SECTION X.

ANAXAGORAS.

1. HIS PERSONAL HISTORY.—Anaxagoras is said to have been born at

Clazamena, about the year 500 B. C.; to have gone to Athens immediately,

or soon after the Persian war, to have lived and taught there for a long

time, and, finally, accused of irreverence to the gods, to have fled,

and died at Lampsacus, at the age of 72. He it was who first planted

philosophy at Athens, which from this time on became the centre of

intellectual life in Greece. Through his personal relations to Pericles,

Euripides, and other important men,—among whom Themistocles and

Thucydides should be named—he exerted a decisive influence upon the

culture of the age. It was on account of this that the charge of

defaming the gods was brought against him, doubtless by the political

opponents of Pericles. Anaxagoras wrote a work “_Concerning Nature_”

which in the time of Socrates was widely circulated.

2. HIS RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS.—The system of Anaxagoras starts

from the same point with his predecessors, and is simply another attempt

at the solution of the same problem. Like Empedocles and the Atomists so

did Anaxagoras most vehemently deny the becoming. “The becoming and

departing,”—so runs one of his sayings—“the Greeks hold without

foundation, for nothing can ever be said to become or depart; but, since

existing things may be compounded together and again divided, we should

name the becoming more correctly a combination, and the departing a

separation.” From this view, that every thing arose by the mingling of

different elements, and departed by the withdrawing of these elements,

Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, was obliged to separate matter from

the moving power. But though his point of starting was the same, yet was

his direction essentially different from that of any previous

philosopher. It was clear that neither Empedocles nor Democritus had

satisfactorily apprehended the moving power. The mythical energies of

love and hate of the one, or the unconscious necessity of the other,

explained nothing, and least of all, the design of the becoming in

nature. The conception of an activity which could thus work designedly,

must, therefore, be brought into the conception of the moving power, and

this Anaxagoras accomplished by setting up the idea of a world-forming

intelligence (νοῦς), absolutely separated from all matter and working

with design.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE νοῦς.—Anaxagoras described this intelligence as

free to dispose, unmingled with any thing, the ground of movement, but

itself unmoved, every where active, and the most refined and pure of all

things. Although these predicates rest partly upon a physical analogy,

and do not exhibit purely the conception of immateriality, yet on the

other hand does the attribute of thought and of a conscious acting with

design admit no doubt to remain of the decided idealistic character of

the Anaxagorean principle. Nevertheless, Anaxagoras went no farther than

to enunciate his fundamental thought without attempting its complete

application. The explanation of this is obvious from the reasons which

first led him to adopt his principle. It was only the need of an

original cause of motion, to which also might be attributed the capacity

to work designedly, which had led him to the idea of an immaterial

principle. His νοῦς, therefore, is almost nothing but a mover of matter,

and in this function nearly all its activity is expended. Hence the

universal complaint of the ancients, especially of Plato and Aristotle,

respecting the mechanical character of his doctrine. In Plato’s Phædon

Socrates relates that, in the hope of being directed beyond a simple

occasioning, or mediate cause, he had turned to the book of Anaxagoras,

but had found there only a mechanical instead of a truly teleological

explanation of being. And as Plato so also does Aristotle find fault

with Anaxagoras in that, while he admits mind as the ultimate ground of

things, he yet resorts to it only as to a _Deus ex machina_ for the

explanation of phenomena, whose necessity he could not derive from the

causality in nature. Anaxagoras, therefore, has rather postulated than

proved mind as an energy above nature, and as the truth and actuality of

natural being.

The further extension of his system, his doctrine concerning the

homoiomeria (constituent elements of things), which according to him

existed together originally in a chaotic condition until with their

separation and parting the formation of the world began—can here only be

mentioned.

4. ANAXAGORAS AS THE CLOSE OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC REALISM.—With the

Anaxagorean principle of the νοῦς, _i. e._ with the acquisition of an

absolutely immaterial principle, closes the realistic period of the old

Grecian Philosophy. Anaxagoras combined together the principles of all

his predecessors. The infinite matter of the Hylics is represented in

his chaotic original mingling of things; the Eleatic pure being appears

in the idea of the νοῦς; the Heraclitic power of becoming and the

Empedoclean moving energies are both seen in the creating and arranging

power of the eternal mind, while the Democritic atoms come to view in

the homoiomeria. Anaxagoras is the closing point of an old and the

beginning point of a new course of development,—the latter through the

setting up of his ideal principle, and the former through the defective

and completely physical manner in which this principle was yet again

applied.

A History of Philosophy in Epitome · 第 10 / 45 章