HEGEL.
_George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel_ was born at Stuttgart, the 27th of
August, 1770. In his eighteenth year he entered the university of
Tübingen, in order to devote himself to the study of theology. During
his course of study here, he attracted no marked attention; Schelling,
who was his junior in years, shone far beyond all his contemporaries.
After leaving Tübingen, he took a situation as private tutor, first in
Switzerland, and afterwards in Frankfort-on-the-Main till 1801, when he
settled down at Jena. At first he was regarded as a disciple, and
defender of Schelling’s philosophy, and as such he wrote in 1801 his
first minor treatise on the “_Difference between Fichte and Schelling_.”
Soon afterwards he became associated with Schelling in publishing the
“_Critical Journal of Philosophy_,” 1802-3, for which he furnished a
number of important articles. His labors as an academical teacher met at
first with but little encouragement; he gave his first lecture to only
four hearers. Yet in 1806 he became professor in the university, though
the political catastrophe in which the country was soon afterwards
involved, deprived him again of the place. Amid the cannon’s thunder of
the battle of Jena he finished “_the Phenomenology of the Mind_,” his
first great and independent work, the crown of his Jena labors. He was
subsequently in the habit of calling this book which appeared in 1807,
his “voyage of discovery.” From Jena, Hegel for want of the means of
subsistence went to Bamberg, where for two years he was editor of a
political journal published there. In the fall of 1808, he became rector
of the gymnasium at Nuremberg. In this situation he wrote his _Logic_,
1812-16. All his works were produced slowly, and he first properly began
his literary activity as Schelling finished his. In 1816, he received a
call to a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, where in 1817 he
published his “_Encyclopædia of the philosophical sciences_,” in which
for the first time he showed the whole circuit of his system. But his
peculiar fame, and his far-reaching activity, dates first from his call
to Berlin in 1818. It was at Berlin that he surrounded himself with an
extensive and very actively scientific school, and where through his
connection with the Prussian government he gained a political influence
and acquired a reputation for his philosophy, as _the_ philosophy of the
State, though this neither speaks favorably for its inner purity, nor
its moral credit. Yet in his “_Philosophy of Rights_,” which appeared in
1821 (a time, to be sure, when the Prussian State had not yet shown any
decidedly anti-constitutional tendency), Hegel does not deny the
political demands of the present age; he declares in favor of popular
representation, freedom of the press, and publicity of judicial
proceedings, trial by jury, and an administrative independence of
corporations.
In Berlin, Hegel gave lectures upon almost every branch of philosophy,
and these have been published by his disciples and friends after his
death. His manner as a lecturer was stammering, clumsy, and unadorned,
but was still not without a peculiar attraction as the immediate
expression of profound thoughtfulness. His social intercourse was more
with the uncultivated than with the learned; he was not fond of shining
as a genius in social circles. In 1829 he became rector of the
university, an office which he administered in a more practical manner
than Fichte had done. Hegel died with the cholera, Nov. 14th, 1831, the
day also of Leibnitz’s death. He rests in the same churchyard with
Solger and Fichte, near by the latter, and not far from the former. His
writings and lectures form seventeen volumes which have appeared since
1882: Vol. I. Minor Articles; II. Phenomenology; III-V. Logic; VI.-VII.
Encyclopædia; VIII. Philosophy of Rights; IX. Philosophy of History; X.
Æsthetics; XI.-XII. Philosophy of Religion; XIII.-XV. History of
Philosophy; XVI.-XVII. Miscellanies. His life has been written by
Rosenkranz.
Hegel’s system may be divided in a number of ways. The best mode is by
connecting it with Schelling. Schellings’s absolute was the identity or
the indifference point of the ideal and the real. From this Hegel’s
threefold division immediately follows. (1) The exposition of the
indifference point, the development of the pure conceptions or
determinations in thought, which lie at the basis of all natural and
intellectual life; in other words, the logical unfolding of the
absolute,—_the science of logic_. (2) The development of the real world
or of nature—_natural philosophy_. (3) The development of the ideal
world, or of mind as it shows itself concretely in right, morals, the
state, art, religion, and science.—_Philosophy of Mind_. These three
parts of the system represent the three elements of the absolute method,
thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The absolute is at first pure, and
immaterial thought; secondly, it is differentiation (_Andersseyn_) of
the pure thought or its diremption (_Verzerrung_) in space and
time—nature; thirdly, it returns from this self-estrangement to itself,
destroys the differentiation of nature, and thus becomes actual
self-knowing thought or mind.
I. SCIENCE OF LOGIC.—The Hegelian logic is the scientific exposition and
development of the pure conceptions of reason, those conceptions or
categories which lie at the basis of all thought and being, and which
determine the subjective knowledge as truly as they form the indwelling
soul of the objective reality; in a word, those ideas in which the ideal
and the real have their point of coincidence. The domain of logic, says
Hegel, is the truth, as it is _per se_ in its native character. It is as
Hegel himself figuratively expresses it, the representation of God as he
is in his eternal being, before the creation of the world or a finite
mind. In this respect it is, to be sure, a domain of shadows; but these
shadows are, on the other hand, those simple essences freed from all
sensuous matters, in whose diamond net the whole universe is
constructed.
Different philosophers had already made a thankworthy beginning towards
collecting and examining the pure conceptions of the reason, as
Aristotle in his categories, Wolff in his ontology, and Kant in his
transcendental analytics. But they had neither completely collected, nor
critically sifted, nor (Kant excepted) derived them from one principle,
but had only taken them up empirically, and treated them
lexicologically. But in opposition to this course, Hegel attempted, (1)
to completely collect the pure art-conceptions; (2) to critically sift
them (_i. e._ to exclude every thing but pure thought); and (3)—which is
the most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian logic—to derive
these dialectically from one another, and carry them out to an
internally connected system of pure reason. Hegel starts with the view,
that in every conception of the reason, every other is contained
_implicite_, and may be dialectically developed from it. Fichte had
already claimed that the reason must deduce the whole system of
knowledge purely from itself, without any thing taken for granted; that
some principle must be sought which should be of itself certain, and
need no farther proof, and from which every thing else could be derived.
Hegel holds fast to this thought. Starting from the simplest conception
of reason, that of pure being, which needs no farther establishing, he
seeks from this, by advancing from one conception ever to another and a
richer one, to deduce the whole system of the pure knowledge of reason.
The lever of this development is the dialectical method.
Hegel’s dialectical method is partly taken from Plato, and partly from
Fichte. The conception of negation is Platonic. All negation, says
Hegel, is position, affirmation. If a conception is negated, the result
is not the pure nothing—a pure negative, but a concrete positive; there
results a new conception which extends around the negation of the
preceding one. The negation of the one _e. g._ is the conception of the
many. In this way Hegel makes negation a vehicle for dialectical
progress. Every presupposed conception is denied, and from its negation
a higher and richer conception is gained. This is connected with the
method of Fichte, which posits a fundamental synthesis; and by analyzing
this, seeks its antitheses, and then unites again these antitheses
through a second synthesis,—_e. g._ being, nothing, becoming, quality,
quantity, measure, &c. This method, which is at the same time analytical
and synthetical, Hegel has carried through the whole system of science.
