Gievres and in
the office in Paris.
It was not until the latter part of June, 1918, that the mask repair
plant began operations. In the meantime these men did very valuable
work in shell filling and in learning the manufacture of gases.
Several of them were sent to the United States, some of them remaining
throughout the war to aid in gas manufacture and in shell filling.
=Construction Division, Gas Service.= The Construction Division
under Colonel Crawford in Paris made complete plans for phosgene
manufacturing plants, for shell filling plants and for the Mask Repair
Plant. These plans included a complete layout of the work for all
persons to be employed in the plants. During this same time a very
careful study of the possibilities for manufacturing gas for filling
shell in France was made.
Finally about March 1, in accordance with the strong recommendations
of these men, Fries reported to General Pershing in person that the
manufacture of gas as well as the filling of shell in France was
inadvisable from every point of view and accordingly he recommended
that gas manufacture and shell filling in France be given up. General
Pershing strongly approved the recommendation and a cablegram was at
once sent to the United States to that effect. The main reason for
this action was the lack of chlorine, since chlorine was the principal
ingredient of nearly all poisonous gases then in use. Chlorine takes,
besides salt, electric power and lots of it. Electric power requires
coal or water power. Neither of the latter sources were available in
France. This question was gone into very thoroughly. The only place
where power might have been developed was in a remote spot near Spain,
and the outlook there was such that it appeared impossible to begin
the manufacture of chlorine under two years. On the other hand the
shipment of chlorine from the United States required from 75 per
cent to 100 per cent of the tonnage required to ship the manufactured
gases themselves, to say nothing of the labor, raw materials, and the
machinery that would have had to be shipped in order to manufacture gas
in France.
=Mustard Gas.= As previously stated Mustard Gas was first used by the
Germans against the British at Ypres on the nights of July 11 and 12,
1917. It was not used much against the French until more than two
months later. Indeed, gas was never used by the Germans to the same
extent against the French as against the English. There are probably
two reasons for this; first, the Germans had a deeper hatred for the
British than the French; second, the British morale was higher than the
French in 1917, and the German thought that if he could break down this
British morale, he could win the war.
The first attack came as a surprise and accordingly got an unusually
large number of casualties. As previously stated the casualties
numbered about 20,000 in about six weeks. This number was considered
so serious that the beginning of the series of attacks against Ypres
in the fall of 1917, was delayed by the British for 10 days or two
weeks until they could study better how to avoid such great losses from
mustard gas. While the composition of the gas was known within two or
three days, as well as the laboratory method by which it was first
manufactured by Victor Meyer in 1886, it took some 11 months to develop
reliable and practical methods of manufacturing it on a large scale.
The Inter-allied Gas Conference in September, 1917, gave a great deal
of attention to mustard gas and methods of combating it both from the
view point of prevention and of curing those gassed by it.
Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to
the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene
chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas
by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of
October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture
of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved
had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and
others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told
in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it
could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if
the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands
of the British they would have received far less information than they
already possessed on mustard gas.
[Illustration: FIG. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”]
Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas
ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the
methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to
those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion
rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the
difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard
gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large
scale.
=Delay of British Masks.= As December 1 approached, and as nothing
further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators
placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England
asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the
masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1,
1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these
masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning
a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams
with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from
there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that
the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first
contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the
delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English
Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough
for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order
for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were
facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line
with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only
mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no
protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from
cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that
our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly
arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.
Colonel Harrison of the British Royal Engineers was in charge of
the British manufacture of masks and it is desired here to express
appreciation of his uniform courtesy and great helpfulness. He
exhibited their methods and facilities and assured us they could meet
any requirements of ours for masks up to a half million, or even more
if necessary, provided they were given time to establish additional
facilities. Finally after a further exchange of cables the masks were
obtained.
During December, 1917 and January, 1918, when every effort was being
made to hurry a lot of masks from Havre—Havre being the British supply
base in France from which the masks were issued to the United States,
the severe cold and snow had so disorganized French traffic that it
was extremely difficult to get cars moving at all. In an effort to
get the masks, priority of shipment was obtained and two or three
officers were assigned to convoy the cars. Notwithstanding convoying,
one carload of 4,000 masks, mainly threes and fours, became lost and
only turned up five weeks later. To make matters worse the British were
sending us very many more of the small sized No. 2 masks than we could
use. The loss of this carload of 4,000 number threes and fours was all
but a tragedy. Indeed, in order to get the First Brigade of the First
Division equipped in time it was necessary to take a large number of
masks already issued to men of the Second Brigade. These masks were
first thoroughly washed and disinfected and then re-issued.
