SECTION XXXI.

HELVETIUS.

_Helvetius_ has exhibited the moral consequences of the sensualistic

standpoint. While theoretical sensualism affirms that all our knowledge

is determined by sensation, practical sensualism adds to this the

analogous proposition that all our volition springs from the same

source, and is regulated by the sensuous desire. Helvetius adopted it as

the principle of morals to satisfy this sensuous desire.

Helvetius was born at Paris in 1715. Gaining a position in his

twenty-third year as farmer-general, he found himself early in the

possession of a rich income, but after a few years he found this office

so vexatious that he abandoned it. The study of Locke decided his

philosophic direction. Helvetius wrote his famed work, _de l’Esprit_,

after he had given up his office and withdrawn himself in seclusion. It

appeared in 1758, and attracted a great attention at home and abroad,

though it drew upon him a violent persecution, especially from the

clergy. It was fortunate for him that the persecution satisfied itself

with suppressing his book. The repose in which he spent his later years

was interrupted only by two journeys which he made to Germany and

England. He died in 1771. His personal character was wholly estimable,

full of kindness and generosity. Especially in his place as

farmer-general he showed himself benevolent towards the poor, and

resolute against the encroachments of his subalterns. The style of his

writings is easy and elegant.

Self-love or interest, says Helvetius, is the lever of all our mental

activities. Even that activity which is purely intellectual, our

instinct towards knowledge, our forming of ideas, rests upon this. Since

now all self-love refers essentially only to bodily pleasure, it follows

that every mental occurrence within us has its peculiar source only in

the striving after this pleasure; but in saying this, we have only

affirmed where the principle of all morality is to be sought. It is an

absurdity to require a man to do the good simply for its own sake. This

is just as impracticable as that he should do the evil simply for the

sake of the evil. Hence if morality would not be wholly fruitless, it

must return to its empirical basis, and venture to adopt the true

principle of all acting, viz., sensuous pleasure and pain, or, in other

words, selfishness as an actual moral principle. Hence, as a correct

legislation is that which secures obedience to its laws through reward

and punishment, _i. e._ through selfishness, so will a correct system of

morals be that which derives the duties of men from self-love, which

shows that that which is forbidden is something which is followed by

disagreeable consequences. A system of ethics which does not involve the

self-interest of men, or which wars against this, necessarily remains

fruitless.

A History of Philosophy in Epitome · 第 31 / 45 章