2. Granted. But does the soul remember herself? Probably not. He
who contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he
is; that, for instance, he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an
intelligence. How indeed would he remember it? Entirely devoted to the
contemplation of the intelligible world, he does not by thought reflect
back upon himself; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to
the intelligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which
he plays the part of matter. He assumes the form of the object he is
contemplating, and he then is himself only potentially. Actually, he is
himself only when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself only,
he is empty of all things, because he does not think the intelligible;
but if by nature he is such that he is all things, in thinking himself,
he thinks all things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the
glance he throws on himself, he embraces all things in this intuition;
on the other hand, by the glance he throws on all things, he embraces
himself in the intuition of all things.