HERBART.
A peculiar, and in many respects noticeable, carrying out of the Kantian
philosophy, was attempted by _Johann Friedrich Herbart_, who was born at
Oldenburg in 1776, chosen professor of philosophy in Göttingen in 1805;
made Kant’s successor at Königsberg in 1808, and recalled to Göttingen
in 1833, where he died in 1841. His philosophy, instead of making, like
most other systems, for its principle, an idea of the reason, followed
the direction of Kant, and expended itself mainly in a critical
examination of the subjective experience. It is essentially a criticism,
but with results which are peculiar, and which differ wholly from those
of Kant. Its fundamental position in the history of philosophy is an
isolated one; instead of regarding antecedent systems as elements of a
true philosophy, it looks upon almost all of them as failures. It is
especially hostile to the post-Kantian German philosophy, and most of
all to Schelling’s philosophy of nature, in which it could only behold a
phantom and a delusion; sooner than come in contact with this, it would
join Hegelianism, of which it is the opposite pole. We will give a brief
exposition of its prominent thoughts.
1. THE BASIS AND STARTING-POINT OF PHILOSOPHY is, according to Herbart,
the common view of things, or a knowledge which shall accord with
experience. A philosophical system is in reality nothing but an attempt
by which a thinker strives to solve certain questions which present
themselves before him. Every question brought up in philosophy should
refer itself singly and solely to that which is given, and must arise
from this source alone, because there is no other original field of
certainty, for men, than experience alone. Every philosophy should begin
with it. The thinking should yield itself to experience, which should
lead it, and not be led by it. Experience, therefore, is the only object
and basis of philosophy; that which is not given cannot be an object of
thought, and it is impossible to establish any knowledge which
transcends the limits of experience.
2. THE FIRST ACT OF PHILOSOPHY.—Though the material furnished by
experience is the basis of philosophy, yet, since it is furnished, it
stands outside of philosophy. The question arises, what is the first act
or beginning of philosophy? The thinking should first separate itself
from experience, that it may clearly see the difficulties of its
undertaking. _The beginning of philosophy_, where the thinking rises
above that which is given, is accordingly doubt or _scepticism_.
Scepticism is twofold, a lower and a higher. The lower scepticism simply
doubts that things are so constituted as they appear to us to be; the
higher scepticism passes beyond the form of the phenomenon, and inquires
whether in reality any thing there exists. It doubts _e. g._ the
succession in time; it asks in reference to the forms of the objects of
nature which exhibit design, whether the design is perceived, or only
attached to them in the thought, &c. Thus the problems which form the
content of metaphysics, are gradually brought out. The result of
scepticism is therefore not negative, but positive. Doubt is nothing but
the thinking upon those conceptions of experience which are the material
of philosophy. Through this reflection, scepticism leads us to the
knowledge that these conceptions of experience, though they refer to
something given, yet contain no conceivable content free from logical
incongruities.
3. REMODELLING OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE.—Metaphysics, according
to Herbart, is the science of that which is conceivable in experience.
Our view thus far has been a twofold one. On the one side we hold fast
to the opinion that the single basis of philosophy is experience, and on
the other side, scepticism has shaken the credibility of experience. The
point now is to transform this scepticism into a definite knowledge of
metaphysical problems. Conceptions from experience crowd upon us, which
cannot be thoughts, _i. e._ they may indeed be thought by the ordinary
understanding, but this thinking is obscure and confused, and does not
separate nor compare opposing characteristics. But an acute process of
thought, a logical analysis, will find in the conceptions of experience
(_e. g._ space, time, becoming, motion, &c.) contradictions and
characteristics, which are totally inconsistent with each other. What
now is to be done? We may not reject these conceptions, for they are
given, and beyond the given we cannot step; we cannot retain them, for
they are inconceivable and cannot logically be established. The only way
of escape which remains to us is to remodel them. _To remodel the
conceptions of experience_, to eliminate their contradictions, is the
proper act of speculation. Scepticism has brought to light the more
definite problems which involve a contradiction, and whose solution it
therefore belongs to metaphysics to attempt; the most important of these
are the problems of inherence, change, and the Ego.
