At the War Office, the report of the Alison committee was supplemented

by another long memorandum on the tunnel question by Sir Garnet

Wolseley. In this document of some twenty thousand words, which

was conveniently furnished with numerous marginal headings like

"Why tunnels through the Alps afford no argument in favor of the

Channel Tunnel," "The Tunnel an acknowledged danger," "What national

advantage then justifies its construction," "Many tunnels will be

constructed," "What we owe to the Channel," and "Danger of surprise

of our fortifications without warning! Fatal result!!," Sir Garnet

recapitulated and elaborated at great length upon his previous

arguments against the tunnel and added several new ones. Sir Garnet

went into fine detail concerning the possibility of a sudden seizure

of the English end of the tunnel and, simultaneously, Dover, by the

French. For example, to his previous description of how hostile

French forces might come by train through the tunnel dressed in

ordinary clothes he added the detail that they might also travel

in the carriages "at express speed, with the blinds down, in their

uniforms and fully armed"—their co-conspirators at the other end

meanwhile having rendered it "not likely that ticket-takers or

telegraph operators on the French side would be allowed any channel

of communicating with us until the operation had been effected." Sir

Garnet was equally explicit about the situation at Dover. Warning that

"the civilian may start in horror at the statement that Dover could

also be taken by surprise," General Wolseley declared that, as things

stood, anybody at all, any night, was free to walk up to any of the

forts at Dover, and, "if he would announce himself to be an officer

returning home to barracks, the wicket would be opened to him, and

if he entered he would see but two men, one the sentry, the other

the noncommissioned officer who had been roused up from sleep by the

sentry to unlock the gate." General Wolseley demonstrated how such a

caller might well be "a dashing partisan leader" of a French raiding

party that had landed in Dover in the dead of night, in calm or foggy

weather, from steamers, and had already quietly knocked down and

silenced any watchman or other witnesses in the dark area. He showed

how such a _soi-disant_ English officer and his accomplices "might thus

easily obtain an entrance into every fort in Dover; the sentry and the

sleepy sergeant might be easily disposed of. The rifles of our sentries

at home are not loaded, and the few men on guard [could be] made

prisoners whilst asleep on their guard bed." Thus, General Wolseley

said, the intruders could quickly effect the seizure of all the forts

in Dover—"In an hour's time from the moment when our end of the tunnel

was taken possession of by the enemy, large reinforcements could reach

Dover through the tunnel, and ... before morning dawned, Dover might

easily be in possession of 20,000 of the enemy, and every succeeding

hour would add to that number." With Dover done in, London would be

next, and the future commander-in-chief of the British Army went on to

show how the enemy force, now swelled to 150,000 men, once it reached

London and occupied the Thames from there to the arsenal at Woolwich,

could dictate its own terms of peace, which he estimated at a rough

guess as the payment of six hundred million pounds and the surrender

of the British Fleet, with the English end of the tunnel remaining

permanently in the hands of the French, so that "the perpetual yoke of

servitude would be ours for ever."

Concerning all the various measures proposed to protect the tunnel,

Sir Garnet had no confidence in them at all. He stressed once more

the unreliability of anything mechanical or electrical, and he added

the new argument that whatever secret devices, such as mines, were

installed in the tunnel for its protection were bound to come to the

knowledge of the enemy sooner or later. Any military secret, General

Wolseley said, was a purchasable secret; he illustrated his argument

with an observation concerning a meeting between Napoleon I and

Alexander I of Russia:

No two men were more loyally followed or had more absolute authority

than Napoleon and Alexander. No two men had a stronger wish or

stronger motive for keeping secret the words which passed between them

personally in a most private conference in a raft in the middle of

a river. Yet, by paying a large sum our Ministry obtained the exact

terms of the secret agreement the two had there arrived at. Moreover,

our Ministry obtained that information so immediately that they were

able to act in anticipation of the designs formed by the two Emperors.

