5. In order to clear up this point, the following illustration has
been much used. Let us imagine a multitude of rays, which start from
a single centre; and you will succeed in conceiving the multitude
begotten in the intelligible world. But, admitting this proposition,
that things begotten in the intelligible, and which are called
multitude, exist simultaneously, one observation must be added: in the
circle, the rays which are not distinct may be supposed to be distinct,
because the circle is a plane. But there, where there is not even the
extension proper to a plane, where there are only potentialities and
beings without extension, all things must be conceived as centres
united together in a single centre, as might be the rays considered
before their development in space, and considered in their origin,
where, with the centre, they form but a single and same point. If now
you imagine developed rays, they will depend from the points from where
they started, and every point will not be any the less a centre, as
nothing will separate it from the first centre. Thus these centres,
though united to the first centre, will not any the less have their
individual existence, and will form a number equal to the rays of which
they are the origins. As many rays as will come to shine in the first
centre, so many centres will there seem to be; and, nevertheless, all
together will form but a single one. Now if we compare all intelligible
entities to centres, and I mean centres that coincide in a single
centre and unite therein, but which seem multiple because of the
different rays which manifest, without begetting them, such rays could
give us some idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible
being seems to be manifold and present everywhere.