This all emphasizes the great difficulties that are encountered when
a new and vital service must be organized in war 4,000 miles overseas
without material, home supplies, or men to draw from. This struggle
to get sufficient masks to keep all men fully equipped remained very
acute until in July, 1918, when the arrival of hundreds of thousands
of masks from the United States made the situation entirely safe. Even
then the necessity of weakening the elastics and shortening the rubber
tubing of the mouthpieces on some 700,000 masks, doubled up our work
tremendously, and added enormously to our troubles in getting masks to
the front in time.
Notwithstanding these troubles the Chemical Warfare Supply Service
never failed and finally forged to the very forefront of all American
supply services. Its method of issuing supplies to troops at the front
has been adopted as the standard for American field armies of the
future.
TECHNICAL
=Gas Laboratory in Paris.= Early in January, 1918, the first members
of the Chemical Service Section, National Army, under the command
of Colonel R. F. Bacon, arrived in France and reported for duty.
Previously, a laboratory site at Puteaux, a suburb of Paris, had been
selected. This plant had been built by a society for investigation
into tuberculosis. Previous to the arrival of the Chemical Service
Section, information had been requested from the United States by cable
as to the size of the laboratory section to be sent over. The reply
stated that the number would probably total about 100 commissioned
and enlisted. The site at Puteaux was accordingly definitely decided
upon. Just following this decision two cables, one after the other,
came from the United States recommending certain specified buildings in
Paris for the laboratory. It was found upon investigation in both cases
that the buildings were either absolutely unsuited or unfinished. This
was another case of trying to fight a war over 4,000 miles of cable.
Colonel Bacon was made head of the Technical Division, which position
he held throughout the war.
[Illustration: FIG. 18.—Shaper for Opening Captured Gas Shell.]
=Technically Trained Men.= In January, 1918, in response to a cable
from the United States a request had been made on the French Government
to send six of their ablest glass blowers to the United States to aid
in making glass lined shells. The French Gas authorities said that it
would be impossible to send those or indeed any other men trained in
the manufacture or handling of poisonous gases or gas containers as
they did not have enough such men for their own work. Accordingly a
cablegram was drafted and sent to the United States, requesting that
50 men experienced in various lines of technical and chemical work be
sent to France. The French authorities said they would put them in any
factories, laboratories or experimental places that the Chief of the
Gas Service desired. A second inquiry about these men was sent but
nevertheless no answer was ever received and no men were sent.
=Protection Against Particulate Clouds.= Just at this time, about the
first of February, 1918, the danger that the Germans might devise some
better method of sending over diphenylchloroarsine than by pulverizing
it in high explosive shell was felt to be serious. The British had just
then perfected protection against diphenylchloroarsine by employing
unsized sulfate wood pulp paper—48 to 60 layers being required. This
number of layers was found to be necessary as they are very thin and
porous. The British had developed a method of putting this paper around
a canister and yet keeping the canister small enough to fit into the
knapsack by reversing its position therein; that is, putting the
canister in the compartment of the knapsack made for the face piece
and putting the face piece in the other compartment. Some of our own
officers and enlisted men were sent to England to work with the British
on this and an order given them for 200,000 of the protected canisters.
They improved on the methods of the British and as it was found that
sulfate paper was very scarce, investigations were made to see if any
of it could be manufactured in France. Very soon thereafter such a
place was located near the city of Nancy. Following this a cablegram
was sent to the United States giving complete specifications for making
this diphenylchloroarsine protection. From this cablegram successful
samples were made though somewhat more bulky than those developed in
England. Very few, however, of these were made in the United States
due, we were informed, to the poor quality of the sulfate paper. Work
was however begun energetically in the United States on other methods
of protection against diphenylchloroarsine.