Finally, having discussed, in the most elaborate fashion, all the

measures that his previous opposition to the scheme had caused to be

proposed for the defense of the tunnel, Sir Garnet condemned them

on the ground of their very elaborateness. "If in any one of these

respects our security fails, it fails in all," he wrote of the multiple

precautions recommended by Sir Archibald Alison's scientific committee.

Thus, in General Wolseley's eyes, the defense of the tunnel was

foredoomed as a self-defeating process, and was therefore a practical

impossibility.

The question of the multiplicity of the proposed defenses was handled

in different fashion in a further War Office memorandum on the tunnel,

issued by the Duke of Cambridge, the Army Commander-in-Chief and a

cousin of Queen Victoria. "Nothing has impressed me more with the

magnitude of the danger which the construction of this proposed tunnel

would bring with it," the Duke of Cambridge wrote, "than the amount

of precautions and their elaborateness [proposed by] this Scientific

Committee.... If this danger was small, as some would have the country

believe, why should all these complicated precautions be necessary?"

The Duke of Cambridge fully endorsed the position taken by Sir Garnet

Wolseley. He protested "most emphatically" against the construction

of a Channel tunnel and "would most earnestly beg Her Majesty's

Government" to consider with the utmost gravity the perils of surprise

attack upon the country arising out of even a modified scheme that

would take into account the recommendations of the Alison committee.

To his memorandum His Royal Highness appended a copy of a report

that he had had his intelligence service put together specially in

connection with the tunnel question—a long account purporting to

show some hundred and seven instances occurring in the history of

the previous two hundred years where hostilities between states had

been started without any prior declaration of war, or even any decent

notification.

If anything seemed likely to have been successfully blocked up and

finished off under all this bombardment, it was Sir Edward Watkin's

Channel-tunnel scheme. Curiously enough, the Board of Trade, which

had ordered the tunnel workings stopped back in April and had no

intention of issuing a working permit for them now, was not altogether

convinced of this. In fact, since April the Board had been developing

the suspicion that something peculiar might be going on down under the

sea at Shakespeare Cliff. Back in the early part of April, the Board

of Trade's order to the Submarine Continental Railway Company to stop

its tunneling activities was received, as one might expect, with some

anguish. The first formal reaction was a letter from the permanent

secretary of the company to T. H. Farrer, the secretary of the Board

of Trade, saying that the company would of course acquiesce in the

orders of the board, but begging, at the same time, to be allowed to

continue the present gallery extending from the main, or Number Two,

shaft at Shakespeare Cliff a short distance further, so as to be able

to complete the first stage of the works—the junction of the main

gallery with the new gallery extending from the ventilating, or Number

Three, shaft. This letter was followed on April 9 by another from Sir

Edward Watkin addressed to Joseph Chamberlain, the president of the

Board of Trade, urgently repeating the request, this time on the ground

of safety. Sir Edward wrote Mr. Chamberlain:

The moment the Board of the Tunnel Company decided to obey you, I

peremptorily ordered the works to be stopped. The [boring] machine has

been silent since Thursday evening. But the Engineer sends me a very

startling report and warning.

He fears _defective ventilation_ [owing to stoppage of the air-driven

boring machine] and danger to life—quite apart from depriving a fine

body of skilled workmen of their bread, and general loss and damage

in money. I can only reply to him that I am acting under your order.

Still ... this is the first time the ventilation of a mine has been

so interfered with. Should the engineer's alarm be well founded, and

should men faint from bad air at the end of the gallery, there would

be no means of getting them out alive.

Sir Edward added, without changing his tone of humane agitation,

that only the day before he had received a request from the Duke of

Edinburgh to be allowed to see the tunnel workings, along with the

Duchess, ten days hence, and that the Speaker of the House of Commons

had already arranged to visit the tunnel "on Saturday, the 22nd,

leaving Charing Cross at eleven." "What must be done?" he asked. Mr.

