CHAPTER XLIII

THE SERBIANS CHECKED

With regard to the military activities of the Allies along the

Macedonian front, little more need be said for the period ending with

February 1, 1917. Having been ousted out of the Monastir Plain, the

German-Bulgarian troops were now defending a new line which seemed

more advantageous to them. Apparently fighting continued, sometimes

with furious determination on both sides, but the results were

negligible. The terrain was now somewhat similar to that in France,

and the situation seemingly became similar. The opposing lines faced

each other deeply intrenched. Neither side could seriously drive the

other back. By this time the Serbian capital had been reestablished in

Monastir and the Serbians could make the claim that they were again

fighting on native soil, though the Monastir district outside the city

never gave birth to one Serbian.

Considering the whole period covering the half year ending with

February 1, 1917, it may well be said that, whatever his reasons,

General Sarrail's activities have deeply disappointed the friends of

the Entente. Reviewing the results of the entire half year's fighting

along the Macedonian front, no results worthy of mention are visible

save the capture of Monastir, and even this is almost entirely limited

to its political value. From a military point of view, the Bulgarians

have held their own with forces obviously inferior in numbers to those

of the Allies. Naturally, in such a country the advantage is always

with the defensive. It is significant that throughout the half year

there are few dispatches indicating strong counterattacks on the part

of the Bulgarians.

PART IV--AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

CHAPTER XLIV

THE FALL OF GORITZ

Next to the Trentino the Isonzo was the part of the Austro-Italian

front which had seen most fighting in the past. From the very

beginning of the war it was there that the Italians had made their

most elaborate efforts. Not only did the territory, difficult though

it was ever there, allow the use of larger numbers and make possible

more extensive operations, but success on the Isonzo front held out a

greater promise than anywhere else--possession of Trieste.

In spite of heroic efforts on the part of the Italian troops, however,

so far not a great deal had been accomplished. It was time that the

Italian lines were well in Austrian territory. But in midsummer, 1916,

they were still not much farther advanced than soon after the outbreak

of hostilities between Italy and Austria. The Austrians so far had

resisted all Italian attempts to take Goritz, an important town on the

Isonzo, about twenty-two miles northwest of Trieste. With Goritz in

the hands of the Austrians Trieste was safe. For it could not be

approached by the Italians as long as this important position

threatened the flank and rear of any army attacking Trieste along the

seashore.

For considerable time little activity had been reported from the

Isonzo front. In fact, during the beginning of August, 1916, nothing

but occasional artillery engagements occurred anywhere on the

Austro-Italian front. On August 4, 1916, however, signs of renewed

Italian activity on the Isonzo front became noticeable. On that day a

vigorous attack was launched against Austrian positions on the

Monfalcone sector, the most southern wing of the Isonzo front. This

sector was about ten miles southwest of Goritz and fifteen miles

northwest of Trieste.

Goritz was protected by three strong positions, Monte Sabotino to the

north, Podgora to the west, and Monte San Michele to the south. The

second of these had been in possession of the Italians for some time,

but was of little use, though only just across the river from Goritz,

because it was exposed to murderous fire from the Austrian positions

on Monte Sabotino. To the south of Monte San Michele and north and

east of Monfalcone there stretched the Doberdo and Carso Plateaus.

These were elevated flatlands of a rocky character, very much exposed.

They were bounded on all sides by hills, the western slopes of which

rose almost directly out of the Gulf of Trieste. Before Trieste itself

could be reached these plateaus had to be crossed.

Following their initial successes of August 4 and 5, 1916, the

Italians extended their operations on August 6, 1916. Stubborn

fighting took place in the region of the Goritz bridgehead, on Monte

Sabotino and Monte San Michele, as well as near Monfalcone and the

Doberdo Plateau. The Italians, as may be seen from the following

description of the special correspondent of the London "Times" who

observed the attack, preceded the general attack with an elaborate

artillery bombardment.

"From 7 o'clock yesterday morning until 3.30 in the afternoon a

fearful bombardment swept the Austrian positions from Monte Sabotino

to Monfalcone such as has never been equaled even in this desolate

zone. Gray-green clouds veiled the entire front, contrasting with the

limpid atmosphere of a perfect day. All the hillsides on this side of

the Isonzo were covered with new batteries, which belched forth an

unceasing rain of projectiles on the surprised Austrians on the rocks

of Sabotino, whose summit (2,030 feet) completely dominates Goritz.

The Carso, the possession of which by the Austrians has been a

deciding factor in many memorable struggles, was completely hidden by

smoke until 3.30 in the afternoon. The general attack had been

arranged for 4 o'clock, but the waiting troops on the Sabotino by 3.30

could endure restraint no longer. Their commander ordered the

cessation of the bombardment and ordered the advance.

"Since October 23 last year the Italian line on the Sabotino remained

unchanged. The southern side of the mountain sloping down to the

Pevmica was honeycombed with elaborately constructed caverns, drilled

out of the solid rock by the Italians. During these months each cavern

was made to contain an entire company of infantry.