=Numbers of Chemists Needed.= It was figured that out of a total force
of some 1,400 gas officers there would be needed in the A. E. F.,
exclusive of those in regiments, approximately 200 chemists, i.e.,
about 15 per cent of the whole. We arranged to have a good chemist on
each Division, Corps and Army Staff, and a certain number with the gas
troops. It was proposed to put 20 to 40 in the laboratory in Paris and
not to exceed 20 at the experimental field. This subject of personnel
is touched on for the reason that a few people seem to have the idea
that the Chemical Warfare Service should be made up of chemists
exclusively. This is very far from being true. It was and is believed
that the Chemical Warfare Service should be composed of men from every
walk of life. In three positions out of every four in the field a good
personality combined with energy, hard work and common sense count for
more than mere technical training.
=Hanlon (Experimental) Field.= As early as December 15, 1917, it
was decided that an experimental field in France was necessary, and
a letter was written to the General Staff requesting authority to
establish one. After considerable delay the authority was granted and
search for a site begun. This was no easy task. While the French were
loading millions of gas shells at the edge of Paris, they appeared
unwilling at first to have us establish a gas experimental field
except in abandoned or inaccessible spots. Finally a very good site
was found and agreed to by the French some 7 miles south of General
Headquarters. Just when we were ready to start work the French
discovered that the proposed field included a portion of one of their
artillery firing ranges. They then suggested another site within 3
miles of General Headquarters. This was a rather fortunate accident as
the site suggested was a better one than at first picked out. The field
was roughly rectangular from 7 to 8 miles in length, and 3 to 4 miles
in width. The total area was about 20 square miles. The work of this
experimental field proved a great success and was rapidly becoming the
real center of the Gas Service in France.
The old saying that the history of a happy country is very brief
applies to this story of the Technical Section of the Gas Service in
France. Its work did not begin as early as that of the other sections,
and as considerable of it was of a nature that could be put off without
immediate fatal effects, the Section was enabled to grow without
the very serious drawbacks encountered by other Sections of the Gas
Service.
Nevertheless its usefulness was very great. Those of the Technical
Section either at the experimental field or at the laboratory were
charged with the opening of all sorts of known and unknown gas and high
explosive shells, fuses and similar things to determine their contents
and their poisonous or explosive qualities. This was work of a very
technical nature, and at the same time highly dangerous.
As stated elsewhere, the determination of the life of the masks became
one of the problems which the laboratory was trying to solve. Hundreds
of canisters were tested, and hundreds per month would have continued
to have been tested throughout the remainder of the war had the war
gone into 1919. It was on the Technical Section that devolved the duty
of determining at the earliest possible moment the physical properties
as well as the physiological effects of any new gas.
Also on that Section fell the preliminary reports as to the probable
usefulness in war of a new gas whether sent over by the enemy or
suggested by our own Technical men, or those of our Allies. This
was indeed a task by itself, as it required a wide knowledge of the
methods of using gases, methods of manufacturing them, and methods of
projecting them on the field of battle.
In addition, it was the duty of the Technical Section to keep the
Chief of the Service fully informed on all the latest developments in
gases and to get that information in shape so that the Chief with his
increasingly wide range of duties would be enabled to keep track of
them without reading the enormous amount ordinarily written.
A much earlier start on technical work would have proved of immense
advantage. In case of another war, the technical side of chemical
warfare should be taken up with the very first expedition that proceeds
to the hostile zone. Had that been done in France, we would have had
masks and gases and proper shells and bombs at least six months before
we did.
INTELLIGENCE
While Intelligence was for a long time under the Training or Technical
Divisions, it finally assumed such importance that it was made a
separate Division. It was so thoroughly organized that by the time of
the Armistice the Chief of the Division could go anywhere among the
United States forces down to companies and immediately locate the Gas
Intelligence officer.
=Intelligence Division.= This work was started by Lieutenant
Colonel Goss within a month after he reported in October, 1917. The
Intelligence Division developed the publication of numerous occasional
pamphlets and also a weekly gas bulletin. So extensive was the work
of this Division that three mimeograph machines were kept constantly
going. The weekly bulletin received very flattering notice from the
British Assistant Chief of Gas Service in the Field. He stated that it
contained a great deal of information he was unable to get from any
other source.
Among other work undertaken by this Intelligence Division was the
compilation of a History of the Chemical Warfare Service in France.