We now proceed to a brief survey of the Hegelian Logic. It is divided
into three parts; the doctrine of _being_, the doctrine of _essence_,
and the doctrine of _conception_.
1. THE DOCTRINE OF BEING. (1.) _Quality._—Science begins with the
immediate and indeterminate conception of _being_. This, in its want of
content and emptiness, is nothing more than a pure negation, a
_nothing_. These two conceptions are thus as absolutely identical as
they are absolutely opposed; each of the two disappears immediately in
its contrary. This oscillation of the two is the pure _becoming_, which,
if it be a transition from nothing to being, we call _arising_, or, in
the reverse case, we call it a _departing_. The still and simple
precipitate of this process of arising and departing, is _existence_
(_Daseyn_). Existence is being with a determinateness, or it is
_quality_; more closely, it is _reality_ or limited existence. Limited
existence excludes every other from itself. This reference to itself,
which is seen through its negative relation to every other, we call
being _per se_ (_Fürsichseyn_). Being _per se_ which refers itself only
to itself, and repels every other from itself, is _the one_. But, by
means of this repelling, the one posits immediately _many_ ones. But the
many ones are not distinguished from each other. One is what the other
is. The many are therefore one. But the one is just as truly the
manifold. For its exclusion is the positing of its contrary, or it
posits itself thereby as manifold. By this dialectic of _attraction_ and
_repulsion_, quality passes over into quantity: for indifference in
respect of distinction or qualitative determinateness is _quantity_.
(2.) _Quantity._—Quantity is determination of greatness, which, as such,
is indifferent in respect of quality. In so far as the _greatness_
contains many ones distinguishably within itself, it is a _discrete_, or
has the element of _discretion_; but on the other hand, in so far as the
many ones are similar, and the greatness is thus indistinguishable, it
is _continuous_, or has the element of _continuity_. Each of these two
determinations is at the same time identical with the other; discretion
cannot be conceived without continuity, nor continuity without
discretion. The existence of quantity, or the limited quantity, is the
_quantum_. The quantum has also manifoldness and unity in itself; it is
the enumeration of the unities, _i. e._ _number_. Corresponding to the
quantum or the extensive greatness, is the intensive greatness or _the
degree_. With the conception of degree, so far as degree is simple
determinateness, quantity approaches quality again. The unity of
quantity and quality is _the measure_.
(3.) _The measure_ is a qualitative quantum, a quantum on which the
quality is dependent. An example of quantity determining the quality of
a definite object is found in the temperature of water, which decides
whether the water shall remain water or turn to ice or steam. Here the
quantum of heat actually constitutes the quality of the water. Quality
and quantity are, therefore, ideal determinations, perpetually turning
around _on_ one being, on a _third_, which, is distinguished from the
immediate what and how much (quality and quantity) of a thing. This
third is the _essence_, which is the negation of every thing immediate,
or quality independent of the immediate being. Essence is being in se,
being divided in itself, a self-separation of being. Hence the
twofoldness of all determinations of essence.
2. THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE. (1.) _The Essence as such._ The essence as
reflected being is the reference to itself only as it is a reference to
something other. We apply to this being the term reflected analogously
with the reflection of light, which, when it falls on a mirror, is
thrown back by it. As now the reflected light is, through its reference
to another object, something mediated or posited, so the reflected being
is that which is shown to be mediated or grounded through another. From
the fact that philosophy makes its problem to know the essence of
things, the immediate being of things is represented as a covering or
curtain behind which the essence is concealed. If, therefore, we speak
of the essence of an object, the immediate being standing over against
the essence (for without this the essence cannot be conceived), is set
down to a mere negative, to an _appearance_. The being appears in the
essence. The essence is, therefore, the being as _appearance in itself_.
The essence when conceived in distinction from the appearance, gives the
conception of the _essential_, and that which only appears in the
essence, is the essenceless, or the _unessential_. But since the
essential has a being only in distinction from the unessential, it
follows that the latter is essential to the former, which needs its
unessential just as much as the unessential needs it. Each of the two,
therefore, appears in the other, or there takes place between them a
reciprocal reference which we call _reflection_. We have, therefore, to
do in this whole sphere with determinations of reflection, with
determinations, each one of which refers to the other, and cannot be
conceived without it (_e. g._ positive and negative, ground and
sequence, thing and properties, content and form, power and expression).
We have, therefore, in the development of the essence, those same
determinations which we found in the development of being, only no
longer in an immediate, but in a reflected form. Instead of being and
nothing, we have now the forms of the positive and negative; instead of
the there-existent (_Daseyn_), we now have existence.
Essence is reflected being, a reference to itself, which, however, is
mediated through a reference to something other which appears in it.
This reflected reference to itself we call _identity_ (which is
unsatisfactorily and abstractly expressed in the so-called first
principle of thought, that A = A). This identity, as a negativity
referring itself to itself, as a repulsion of its own from itself,
contains essentially the determination of _distinction_. The immediate
and external distinction is the _difference_. The essential distinction,
the distinction in itself, is the _antithesis_ (_positive and
negative_). The self-opposition of the essence is the _contradiction_.
The antithesis of identity and distinction is put in agreement in the
conception of the ground. Since now the essence distinguishes itself
from itself, there is the essence as identical with itself or the
_ground_, and the essence as distinguished from itself or the
_sequence_. In the category of ground and sequence the same thing, _i.
e._ the essence, is twice posited; the grounded and the ground are one
and the same content, which makes it difficult to define the ground
except through the sequence, or the sequence except through the ground.
The two can, therefore, be divided only by a powerful abstraction; but
because the two are identical, it is peculiarly a formalism to apply
this category. If reflection would inquire after a ground, it is because
it would see the thing as it were in a twofold relation, once in its
immediateness, and then as posited through a ground.
(2.) _Essence and Phenomenon._—The _phenomenon_ is the appearance which
the essence fills, and which is hence no longer essenceless. There is no
appearance without essence, and no essence which may not enter into
phenomenon. It is one and the same content which at one time is taken as
essence, and at another as phenomenon. In the phenomenal essence we
recognize the positive element which has hitherto been called ground,
but which we now name _content_, and the negative element which we call
the _form_. Every essence is a unity of content and form, _i. e._ _it
exists_. In distinction from immediate being, we call that being which
has proceeded from some ground, _existence_, _i. e._ grounded being.
When we view the essence as existing, we call it _thing_. In the
relation of a thing to its _properties_ we have a repetition of the
relation of form and content. The properties show us the thing in
respect of its form, but it is thing in respect of its content. The
relation between the thing and its properties is commonly indicated by
the verb _to have_ (_e. g._ the thing _has_ properties), in order to
distinguish between the two. The essence as a negative reference to
itself, and as repelling itself from itself in order to a reflection in
an _alterum_, is _power_ and _expression_. In this category, like all
the other categories of essence, one and the same content is posited
twice. The power can only be explained from the expression, and the
expression only from the power; consequently every explanation of which
this category avails itself, is tautological. To regard power as
uncognizable, is only a self-deception of the understanding respecting
its own doing.—A higher expression for the category of power and
expression is the category of _inner_ and _outer_. The latter category
stands higher than the former, because power needs some solicitation to
express itself, but the inner is the essence spontaneously manifesting
itself. Both of these, the inner and the outer, are also identical;
neither is without the other. That, _e. g._ which the man is internally
in respect of his character, is he also externally in his action. The
truth of this relation will be, therefore, the identity of inner and
outer, of essence and phenomenon, viz.:
(3.) _Actuality._—Actuality must be added as a _third_ to being and
existence. In the actuality, the phenomenon is a complete and adequate
manifestation of the essence. The true actuality is, therefore (in
opposition to _possibility_ and _contingency_), a necessary being, a
rational _necessity_. The well-known Hegelian sentence that every thing
is rational, and every thing rational is actual, is seen in this
apprehension of “actuality” to be a simple tautology. The necessary,
when posited as its own ground, identical with itself, is _substance_.
