([Footnote] *'The Natural History Review', 1864.)
1. UEBER DIE DARWIN'SCHE SCHOPFUNGSTHEORIE; EIN VORTRAG, VON A.
KOLLIKER. Leipzig, 1864.
2. EXAMINATION DU LIVRE DE M. DARWIN SUR L'ORIGINE DES ESPECES. PAR P.
FLOURENS. Paris, 1864.
In the course of the present year several foreign commentaries upon Mr.
Darwin's great work have made their appearance. Those who have perused
that remarkable chapter of the 'Antiquity of Man,' in which Sir Charles
Lyell draws a parallel between the development of species and that of
languages, will be glad to hear that one of the most eminent philologers
of Germany, Professor Schleicher, has, independently, published a most
instructive and philosophical pamphlet (an excellent notice of which is
to be found in the 'Reader', for February 27th of this year) supporting
similar views with all the weight of his special knowledge and
established authority as a linguist. Professor Haeckel, to whom
Schleicher addresses himself, previously took occasion, in his splendid
monograph on the 'Radiolaria',* to express his high appreciation of,
and general concordance with, Mr. Darwin's views. ([Footnote] *'Die
Radiolarien: eine Monographie', p. 231.)
But the most elaborate criticisms of the 'Origin of Species' which
have appeared are two works of very widely different merit, the one
by Professor Kolliker, the well-known anatomist and histologist of
Wurzburg; the other by M. Flourens, Perpetual Secretary of the French
Academy of Sciences.
Professor Kolliker's critical essay 'Upon the Darwinian Theory' is,
like all that proceeds from the pen of that thoughtful and accomplished
writer, worthy of the most careful consideration. It comprises a brief
but clear sketch of Darwin's views, followed by an enumeration of the
leading difficulties in the way of their acceptance; difficulties which
would appear to be insurmountable to Professor Kolliker, inasmuch as
he proposes to replace Mr. Darwin's Theory by one which he terms the
'Theory of Heterogeneous Generation.' We shall proceed to consider first
the destructive, and secondly, the constructive portion of the essay.
We regret to find ourselves compelled to dissent very widely from many
of Professor Kolliker's remarks; and from none more thoroughly than from
those in which he seeks to define what we may term the philosophical
position of Darwinism.
"Darwin," says Professor Kolliker, "is, in the fullest sense of the
word, a Teleologist. He says quite distinctly (First Edition, pp.
199, 200) that every particular in the structure of an animal has been
created for its benefit, and he regards the whole series of animal forms
only from this point of view."
And again:
"7. The teleological general conception adopted by Darwin is a mistaken
one.
"Varieties arise irrespectively of the notion of purpose, or of utility,
according to general laws of Nature, and may be either useful, or
hurtful, or indifferent.
"The assumption that an organism exists only on account of some definite
end in view, and represents something more than the incorporation of a
general idea, or law, implies a one-sided conception of the universe.
Assuredly, every organ has, and every organism fulfils, its end, but its
purpose is not the condition of its existence. Every organism is also
sufficiently perfect for the purpose it serves, and in that, at least,
it is useless to seek for a cause of its improvement."
It is singular how differently one and the same book will impress
different minds. That which struck the present writer most forcibly on
his first perusal of the 'Origin of Species' was the conviction that
Teleology, as commonly understood, had received its deathblow at Mr.
Darwin's hands. For the teleological argument runs thus: an organ or
organism (A) is precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose (B);
therefore it was specially constructed to perform that function. In
Paley's famous illustration, the adaptation of all the parts of the
watch to the function, or purpose, of showing the time, is held to be
evidence that the watch was specially contrived to that end; on the
ground, that the only cause we know of, competent to produce such an
effect as a watch which shall keep time, is a contriving intelligence
adapting the means directly to that end.
Suppose, however, that any one had been able to show that the watch had
not been made directly by any person, but that it was the result of the
modification of another watch which kept time but poorly; and that this
again had proceeded from a structure which could hardly be called a
watch at all--seeing that it had no figures on the dial and the hands
were rudimentary; and that going back and back in time we came at last
to a revolving barrel as the earliest traceable rudiment of the whole
fabric. And imagine that it had been possible to show that all these
changes had resulted, first, from a tendency of the structure to vary
indefinitely; and secondly, from something in the surrounding world
which helped all variations in the direction of an accurate time-keeper,
and checked all those in other directions; then it is obvious that the
force of Paley's argument would be gone. For it would be demonstrated
that an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular purpose might
be the result of a method of trial and error worked by unintelligent
agents, as well as of the direct application of the means appropriate to
that end, by an intelligent agent.
