ARISTOTLE SAID, MATTER IS NOTHING REAL ACTUALLY, BUT ONLY POTENTIALLY.

5. If this be so, what opinion shall we form of matter? How can it

be the matter of beings? Because matter potentially constitutes the

beings. But, since matter already exists potentially, may we not

already say that it exists, when we consider what it is to be? The

being of matter is only what is to be; it consists of what is going to

be; therefore matter exists potentially; but it is potentially not any

determinate thing, but all things. Therefore, being nothing by itself,

and being what it is, namely, matter, it is nothing actually. If it

were something actually, what it would actually be would not be matter;

consequently, matter would no longer be absolutely matter; it would be

matter only relatively, like metal. Matter is, therefore, non-being; it

is not something which merely differs from being, like movement, which

relates to matter because it proceeds from matter, and operates in it.

Matter is denuded and despoiled of all properties; it can not transform

itself, it remains ever what it was at the beginning, non-being. From

the very being it actually was no being, since it had withdrawn from

all beings, and had never even become any of them; for never was it

able to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to

assume. Its permanent condition is to trend towards something else,

to exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow. As

it appears where ends the order of intelligible beings, and as it is

contained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it, it is their

last degree. Being contained in both intelligible and sense-things,

it does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes

of beings. It exists only potentially; it limits itself to being a

feeble and obscure image, which can not assume any form. May we not

thence conclude that matter is the image actually; and consequently,

is actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that is, it is

essentially non-being. If then matter actually be non-being, it is the

highest degree of non-being, and thus again essentially is non-being.

Since non-being is its real nature, it is, therefore, far removed from

actually being any kind of a being. If it must at all be, it must

actually be non-being, so that, far from real-being, its "being" (so

to speak) consists in non-being. To remove the deception of deceptive

beings, is to remove their "being." To introduce actuality in the

things which possess being and essence potentially, is to annihilate

their reason for being, because their being consists in existing

potentially.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 73 / 381 题