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SUBMARINE WARFARE OF TO-DAY
[Illustration: THE SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE FLEET
The White Ensign is hoisted over the German Eagle.
_British Official Photograph_]
SUBMARINE WARFARE OF TO-DAY
HOW THE SUBMARINE MENACE WAS MET AND VANQUISHED,
WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE INVENTIONS AND DEVICES
USED, FAST BOATS, MYSTERY SHIPS, NETS, AIRCRAFT,
&c. &c., ALSO DESCRIBING THE SELECTION
AND TRAINING OF THE ENORMOUS
PERSONNEL USED IN THIS NEW
BRANCH OF THE NAVY
BY
CHARLES W. DOMVILLE-FIFE
_Lieut. R.N.V.R., late of the Staff of H.M. School of Submarine Mining_
AUTHOR OF
"SUBMARINES & SEA POWER" "SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD'S NAVIES"
"SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY" _&c._ _&c._ _&c._
WITH 53 ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON
SEELEY, SERVICE & CO. LIMITED
38 GREAT RUSSELL STREET
1920
Science of To-Day Series
NEW VOLUME
13. Submarine Warfare of To-Day.
By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE, Lieut., R.N.V.R., late of the Staff of H.M.
School of Submarine Mining. Author of "Submarines and Sea Power,"
"Submarines of the World's Navies," "Submarine Engineering of To-Day,"
_&c._ _&c._ With many Illustrations and Diagrams. Extra Crown 8vo. 7s.
6d. nett.
ALREADY PUBLISHED
1. ELECTRICITY OF TO-DAY.
By C. R. GIBSON, F.R.S.E.
2. ASTRONOMY OF TO-DAY.
By CECIL G. DOLMAGE, M.A., D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.A.S.
3. SCIENTIFIC IDEAS OF TO-DAY.
By C. R. GIBSON.
4. BOTANY OF TO-DAY.
By Professor G. F. SCOTT ELLIOT, M.A., B.SC.
6. ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY.
By T. W. CORBIN.
7. MEDICAL SCIENCE OF TO-DAY.
By WILLMOTT EVANS, M.D.
8. MECHANICAL INVENTIONS OF TO-DAY.
By T. W. CORBIN.
9. PHOTOGRAPHY OF TO-DAY.
By H. CHAPMAN JONES, F.I.C., F.C.S., F.R.P.S.
10. SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY.
By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE.
11. GEOLOGY OF TO-DAY.
By Professor J. W. GREGORY, F.R.S.
12. AIRCRAFT OF TO-DAY.
By CHARLES C. TURNER, Lieut., R.N.V.R.
SEELEY, SERVICE & CO., LTD., 38 Great Russell St.
=Dedicated=
TO THE MEMORY OF
THE LATE LIEUT. WALTER PRICE, R.N.V.R.
A TRUE FRIEND AND A
GALLANT OFFICER
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I DESIRE simply to say that I commenced taking an active interest in
submarines in 1904. I wrote my first book on the subject, _Submarines of
the World's Navies_, in 1910, and I have watched and written of the rise
of these and kindred weapons for the past fifteen years of rapid
development in peace and war, finally taking a humble part in the defeat
of the great German submarine armada during the years 1914-1918.
C. D.-F.
1919.
INTRODUCTION
WHILE Great Britain remains an island, with dominion over palm and pine,
it is to the sea that her four hundred millions of people must look for
the key to all that has been achieved in the past and all that the
future promises in the quickening dawn of a new era.
Not only over Great Britain alone, however, does the ocean cast its
spell, for it is the free highway of the world, sailed by the ships of
all nations, without other hindrances than those of stormy nature, and
navigated without restriction from pole to pole by the seamen of all
races. It was the international meeting-place, where ensigns were
"dipped" in friendly greeting, and since the dawn of history there has
been a freemasonry of the sea which knew no distinction of nation or
creed.
When the call of humanity boomed across the dark, storm-tossed waters
the answer came readily from beneath whatever flag the sound was heard.
