It may again be objected that it is indeed the soul that remembers; but
only because she is resident in the body, and is not pure; she must be
affected in some particular manner to be able to impress the body with
the forms of sense-objects; her seat must be in the body to receive
these forms, and to preserve them. But to begin with, these forms
could not have any extension; then they could not be either (Stoic)
seal-imprints, or impressions; for in the soul there is no impulsion,
nor any imprint similar to that of a seal on wax, and the operation
itself by which it perceives sense-objects is a kind of thought
(or intellection). Indeed, it would be impossible to speak of an
impression in the act of thought. Thought has no need of the body or a
corporeal quality. It is besides necessary for the soul to remember her
movements, as for instance, her desires which have not been satisfied,
and whose object the body has not attained; for what could the body
tell us of an object which the body has not yet reached?[144] (Speaking
of thoughts), how could the soul, conjointly with the body, remember
things which the body, by its very nature, could absolutely not know?