The relation between Herbart and Hegel is very clear at this point. Both
are agreed respecting the contradictory nature of the determinations of
thought, and the conceptions of experience. But from this point they
separate. It is the nature of these conceptions as of every thing, says
Hegel, to be an inner contradiction; becoming, for instance, is
essentially the unity of being, and not being, &c. This is impossible,
says Herbart, on the other side, so long as the principle of
contradiction is valid; if the conceptions of experience contain inner
contradictions, this is not the fault of the objective world, but of the
representing subject who must rectify his false apprehension by
remodelling these conceptions, and eliminating the contradiction.
Herbart thus charges the philosophy of Hegel with empiricism, because it
receives from experience these contradictory conceptions unchanged, and
not only regards these as established, but even goes so far as to
metamorphose logic on their account, and this simply because they are
given in experience, though their contradictory nature is clearly seen.
Hegel and Herbart stand related to each other as Heraclitus and
Parmenides (_cf._ § § VI. and VII.)
4. HERBART’S REALS.—From this point Herbart reaches his “reals”
(_Realen_) as follows: To discover the contradictions, he says, in all
our conceptions of experience, might lead us to absolute scepticism, and
to despair of the truth. But here we remember that if the existence of
every thing real be denied, then the appearance, sensation,
representation, and thought itself would be destroyed. We perceive,
therefore, just as strong an indication of being as of appearance. We
cannot, indeed, ascribe to the given any true and essential being _per
se_, it is not _per se_ alone, but only on, or in, or through something
other. _The truly being_ is an absolute being, which as such excludes
every thing relative and dependent; it is _absolute position_, which it
is not for us first to posit, but only to recognize. In so far as this
being is attributed to any thing, this latter possesses reality. The
truly being is, therefore, ever a _quale_, a something which is
considered as being. In order now that this posited may correspond to
the conditions which lie in the conception of absolute position, the
_what_ of the real must be thought (_a_) as absolutely positive or
affirmative, _i. e._ without any negation or limitation, which might
destroy again the absoluteness; (_b_) as absolutely simple, _i. e._ in
no way, as a multiplicity or admitting of inner antitheses; (_c_) as
indeterminate by any conceptions of greatness, _i. e._ not as a quantum
which may be divided and extended in time and space; hence, also, not as
a constant greatness or continuity. But we must never forget that this
being or this absolute reality is not simply something thought, but is
something independent and resting on itself, and hence it is simply to
be recognized by the thinking. The conception of this thinking lies at
the basis of all Herbart’s metaphysics. Take an example of this. The
first problem to be solved in metaphysics is the problem of inherence,
or the thing with its characteristics. Every perceptible thing
represents itself to the senses as a complex of several characteristics.
But all the attributes of a thing which are given in perception are
relative. We say _e. g._ that sound is a property of a certain body. It
sounds—but it cannot-do this without air; what now becomes of this
property in a space without air? Again, we say that a body is heavy, but
it is only so on the earth. Or again, that a body is colored, but light
is necessary for this; what now becomes of such a property in darkness?
Still farther, a multiplicity of properties is incompatible with the
unity of an object. If you ask _what_ is this thing, you are answered
with the sum of its characteristics; it is soft, white, full-sounding,
heavy,—but your question was of one, not of many. The answer only
affirms what the thing has, not what it is. Moreover, the list of
characteristics is always incomplete. The what of a thing can therefore
lie neither in the individual given properties, nor in their unity. In
determining what a thing is, we have only this answer remaining, viz.,
the thing is that unknown, which we must posit before we can posit any
thing as lying in the given properties; in a word, it is the substance.
