31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both the rational and
irrational souls possess memory, we will have two kinds of imagination
(intellectual and sensual); and if both souls are separate, each of
them will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of two kinds
of imagination within us in the same principle would not account for
there being two kinds of imagination; and it would leave unsolved
the question to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong
to both kinds of imagination, there will always be two kinds of
imagination--for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible
things belongs to the one, and that of sense-things to the other;
otherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common. If
then memory equally belong to both imaginations, what difference is
there between them? Besides, why do we not notice this difference? Here
is the cause.
OF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PREDOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE
OTHER.
When both kinds of imagination harmonize, they co-operate (in the
production of a single act). The most powerful dominates, and only a
single image is produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger,
as the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the contrary, when
both kinds of imagination disagree and struggle, then only one of them
manifests, and the other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore
that we have two souls[152]; for both souls are melted into a single
one, and the one serves as vehicle for the other. The one sees all, but
preserves only certain memories when she leaves the body, and leaves in
oblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other. Likewise,
after we have established relations with friends of an inferior order,
we may acquire more distinguished friendships, and we remember the
former but very little, though we remember the latter very distinctly.