The phenomenal side, the unessential in the substance, and the
contingent in the necessary, are _accidences_. These are no longer
related to the substance, as the phenomenon to the essence, or the outer
to the inner, _i. e._ as an adequate manifestation; they are only
transitory affections of the substance, accidentally changing phenomenal
forms, like sea waves on the water of the sea. They are not produced by
the substance, but are rather destroyed in it. The relation of substance
leads to the relation of _cause_. In the relation of cause there is one
and the same thing posited on the one side as _cause_, and on the other
side as _effect_. The cause of warmth is warmth, and its effect is again
warmth. The effect is a higher conception than the accidence, since it
actually stands over against the cause, and the cause itself passes over
into effect. So far, however, as each side in the relation of cause
presupposes the other, we shall find the true relation one in which each
side is at the same time cause and effect, _i. e._ _reciprocal action_.
Reciprocal action is a higher relation than causality, because there is
no pure causality. There is no effect without counteraction. We leave
the province of essence with the category of reciprocal action. All the
categories of essence had shown themselves as a duplex of two sides, but
when we come to the category of reciprocal action, the opposition
between cause and effect is destroyed, and they meet together; unity
thus takes again the place of duplicity. We have, therefore, again a
being which coincides with mediate being. This unity of being and
essence, this inner or realized necessity, is the conception.
3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPTION.—A conception is a rational necessity.
We can only have a conception of that whose true necessity we have
recognized. The conception is, therefore, the truly actual, the peculiar
essence; because it states as well that which is actual as that which
should be.
(1.) _The subjective conception_ contains the elements of _universality_
(the conception of species), _particularity_ (ground of classification,
logical difference), and _individuality_ (species—logical difference).
The conception is therefore a unity of that which is distinct. The
self-separation of the conception is the _judgment_. In the judgment,
the conception appears as self-excluding duality. The twofoldness is
seen in the difference between subject and predicate, and the unity in
the copula. Progress in the different forms of judgment, consists in
this, viz., that the copula fills itself more and more with the
conception. But thus the judgment passes over into the _conclusion_ or
inference, _i. e._ to the conception which is identical with itself
through the conception. In the inference one conception is concluded
with a third through a second. The different figures of the conclusion
are the different steps in the self-mediation of the conception. The
conception is when it mediates itself with itself and the conclusion is
no longer subjective; it is no longer my act, but an objective relation
is fulfilled in it.
(2.) _Objectivity_ is a reality _only_ of the conception. The objective
conception has three steps,—_Mechanism_, or the indifferent relation of
objects to each other; _Chemism_, or the interpenetration of objects and
their neutralization; _Teleology_, or the inner design of objects. The
end accomplishing itself or the self-end is,
(3.) _The idea._—The idea is the highest logical definition of the
absolute. The immediate existence of the idea, we call _life_, or
process of life. Every thing living is self-end immanent-end. The idea
posited in its difference as a relation of objective and subjective, is
the _true_ and _good_. The true is the objective rationality
subjectively posited; the good is the subjective rationality carried
into the objectivity. Both conceptions together constitute the _absolute
idea_, which is just as truly as it _should_ be, _i. e._ the good is
just as truly actualized as the true is living and self-realizing.
The absolute and full idea _is in space_, because it discharges itself
from itself, as its reflection; this its being in space is _Nature_.
II. THE SCIENCE OF NATURE.—Nature is the idea in the form of
differentiation. It is the idea externalizing itself; it is the mind
estranged from itself. The unity of the conception is therefore
concealed in nature, and since philosophy makes it its problem to seek
out the intelligence which is hidden in nature, and to pursue the
process by which nature loses its own character and becomes mind, it
should not forget that the essence of nature consists in being which has
externalized itself, and that the products of nature neither have a
reference to themselves, nor correspond to the conception, but grow up
in unrestrained and unbridled contingency. Nature is a bacchanalian god
who neither bridles nor checks himself. It therefore represents no ideal
succession, rising ever in regular order, but, on the contrary, it every
where obliterates all essential limits by its doubtful structures, which
always defy every fixed classification. Because it is impossible to
throw the determinations of the conception over nature, natural
philosophy is forced at every point, as it were, to capitulate between
the world of concrete individual structures, and the regulative of the
speculative idea.
Natural philosophy has its beginning, its course, and its end. It begins
with the first or immediate determination of nature, with the abstract
universality of its being _extra se_, space and matter; its end is the
dissevering of the mind from nature in the form of a rational and
self-conscious individuality—man; the problem which it has to solve is,
to show the intermediate link between these two extremes, and to follow
out successively the increasingly successful struggles of nature to
raise itself to self-consciousness, to man. In this process, nature
passes through three principal stages.
1. MECHANICS, or matter and an ideal system of matter. Matter is the
being _extra se_ (_Aussersichseyn_) of nature, in its most universal
form. Yet it shows at the outset that tendency to being _per se_ which
forms the guiding thread of natural philosophy—gravity. Gravity is the
being _in se_ (_Insichseyn_) of matter; it is the desire of matter to
come to itself, and shows the first trace of subjectivity. The centre of
gravity of a body is _the one_ which it seeks. This same tendency of
bringing all the manifold unto being _per se_ lies at the basis of the
solar system and of universal gravitation. The centrality which is the
fundamental conception of gravity, becomes here a system, which is in
fact a rational system so far as the form of the orbit, the rapidity of
motion, or the time of revolution may be referred to mathematical laws.
2. PHYSICS.—But matter possesses no individuality. Even in astronomy it
is not the bodies themselves, but only their geometrical relations which
interest us. We have here at the outset to treat of quantitative and not
yet of qualitative determinations. Yet in the solar system, matter has
found its centre, itself. Its abstract and hollow being _in se_ has
resolved itself into form. Matter now, as possessing a quality, is an
object of _physics_. In physics we have to do with matter which has
particularized itself in a body, in an individuality. To this province
belongs inorganic nature, its forms and reciprocal references.
3. ORGANICS.—Inorganic nature, which was the object of physics, destroys
itself in the chemical process. In the chemical process, the inorganic
body loses all its properties (cohesion, color, shining, sound,
transparency, &c.), and thus shows the evanescence of its existence and
that relativity which is its being. This chemical process is overcome by
the organic, the living process of nature. True, the living body is ever
on the point of passing over to the chemical process; oxygen, hydrogen
and salt, are always entering into a living organism, but their chemical
action is always overcome; the living body resists the chemical process
till it dies. Life is self-preservation, self-end. While therefore
nature in physics had risen to individuality, in organics, it progresses
to subjectivity. The idea, as life, represents itself in three stages.