For if, in order to see what the thing purely and essentially is, we
take away the characteristics which it may have, we find that nothing
more remains, and we perceive that what we considered as the real thing
was only a complex of characteristics, and the union of these in one
whole. But since every appearance indicates a definite reality, and thus
since there must be as much reality as there is appearance, we have to
consider the reality, which lies at the basis of the thing, with its
characteristics, as a complex of many simple substances or monads, and
whose quality is different in different instances. When our experience
has led us to a repeated grouping together of these monads, we call the
group a thing. Let us now briefly look at the formation of those
fundamental conceptions of metaphysics, which involve the same thoughts
through the fundamental conception of being. First, there is the
conception of causality, which cannot be maintained in its ordinary
form. All that we can perceive in the act is succession in time, and not
the necessary connection of cause with effect. The cause in itself can
be neither transcendent nor immanent; it cannot be transcendent, because
a real influence of one real thing upon another, contradicts the
conception of the absolute reality; nor immanent, for then the substance
must be thought as one with its characteristics, which contradicts the
investigations concerning a thing with its characteristics. We can just
as little find in the conception of the real an answer to the question,
how one determinate being can be brought into contact with another, for
the real is the absolute unchangeable. We can therefore only explain the
conception of causality on the ground that the different reals which lie
at the basis of the characteristics are conceived, each one for itself,
as cause of the phenomenon, there being just as many causes as there are
phenomena. The problem of change, is intimately connected with the
conception of cause. Since, however, according to Herbart, there is no
inner change, no self-determination, no becoming and no life; since the
monads are, and remain in themselves unchangeable, they do not therefore
_become_ different in respect of quality, but they _are_ originally
different one from another, and each one exhibits its equality without
ever any change. The problem of change can thus only be solved through
the theory of the disturbance and self-preservation of these essences.
But if that which we call not simply an apparent but an actual event, in
the essence of the monads, may be reduced to a “self-preservation,” as
the last gleam of an activity and life, still we have the question ever
remaining, how to explain the appearance of change. For this it is
necessary to bring in two auxiliary conceptions; first, that of
accidental views, and second, that of intellectual spaces. The
accidental views, an expression taken from mathematics, signify, in
reference to the problem before us this much, viz., one and the same
conception may often be considered in very different relations to some
other essence, without the slightest change in its own essence, _e. g._
a straight line may be considered as radius or as tangent, and a tone as
harmonious or discordant. By help of these accidental views, we may now
regard that which actually results in the monad, when other monads,
opposite in quality, come in contact with it, as on the one side an
actual occurrence, though on the other side, no actual change can be
imputed to the original condition of the monads (a gray color, _e. g._
seems comparatively white by the side of black, and comparatively black
by the side of white, without changing at all its quality). A further
auxiliary conception is that of intellectual space, which, arises when
we must consider these essences as at the same time together and not
together. By means of this conception we can eliminate the
contradictions from the conception of movement. Lastly, it can be seen
that the conception of matter and that of the Ego (in psychologically
explaining which, the rest of the metaphysics is occupied) are, like the
preceding ones, no less contradictory in themselves than they are
irreconcilable with the fundamental conception of the real; for neither
can an extended being, like matter, be formed out of spaceless
monads—and with matter, therefore, fall also the ordinary conceptions of
space and time—nor can we admit, without transformation, the conception
of the Ego, since it exhibits the contradictory conception of a thing
with many and changing characteristics (conditions, powers, faculties,
&c.)
We are reminded by Herbart’s “_reals_” of the atomic theory of the
atomists (_cf._ § IX. 2), of the Eleatic theory of the one being (_cf._
§ VI.), and of Leibnitz’s monadology. His reals however are
distinguished from the atoms by not possessing impenetrability. The
monads of Herbart may be just as well represented in the same space as a
mathematical point may be conceived as accurately coexisting with
another in the same place. In this respect the “real” of Herbart has a
far greater similarity to the “one” of the Eleatics. Both are simple,
and to be conceived in intellectual spaces, but the essential difference
is, that Herbart’s substances exist in numbers distinct from one
another, and even from opposites among themselves. Herbart’s simple
quantities have already been compared to the monads of Leibnitz, but
these latter have essentially a power of representation; they are
essences with inner circumstances, while, according to Herbart,
representation, just as little as every other circumstance, belongs to
the essence itself.