But in August, 1914, there came a change, so dramatic, so sudden, that
maritime nations were stunned. Germany, in an excess of war fever, broke
the sea laws, and laughed while women and children drowned. Crime
followed crime, and the great voice of the Republican West protested in
unison with that of the Imperial East. Still the Black Eagle laughed as
it flew far and wide, carrying death to whomsoever came within its
shadow, regardless of race and sex.
But there was an avenger upon the seas, one who had been rocked in its
cradle from time immemorial, and to whom the world appealed to save the
lives of their seamen. It sailed beneath the White Ensign and the Blue,
and with aid from France, Italy and Japan it fought by day and by night,
in winter gale and snow, and in summer heat and fog, in torrid zone and
regions of perpetual ice to free the seas of the traitorous monster who
had, in the twentieth century, hoisted the black flag of piracy and
murder. For three years this ceaseless war was waged, and then, with her
wonderful patience exhausted, the great sister nation of the mother
tongue joined her fleets and armies with those of the battle-worn Allies
and peace came to a long-suffering world.
In that abyss of war there was romance sufficient for many generations
of novelists and historians. Many were the epic fights, unimportant in
themselves, but which need only a Kingsley or a Stevenson to make them
famous for all time. So with the happenings to be described in this
book, many of them historically unimportant compared with the
epoch-making events of which they formed a decimal part, but told in
plain words; just records of romance on England's sea frontier in the
years 1914-1918.
Although jealous of any encroachment on the space available for the
description of guerrilla war at sea, there are many things which must
first be said regarding the organisation and training of what may
appropriately be termed the "New Navy," which took the sea to combat the
submarine and the mine; also of the novel weapons devised amid the whirl
of war for their use, protection and offensive power. Into this brief
recital of the events leading to the real thing an endeavour will be
made to infuse the life and local colour, which, however, would be more
appropriate in a personal narrative than in a general description of
anti-submarine warfare of to-day, but without which much that is
essential could not be written without dire risk of tiring the reader
before the first few chapters had been passed.
The names of places and ships have necessarily been changed to avoid
anything of a personal character, and all references to existing or dead
officers and men have been rigidly excluded as objectionable and
unnecessary in a book dealing entirely with events.
Many of the incidents described--written while the events stood out in
clear, mental perspective--could no doubt be duplicated and easily
surpassed by many whose fortunes took them into zones of sea war during
the historic years just past. If such is found to be the case, then the
object of this book has been accomplished, for it sets out to tell, not
of great epoch-making events, but of the organisation, men, ships,
weapons and ordinary incidents of life in what, for lack of a better
term, has been called the "New Navy"--a production of the World War.
It may be that an apology is due for placing yet another war book before
a war-weary public, but an effort has been made to make of the following
chapters _a record of British maritime achievement_, more than a
narrative of sea fighting, although to do this without introducing the
human element, the arduous nature of the work, the monotony, the danger
and, finally, the compensating moments of excitement would have been to
falsify the account and belittle the achievement.
There are many books available, full of exciting stories of sea and land
war, but no other, so far as the Author knows, which describes in detail
and in plain phraseology those important "little things"--liable to be
overlooked amid the whirl of war--which go to make an anti-submarine
personnel, fleet and base, together with an account of "how it was
done."
