PRACTICE IS ONLY A PREPARATION FOR CONTEMPLATION.

6. (5). The purpose of action is to contemplate, and to possess

the contemplated object. The object or activity, therefore, is

contemplation. It seeks to achieve indirectly what it is unable to

accomplish directly. It is not otherwise when one has achieved the

object of one's desires. One's real desire is not to possess the

desired object without knowing it, but to know it more thoroughly, to

present it to the sight of the soul, and to be able to contemplate it

therein. Indeed, activity always has in view some good; one desires

to posses it interiorly, to appropriate it, and to possess the result

of one's action. Now as Good can be possessed only by the soul,

activity once more brings us back to contemplation. Since the soul

is a "reason," what she is capable of possessing could be no more

than a silent "reason," being so much the more silent as it is more

a "reason," for perfect "reason" seeks nothing farther; it rests in

the manifestation of that with which it is filled; the completer the

manifestation, the calmer is the contemplation, and the more does it

unite the soul. Speaking seriously, there is identity between knowing

subject and known object in the actualization of knowledge. If they

were not identical, they would be different, being alien to each other,

without any real bond, just as reasons (are foreign to the soul) when

they slumber within her, without being perceived. The reason[187] must

therefore not remain alien to the learning soul, but become united

thereto, and become characteristic of her. Therefore when the soul

has appropriated a "reason," and has familiarized herself therewith,

the soul as it were draws it out of her (breast) to examine it. Thus

she observes the thing that she (unconsciously) possessed, and by

examining it, distinguishes herself therefrom, and by the conception

she forms of it, considers it as something foreign to her; for though

the soul herself be a "reason" and a kind of intelligence, nevertheless

when she considers something, she considers it as something distinct

from herself, because she does not possess the true fulness, and is

defective in respect to her principle (which is intelligence). Besides,

it is with calmness that she observes what she has drawn from within

herself; for she does not draw from within herself anything of which

she did not formerly have even a notion. But she only drew from within

herself that of which her view was incomplete, and which she wished to

know better. In her actualizations (such as sensation), she adapts the

"reasons" she possesses to exterior objects.[188] On one hand, as she

possesses (the intelligible entities) better than does nature, she is

also calmer and more contemplative; on the other hand, as she does not

possess (the intelligible entities) perfectly, more (than intelligence)

she desires to have direct experimental knowledge and contemplation of

the object she contemplates. After having (temporarily) withdrawn from

her own higher part, and having (by discursive reason) run through the

series of differences, she returns to herself, and again gives herself

up to contemplation by her higher part (intelligence) from which she

had withdrawn (to observe the differences); for the higher part does

not deal with differences, as it abides within herself. Consequently

the wise mind is identical with reason, and in itself possesses what it

manifests to others. It contemplates itself; it arrives at unity not

only in respect to exterior objects, but also in respect to itself; it

rests in this unity, and finds all things within itself.

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