Chamberlain replied promptly by telegraph that if the stopping of

the machinery in the tunnel was constituting a danger to life, he

authorized Sir Edward, pending further investigation of the situation

by the Board of Trade, temporarily to keep the machinery going to the

extent of preventing this danger. However, he followed up this telegram

with a letter to Sir Edward in which he expressed himself as being "not

able to understand the exact nature of the physical danger anticipated"

by Sir Edward in the tunnel if the workings were stopped. "I do not see

the necessity for workmen remaining in the tunnel where the ventilation

is likely to be defective," Mr. Chamberlain observed. He added that he

was making arrangements to have one of the Board of Trade inspectors

visit the tunnel to investigate the situation.

On April 11, the Board of Trade duly telegraphed Sir Edward that its

chief inspector of railways, Colonel Yolland, of the Royal Engineers,

would be at Dover at noon the next day to investigate the ventilation

problem in the tunnel. Sir Edward, however, wired back that he was

unable to meet the Colonel at Dover that day and could not make an

appointment with him "until after the visit to the works of the Duke of

Edinburgh on Tuesday next."

To this the Board of Trade replied, on April 13, that Colonel Yolland

had been instructed to visit the tunnel works "entirely out of regard

to the very urgent and grave question raised in your letter ...

respecting the ventilation of the boring" and that the department was

finding it difficult to understand why Colonel Yolland's visit to

the tunnel should be postponed. Sir Edward's answer to this was to

invite Mr. Chamberlain down into the tunnel personally, so that Sir

Edward could "show and explain everything," since "until you have

seen, and had explained to you, on the spot as Mr. Gladstone did and

had, and as we hope the Duke of Edinburgh will next Tuesday, the

nature and condition of our works, it is, in my humble judgement,

impossible to discuss the question with exactitude." He said nothing

about the possibility of Mr. Chamberlain's or the Duke and Duchess of

Edinburgh's being asphyxiated in the tunnel. Mr. Chamberlain declined

the invitation; he said he had ordered Colonel Yolland down to Dover

immediately to report on the tunnel. But Colonel Yolland didn't get

down into the tunnel to make an inspection that month. Some impediment,

some unanticipated difficulty always seemed to arise when things

appeared to be about to straighten themselves out. By the beginning

of May, the Board of Trade, still trying, flatly informed Sir Edward

that Colonel Yolland and Walter Murton, its solicitor, would inspect

the tunnel workings on May 6. But on May 4 the general manager of the

South-Eastern Railway replied that "Sir Edward Watkin wishes me to say

that he regrets very much that it will be quite impossible to arrange

for such inspection to take place on that date." He suggested that Sir

Edward could arrange it for the 13th. The Board of Trade, replying

immediately, insisted on its taking place "not later than Wednesday

next." That letter was met with the answer that "Sir Edward Watkin

is at present out of town, and is not expected to return until early

next week." He must have stayed out of town quite a while, because the

Board of Trade heard nothing from the company until May 18, when the

directors of the company, writing jointly, told the department that

while they acquiesced in the request of Colonel Yolland and Mr. Murton

to visit the tunnel, unfortunately "the machinery is under repair,"

and as a consequence "it would not be ... safe for those gentlemen

to go down the shaft." However, the directors added, hopefully, they

felt sure that "by working the machinery, air compressors, and pumping

engines for a few days and nights" their engineers could get everything

in order for a proper tour of inspection. On May 24 Mr. Murton tried

again. He wrote the tunnel proprietors, notifying them that "Colonel

Yolland and myself propose to inspect the tunnel works on Saturday next

the 27th instant." But the company's reply to the letter was regretful.

It said that "the repairs to the winding engine cannot be completed

until after Whitsuntide."

Meanwhile, Mr. Murton was having his difficulties with the solicitor

of the South-Eastern over the legal question of the company's claims

to ancient manorial rights to the use of the foreshore at Shakespeare

Cliff, as the tone of various letters he was obliged to write

indicates. For example:

DEAR SIR,

May I remind you that I have not yet received the abstract of title; I

beg that you will at once send it to me....