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE TASK OF THE ALLIED NAVIES 17
II. THE NEW NAVY--TRAINING AN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCE 36
III. A NAVAL UNIVERSITY IN TIME OF WAR 47
IV. THE NEW FLEETS IN BEING 50
V. THE HYDROPHONE AND THE DEPTH CHARGE 70
VI. SOME CURIOUS WEAPONS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 85
VII. MYSTERY SHIPS 96
VIII. A TYPICAL WAR BASE 102
IX. THE CONVOY SYSTEM 116
X. THE MYSTERIES OF SUBMARINE HUNTING EXPLAINED 126
XI. THE MYSTERIES OF GERMAN MINE-LAYING EXPLAINED 143
XII. THE MYSTERIES OF MINESWEEPING EXPLAINED 157
XIII. THE MINE BARRAGE 179
XIV. OFF TO THE ZONES OF WAR 187
XV. A MEMORABLE CHRISTMAS 192
XVI. THE DERELICT 202
XVII. MINED-IN 209
XVIII. THE CASUALTY 220
XIX. HOW H.M. TRAWLER NO. 6 LOST HER REFIT 226
XX. THE RAIDER 233
XXI. THE S.O.S. 238
XXII. IN THE SHADOW OF A BIG SEA FIGHT 248
XXIII. A NIGHT ATTACK 258
XXIV. MYSTERIES OF THE GREAT SEA WASTES 264
XXV. FROM OUT THE CLOUDS AND THE UNDER-SEAS 273
XXVI. ON THE SEA FLANK OF THE ALLIED ARMIES 286
INDEX 301
List of Illustrations
SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE FLEET _Frontispiece_
FACING
PAGE
PLAN OF A 55 FEET COASTAL MOTOR BOAT 16
LARGE HEAVILY ARMED GERMAN SUBMARINE 32
MOTOR LAUNCH HULLS BEING CONSTRUCTED 56
A 40 FEET COASTAL MOTOR BOAT AT FULL SPEED 64
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE SAME BOAT AT FULL SPEED 64
DROPPING DEPTH CHARGES 80
INNOCENT-LOOKING BUT DEADLY 96
HIDDEN TORPEDO TUBES OF H.M.S. _HYDERABAD_ 96
AFTER-DECK OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (BEFORE ACTION) 104
AFTER-DECK OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (PREPARED FOR ACTION) 104
MOCK WHEEL AND COMPASS PEDESTAL OF THE _HYDERABAD_ 112
MOCK WHEEL AND COMPASS PEDESTAL OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (COLLAPSED) 112
MOTOR LAUNCH CLEARED FOR ACTION 120
A WRECKED COASTAL MOTOR BOAT 136
CAPTIVE MINE-LAYING SUBMARINE 144
A MINESWEEPER 160
A PARAVANE 176
MORSE SIGNALLING 184
MOTOR LAUNCH OF THE NAVAL PATROL 216
A MONITOR 280
[Illustration: PLAN OF 55 FEET COASTAL BOAT, CARRYING TWO 18-INCH
TORPEDOES]
SUBMARINE WARFARE
OF TO-DAY
CHAPTER I
THE TASK OF THE ALLIED NAVIES
THE hour was that of the Allies' greatest need--the last months of the
year 1914. On that fateful 4th August the British navy was concentrated
in the North Sea, and the chance for a surprise attack by the German
fleet, or an invasion of England by the Kaiser's armies, vanished for
ever, and with this one chance went also all reasonable possibility of a
crushing German victory.
Although during the years of bitter warfare which followed this silent
_coup de main_ the German fleet many times showed signs of awakening
ambition, it did not, after Jutland, dare to thrust even its vanguard
far into the open sea. Behind its forts, mines and submarines it waited,
growing weaker with the dry-rot of inaction, for the chance that fickle
Fortune might place a single unit of the Allied fleet within easy reach
of its whole mailed-fist.
With a great and modern fleet--the second strongest in the
world--awaiting its chance less than twenty hours' steam from the coast
of Great Britain, it quickly became evident that the old Mistress of
the Seas would have to call upon her islanders to supply a "new navy" to
scour the oceans while her main battle squadrons waited and watched for
the second Trafalgar.
Faced, then, with the problem of a long blockade, a powerful fleet in
readiness to strike at any weak or unduly exposed point of land or
squadron, and with similar problems on a decreasing scale imposed by
Austria in the Adriatic and by Turkey behind the Dardanelles, the work
of the main battle fleets became well defined by the commonest laws of
naval strategy.
All this without taking into account the widespread menace of submarines
and mines, and, in the earlier stages of the war, the rounding-up of
detached enemy squadrons, such as that under Von Spee in South American
waters, and the protection of the transport and food ships from raiders
like the _Wolfe_ and the _Moewe_.
