As to anger, we shall have to examine its nature, what power of the
soul it constitutes, whether it be anger that imparts to the heart
a trace of its own power; if there exist another force capable of
producing the movement revealed in the animal; and finally, if it be
not a trace of anger, but anger itself which resides in the heart.
ANGER ORIGINATES IN THE VEGETATIVE AND GENERATIVE POWER, AS TRACE OF
THE SOUL.
First, what is the nature of anger? We grow irritated at maltreatment
of ourselves or of a person dear to us; in general, when we witness
some outrage. Therefore anger implies a certain degree of sensation,
or even intelligence, and we should have to suppose that anger
originates in some principle other than the vegetative power. Certain
bodily conditions, however, predispose us to anger; such as being
of a fiery disposition, and being bilious; for people are far less
disposed to anger if of a cold-blooded nature. Besides, animals grow
irritated especially by the excitement of this particular part, and
by threats of harm to their bodily condition. Consequently we would
once more be led to refer anger to the condition of the body and
to the principle which presides over the constitution of organism.
Since men are more irritable when sick than when well, when they are
hungry, more than when well satisfied, anger or its principle should
evidently be referred to the organized and living body; evidently,
attacks of anger are excited by the blood or the bile, which are living
parts of the animal. As soon as the body suffers, the blood as well
as the bile boils, and there arises a sensation which arouses the
imagination; the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the
organism, and disposes the soul to attack what causes this suffering.
On the other hand, when the reasonable soul judges that we have been
injured, she grows excited, even if there were no disposition to anger
in the body. This affection seems therefore to have been given to us
by nature to make us, according to the dictates of our reasons, repel
and threatens us. (There are then two possible states of affairs.)
Either the irascible power first is moved in us without the aid of
reason, and later communicates its disposition to reason by means of
the imagination; or, reason first enters into action, and then reason
communicates its impulse to that part of our being which is disposed to
anger. In either case, anger arises in the vegetative and generative
power, which, in organizing the body, has rendered it capable to
seek out what is agreeable, and to avoid what is painful; diffusing
the bitter bile through the organism, imparting to it a trace of the
soul, thus communicating to it the faculty of growing irritated in the
presence of harmful objects, and, after having been harmed, of harming
other things, and to render them similar to itself. Anger is a trace of
the soul, of the same nature as the soul's faculty of desire, because
those least seek objects agreeable to the body, and who even scorn the
body, are least likely to abandon themselves to the blind transports
of anger. Although plant-life possesses the vegetative power, it does
not possess the faculty of anger because it has neither blood nor bile.
These are the two things which, in the absence of sensation, leads
one to boil with indignation. When however sensation joins these two
elements, there arises an impulse to fight against the harmful object.
If the irrational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty
of desire, and that of anger, and if the former were to be considered
the vegetative power, and the other, on the contrary, as a trace of
the vegetative power, residing in either the heart or blood, or in
both; this division would not consist of opposed members, because the
second would proceed from the first. But there is an alternative: both
members of this division, the faculties of desire and anger, might be
considered two powers derived from one and the same principle (the
vegetative power). Indeed, when the appetites are divided, it is their
nature, and not the being from which they depend, that is considered.
This essence itself, however, is not the appetite, but completes it,
harmonizing with it the actions proceeding from the appetite. It is
also reasonable to assign the heart as seat of the trace of the soul
which constitutes anger; for the heart is not the seat of the soul, but
the source of the (arterially) circulating blood.