MEMORY IS NOT AS HIGH AS UNREFLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION.

4. In the intelligible world, the soul sees the Good by intelligence;

for intelligence does not hinder her from arriving to the Good.

Between the soul and the Good, the intermediary is not the body, which

could be no more than an obstacle; for if the bodies can ever serve

as intermediaries, it would only be in the process of descending

from the first principles to third rank entities. When the soul

occupies herself with inferior objects, she possesses what she wished

to possess conformably to her memory and imagination. Consequently

memory, even should it apply itself to the very best things, is not

the best thing possible; for it consists not only in feeling that one

remembers, but also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to

the affections, to the earlier intuitions which are remembered. Now

it may happen that a soul possesses something unconsciously, so that

she possesses it better than if she were conscious thereof. In fact,

when she is conscious thereof, she possesses it like something foreign

to her, and from which she is keeping herself distinct; when, on the

contrary, she is unconscious of it she becomes what she possesses; and

it is especially this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly

effect her degradation (when she conforms herself to sense-objects, by

applying her imagination thereto).

INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES ARE NOT MERELY IMAGES, BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR

MEMORY.

That the soul, on leaving the intelligible world, brings away with her

memories thereof, implies that even in the (intelligible) world she

to a certain degree already possessed memory; but this potentiality

was eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities. It would

be absurd to insist that the latter existed in the soul in the

condition of simple images; on the contrary, they there constituted an

(intellectual) potentiality which later passed into the condition of

actualization. Whenever the soul happens to cease applying herself to

the contemplation of intelligible entities she no longer sees what she

formerly saw (that is, sense-objects).

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 186 / 381 题