Every organism is coherent (that is, is sympathetic with itself). In
the case of a single organism, our demonstration suffices, and all
things will experience common affections so far as they constitute
parts of the single organism. The plea that a body exterior to the
world could be felt because of its resemblance (is ill-founded because
perception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the
organism that possesses perception. For its organ resembles (the
perceived object); thus sensation would be the perception presented to
the soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects. If then
the organism feel not only its contents, but also objects resembling
them, it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature;
and these things will be perceived not because they are contents
thereof, but by virtue of their resemblance thereto. It seems rather
that perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their
resemblance, because the soul has familiarized herself with them, and
has assimilated them to herself. If then the soul which has assimilated
these objects to herself differ from them, the things which were
supposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign
to her. The absurdity of this consequence shows us that there is a
flaw in the hypothesis; for it affirms simultaneously that the soul
exists, and does not exist, that the things are both conformable and
different, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hypothesis implies
contradictories, it is not admissible; for it supposes that the soul
exists in this world, as a result of the world, both being and not
being universal, both being and not being different, both being and not
being perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned; and
since it implies a contradiction, no reasonable consequence could be
deduced therefrom.