THE CONVOY SYSTEM
ALTHOUGH the convoy system was employed at the beginning of the war for
the transport of the Imperial armies to France, and subsequently for all
the Allied troop movements overseas, it was some three years later
before it was extended to the entire British Mercantile navy, on which
the United Kingdom depended for too many of the necessities of civilised
life.
The rapid development of submarine piracy, however, compelled the
Admiralty, early in the year 1917, to resort to what was merely a new
form of the old system of protecting sea-borne trade. This comprised the
collection of all merchant ships passing through the danger zones into
nondescript fleets, and the provision of light cruisers, destroyers,
torpedo-boats, trawlers and occasionally (for coastal convoys) of patrol
launches to escort them. Certain types of aircraft were also frequently
used for observation and scouting purposes.
Previous to the adoption of the convoy system a merchantman, whether it
was a fast-moving liner or a sturdy but slow ocean tramp, _zigzagged_
through the danger zones with lights out and life-boats ready. Many were
the exciting runs made in this way, with shells ploughing up the water
around and torpedoes avoided only by the quick use of the helm; but the
courage of our merchant seamen was of that indomitable character
exhibited now for over three centuries, since the days of Drake,
Hawkins, Raleigh and the other sea-dogs of old.
But the danger zones grew wider as the radius of action of newer and
larger German submarines increased. At last no waters were immune, from
the Arctic circle to the Equator, or from Heligoland to New York.
The hour was one of extreme peril for the sea-divided Empire. To lose
several hundred ships, with many thousands of lives and much-needed
cargoes of food and munitions, when the valiant armies of civilisation
were battling with the Teuton hordes, was bad enough; but if the enemy
had been able, by casting aside the laws of humanity and sea war, to
compel British ships to remain in harbour or meet certain destruction on
the high seas, the result could only have been the complete failure of
the Allied cause, the conquest of Europe and the fall of the greatest
political edifice since Imperial Rome.
Between the world and these catastrophes, however, stood the undefeated
Mercantile Marine and the Allied navies. Councils were held in the
historic rooms of Whitehall and the old convoy system emerged from the
archives of Nelson's day. The commerce raiders were no longer the
canvas-pressed privateers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, who fought a clean fight, often against great
odds, but were submarine pirates of the mechanical age, who only
appeared from the sea depths when their victims had been placed _hors de
combat_.
It is an old axiom of war that new weapons of attack are invariably met
by new methods of defence. So it was with the convoy system which gave
the death-blow to German hopes of a submarine victory. In order to
understand this _new_ method it is necessary to study the accompanying
diagram, which, however simple it may appear on paper, is extremely
difficult to carry out in practice.
At each great port there was a convoy officer, who assembled the
merchant ships when they had been loaded and explained to their captains
the exact position each ship was to occupy when the fleet was at sea.
Printed instructions were handed round urging each vessel to keep its
correct station, stating the procedure to be adopted in the event of an
engine breakdown, giving the manoeuvres which were instantly to be
carried into effect when an attack was threatened, and finally the
special signals arranged for communication between the merchantmen and
their escort by day and by night.
The number of vessels composing a convoy varied, but often exceeded
twenty big cargo ships, carrying some 120,000 tons of merchandise, or
six liners, with 20,000 troops on board, while the escorting flotilla
consisted of a light cruiser, acting as flag-ship, six destroyers, two
special vessels ("P" boats) towing observation airships, and some eight
or ten trawlers, with possibly one or more seaplanes and several M.L.'s
for the first few miles of the voyage. The destroyers were spread out
ahead and on the flanks of the fleet, and by using their greatly
superior speed were able to zigzag and circle round the whole convoy.
[Illustration: FIG. 18.--Diagram showing the disposition of a convoy of
troops, munitions or food.]
In the event of an attack the whole fleet turned off from the course
they were steering at a sharp angle, showing only their sterns to the
U-boat. A destroyer acted as rearguard to prevent any of the convoyed
ships from straggling. When the fleet had arrived at a rendezvous far
out in the open sea, where the danger of a submarine attack was much
less, the escort handed over their charges to one or two ocean-going
cruisers, which stayed with the merchant ships throughout the remainder
of their voyage.
[Illustration: A MOTOR LAUNCH CLEARED FOR ACTION
_Yachting Monthly_]
The escorting flotilla then cruised about in the vicinity of the
rendezvous until an incoming convoy appeared. These ships were then
taken over from their mid-ocean cruiser guard and escorted back through
the danger zone to port, and so the game of war continued until months
became years.
All this may sound straightforward and quite simple, but there were
difficulties, to say nothing of dangers, which made it a most arduous
operation. First came the speed problem. Every merchant ship differed in
this important respect, so the speed of the slowest unit became the
speed of the entire fleet, and this reduction made an attack by
under-water craft much easier of accomplishment. Hence the call for
"standard ships," which is a point that should be borne in mind by
future generations as a safeguard against blockade. Then came the
question of destination, which increased the number of escorting
flotillas, and especially ocean cruiser guards, required for a given
number of cargo ships. Next there was the loading and unloading to be
considered, involving long hours and hard work by the men on the
quaysides. This great difficulty was one of the reasons for the
formation of docker battalions. Coaling such big fleets by given times
caused many grey hairs to appear where otherwise they would not have
been. Finally there was the danger of mines having been laid in the
fair-ways leading to the port, which necessitated every convoy being met
by special vessels to sweep the seas in front of each incoming and
outgoing fleet.
