UNITY IS IN THE MANIFOLD BY A MANNER OF EXISTENCE.

8. When light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines,

because the location of that body is known. But if a being be

immaterial, if it have no need of a body, if it be anterior to all

bodies, and be founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as

has a body, or resting on any foundation--then, a being endowed with

such a nature has no origin from which it is derived, resides in no

place, and depends on no body. How could you then say that one of its

parts is here, and another is there? For thus it would have an origin

from which it had issued, and it would depend from something. We must,

therefore, say that if something participate in this being by the

power of the universe, it participates in this being entirely, without

thereby being changed or divided; for it is a being united to a body

that suffers (although often that happens to it only accidentally),

and in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible,

since it is some part of the body, either its passion, or form. As

to the (being) which is united to any body, and to which the body

aspires to be united, it must in no manner share the passions of the

body, as such; for the essential passion of the body, as such, is

to divide itself. If, therefore, the body be by nature inclined to

divide itself, then is the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How,

in fact, could one divide that which has no extension? If, therefore,

the extended (being) participate in the (being) which has no extension,

it participates in this (being) without dividing it; otherwise, this

(being) would have extension. Consequently, when you say that the

unity (of the universal essence) is in the manifold, you do not say

that unity has become manifoldness, but you refer to this unity the

manner of existence of the multitude, seeing it in this whole multitude

simultaneously. As to this Unity, it will have to be understood that

it belongs to no individual, nor to the whole multitude, but that it

belongs to itself alone, that it is itself, and that, being itself,

it does not fail to support itself. Nor does it possess a magnitude

such as of our universe, nor, let alone, such as that of one of the

parts of the universe; for it has absolutely no magnitude. How could

it have any magnitude? It is the body that should have such magnitude.

As to the (being) whose nature is entirely different from that of the

body, no magnitude should be ascribed to it. If it have no magnitude,

it is nowhere; it is neither here nor there; for if so, it would be in

several places. If then the local division suits only the (being) of

which one part is here, and the other there, how could the (being) that

is neither here nor there be divided? Consequently, the incorporeal

(being) must remain indivisible in itself, although the multitude of

things aspire to unite itself to it, and succeeds therein. If they

aspire to possess it, they aspire to possess it entire, so that if

they succeed in participating in that (being), they will participate

in that entire (being) so far as their capacity reaches. Nevertheless,

the things that participate in this (being) must participate in it

as if they did not participate in it, in this sense that it does not

belong exclusively to any of them. It is thus that this (being) dwells

entirely in itself, and in the things in which it manifests; if it did

not remain entire, it would no more be itself, and things would no

longer participate in the (being) to which they aspire, but in some

other (being) to which they did not aspire.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 16 / 381 题