This alone involved a lot of work. In order that this history might
be truly representative, about three months before the Armistice both
moving and still pictures were taken of actual battle conditions, as
well as of numerous works along the Service of Supplies.
Without going into further detail it is sufficient to say that when the
Armistice was signed there were available some 200 still pictures, and
some 8,000 feet of moving picture films. Steps were immediately taken
to have this work continued along definite lines to give a complete and
continuous history of the Chemical Warfare Service in France in all its
phases.
The intelligence work of the Gas Service, while parallel to a small
extent with the General Intelligence Service of the A. E. F., had to
spread to a far greater extent in order to get the technical details
of research, manufacture, development, proving, and handling poisonous
gases in the field. It included also obtaining information at the
seats of Government of the Allies, as well as from the enemy and other
foreign sources.
The most conspicuous intelligence work done along these lines was by
Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Zanetti, who was made Chemical Warfare liaison
officer with the French in October, 1917. He gathered together and
forwarded through the Headquarters of the Chemical Warfare Service
to the United States more information concerning foreign gases, and
foreign methods of manufacturing and handling them, than was sent from
all other sources combined. By his personality, energy and industry
he obtained the complete confidence of the French and British. This
confidence was of the utmost importance in enabling him to get
information which could have been obtained in no other way. Suffice to
say that in the 13 months he was liaison officer with the French during
the war, he prepared over 750 reports, some of them very technical and
of great length.
As a whole, the Intelligence Division was one of the most successful
parts of the Chemical Warfare Service. Starting 2½ years after the
British and French, the weekly bulletin and occasional papers sent
out by the Chemical Warfare Service on chemical warfare matters came
to be looked upon as the best available source for chemical warfare
information, not alone by our own troops but also by the British.
MEDICAL
The Medical Section of the Chemical Warfare Service was composed of
officers of the Medical Department of the Army attached to the Chemical
Warfare Service. These were in addition to others who worked as an
integral part of the Chemical Warfare Service, either at the laboratory
or on the experimental field in carrying out experiments on animals to
determine the effectiveness of the gases.
The Medical Section was important for the reason that it formed the
connecting link between the Chemical Warfare Service and the Medical
Department. Through this Section, the Medical Department was enabled to
know the kinds of gases that would probably be handled, both by our own
troops and by the enemy, and their probable physiological effects.
Colonel H. L. Gilchrist, Medical Department, was the head of this
Section. It was through his efforts that the Medical Department
realized in time the size of the problem that it had to encounter in
caring for gas patients. Indeed, records of the war showed that out of
224,089 men, exclusive of Marines, admitted to the hospitals in France,
70,552 were suffering from gas alone. These men received a total of
266,112 wounds, of which 88,980, or 33.4 per cent, were gas. Thus ⅓ of
all wounds received by men admitted to the hospital were gas. While
the records show that the gas cases did not remain on the average in
the hospitals quite as long as in the case of other classes of wounds,
yet gas cases became one of the most important features of the Medical
Department’s work in the field.
The Medical Section, through its intimate knowledge of what was going
on in the Chemical Warfare Service as well as what was contemplated
and being experimented with, was enabled to work out methods of
handling all gas cases far in advance of what could have been done
had there been no such section. One instance alone illustrates this
fully. It became known fairly early that if a man who had been gassed
with mustard gas could get a thorough cleansing and an entire change
of clothing within an hour after exposure, the body burns could
be eliminated or largely decreased in severity. This led to the
development of degassing units. These consisted of 1,200 gallon tanks
on five-ton trucks equipped with a heater. Accompanying this were
sprinkling arrangements whereby a man could be given a shower bath,
his nose, eyes and ears treated with bicarbonate of soda, and then be
given an entire change of clothing. These proved a very great success,
although they were not developed in time to be used extensively before
the war closed.
There is an important side to the Medical Section during peace, that
must be kept in mind. The final decision as to whether a gas should
be manufactured on a large scale and used extensively on the field of
battle depends upon its physiological and morale effect upon troops. In
the case of the most powerful gases, the determination of the relative
values of those gases so far as their effects on human beings is
concerned is a very laborious and exacting job. Such gases have to be
handled with extreme caution, necessitating many experiments over long
periods of time in order to arrive at correct decisions.