We must still clear up what would be said by Hercules (that is, the
man himself), alone, and separated from his image. What then would
the rational soul, if separated and isolated, say? The soul which has
been attracted by the body knows everything that the man (speaking
strictly), has done or experienced here below. In course of time, at
death, the memories of earlier existences are reproduced; but the soul,
out of scorn, allows some to escape her. Having indeed purified herself
from the body, she will remember the things that were not present to
her during this life.[146] If, after having entered into another body,
she happen to consider the past, she will speak of this life which
will become foreign to her, of what she has recently abandoned, and
of many other earlier facts. The circumstances which happen during a
long period will always remain buried in oblivion. But we have not yet
discovered what the soul, when isolated from the body will remember. To
solve this question, we shall be forced to decide to which power of the
soul memory belongs.
MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE REDUCED TO
SENSATION.
28. Does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know? Is
it by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires,
and by anger that we remember the things that irritate us? Some will
think so. It is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure, and
retains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for instance, appetite meets
an object which has already made it experience pleasure, it remembers
this pleasure on seeing this object. Why indeed should appetite not
be similarly moved by some other object? Why is it not moved in some
manner by the same object? Why should we not thus attribute to it the
sensation of things of this kind? Further, why should appetite itself
not be reduced to the power of sensation, and not do likewise for
everything, naming each thing, by what predominates therein?