I am, & c.,

WALTER MURTON

Or again:

DEAR SIR,

I am without answer to my letter of the 31st ultimo. I beg you will

let me know without further delay whether you do or do not propose to

send me abstract of title.

I am, & c.,

WALTER MURTON

Or yet again:

DEAR SIR,

Will you kindly write me a reply to my letters which I can send on to

the Board of Trade.

Yours, & c.,

WALTER MURTON

By June 9, the Board of Trade became quite out of patience over the

matter of inspecting the tunnel. Introducing an ominous note, it

informed Sir Edward that Mr. Chamberlain "feels that he must insist

upon this visit of inspection, and if he understands that permission

is refused, will be compelled to place the matter in the hands of his

legal advisers, with the view of determining and enforcing the rights

of the Crown." Sir Edward was indignant. In reply, he declared that

he was being subjected to an "undeserved threat." Mr. Chamberlain,

responding, denied that the threat was undeserved. He wrote firmly:

Hitherto, on one ground or another, this inspection has been again and

again postponed.

I am bound to guard the rights of the Crown in this matter, and I

desire to ascertain whether those rights have up to the present time

been in any way invaded.

This is the object of the inspection, and as it will not brook delay

... I have only now to ask an immediate answer stating definitely when

it can take place.

Sir Edward's answer was once more to beg Mr. Chamberlain himself to

join a party of prominent visitors going down to see the tunnel; he

added that "Colonel Yolland shall be at once communicated with."

But by various intervening circumstances—joint letters got up by the

tunnel promoters to the Prime Minister and to the Board of Trade

protesting hard treatment, and so on—the Board of Trade found itself

brooking delays all through the month of June. On June 26, the Board

of Trade wrote in stern fashion to Sir Edward that the demands of the

Board of Trade to inspect the tunnel workings "have been repeatedly

formulated and persistently evaded on behalf of the Submarine

Continental Railway Company," and that the only way the company could

avoid legal action by the Crown was "to consent _at once_ to the

proposed inspection." There was no satisfactory reply from the tunnel

proprietors, and on July 5 the Board of Trade, after due notification

to the Submarine Continental Railway Company, obtained an order from

Mr. Justice Kay, in the High Court of Justice, restraining the tunnel

promoters and their employees from "further working or excavating,

or taking or interfering with any chalk, soil, or other substance"

in the Channel tunnel without the consent of the Board of Trade, and

ordering them to give the department access to the tunnel to inspect

the workings. In the course of these judicial proceedings, a number of

affidavits presented to Mr. Justice Kay by the Government revealed the

interesting information that the Board of Trade, finding itself unable

to obtain access for its inspectors into the tunnel, for some time

past had felt itself obliged to station watchers on top of Shakespeare

Cliff and on the sea regularly to spy upon the tunnel workings and

to count the number of bucketfuls of soil it maintained had been

removed from the workings. And, according to all its calculations, the

Board of Trade had little doubt that the proprietors of the Submarine

Continental Railway Company were deliberately and surreptitiously

tunneling under the sea below low-water mark, on Crown property, and

burrowing into and removing chalk of the realm.

Intimation of what was in store for him in the High Court of Justice

reached Sir Edward Watkin at the very time that he was showing a party

of distinguished people, including Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of

the Suez Canal, around the tunnel. A glimpse of that interesting visit

is contained in a report in the London _Times_:

M. de Lesseps, while down in the tunnel and under the sea, proposed

the health of the Queen, remarking that the completion of the work was

required in the interest of mankind.

When all the visitors were again above ground, luncheon was served in

a marquee.

Sir E. Watkin, in proposing the health of M. de Lesseps, remarked

that there were those in our country who seemed to consider that the

work of the company they had just inspected was a crime. He had just

received a telegram informing him that he would have to answer on

Wednesday next at the instigation of the President of the Board of

Trade before a court of law for having committed the crime of carrying

on these experiments. (Hisses and groans.)