(1.) The general image of life in _geological_ organism, or the _mineral
kingdom_. Yet the mineral kingdom is the result, and the residuum of a
process of life and formation already passed. The primitive rock is the
stiffened crystal of life, and the geological earth is a giant corpse.
The present life which produces itself eternally anew, breaks forth as
the first moving of subjectivity,
(2.) In the organism of _plants_ or the _vegetable kingdom_. The plant
rises indeed to a formative process, to a process of assimilation, and
to a process of species. But it is not yet a totality perfectly
organized in itself. Each part of the plant is the whole individual,
each twig is the whole tree. The parts are related indifferently to each
other; the crown can become a root, and the root a crown. The plant,
therefore, does not yet attain a true being _in se_ of individuality;
for, in order that this may be attained, an absolute unity of the
individual is necessary. This unity, which constitutes an individual and
concrete subjectivity, is first seen in
(3.) The _animal_ organism, the _animal kingdom_. An uninterrupted
intus-susception, free motion and sensation, are first found in the
animal organism. In its higher forms we find an inner warmth and a
voice. In its highest form, man, nature, or rather the spirit, which
works through nature, apprehends itself as conscious individuality, as
Ego. The spirit thus become a free and rational self, has now completed
its self-emancipation from nature.
III. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.—1. THE SUBJECTIVE MIND.—The mind is the truth
of nature; it is being removed from its estrangement, and become
identical with itself. Its formal essence, therefore, is freedom, the
possibility of abstracting itself from every thing else; its material
essence is the capacity of manifesting itself as mind, as a conscious
rationality,—of positing the intellectual universe as its kingdom, and
of building a structure of objective rationality. In order, however, to
know itself, and every thing rational,—in order to posit nature more and
more negatively, the mind, like nature, must pass through a series of
stages or emancipative acts. As it comes from nature and rises from its
externality to being, _per se_, it is at first soul or spirit of nature,
and as such, it is an object of _anthropology_ in a strict sense. As
this spirit of nature, it sympathizes with the general planetary life of
the earth, and is in this respect subject to diversity of climate, and
change of seasons and days; it sympathizes with the geographical portion
of the world which it occupies, _i. e._, it is related to a diversity of
race; still farther, it bears a national type, and is moreover
determined by mode of life, formation of the body, &c., while these
natural conditions work also upon its intelligent and moral character.
Lastly, we must here take notice of the way in which nature has
determined the individual subject, _i. e._ his natural temperament,
character, idiosyncrasy, &c. To this belong the natural changes of life,
age, sexual relation, sleep, and waking. In all this the mind is still
buried in nature, and this middle condition between being _per se_ and
the sleep of nature, is sensation, the hollow forming of the mind in its
unconscious and unenlightened (_verstandlos_) individuality. A higher
stage of sensation is feeling, _i. e._ sensation _in se_, where being
_per se_ appears; feeling in its completed form is self-feeling. Since
the subject, in self-feeling, is buried in the peculiarity of his
sensations, but at the same time concludes himself with himself, as a
subjective one, the self-feeling is seen to be the preliminary step to
consciousness. The Ego now appears as the shaft in which all these
sensations, representations, cognitions and thoughts are preserved,
which is with them all, and constitutes the centre in which they all
come together. The mind as conscious, as a conscious being _per se_, as
Ego, is the object of the _phenomenology_ of consciousness.
The mind was individual, so long as it was interwoven with nature; it
is consciousness or Ego when it has divested itself of nature. When
distinguishing itself from nature, the mind withdraws itself into
itself, and that with which it was formerly interwoven, and which gave
it a peculiar (earthly, national, &c.) determination, stands now
distinct from it, as its external world (earth, people, &c). The awaking
of the Ego is thus the act by which the objective world, as such, is
created; while on the other hand, the Ego awakens to a conscious
subjectivity only _in_ the objective world, and in distinction from it.
The Ego, over against the objective world, is consciousness in the
strict sense of the word. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness by
passing through the stages of immediate sensuous consciousness,
perception, and understanding, and convincing itself in this its
formative history, that it has only to do with itself, while it believed
that it had to do with something objective. Again, self-consciousness
becomes universal or rational self-consciousness, as follows: In its
strivings to stamp the impress of the Ego upon the objective, and thus
make the objective subjective, it falls in conflict with other
self-consciousnesses, and begins a war of extermination against them,
but rises from this _bellum omnium contra omnes_, as common
consciousness, as the finding of the proper mean between command and
obedience, _i. e._ as truly universal, _i. e._ rational
self-consciousness. The rational self-consciousness is actually free,
because, when related to another, it is really related to itself, and in
all is still with itself; it has emancipated itself from nature. We have
now mind as mind, divested of its naturalness and subjectivity, and as
such, it is an object of _Pneumatology_.
Mind is at first theoretical mind, or intelligence, and then practical
mind, or will. It is theoretical in that it has to do with the rational
as something given, and now posits it as its own; it is practical in
that it immediately wills the subjective content (truth), which it has
as its own, to be freed from its one-sided subjective form, and
transformed into an objective. The practical mind is, so far, the truth
of the theoretical. The theoretical mind, in its way to the practical,
passes through the stages of intuition, representation, and thought; and
the will on its side forms itself into a free will through impulse,
desire, and inclination. The free will, as having a being in space
(_Daseyn_), is the _objective mind_, right, and the state. In right,
morals and the state, the freedom and rationality, which are chosen by
the will, take on an objective form. Every natural determination and
impulse now becomes moralized, and comes up to view again as ethical
institute, as right and duty (the sexual impulse now appears as
marriage, and the impulse of revenge as civil punishment, &c.)
2. THE OBJECTIVE MIND.—(1.) The immediate objective being (_Daseyn_) of
the free will is _the right_. The individual, so far as he is capable of
rights, so far as he has rights and exercises them, is a person. The
maxim of right is, therefore, be a person and have respect to other
persons. The person allows himself an external sphere for his freedom, a
substratum in which he can exercise his will: as property, possession.
As person I have the right of possession, the absolute right of
appropriation, the right to cast my will over every thing, which thereby
becomes mine. But there exist other persons besides myself. My right is,
therefore, limited through the right of others. There thus arises a
conflict between will and will, which is settled in a compact, in a
common will. The relation of compact is the first step towards the
state, but only the _first_ step, for if we should define the state as a
compact of all with all, this would sink it in the category of private
rights and private property. It does not depend upon the will of the
individual whether he will live in the state or not. The relation of
compact refers to private property. In a compact, therefore, two wills
merge themselves in a common will, which as such becomes a right. But
just here lies also the possibility of a conflict between the individual
will and the right or the universal will. The separation of the two is a
wrong (civil wrong, fraud, crime). This separation demands a
reconciliation, a restoration of the right or the universal will from
its momentary suppression or negation, by the particular will. The right
restoring itself in respect of the particular will, and establishing a
negation of the wrong, is punishment. Those theories, which found the
right of punishment in some end of warning or improvement, mistake the
essence of punishment. Threatening, warning, &c., are finite ends, _i.
e._ means, and moreover uncertain means: but an act of righteousness
should not be made a means; righteousness is not exercised in order that
any thing other than itself shall be gained. The fulfilment and
self-manifestation of righteousness is absolute end, self-end. The
particular views we have mentioned, can only be considered in reference
to the mode of punishment. The punishment which is inflicted on a
criminal, is _his_ right, _his_ rationality, _his_ law, beneath which he
should be subsumed. His act comes back upon himself. Hegel also defends
capital punishment whose abolition seemed to him as an untimely
sentimentalism.