Now it appears to us that what we have here, for illustration's sake,
supposed to be done with the watch, is exactly what the establishment of
Darwin's Theory will do for the organic world. For the notion that every
organism has been created as it is and launched straight at a purpose,
Mr. Darwin substitutes the conception of something which may fairly be
termed a method of trial and error. Organisms vary incessantly; of these
variations the few meet with surrounding conditions which suit them and
thrive; the many are unsuited and become extinguished.
According to Teleology, each organism is like a rifle bullet fired
straight at a mark; according to Darwin, organisms are like grapeshot of
which one hits something and the rest fall wide.
For the teleologist an organism exists because it was made for the
conditions in which it is found; for the Darwinian an organism exists
because, out of many of its kind, it is the only one which has been able
to persist in the conditions in which it is found.
Teleology implies that the organs of every organism are perfect and
cannot be improved; the Darwinian theory simply affirms that they
work well enough to enable the organism to hold its own against such
competitors as it has met with, but admits the possibility of indefinite
improvement. But an example may bring into clearer light the profound
opposition between the ordinary teleological, and the Darwinian,
conception.
Cats catch mice, small birds and the like, very well. Teleology tells
us that they do so because they were expressly constructed for so
doing--that they are perfect mousing apparatuses, so perfect and so
delicately adjusted that no one of their organs could be altered,
without the change involving the alteration of all the rest. Darwinism
affirms on the contrary, that there was no express construction
concerned in the matter; but that among the multitudinous variations of
the Feline stock, many of which died out from want of power to resist
opposing influences, some, the cats, were better fitted to catch mice
than others, whence they throve and persisted, in proportion to the
advantage over their fellows thus offered to them.
Far from imagining that cats exist IN ORDER to catch mice well,
Darwinism supposes that cats exist BECAUSE they catch mice well--mousing
being not the end, but the condition, of their existence. And if the cat
type has long persisted as we know it, the interpretation of the fact
upon Darwinian principles would be, not that the cats have remained
invariable, but that such varieties as have incessantly occurred have
been, on the whole, less fitted to get on in the world than the existing
stock.
If we apprehend the spirit of the 'Origin of Species' rightly, then,
nothing can be more entirely and absolutely opposed to Teleology, as it
is commonly understood, than the Darwinian Theory. So far from being a
"Teleologist in the fullest sense of the word," we would deny that he
is a Teleologist in the ordinary sense at all; and we should say that,
apart from his merits as a naturalist, he has rendered a most remarkable
service to philosophical thought by enabling the student of Nature to
recognise, to their fullest extent, those adaptations to purpose which
are so striking in the organic world, and which Teleology has done
good service in keeping before our minds, without being false to the
fundamental principles of a scientific conception of the universe.
The apparently diverging teachings of the Teleologist and of the
Morphologist are reconciled by the Darwinian hypothesis.
But leaving our own impressions of the 'Origin of Species,' and turning
to those passages especially cited by Professor Kolliker, we cannot
admit that they bear the interpretation he puts upon them. Darwin, if we
read him rightly, does 'not' affirm that every detail in the structure
of an animal has been created for its benefit. His words are (p. 199):--
"The foregoing remarks lead me to say a few words on the protest lately
made by some naturalists against the utilitarian doctrine that every
detail of structure has been produced for the good of its possessor.
They believe that very many structures have been created for beauty in
the eyes of man, or for mere variety. This doctrine, if true, would be
absolutely fatal to my theory--yet I fully admit that many structures
are of no direct use to their possessor."
And after sundry illustrations and qualifications, he concludes (p.
200):--
"Hence every detail of structure in every living creature (making some
little allowance for the direct action of physical conditions) may be
viewed either as having been of special use to some ancestral form,
or as being now of special use to the descendants of this form--either
directly, or indirectly, through the complex laws of growth."
But it is one thing to say, Darwinically, that every detail observed
in an animal's structure is of use to it, or has been of use to its
ancestors; and quite another to affirm, teleologically, that every
detail of an animal's structure has been created for its benefit. On the
former hypothesis, for example, the teeth of the foetal 'Balaena' have
a meaning; on the latter, none. So far as we are aware, there is not
a phrase in the 'Origin of Species', inconsistent with Professor
Kolliker's position, that "varieties arise irrespectively of the notion
of purpose, or of utility, according to general laws of Nature, and may
be either useful, or hurtful, or indifferent."