UNITY MUST BE SOUGHT FOR IN ESSENCE.

1. It is a common conception of human thought that a principle single

in number and identical is everywhere present in its entirety; for it

is an instinctive and universal truism that the divinity which dwells

within each of us is single and identical in all.[3] It cannot be

expected that the men who will use this expression should be able to

explain how God is present in us, and without subjecting their opinion

to the scrutiny of reason; they will only affirm that such is the state

of the case; and resting in this conception which is the spontaneous

result of their understanding, they will all hold to this something

that is single and only, and will refuse to give up this unity.

That is the most solid principle of all, a principle that our souls

whisper instinctively, and which is not deduced from the observation

of particular things, but which claims our attention far before them,

even before the maxim that everything aspires to the Good. Now this

principle is true if all the beings aspire to unity, form an unity and

tend towards unity. This unity, advancing towards all other things, so

far as it can advance seems to be manifold, and indeed becomes so, in

certain respects, but the ancient nature which is the desire of the

Good, that belongs to itself, really leads to unity; and every nature

aspires to possess this unity by turning towards itself; for the good

of the nature which is One, is to belong to oneself, to be oneself;

that is, to unify oneself. That is why it is reasonably said that

the Good peculiarly belongs to (this nature), and must not be sought

outside of it. How indeed could the Good have fallen outside of the

essence, or be found in non-essence? It must evidently be sought in

essence, since itself is not non-essence. If then the Good be essence,

and may be found in essence, it must be within itself in each of us. We

cannot, therefore, be far from essence, but we are in it. Neither is it

far from us. All (beings), therefore, constitute but a unity.

"BEING" IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS PARTICIPATING IN BEING.

2. As the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here

raised is not one, but divided, it makes use of corporeal nature in its

researches, by borrowing its principles. That is why reason, thinking

it intelligible being, similar to bodies, divides it, doubting its

unity. It could not be otherwise, because its investigation was not

founded on the proper immanent principles. We must, therefore, in our

discussion about the one universal Essence, choose principles capable

of enlisting support, principles that would be intellectual, that is,

would connect with intelligible entities, and veritable being. For

since our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux, being subject

to all kinds of changes, trending towards all directions of space;

it should consequently be called not "being," but generation, or

becoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary, is not divided; it

subsists ever in the same manner and in the same state, neither is

born, nor perishes; occupies neither place nor space; does not reside

in any determinate location; neither enters, nor issues, but remains

in itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this

(physical) nature, and the things that are related to it, which

(deductively) give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms

equally probable. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our

starting-point must be the nature of the being considered; principles

have to be legitimately derived therefrom; and then, without

surreptitiously substituting any other nature (inductively), borrow

from the intelligible Being itself the conception formed about it; for

being, or whatness, is everywhere taken as principle; and it is said

that the definition of an object, when well made, sets forth many of

its accidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things where being

is everything, we must, so much the more, apply our whole attention to

this being; base all our (arguments) thereon, and refer everything to

it.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 35 / 381 题