The German High Command realised this as quickly as that of the Allies.
Their oversea commerce was strangled within a few days of the
Declaration of War with Great Britain, and their fleet was confined to
harbour, with the exception of occasional operations against Russia in
the Baltic. From the German standpoint the naval problem resolved itself
into one of how best to strike at the lines of communication of the
Allies, paying special attention, first, to the transport of troops,
and, second, to England's food supply. As they alone knew to what extent
they would violate the laws of war and of humanity, it became apparent
that the submarine and the mine were the only possible weapons which
could be used for this purpose in face of the superior fleets of the
Allies. But the number of these weapons was strictly limited compared
with the immense shipping resources at the command of the Western
Powers, so one submarine must do the work of many, and an effort was
made to accomplish this by a reign of sea terrorism and inhuman conduct
unparalleled in the history of the world. It opened with the sinking of
the _Lusitania_.
The Allies had secured and maintained the command of the sea, and _all
that it implies_, but to do this with the certainty of correct strategy
they had to dedicate almost their entire battle fleet to the purpose for
which battle fleets have always been intended--the checkmating or
annihilation of the opposing navy.
There came a second problem, however, one entirely new to sea warfare,
and unconsidered or provided against in its strategic and tactical
entirety because hitherto deemed too inhuman for modern war. This was
the ruthless use of armed submarines against unarmed passenger and
merchant ships, and the scattering broadcast over the seas, regardless
of the lives and property of neutrals, of thousands of explosive mines.
The type of ship constructed exclusively for open sea warfare against
surface adversaries was not the best answer to the submarine. The
blockading of the hostile surface fleet did not prevent, or even greatly
hinder, the free passage of submarine flotillas, and the building by
Germany of under-water mine-layers enabled fields of these weapons to be
laid anywhere within the carrier's radius of action.
In this way the second, or submarine, phase of the naval war opened, and
it was to supplement the comparatively few fast destroyers and other
suitable ships which could be spared from the main fleets that the "new
navy" was formed.
THE SHIPS
The area of the North Sea alone exceeds 140,000 square miles, and when
the whole vast stretch of water encompassed by what was known as the
radius of action of hostile submarines, from their bases on the German,
Belgian, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian coasts, had to be considered as
a possible zone of operations for German and Austrian under-water
flotillas, much of the water surface of the world was included. Likewise
the network of sea communications on which the Allies depended for the
maintenance of essential transport and communication comprised the
pathways of the seven seas. To patrol all these routes adequately, and
to guard the food and troop ships, hastening in large numbers to the aid
of the Motherland from the most distant corners of the earth; to protect
the 1500 miles sea frontier of the British Isles; to give timely aid to
sinking or hard-pressed units of the mercantile fleet; to hound the
submarine from the under-seas and to sweep clear, almost weekly, several
thousand square miles of sea, from Belle Isle to Cape Town and the
Orkneys to Colombo, required ships, not in tens, but in thousands. To
find these in an incredibly short space of time became the primary naval
need of the moment.
Who that lived through those days will forget the struggle to supply
ships and guns? The searching of every harbour for craft, from motor
boats to old-time sailing-ships, and from fishing craft to liners. The
scouring of the Dominions and Colonies. How blessed was their aid! Help,
generous and spontaneous, came from all quarters, including the most
unexpected. Over five hundred fast patrol boats, or motor launches, in
less than twelve months from Canada and America. Guns from Japan.
Coasting steamers from India, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
Seaplanes from the Crown Colonies. Rifles from Canada. Machine guns from
the United States. Ambulances from English and Colonial women's leagues.
In fact, contributions to the "new navy" from all corners of the earth.
To patrol the coasts of Britain alone, and to keep its harbours and
coastal trade routes clear of mines, needed over 3500 ships, with at
least an equal number of guns, 30,000 rifles and revolvers, and millions
of shells.