(2.) The removal of the opposition of the universal and particular will
in the subject constitutes _morality_. In morality the freedom of the
will is carried forward to a self-determination of the subjectivity, and
the abstract right becomes duty and virtue. The moral standpoint is the
standpoint of conscience, it is the right of the subjective will, the
right of a free ethical decision. In the consideration of strict right,
it is no inquiry what my principle or my view might be, but in morality
the question is at once directed towards the purpose and moving spring
of the will. Hegel calls this standpoint of moral reflection and dutiful
action for a reason—morality, in distinction from a substantial,
unconditioned and unreflecting ethics. This standpoint has three
elements; (1) the element of resolution (_vorsatz_), where we consider
the inner determination of the acting subject, that which allows an act
to be ascribed only to me, and the blame of it to rest only on my will
(imputation); (2) the element of purpose, where the completed act is
regarded not according to its consequences, but according to its
relative worth in reference to myself. The resolution was still
internal; but now the act is completed, and I must suffer myself to
judge according to the constituents of the act, because I must have
known the circumstances under which I acted; (3) the element of the
good, where the act is judged according to its universal worth. The good
is peculiarly the reconciliation of the particular subjective will with
the universal will, or with the conception of the will; in other words,
to will the rational is good. Opposed to this is evil, or the elevation
of the subjective will against the universal, the attempt to set up the
peculiar and individual choice as absolute; in other words, to will the
irrational is evil.
(3.) In morality we had conscience and the abstract good (the good which
ought to be) standing over against each other. The concrete identity of
the two, the union of subjective and objective good, is _ethics_. In the
ethical the good has become actualized in an existing world, and a
nature of self-consciousness.
The ethical mind is seen at first immediately, or in a natural form, as
marriage and the _family_. Three elements meet together in marriage,
which should not be separated, and which are so often and so wrongly
isolated. Marriage is (1) a sexual relation, and is founded upon a
difference of sex; it is, therefore, something other than Platonic love
or monkish asceticism; (2) it is a civil contract; (3) it is love. Yet
Hegel lays no great stress upon this subjective element in concluding
upon marriage, for a reciprocal affection will spring up in the married
life. It is more ethical when a determination to marry is first, and a
definite personal affection follows afterwards, for marriage is most
prominently duty. Hegel would, therefore, place the greatest obstacles
in the way of a dissolution of marriage. He has also developed and
described in other respects the family state with a profound ethical
feeling.
Since the family becomes separated into a multitude of families, it is a
_civil society_, in which the members, though still independent
individuals, are bound in unity by their wants, by the constitution of
rights as a means of security for person and property, and by an outward
administrative arrangement. Hegel distinguished the civil society from
the state in opposition to most modern theorists upon the subject, who,
regarding it as the great end of the state to give security of property
and of personal freedom, reduced the state to a civil society. But on
such a standpoint which would make the state wholly of wants and of
rights, it is impossible, _e. g._ to conceive of war. On the ground of
civil society each one stands for himself, is independent, and makes
himself as end, while every thing else is a means for him. But the
state, on the contrary, knows no independent individuals, each one of
whom may regard and pursue only his own well-being; but in the state,
the whole is the end, and the individual is the means.—For the
administration of justice, Hegel, in opposition to those of our time who
deny the right of legislation, would have written and intelligible laws,
which should be within reach of every one; still farther, justice should
be administered by a public trial by jury.—In respect of the
organization of civil society, Hegel expresses a great preference for a
corporation. Sanctity of marriage, he says, and honor in corporations,
are the two elements around which the disorganization of civil society
turns.
Civil society passes over into the _state_ since the interest of the
individual loses itself in the idea of an ethical whole. The state is
the ethical idea actualized, it is the ethical mind as it rules over the
action and knowledge of the individuals conceived in it. Finally the
states themselves, since they appear as individuals in an attracting or
repelling relation to each other, represent, in their destiny, in their
rise and fall, the process of the _world’s history_.
In his apprehension of the state, Hegel approached very near the ancient
notion, which merged the individual and the right of individuality,
wholly in the will of the state. He held fast to the omnipotence of the
state in the ancient sense. Hence his resistance to modern liberalism,
which would allow individuals to postulate, to criticize, and to will
according to their improved knowledge. The state is with Hegel the
rational and ethical substance in which the individual has to live, it
is the existing reason to which the individual has to submit himself
with a free view. He regarded a limited monarchy as the best form of
government, after the manner of the English constitution, to which Hegel
was especially inclined, and in reference to which he uttered his
well-known saying that the king was but the dot upon the i. There must
be an individual, Hegel supposes, who can _affirm_ for the state, who
can prefix an “_I will_” to the resolves of the state, and who can be
the head of a formal decision. The personality of a state, he says, “is
only actual as a person, as monarch.” Hence Hegel defends hereditary
monarchy, but he places the nobility by its side as a mediating element
between people and prince—not indeed to control or limit the government,
nor to maintain the rights of the people, but only that the people may
experience that there is a good rule, that, the consciousness of the
people may be with the government and that the state may enter into the
subjective consciousness of the people.
States and the minds of individual races pour their currents into the
stream of the world’s history. The strife, the victory, and the
subjection of the spirits of individual races, and the passing over of
the world spirit from one people to another, is the content of the
world’s history. The development of the world’s history is generally
connected with some ruling race, which carries in itself the world
spirit in its present stage of development, and in distinction from
which the spirits of other races have no rights. Thus these race-spirits
stand around the throne of the absolute spirit, as the executors of its
actualization, as the witnesses and adornment of its glory.
3. THE ABSOLUTE MIND.—(1.) _Æsthetics_. The absolute mind is immediately
present to the sensuous intuition as the beautiful or as art. The
beautiful is the appearance of the idea through a sensible medium (a
crystal, color, tone, poetry); it is the idea actualized in the form of
a limited phenomenon. To the beautiful (and to its subordinate kinds,
the simply beautiful, the sublime, and the comical) two factors always
belong, thought and matter; but both these are inseparable from each
other; the matter is the outer phenomenon of the thought, and should
express nothing but the thought which inspires it and shines through it.
The different ways in which matter and form are connected, furnish the
different forms of art. In the symbolic form of art the matter
preponderates; the thought presses through it, and brings out the ideal
only with difficulty. In the classic form of art, the ideal has attained
its adequate existence in the matter; content and form are absolutely
befitting each other. Lastly, in romantic art, the mind preponderates,
and the matter is a mere appearance and sign through which the mind
every where breaks out, and struggles up above the material. The system
of particular arts is connected with the different forms of art; but the
distinction of one particular art from another, depends especially upon
the difference of the material.
