1. We have already seen[276] that the nature of the Good is simple and
primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also
demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself,
but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself
the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than
the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added.
Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when
we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and
the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so
far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very
simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient,
because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things
of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an
attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from
something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is
derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must
not have anything above it.