In addition to this huge fleet other smaller squadrons were required for
the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and Red Sea, the East and West
Indies, the coasts of the Dominions and Colonies, and for the Russian
lines of communication in the White Sea. For these oversea bases just
under 1000 ships were required, exclusive of those locally supplied by
the Dominions and Colonies themselves.
All this without considering the main battle fleets or, in fact, any
portion of the regular navy, and the ships required for the transport of
food, troops and munitions of war, together with their escorts. Some
idea of the numbers engaged in keeping the Allies supplied with the
diverse necessities of life and war may be gathered from the fact that
the average sailings in and out of the harbours of the United Kingdom
alone during the four years of war amounted to over 1200 a week.
The immense fleet forming the new navy was not homogeneous in design,
power, appearance or, in fact, in anything except the spirit of the
personnel and the flag beneath which they fought--and alas! nearly 4000
died. The squadrons, or units, as they were called, consisted of fine
steam yachts, liners from the ocean trade routes, sturdy sea tramps,
deep-sea trawlers, oilers, colliers, drifters, paddle steamers, and the
more uniform and specially built fighting sloops, whalers, motor
launches and coastal motor boats. The latter type of craft was aided by
its great speed, nearly fifty miles an hour; but more about these ships
and their curious armament later.
WAR BASES
The great auxiliary navy had to be built or obtained without depleting
the ordinary mercantile fleets, and the shipbuilding and repairing
yards, even in the smallest sea and river ports, worked day and night.
The triumph was as wonderful as it was speedy. In less than fifteen
months from August, 1914, the new navy was a gigantic force, and its
operations extended from the Arctic Sea to the Equator. All units were
armed, manned and linked up by wireless and a common cause.
Before this could be accomplished, however, the problem of maintaining
this vast fleet and adequately controlling its operations had to be
faced and overcome. The seas adjacent to the coasts of the United
Kingdom, the Mediterranean Littoral and Colonial waters were divided
into "patrol areas" on special secret charts, and each "area" had its
own naval base, with harbour, stores, repairing and docking facilities,
intelligence centre, wireless and signal stations, reserve of officers
and men, social headquarters, workshops and medical department.
Each base was under the command of an admiral and staff, many of the
former returning to duty, after several years of well-earned rest, as
captains and commodores, with salaries commensurate with their reduced
rank. Their staffs consisted of some six to twelve officers of the new
navy, with possibly one or two from the "pukka service," and their
command often extended over many hundreds of square miles of submarine
and mine infested sea.
Of these bases, which will be fully described in later chapters, there
were about fifty, excluding the great dockyards and fleet headquarters,
but inclusive of those situated overseas. When it is considered what a
war base needs to make it an efficient rendezvous for some hundreds of
ships and thousands of men, some idea of the gigantic task of
organisation which their establishment, often in poorly equipped
harbours and distant islands, required, not only in the first instance,
but also with regard to maintenance and supplies, will be realised,
perhaps, however, more fully when it is stated that the average ship
needs a month spent in docking and overhauling at least once a year, and
that the delicate and more speedy units of such a fleet need nearly four
times that amount of attention.
HEADQUARTERS STAFF
One of the first requisites of the auxiliary navy was the creation of a
headquarters staff at the Admiralty, London. This was formed from naval
officers of experience both in the regular service and in the two
reserves (R.N.R. and R.N.V.R.).
Forming an integral part of the great British or Allied armada, all
operations were under the control of the Naval War Staff, but for
purposes of more detailed organisation and administration additional
departments were created which exercised direct jurisdiction over their
respective fleets. The principal of these was known as the "Auxiliary
Patrol Office," under the Fourth Sea Lord and the Department of the
Director of Minesweeping. These formed a part of the General Staff--if a
military term is permissible--and both issued official publications
periodically throughout the war, which served to keep the staffs of all
the different war bases and the commanding officers of the thousands of
ships informed as to current movements and ruses of the enemy.
It is unnecessary to detail more closely the work of these departments,
especially as much has yet to be said before plunging into the maelstrom
of war. A sufficient indication of the colossal nature of the work they
were called upon to perform will be found in a moment's reflection of
what the administration and control of such a large and nondescript
fleet, spread over the world--from the White Sea to the East
Indies--must have meant to the small staff allowed by the exigencies of
an unparalleled war.