(_a._) The beginning of art is _Architecture_. It belongs essentially to
the symbolic form of art, since in it the sensible matter far
preponderates, and it first seeks the true conformity between content
and form. Its material is stone, which it fashions according to the laws
of gravity. Hence it has the character of magnitude, of silent
earnestness, of oriental sublimity.
(_b._) _Sculpture._—The material of this art is also stone, but it
advances from the inorganic to the organic. It gives the stone a bodily
form, and makes it only a serving vehicle of the thought. In sculpture,
the material, the stone, since it represents the body, that building of
the soul, in its clearness and beauty, disappears wholly in the ideal;
there is nothing left of the material which does not serve the idea.
(_c._) _Painting._—This is preeminently a romantic art. It represents,
as sculpture cannot do, the life of the soul, the look, the disposition,
the heart. Its medium is no longer a coarse material substratum, but the
colored surface, and the soul-like play of light; it gives the
_appearance_ only of complete spacial dimension. Hence it is able to
represent in a complete dramatic movement the whole scale of feelings,
conditions of heart, and actions.
(_d._) _Music._—This leaves out all relation of space. Its material is
sound, the vibration of a sonorous body. It leaves, therefore, the field
of sensuous intuition, and works exclusively upon the sensation. Its
basis is the breast of the sensitive soul. Music is the most subjective
art.
(_e._) Lastly in _Poetry_, or the speaking art, is the tongue of art
loosed; poetry can represent every thing. Its material is not the mere
sound, but the sound as word, as the sign of a representation, as the
expression of reason. But this material cannot be formed at random, but
only in verse according to certain rhythmical and musical laws. In
poetry, all other arts return again; as epic, representing in a pleasing
and extended narrative the figurative history of races, it corresponds
to the plastic arts; as lyric, expressing some inner condition of soul,
it corresponds to music; as dramatic poetry, exhibiting the struggles
between characters acting out of directly opposite interests, it is the
union of both these arts.
(2.) _Philosophy of Religion._—Poetry forms the transition from art to
religion. In art the idea was present for the intuition, in religion it
is present for the representation. The content of every religion is the
reconciliation of the finite with the infinite, of the subject with God.
All religions seek a union of the divine and the human. This was done in
the crudest form by
(_a._) The natural religions of the oriental world. God is, with them,
but a power of nature, a substance of nature, in comparison with which
the finite and the individual disappear as nothing.
(_b._) A higher idea of God is attained by the religions of spiritual
individuality, in which the divine is looked upon as subject,—as an
exalted subjectivity, full of power and wisdom in Judaism, the religion
of sublimity; as a circle of plastic divine forms in the Grecian
religion, the religion of beauty; as an absolute end of the state in the
Roman religion, the religion of the understanding or of design.
(_c._) The revealed or Christian religion first establishes a positive
reconciliation between God and the world, by beholding the actual unity
of the divine and the human in the person of Christ, the God-man, and
apprehending God as triune, _i. e._ as Himself, as incarnate, and as
returning from this incarnation to Himself. The intellectual content of
revealed religion, or of Christianity, is thus the same as that of
speculative philosophy; the only difference being, that in the one case
the content is represented in the form of the representation, in the
form of a history; while, in the other, it appears in the form of the
conception. Stripped of its form of religious representation, we have
now the standpoint of
(3.) _The Absolute Philosophy_, or the thought knowing itself as all
truth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from
itself, having the system of philosophy for its development—a closed
circle of circles.
<tb>
With Hegel closes the history of philosophy. The philosophical
developments which have succeeded him, and which are partly a carrying
out of his system, and partly the attempt to lay a new basis for
philosophy, belong to the present, and not yet to history.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: This word literally means _clearing up_, but has a
philosophical sense for which no precise equivalent is found in the
English language. When used physically, it denotes that every
obstruction which prevented the clear sight of the bodily eye is
removed, and when used psychologically it implies the same fact in
reference to our mental vision. The _Aufklärung_ in philosophy is hence
the clearing up of difficulties which have hindered a true philosophical
insight. To express this, I know of no better word than the literal
rendering, “_up-clearing_” or “_clearing up_” which the reader will find
adopted in the following pages.—TRANSLATOR.]
[Footnote 2: The article on Socrates, from page 52 to page 64, was
translated by Prof. N. G. Clark, of the University of Vermont.]
[Footnote 3: A German mile is about four and a half English miles.—TR.]
[Footnote 4: Schelling died August 20th, 1854, at Ragaz, Switzerland,
whither he had gone for the benefit of his health, which had long been
declining.—TRANSLATOR.]
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that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading for a
good deal. Let the reader be as adverse as he may to the
writer’s philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive
as Mr. Buckle is to the progress party, let him be as orthodox
in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dogmatic as his
author is skeptical—let him, in short, find his prejudices
shocked at every turn of the argument, and all his
prepossessions whistled down the wind—still there is so much
in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection, and
excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation,
perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto
untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled fields,
fresh woods and pastures new—that we may fairly defy the most
hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to
read it through without being glad of having done so, or,
having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its 854
pages, to pass it away unread.—_New Monthly (London)
Magazine_.
History of the Romans under the Empire.
By CHARLES MERIVALE, B.D., late Fellow of St. John’s College.
7 Vols. small 8vo. Handsomely printed on tinted paper. Price,
$2 per Vol. (Nearly ready.)
CONTENTS:
Vols. I and II.—Comprising the History to the Fall of Julius
Cæsar.
Vol. III.—To the Establishment of the Monarchy by Augustus.
Vols. IV. and V.—From Augustus to Claudius, B.C. 27 to A.D.
54.
Vol. VI.—From the Reign of Nero, A.D. 54, to the Fall of
Jerusalem, A.D. 70.
Vol. VII.—From the Destruction of Jerusalem, A.D. 70, to the
Death of M. Aurelius.
This valuable work terminates at the point where the narrative
of Gibbon commences.
... “When we enter on a more searching criticism of the two
writers, it must be admitted that Merivale has as firm a grasp
of his subject as Gibbon, and that his work is characterized
by a greater freedom from prejudice, and a sounder philosophy.
... “This history must always stand as a splendid monument of
his learning, his candor, and his vigorous grasp of intellect.
Though he is in some respects inferior to Macaulay and Grote,
he must still be classed with them as one of the second great
triumvirate of English historians.”—_North American Review.
April, 1863._
NEW VIEWS OF HEAT AND OF THE FORCES.
HEAT,
CONSIDERED AS A MODE OF MOTION,
Being a Course of Twelve Lectures delivered before the Royal
Institution of Great Britain.
BY JOHN TYNDALL, F. R. S.
PROFESSOR OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROYAL
INSTITUTION—AUTHOR OF THE “GLACIERS OF THE ALPS.”
With One Hundred Illustrations. 8vo., 480 pages. Price, $2.00.
This volume is by the gifted successor of Faraday, the young
Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution of
England. The author, himself celebrated as a discoverer, an
ingenious and fertile experimenter, a bold but disciplined
thinker, a vivid and imaginative speaker, and dealing with the
most splendid generalizations and the grandest phenomena of
nature, was listened to with the profoundest attention. The
new views of the nature of heat, its connections with the
other forms of force, and the sublime part it plays in the
scheme of Nature—views which have but recently been adopted in
the scientific world—are here for the first time brought
forward, and illustrated with a resource of experiment, a
brilliancy of illustration, and a clearness and eloquence of
style for which Professor Tyndall is unequalled.
