d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow
(German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then
had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow
protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that
Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to
the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.
Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the
Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:--
"Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
who stated to him that at Berlin a _demarche_ of the
Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.
Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were
endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but
that up to the present time they had not been successful in this,
and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a
_demarche_ of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky
had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did
not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the
Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension
in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]
Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold
back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this
if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which
Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression
given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge
of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have
been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.
But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its
own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6
p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Allize, the
French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:--
=" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more
or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.=
="In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day
that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him
(dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms
which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the
existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."=[85]
It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew
the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at
Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von
Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French
Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:--
"I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had
with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that
Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with
Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.
"Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government
having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....
_Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were
communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I
showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support
claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less
striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the
officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they
were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to
Serbia._"[86]
Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his
Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated
July 24, 1914:--
"I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a
surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have
despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.
"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and
England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
Germany.
"The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so,
she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]
Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch
from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French
Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from
Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris), at which the latter
twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--
"Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of
the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.
In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the
Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the
apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply
with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried
away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The
Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to
abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no
choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the
Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using
military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to
them.... The German Government consider that in the present case
there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought
seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
concerned.
"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable
consequences...."[88]
A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German
Ambassador in London.[89]
Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the
French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the
morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and
presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about
the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the
contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.
Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on
instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to
argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have
us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of
the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered
together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully
handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be
settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly
instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.
As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British
Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was
both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]
It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only
to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve
months before.
On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti
(ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:--
"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year
before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I
received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late
Foreign Minister), the following telegram:--
"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention
of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as
defensive, hoping to bring into operation the _casus foederis_
of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to
be inapplicable. (_Sensation._)
"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with
Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it
may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider
such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that,
therefore, we do not consider that the _casus foederis_
arises.
"'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'
"I replied:--
"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a
_casus foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she
is taking on her own account, since there is no question of
defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It
is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this
most perilous adventure.' (_Hear, hear._)
"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and
recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our
relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality
made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects
to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an
interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already
accepted by the Allies.
"I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes
of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely
loyal to the observance of her pledges." (_Loud applause._)[91]
As the _Times_ of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:--
"In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the
German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to
take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England,
is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for
a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia
at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor
Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of
French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers,
but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully
thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."
On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the
heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the
issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.
Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin
on July 25 wrote:--
"The English Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]
On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to
his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:--
"that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite
understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved
of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once
fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by
her duties as an ally."[93]
The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris,
in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the
German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):--
"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]
A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's
cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian
Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25,
1914:--
"Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
action."[95]
On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--
"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
attributed to Germany.
"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
justified."[96]
That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some
cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French
Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:--
"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche.
"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]
From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following
statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--
"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]
Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his
Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not
published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had
been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of
the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on
German readers![99]
On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:--
"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
preparing."[100]
But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram
sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--
"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
unreliable."[101]
On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--
"I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
previous arrangement with the Emperor William.
"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
share this feeling."[102]
Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in
Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--
="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]
Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for
as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank,
stated on January 29, 1915:--
"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."
FOOTNOTES:
[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.
[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.
[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.
[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.
[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.
[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.
[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.
[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.
[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.
[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.
[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.
[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.
[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.
[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.
[98] Cd. 7717, No. 83.
[99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.
[100] Cd. 7717, No. 78.
[101] Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.
[102] Cd. 7717, No. 87.
[103] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
APPENDIX B.
HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British
Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:--
"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
acting as if she made any such claim. _As for Germany, she knew
very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
matter._"[104]
Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at
Berlin, on July 26, 1914:--
"Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
would not act if Austria did _not_ annex territory."[105]
The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador
in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British
Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:--
"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]
So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the
Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador
in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--
"I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]
Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British
Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:--
"Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]
FOOTNOTES:
[104] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 32.
[105] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 33.
[106] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 71.
[107] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 41.
[108] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 38.
APPENDIX C.
SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.
In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government
to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the
Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:--
THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).
THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)
THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).
SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
University, 1913-14).
MR. H. A. L. FISHER (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).
MR. HAROLD COX, M.A. (Editor, _Edinburgh Review_).
SIR KENELM E. DIGBY, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
State at Home Office, 1895-1903).
This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the
evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave
conclusions:--