5. PSYCHOLOGY is connected with metaphysics. The Ego is primarily a
metaphysical problem, and comes in this respect under the category of
the thing with its characteristics. It is a real with many properties
changing circumstances, powers, faculties, activities, &c., and thus is
not without contradictions. But then the Ego is a psychological
principle, and here those contradictions may be considered which lie in
the ideality of subject and object. The subject posits itself and is
therefore itself object. But this posited object is nothing other than
the positing subject. Thus the Ego is, as Fichte says, subject-object,
and, as such, full of the hardest contradictions, for subject and object
will never be affirmed as one and the same without contradiction. But
now if the Ego is given it cannot be thrown away, but must be purified
from its contradictions. This occurs whenever the Ego is conceived as
that which represents, and the different sensations, thoughts, &c. are
embraced under the common conception of changing appearance. The
solution of this problem is similar to that of inherence. As in the
latter problem the thing was apprehended as a complex of as many reals
as it has characteristics, just so here the Ego; but with the Ego inner
circumstances and representations correspond to the characteristics.
Thus that which we are accustomed to name Ego is nothing other than the
soul. The soul as a monad, as absolutely being, is therefore simple,
eternal, indissoluble, from which we may conclude its eternal existence.
From this standpoint Herbart combats the ordinary course of psychology
which ascribes certain powers and faculties to the soul. That which
stands out in the soul is nothing other than self-preservation, which
can only be manifold and changing in opposition to other reals. The
causes of changing circumstances are therefore these other reals, which
come variously in conflict with the soul-monad, and thus produce that
apparently infinite manifoldness of sensations, representations, and
affections. This theory of self-preservation lies at the basis of all
Herbart’s psychology. That which psychology ordinarily calls feeling,
thinking, representing, &c., are only specific differences in the
self-preservation of the soul; they indicate no proper condition of the
inner real essence itself, but only relations between the reals,
relations, which, coming up together at the same time from different
sides, are partly suppressed, partly forwarded, and partly modified.
Consciousness is the sum of those relations in which the soul stands to
other essences. But the relations to the objects, and hence to the
representations corresponding to these, are not all equally strong; one
presses, restricts, and obscures another, a relation of equilibrium
which can be calculated according to the doctrine of statics. But the
suppressed representations do not wholly disappear, but waiting on the
threshold of consciousness for the favorable moment when they shall be
permitted again to arise, they join themselves with kindred
representations, and press forward with united energies. This movement
of the representations (sketched in a masterly manner by Herbart) may be
calculated according to the rules of mathematics, and this is Herbart’s
well known application of mathematics to the empirical theory of the
soul. The representations which were pressed back, which wait on the
threshold of consciousness and only work in the darkness, and of which
we are only half conscious, are feelings. They express themselves as
desires, according as their struggle forward is more or less successful.
Desire becomes will when united with the hope of success. The will is no
separate faculty of the mind, but consists only in the relation of the
dominant representations to the others. The power of deciding and the
character of a man, prominently depend upon the constant presence in the
consciousness of a certain number of representations, while other
representations are weakened, or denied an entrance over the threshold
of consciousness.
6. THE IMPORTANCE OF HERBART’S PHILOSOPHY.—Herbart’s philosophy is
important mainly for its metaphysics and psychology. In the other
spheres and activities of the human mind, _e. g._ rights, morality, the
state, art, religion, his philosophy is mostly barren of results, and
though there are not wanting here striking observations, yet these have
no connection with the speculative principles of the system. Herbart
fundamentally isolates the different philosophical sciences,
distinguishing especially and in the strictest manner between
theoretical and practical philosophy. He charges the effort after unity
in philosophy, with occasioning the greatest errors; for logical,
metaphysical, and æsthetic forms are entirely diverse. Ethics and
æsthetics have to do with objects in which an immediate evidence
appears, but this is foreign to the whole nature of metaphysics, which
can only gain its knowledge as errors have been removed. Æsthetic
judgments on which practical philosophy rests, are independent of the
reality of any object, and appear with immediate certainty in the midst
of the strongest metaphysical doubts. Moral elements, says Herbart, are
pleasing and displeasing relations of the will. He thus grounds the
whole practical philosophy upon æsthetic judgments. The æsthetic
judgment is an involuntary and immediate judgment, which attaches to
certain objects, without proof, the predicates of goodness and
badness.—Here is seen the greatest difference between Herbart and Kant.
We may characterize, on the whole, the philosophy of Herbart as a
carrying out of the monadology of Leibnitz, full of enduring acuteness,
but without any inner fruitfulness or capacity of development.