HOW CAN TIME BE DIVIDED WITHOUT IMPLYING DIVISION OF THE SOUL'S ACTION?

15. We still have to solve one question bearing on the above

discussion. If eternity relate to Intelligence, and time to the

Soul--for we have stated that the existence of time is related to

the actualization of the Soul, and depends therefrom--how can time

be divided, and have a past, without the Soul's action itself being

divided, without her reflection on the past constituting memory in

her? Indeed, eternity implies identity, and time implies diversity;

otherwise, if we suppose there is no change in the actualizations of

the Soul, time will have nothing to distinguish it from eternity. Shall

we say that our souls, being subject to change and imperfection, are in

time, while the universal Soul begets time without herself being in it?

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 205 / 381 题