OFFICERS AND MEN
The greatest problem in modern naval war is, undoubtedly, the supply of
trained men. For this reason it has been left to the last to describe
how the difficulty was faced and overcome by England and her oversea
Dominions in 1914.
Before doing so, however, it may be of interest to give here a few
extracts from an excellent little official publication, showing how the
British fleet was manned and expanded in bygone days of national
peril[1]:
"In time of war there has always been an intimate
connection between the Royal Navy and the Merchant
Service. Latterly, and more especially since the
Russian War of 1854 to 1856, this fact tended to
be forgotten, partly because men-of-war developed
on particular lines and became far more unlike
merchantmen than they had ever been before, and
also because, by the introduction of continuous
service, the personnel of the Navy seemed to have
developed into a separate caste, distinguished by
its associations, traditions and _esprit de
corps_, as much by its special training and
qualifications, from other seafaring men. This war
has proved once again, to such as needed proof,
that the two services cannot exist without each
other, and that the Sea Power of the Empire is not
its naval strength alone, but its maritime
strength. Even at the risk of insisting on the
obvious, it is necessary to repeat that, for an
Island Empire, a war at sea cannot be won merely
by the naval action which defeats the enemy; naval
successes are of value for the fruit they bear,
the chief of which is the power that they give to
the victor to maintain his own sea-borne trade and
to interrupt that of the enemy.
"An elementary way of looking at the problems of
manning the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service
is to consider that there is in the country a
common stock of seamen, on which both can draw.
But this theory, like many others equally obvious
and tempting, has the disadvantage that it leaves
important factors out of account and, if worked
out, results in an absurdity. Thus, shortly before
war began there were in the country some 420,000
seamen, of whom one-third were in the Navy and
two-thirds engaged in merchant ships and fishing
vessels. There was no considerable body of
unemployed seamen. During the war the personnel of
the Navy was expanded to something like the
420,000 which represents the common stock of
seamen. Therefore, if the theory met the case,
there would have been no men left for the Merchant
Service. But the merchant ships, in spite of
difficulty and danger, continued to run, employing
great numbers of men. And we must not forget to
take into account the number of men, amounting to
48,000 killed and 4500 prisoners of war, who have
been lost in the two services during the war. So
it comes to this, that the common stock of seamen,
or at least of men fit to man ships, has expanded
during the war by more than 50 per cent. Whence
came these extra men? Clearly for the most part
from the non-seafaring classes.
"The Navy in November, 1918, employed some 80,000
officers and men from the Merchant Service--viz.
20,000 R.N.R. ratings, 36,000 Trawler Reserve, and
20,000 mercantile seamen and firemen on Transport
agreements, plus the officers. If the supposition,
made in the absence of statistics, is correct
that at this time the number of men in the
Merchant Service itself had decreased
proportionately to the loss of tonnage, it would
seem that the Merchant Service needed no
considerable inflow of men during the war. In
other words, most of those added to the stock of
seamen during the war must have gone into the
Navy. This corresponds with known fact: the Navy
has, in addition to the Reserve men already
mentioned, nearly 200,000 men to demobilise in
order to put its personnel on the footing on which
it stood when war broke out.