<b>From the American Journal of Science.</b>—With all the skill which
has made Faraday the master of experimental science in Great
Britain, Professor Tyndall enjoys the advantage of a superior
general culture, and is thus enabled to set forth his
philosophy with all the graces of eloquence and the finish of
superior diction. With a simplicity, and absence of
technicalities which render his explanations lucid to
unscientific minds, and at the same time a thoroughness and
originality by which he instructs the most learned, he unfolds
all the modern philosophy of heat.
<b>New York Times.</b>—Professor Tyndall’s course of lectures on heat
is one of the most beautiful illustrations of a mode of
handling scientific subjects, which is comparatively new, and
which promises the best results, both to science and to
literature generally; we mean the treatment of subjects in a
style at once _profound_ and _popular_. The title of Professor
Tyndall’s work indicates the theory of heat held by him, and
indeed the only one now held by scientific men—_it is a mode
of motion_.
<b>Boston Journal.</b>—He exhibits the curious and beautiful workings
of nature in a most delightful manner. Before the reader
particles of water lock themselves or fly asunder with a
movement regulated like a dance. They form themselves into
liquid flowers with fine serrated petals, or into rosettes of
frozen gauze, they bound upward in boiling fountains, or creep
slowly onward in stupendous glaciers. Flames burst into music
and sing, or cease to sing, as the experimenter pleases, and
metals paint themselves upon a screen in dazzling hues as the
painter touches his canvas.
<b>New York Tribune.</b>—The most original and important contribution
that has yet been made to the theory and literature of
thermotics.
<b>Scientific American.</b>—The work is written in a charming style,
and is the most valuable contribution to scientific literature
that has been published in many years. It is the most popular
exposition of the dynamical theory of heat that has yet
appeared. The old material theory of heat may be said to be
defunct.
<b>Louisville Democrat.</b>—This is one of the most delightful
scientific works we have ever met. The lectures are so full of
life and spirit that we can almost imagine the lecturer before
us, and see his brilliant experiments in every stage of their
progress. The theory is so carefully and thoroughly explained
that no one can fail to understand it. Such books as these
create a love for science.
<b>Troy Whig.</b>—No one can take up these lectures and pursue the
general train and scope of thought which they compel, without
having attained already to a love of practical science which
will inevitably impress itself on his mental habits hereafter.
<b>Independent.</b>—Professor Tyndall’s expositions and experiments
are remarkably thoughtful, ingenious, clear and convincing;
portions of the book have almost the interest of a romance, so
startling are the descriptions and elucidations.
_Any of these Books sent free by mail to any address on receipt of
Price._
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
OF
D. APPLETON & CO.,
443 & 445 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.
The Life and Correspondence of THEODORE PARKER, Minister of
the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, Boston. By JOHN
WEISS. With two Portraits on Steel, fac-simile of Handwriting,
and nineteen Wood Engravings. 2 vols., 8vo. 1,008 pages.
Price, $6.
“These volumes contain an account of Mr. Parker’s childhood
and self-education; of the development of his theological
ideas; of his scholarly and philosophical pursuits; and of his
relation to the Anti-Slavery cause, and to the epoch in
America which preceded the civil war. His two visits to Europe
are described in letters and extracts from his journal. An
autobiographical fragment is introduced in relation to Mr.
Parker’s early life, and his letters of friendship on
literary, speculative, and political topics are freely
interspersed. The illustrations represent scenes connected
with various periods of Mr. Parker’s life, the houses he dwelt
in, his country haunts, the meeting house, his library, and
the Music Hall in which he preached.”
Catechism of the Steam Engine,
In its various Applications to Mines, Mills, Steam Navigation,
Railways, and Agriculture. With Practical Instructions for the
Manufacture and Management of Engines of every Class. By JOHN
BOURNE, C. E. New and Revised Edition. 1 vol., 12mo.
Illustrated. Cloth. $2.
“In offering to the American public a reprint of a work on the
Steam Engine so deservedly successful, and so long considered
standard, the Publishers have not thought it necessary that it
should be an exact copy of the English edition. There were
some details in which they thought it could be improved and
better adapted to the use of American Engineers. On this
account the size of the page has been increased to a full
12mo, to admit of larger illustrations, which, in the English
edition, are often on too small a scale, and some of the
illustrations themselves have been supplied by others equally
applicable, more recent, and to us more familiar examples. The
first part of Chapter XI., devoted in the English edition to
English portable and fixed agricultural engines, in this
edition gives place entirely to illustrations from American
practice, of steam engines as applied to different purposes,
and of appliances and machines necessary to them. But with the
exception of some of the illustrations and the description of
them, and the correction of a few typographical errors, this
edition is a faithful transcript of the latest English
edition.”
D. APPLETON & CO.’S PUBLICATIONS.
History of the Romans under the Empire. By CHARLES MERIVALE,
B. D., late Fellow of St. John’s College. 7 vols., small 8vo.
Handsomely printed on tinted paper. Price, in cloth, $2 per
vol. Half Morocco extra, $3 50.
CONTENTS:
Vols. I. and II.—Comprising the History to the Fall of Julius
Cæsar.
Vol. III.—To the Establishment of the Monarchy by Augustus.
Vols. IV. and V.—From Augustus to Claudius, B. C. 27 to A. D.
54.
Vol. VI.—From the Reign of Nero, A. D. 54, to the Fall of
Jerusalem, A. D. 70.
Vol. VII.—From the Destruction of Jerusalem, A. D. 70, to the
Death of M. Aurelius.
This valuable work terminates at the point where the narrative
of Gibbon commences.
... “When we enter on a more searching criticism of the two
writers, it must be admitted that Merivale has as firm a grasp
of his subject as Gibbon, and that his work is characterized
by a greater freedom from prejudice, and a sounder philosophy.
... “This history must always stand as a splendid monument of
his learning, his candor, and his vigorous grasp of intellect.
Though he is in some respects inferior to Macaulay and Grote,
he must still be classed with them, as one of the second great
triumvirate of English historians.”—_North American Review,
April, 1863._
Practice in the Executive Department of the Government, under
the Pension, Bounty, and Prize Laws of the United States, with
Forms and Instructions for Collecting Arrears of Pay, Bounty,
and Prize Money, and for Obtaining Pensions. By ROBERT SEWELL,
Counsellor at Law. 1 vol., 8vo. Sheep. Price, $3 50.
“I offer this little book with confidence to the profession,
as certain to save lawyers, in one case, if they never have
any more, more time and trouble than its cost. To the public
generally, the book is offered as containing a large amount of
useful information on a subject now, unfortunately, brought
home to half the families in the land. To the officers and
soldiers of the Army it will also be found a useful companion;
and it is hoped that by it an amount of information of great
value to the soldiers, and to their families at home, will be
disseminated, and the prevailing ignorance respecting the
subject treated of in a great degree removed.”—_Extract from
Preface._
Hints to Riflemen.