Somewhat revealingly, Sir Edward added, when the signs of indignation

subsided, that

For his own part, if he was to be committed by a court of law for

contempt, he should have this consolation—that the proceedings

which had been taken against him had been delayed sufficiently long

to enable him with his colleagues to have the honor of entertaining

M. de Lesseps, in whom he should have a witness, if he had to call

one, to prove that they had been engaged in a work which had been as

successful as he believed it would be ultimately useful.

At long last, supported by all the might of the Crown, Colonel Yolland

got to the tunnel on July 8 to make his inspection of the workings.

But upon his arrival there he found, to his chagrin, that "I was not

provided, at the time ... with all the necessary means for making the

measurements, and taking the requisite bearings" in the tunnel, and he

was obliged to put his inspection off once more. Properly equipped,

he descended into the tunnel a week later, on Saturday, July 15, and

inspected everything, including the boring apparatus that Sir Edward

had insisted had to be used to ventilate the gallery and prevent

loss of life. What Colonel Yolland found there caused the Board of

Trade, five days later, to send a most severe letter to the tunnel

proprietors. In it, the Board declared:

1. That the means of ventilating the tunnel could have been and be so

readily disconnected from the boring machine (i.e., by the movement

of a single lever that would pour a stream of compressed air coming

from the supply pipe directly into the tunnel) that it has never been

necessary that a single inch of cutting should have taken place in

order to protect life or to secure ventilation, nor can such necessity

arise in the future.

2. That in spite of the repeated orders of the Board of Trade, and

the assurances of the Secretary of the Submarine Railway Company and

Sir Edward Watkin himself that those orders were acquiesced in and

submitted to, the substantial work of boring has nevertheless been

carried to a distance of more than 600 yards from low-water mark (thus

constituting a trespass on the property of the Crown).

Calling these acts "a flagrant breach of faith" on the part of the

tunnel promoters, the Board of Trade wrote that henceforth the order

of the court "must be strictly and literally adhered to," and that

no work of maintenance, ventilation, drainage, or otherwise would be

allowed without the express permission of the board. Sir Edward Watkin

and his fellow directors, after some days, replied in hurt fashion to

what they termed "the unjustified accusations directed against them."

They reiterated their concern for the health of their employees in

the tunnel, and in connection with their tunneling activities below

low-water mark they came up with the ingenious explanation that "many

visits of Royal and other personages have been, by request, made to the

tunnel for purposes of inspection, and it was essential fully to work

the machine from time to time for the purpose of such visits." They

also sent a protest to Mr. Gladstone at 10 Downing Street against their

hard treatment, and asked for the Prime Minister's intercession with

the Board of Trade. But there was nothing doing. Mr. Gladstone politely

refused to act and replied that the actions of the Board of Trade had

the full sanction of the Government.

On August 5, Colonel Yolland descended once more into the tunnel

to make an inspection. He found things there in a rather run-down

condition. "The tunnel is not nearly so dry as it was when I first

saw it," he wrote in his report to the Board of Trade, referring to

the fact that the engineers had ceased work on the drainage of the

gallery. Colonel Yolland also mentioned in his report that during his

previous visit, on July 15, "I had an escape from what might have been

a serious accident. The wet chalk in the bottom of the tunnel, between

and outside the rails of the tramways, is so slippery and greasy that

it is almost impossible to keep on one's feet; and, on one occasion, I

suddenly slipped, and fell at full length on my back, and the back of

my head came against one of the iron rails of the tramway—fortunately

with no great force or my skull might have been seriously bruised or

fractured." The Colonel added, "There is not light enough in the tunnel

from the electric lamps to enable one to see one's way through ... so

that it is necessary to carry a lamp in one hand and a note-book in the

other, to record the different measurements." The Colonel then gave

some startling news. He declared that, according to his measurements,

somebody had advanced the length of the tunnel some seventy yards since

his inspection on July 15.

The Tunnel Under the Channel · 第 5 / 9 段