"It will be of interest to see how the personnel
of the Navy expanded in former wars, and how at
the peace it was invariably reduced to something
like its pre-war figures. This can readily be done
in tabular form:
NAVAL PERSONNEL (_Numbers Voted_)
Year Name of War Before War Maximum After the
during War Peace
1689} 7,040 -- --
1697}League of Augsburg -- 40,000 --
1700} -- -- 7,000
1700} 7,000 -- --
1712}Spanish Succession -- 40,000 --
1713} -- -- 10,000
1738}Austrian 10,000 -- --
1748}Succession -- 40,000 --
1759} -- -- 10,000
1754} 10,000 -- --
1762}Seven Years' War -- 70,000 --
1764} -- -- 16,000
1775}American 18,000 -- --
1783}Independence -- 110,000 --
1785} -- -- 18,000
1793}French 16,000 -- --
1801}Revolution -- 135,000 --
1803} -- -- 50,000
1803} 50,000 -- --
1812}Napoleonic War -- 145,000 --
1817} -- -- 19,000
1853} 45,500 -- --
1856}Russian War -- 76,000 --
1857} -- -- 53,000
1914}The Present War 146,000 -- --
1918} -- 450,000 --
"It appears at once from these figures that the
naval expansion during earlier wars was in most
cases much greater proportionately than it has
been in this. Roughly the personnel in this war
has been multiplied by three; in earlier wars it
was increased six, seven, eight, or even nine
fold, if we take the difference between the
figures for 1792 and 1812.
"It is a common error to suppose that our ships in
the old wars were manned entirely by seamen. A
knowledge of how the men were raised shows that
this cannot have been so; and confirmation can be
had from a very brief study of ships' muster
books. Only about a third of the crew of a
line-of-battle ship were, in the seaman's phrase,
'prime seamen.' The rest were either only partly
trained or were frankly not sailor men. The
_Victory_ at Trafalgar was not an ill-manned
ship--here is an analysis of her crew: officers,
commissioned and warrant, 28; petty officers,
including marines, 63; able seamen, 213; ordinary
seamen and boys, 225; landsmen, 86; marines, 137;
artificers, 18; quarter gunners, 12;
supernumeraries and domestics, 37.
"During the whole of our naval history down to
1815 it was the invariable rule that in peace time
the battle fleets were laid up unmanned, and only
enough ships were kept in commission to 'show the
flag' and to police the sea. This accounts for the
very large increase of the naval personnel which
immediately became necessary when there was a
threat of war; and it accounts also for the
difficulty which was always experienced in raising
the men. This difficulty was even greater than we
are apt to suppose, for the Merchant Service has
never been able to give the navy more than a
fraction of the total number of men needed, and
the machinery for raising extra men has, until
this war, always been of a most primitive nature.
"When war came the ships were commissioned,
without crews. This could be done because from the
latter part of the seventeenth century there was a
permanent force of officers. Then the officers had
to find their own crews. They began by drawing
their proportion of marines, and then proceeded
to invite seamen to volunteer. In this way they
got a number of skilled seamen, men who had been
in the navy before, and came back to it either as
petty officers or in the hope of becoming so. Then
warrants to impress seamen would be issued.
Theoretically the impress was merely a form of
conscription, the Crown claiming by prerogative
the right to the services of its seafaring
subjects. Practically a good deal of violence was
at times necessary, as many of the men, preferring
to sail in merchant ships, or wishing to wait for
a proclamation of bounty, tried to avoid arrest.
The scuffles that took place on these occasions
gave the impress service a bad name, not
altogether deserved, for real efforts were made to
avoid hardship, and in any case the number of men
raised in this way was greatly exaggerated by
popular report."
There was no compulsion during the Great War to join any unit of the
British fleet. Therefore all were either in the regular service,
reservists or volunteers. The need was made known not only throughout
the British Isles, but also from Vancouver to Cape Town, Sydney and
Wellington, and men in all walks of life, but with either the
_Wander-Lust_ or true love of the wide open sea in their blood, rallied
from all parts of the far-flung Empire to the call of the White Ensign.
In order to obtain some 6000 officers and nearly 200,000 trained or
semi-trained men, new sources of supply had to be tapped. Already the
great battle fleets, brought up to full war strength and with adequate
reserves, had absorbed nearly all the Reserve officers who could be
spared from the food and troop transports.[2]
First came the great sea-training establishment of the Empire--the
Mercantile Marine and its retired officers and men--already heavily
depleted. Then the yacht clubs from the Fraser to the Thames and Clyde.
Thousands of professionals and amateurs came overseas to the training
cruisers and the "naval university," Canada alone supplying several
hundred officers.
Doctors came from the hospitals and from lucrative private practices.