By H. W. S. CLEVELAND. 1 vol., 12mo. Illustrated, with
numerous Designs of Rifles and Rifle Practice. Cloth. Price,
$1 50.
“I offer these hints as the contribution of an old sportsman,
and if I succeed in any degree in exciting an interest in the
subject, my end will be accomplished, even if the future
investigations of those who are thus attracted should prove
any of my opinions to be erroneous.”—_Extract from Preface._
Laws and Principles of Whist, Stated and Explained, and its
Practice Illustrated on an Original System, by means of hands
played completely through. By CAVENDISH. From the fifth London
edition. 1 vol., square 16mo. Gilt edge. $1 25.
“An excellent and very clearly written treatise; the rules of
the game thoroughly explained; its practice illustrated by
means of hands played completely through, and much of the
minutiæ and finesse of the game given that we have never seen
in any other volume of the kind. Whist players will recognize
it as an authority; and that it is a success is proved by its
having already gone through five editions. It is got out very
neatly, in blue and gold, by the publishers.”—_Com. Bulletin._
Roba di Roma.
By W. W. STORY. 2 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $3.
“Till Rome shall fall, the City of the Seven Hills will be
inexhaustible as a subject of interest. ‘Roba di Roma’
contains the gatherings of an honest observer and a real
artist.... It has permanent value to entitle it to a place of
honor on the shelf which contains every lover of Italy’s
Rome-books.”—_Athenæum._
Heat considered as a Mode of Motion. Being a Course of Twelve
Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain.
By JOHN TYNDALL, F.R.S. Author of “The Glaciers of the Alps.”
1 vol., 12mo. With 101 illustrations. Cloth. $2.
“No one can rend Dr. Tyndall’s book without being impressed
with the intensity of the author’s conviction of the truth of
the theory which it is his object to illustrate, or with the
boldness with which he confronts the difficulties which lie
encounters.... Dr. Tyndall’s is the first work in which the
undulatory or mechanical theory of heat has been placed in a
popular light; but we are sure that no one, however profound
his knowledge upon the subject of which it treats, will rise
from its perusal without a feeling that he has been both
gratified and instructed in a high degree while reading its
pages.”—_London Reader._
Life of Edward Livingston, Mayor of the City of New York;
Member of Congress; Senator of the United States; Secretary of
State; Minister to France; Author of a System of Penal Law for
Louisiana; Member of the Institute of France, etc. By CHARLES
H. HUNT, with an Introduction by GEORGE BANCROFT. 1 vol., 8vo.
Cloth, $3.50.
“One of the purest of statesmen and the most genial of men,
was Edward Livingston, whose career is presented in this
volume....
“The author of this volume has done the country a service. He
has given us in a becoming form an appropriate memorial of one
whom succeeding generations will be proud to name as an
American jurist and statesman.”—_Evangelist._
Round the Block. An American Novel. With Illustrations. 1
vol., 12mo. Cloth. Price, $1 50.
“The story is remarkably clever. It presents the most vivid
and various pictures of men and manners in the great
Metropolis. Unlike most novels that now appear, it has no
‘mission,’ the author being neither a politician nor a
reformer, but a story teller, according to the old pattern,
and a capital story he has produced, written in the happiest
style, and full of wit and action. He evidently knows his
ground, and moves over it with the foot of a master. It is a
work that will be read and admired, unless all love for good
novels has departed from us; and we know that such is not the
case.”—_Boston Traveler._
The History of Civilization in England. By HENRY THOMAS
BUCKLE. 2 vols., 8vo. Cloth. $6.
“Whoever misses reading this book, will miss reading what is,
in various respects, to the best of our judgment and
experience, the most remarkable book of the day—one, indeed,
that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading for a
good deal. Let the reader be as averse as he may to the
writer’s philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive
as Mr. Buckle is to the progress party, let him be as orthodox
in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dogmatic as his
author is skeptical—let him, in short, find his prejudices
shocked at every turn of the argument, and all his
prepossessions whistled down the wind—still there is so much
in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection, and
excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation,
perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto
untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled fields,
fresh woods and pastures new—that we may fairly defy the most
hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to
read it through without being glad of having done so, or
having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its
pages, to pass it away unread.”—_New Monthly (London)
Magazine._
Illustrations of Universal Progress.
A Series of Essays. By HERBERT SPENCER, Author of “The
Principles of Psychology;” “Social Statics;” “Education.” 1
vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1 75.
“The readers who have made the acquaintance of Mr. Herbert
Spencer through his work on Education, and are interested in
his views upon a larger range of subjects, will welcome this
new volume of ‘Essays.’ Passing by the more scientific and
philosophical speculations, we may call attention to a group
of articles upon moral and political subjects, which are very
pertinent to the present condition of affairs.”—_Tribune._
Thirty Poems.
BY WM. CULLEN BRYANT. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1.25; cloth gilt,
$1.75; mor., $3.50.
“No English poet surpasses him in knowledge of nature, and but
few are his equals. He is better than Cowper and Thomson in
their special walks of poetry, and the equal of Wordsworth,
that great high priest of nature.”—_The World._
An Introduction to Municipal Law, designed for General
Readers, and for Students in Colleges and High Schools. By
JOHN NORTON POMEROY. 1 vol., 8vo. 544 pages. Cloth, $3.
“I have spent nearly four days in reading your book, and am
willing to say, in reference to it, that, when considered in
reference to its scope and the design had in view in entering
upon it, it is a work of great merit. The topics are presented
clearly, discussed with ability, and in the main satisfactory
results arrived at. Parts I. and II., I think, may prove very
useful to students at law and young lawyers, as there is a
great deal in the history of the law, and especially in its
sources, both common and civil, that is very clearly, briefly,
and logically stated, and more available in the manner
presented in your work than in any other that I am acquainted
with.”—_From_ AMOS DEAN, _Esq., Albany Law School_.
Thackeray; The Humorist and Man of Letters, the Story of his
Life, with particulars of his early career never before made
public. By THEODORE TAYLOR, Esq. Illustrated with a Portrait,
one of the latest taken from life; View of Thackeray’s House;
Facsimile of his Handwriting; Humorous Illustrations by George
Cruikshank; and other Pictures and Sketches. One vol., 12mo.
Cloth. Price, $1 25.
“The author, Mr. T. Taylor, long resident in Paris, has been
collecting information for many years, and has much to say of
Mr. Thackeray’s artist life in that city. The book is
illustrated with a portrait and some curious original
sketches.”—_From the Guardian._
The Iron Manufacture of Great Britain. Theoretically and
Practically considered: Including Descriptive Details of the
Ores, Fuels, and Fluxes employed; the Preliminary Operation of
Calcination; the Blast, Refining, and Puddling Furnaces;
Engines and Machinery; and the Various Processes in Union,
etc., etc. By W. TRURAN, C. E., formerly Engineer at the
Dowlais Iron Works, under the late Sir John Guest, Bart.
Second Edition, revised from the manuscripts of the late Mr.
Truran, by J. ARTHUR PHILLIPS, Author of “A Manual of
Metallurgy,” “Records of Mining,” etc., and WM. H. DORMAN. One
vol., imperial 8vo. Containing 84 Plates. Price, $10.