[Illustration: FIG. 19.--Diagram showing the convoy system.]
All this and more had to be contended with and overcome before each
convoy was able to sail. Then danger and difficulty came hand-in-hand.
On a bright morning, with probably a fresh breeze blowing and a choppy
sea, the work of the escorting flotilla was easy, but with such climatic
conditions the risk of attack was so great in the waters around the
coasts that troopships usually left harbour under cover of night. No
lights were then allowed, and it will not be difficult for readers to
imagine what it meant to be pounding through a black void in a
fast-moving destroyer, against, possibly, a heavy head sea, with some
twenty or thirty big ships in the darkness and spray around. Thick
sea-mists were the cause of endless trouble, for the safety of an
invisible fleet depended on the vigilance of a half-blind escort. Winter
gales scattered the ships and rendered signals invisible. Attacks came
from the most unexpected quarters and often from more than one point of
the compass at the same time. However, relief came at last, on that
never-to-be-forgotten morning when Sir David Beatty and his admirals
accepted the unconditional surrender of the German fleet and its unsunk
submarines.
Were this chapter to end with the foregoing description of the convoy
system the reader would not be in possession of the full facts from
which to gauge the importance of the work. Something must be said of
what was accomplished. First in order of importance came the transport
of many millions of soldiers not only from England to France, but also
to and from every colony and dominion of the world-wide Empire. By
August, 1915, the British navy had transported, across seas infested
with submarines and mines, a million men without the loss of a single
life or a single troopship.[5] The first Canadian army of 33,000 men
crossed the Atlantic in one big fleet of forty liners, under the escort
of four cruisers and a battleship, in October, 1914, without accident.
Transports to the number of 60 were required to convey the first
Australian army over the 14,000 miles of sea to Europe, and it was while
convoying this huge fleet that the cruiser _Sydney_ chased and destroyed
the German raider _Emden_. The Russian force which rendered valuable
service in France was safely convoyed over the 9000 miles of sea from
Dalny to Marseilles. Never once during the four and a half years of war
was the supply of food, munitions and reinforcements, or the return of
the wounded--to and from the many theatres of land operations--seriously
hindered by the German, Austrian or Turkish navies.
Turning to the gigantic task of guarding England's food supply, we find,
in one notable case, an example of the good work performed almost daily
for nearly five years. Over 4500 merchant ships had been escorted across
the North Sea to Scandinavian ports alone before the disaster of 14th
October 1917 befell the convoy on that route. On that occasion the
anti-submarine escort of three destroyers were intercepted, midway
between the Shetland Islands and Norway, by two heavily armed German
cruisers. The destroyers fought to the last to save their charges, but
unfortunately only three merchant ships succeeded in getting safely
away. Five Norwegian ships, three Swedish and one Danish ship were sunk.
From this it will be observed that not only British merchantmen were
protected by escorts.
The second attack on the Scandinavian convoy occurred on 12th December.
The escort consisted of two destroyers, the _Partridge_ and _Pellew_,
with four armed trawlers. Fortunately the convoy was comparatively a
small one, for it was attacked and almost totally destroyed in the North
Sea by four of the largest German destroyers. H.M.S. _Pellew_, although
badly damaged, succeeded in returning to England.
It may be rightly thought that in both these cases the escorting
flotilla was not strong enough, but it should be remembered that if
heavier ships had been employed they would have been much less able to
cope with a submarine attack. The escort in both cases was purely an
anti-submarine defence, and only on the Scandinavian and Netherlands
routes was a surface attack at all possible, because all exits from the
North Sea were securely closed by the strategic positions occupied by
the Grand Fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, in conjunction with
subsidiary fleets at Harwich and extensive mine-fields.
When it became apparent that surface as well as submarine attacks on the
North Sea convoys had to be provided against, other means were promptly
adopted, and no further disasters occurred.
The strong escort accompanying the transports bringing to Europe the
first American army were attacked at night by a submarine, but succeeded
in avoiding the torpedoes fired. This was due to the smartness with
which the United States warships were manoeuvred. Three subsequent
attacks on the same convoy route also failed.
The Report of the War Cabinet for the year 1917 gives some remarkable
figures in support of the convoy system. On the Atlantic routes about 90
per cent. of the ships were formed into fleets and escorted. From the
inauguration of this system the loss on these routes from all causes was
0.82 per cent., and if all the trade routes to and from the United
Kingdom are included, the loss was only 0.58 per cent. With these
figures in mind, who will deny that the navy is the surest form of
national as well as Imperial insurance?
FOOTNOTE:
[5] When writing of the navy in this connection due praise should be
given to the Mercantile Marine, which this war has proved to be a very
important part of the _true_ sea power of Great Britain.