The engineering professions and trades supplied the technical staffs and
skilled mechanics. The great banks and city offices yielded the
accountants, and the fishing and pleasure-boating communities, not only
of Great Britain, but also of the Dominions and Colonies, yielded the
men in tens of thousands. In this way the personnel of the new navy was
completed in a very few months.
Before passing on to describe, in the detail of personal acquaintance,
the severe training of this naval force, a general knowledge of its
heterogeneous character is necessary to enable the reader to understand
this great assemblage of the sons of the Empire.
[Illustration: A LARGE AND HEAVILY ARMED GERMAN SUBMARINE OF THE CRUISER
TYPE
_British Official Photograph_]
In the smoke-filled wardroom and gunroom of the training cruiser, H.M.S.
_Hermione_ one windy March evening in 1916 there were some eighty
officers of the auxiliary fleet, and of this number one hailed from
distant Rhodesia, where he was the owner of thousands of acres of land
and a goodly herd of cattle, but who, some time in the past, had rounded
the Horn in a _wind-jammer_ and taken _sights_ in the "Roaring Forties."
Another was a seascape painter of renown both in England and the United
States. A third was a member of a Pacific coast yacht club. A fourth was
the son of an Irish peer, the owner of a steam yacht. Then came a London
journalist, a barrister, a solicitor and a New Zealand yachtsman, while
sitting at the table was a famous traveller and a _pukka_ commander.
In the neighbouring gunroom, among the crowd of sub-lieutenants--all of
the same great force, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve--was a
grey-haired veteran from the Canadian Lakes, a youngster from the Clyde,
the son of a shipowner from Australia and a bronzed mine manager from
the Witwatersrand.
Among the engineers and mechanics the same diversity. Men from several
of the great engineering establishments, a student from a North Country
university, electrical engineers from the power stations and mechanics
from the bench, with here and there one or two with sea-going
experience.
In the forecastle and elsewhere about the old cruiser--now merely a
training establishment--were sailors with years of experience in both
sail and steam. Fishermen from the Hebrides and Newfoundland rubbing
shoulders with yacht hands from the Solent and Clyde.
From this curiously mixed but excellent raw material a naval personnel,
with its essential knowledge and discipline, had to be fashioned in
record time by an incredibly small staff of commissioned and warrant
officers of the permanent service, aided by the more experienced
amateurs.
It must, however, not be thought from this that the amateur was
converted into a professional seaman in the space of a week or two.
Three months of specialised training enabled them to take their place in
the new fleet, but with some it required a much longer period to enable
them to feel that perfect self-confidence when _alone_ in the face of
difficulties and dangers which is the true heritage of the sea.
To describe here the training of officers and men would be to repeat
what will be more fully and personally described in succeeding chapters.
It is sufficient to say that the aim was to bring them all to a
predetermined standard of efficiency, which would enable the officers to
command ships of specific types at sea and in action, and the men to
form efficient engineers and deck hands for almost any ship in the Navy.
The medical branches naturally required no special training and the
accountants merely a knowledge of naval systems of financial and general
administration. These two branches had their own training
establishments.
When the period of preliminary training in the cruiser _Hermione_ was
over the officers were passed on to the Royal Naval College at
Greenwich, and from there to one or other of the fifty war bases in the
United Kingdom, the Mediterranean or farther afield. Their appointments
were to ships forming the fleets attached to each of these bases and
generally operating in the surrounding seas.
In this way the whole zone of war was covered by an anti-submarine and
minesweeping organisation and general naval patrol, which operated in
conjunction with, but separate from, the battle fleets, squadrons and
flotillas, which were thus left free to perform their true functions in
big naval engagements.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Extract from _Naval Demobilisation_--issued by the Ministry of
Reconstruction.
[2] The personnel of the new navy consisted of R.N., R.N.R. and R.N.V.R.
officers. The former came mostly from the retired list. The R.N.R.
needed training only in such subjects as gunnery, tactics, etc. The
training of the R.N.V.R. is here described.