"Recently, unknown to the enemy, a tunnel 850 feet long, which reached

to within 90 feet of the Austrian trenches had been added to the

engineering exploits of the Italians; 800 men were assembled in this

tunnel. At a given signal they led the attack, supported by first-line

troops and strong reserves, thanks to this intricate system of

galleries on Sabotino's crest. The attack was watched by countless

observers, who, on other mountains, were hanging breathless on the

result of this hour's work. Innumerable patches of scrubby undergrowth

had been set on fire by the Italians to prevent their serving Austrian

snipers and were now wrapped in low-hanging clouds of black smoke.

Between these black patches the Italians crept ahead when the signal

came. The assault of the Austrian positions was of incredible

rapidity. So much so that the first positions were carried by the time

the enemy turned on his curtain of fire. The first, second, and third

lines of trenches were carried in twenty minutes, after which the

Austrians began a terrific bombardment of their old positions. The

redoubt on the summit fell within an hour and the chase went on along

the crest and down the sides, straight to the Isonzo, the pursuers

everywhere gathering up prisoners in droves. San Mauro (one and

one-fourth miles south of Sabotino) was taken by 6 o'clock, after

which the work of intrenchment began."

In spite of the most stubborn resistance the Austrians had to give way

gradually. On August 7, 1916, the Austrian troops on Monte Sabotino

were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Isonzo. At the same time the

positions on Monte San Michele were evacuated and the Italians thereby

were put in full possession of the Goritz bridgehead. Their attacks of

August 5, 6, and 7, 1916, had netted them territory for which they had

been fighting for months, besides about 10,000 prisoners, some 20 guns

and 100 machine guns and considerable war material of all description.

Without loss of time they brought in heavy artillery and opened a

devastating fire on unfortunate Goritz. Strong resistance was offered

by the Austrians at many points, not so much now in the hope of

preventing the fall of Goritz as in order to protect their retreat. In

spite of this resistance small detachments of Italians crossed the

Isonzo at nightfall of August 8, 1916, while their engineers threw

bridges over the river at various points.

On August 9, 1916, the bridge over the Isonzo leading directly into

Goritz was stormed after one of the most sanguinary battles of the

entire attack. This removed the last obstacle, and Italian troops

immediately occupied the city. At the same time other troops took up

the pursuit of the retreating Austrians. The latter delayed these

operations as much as possible by rear-guard actions and by

counterattacks against the new Italian positions on Monte San Michele

and against the village of San Martino, just south of the mountain.

On August 10, 1916, the Third Italian Army continued with increased

pressure the attack on the San Michele and San Martino sectors, which

had begun on the 9th instant, and succeeded in capturing very strong

Austrian defenses between the Vippacco and Monte Cosich. The Austrians

were routed completely and retired east of Vallone, leaving, however,

strong rear guards on Cima Debeli and on Hill 121, east of Monfalcone.

The Italians also occupied Rubbia and San Martino del Carso and the

whole of the Doberdo Plateau, reaching the line of the Vallerie. East

of Goritz the Austrians were holding out in trenches on the lines of

Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Marto.

The Vallone was crossed by Italian troops on August 11, 1916. The

same detachments stormed the western slopes of Monte Nadlogern and the

summit of Crn-Hrid and occupied Opacchiasella, on the northern edge of

the Carso Plateau.

By this time the Austrians had recovered their breath to some extent.

They had taken up strong positions previously prepared for them in the

hills to the east of Goritz and there resisted successfully all

Italian attacks. Occasional counterattacks against the new Italian

positions, however, brought no results.

To the south of Goritz, too, the Italian advance came to a standstill

after the Vallone Valley, separating the Doberdo from the Carso

Plateau, had been crossed. Continuous fighting, however, went on along

the northern edge of the Carso Plateau throughout the balance of the

month of August, 1916, much of it being done by the artillery of both

sides. The end of August, 1916, then, saw the Italians in possession

of Goritz and their lines at some points as much as five miles nearer

to Trieste. The latter, however, seemed at least for the time being

safely in the hands of the Austrians, who by this time had received

reenforcements and appeared to be determined to stop the Italian

advance across the Carso Plateau at all odds.

CHAPTER XLV

FALL AND WINTER ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

With the beginning of fall and the slowing down of the Italian drive

against Trieste after the capture of Goritz, activities on the various

parts of the Austro-Italian front were reduced almost exclusively to

artillery duels. Occasionally attacks of small bodies of infantry were

made on both sides. They yielded, however, hardly ever results of any

importance and had practically no influence on the relative positions

of the Austrians and Italians.

On September 1, 1916, the Austrians made an unsuccessful attack

against Italian positions on Monte Civarone in the Sugana Valley

(Dolomite Mountains). Italian attacks south of Salcano and west of

Lokvicza were equally unsuccessful. Especially heavy artillery

engagements occurred on that day on the Trentino front and along the

coast of the Gulf of Trieste near Monte Santo.

On September 2, 1916, along the coast of the Gulf of Trieste artillery

and mine-throwing engagements continued in various sectors with

intermittent violence. Fighting also spread to the Plava sector. On

the Ploecken sector the Italians after a very violent artillery fire

attacked unsuccessfully on a small front. Several attempts made by

minor Italian detachments to advance on the Tyrol front were repulsed.

Two attacks on Civaron failed.

On the Trentino front Austrian artillery activity continued. Villages

of the Astico Valley and the Italian positions on Cauriol in the

Avisio Valley in particular were shelled. On the northern slopes of

Cauriol Italian Alpine troops engaged the Austrians, inflicting

considerable losses. In the hilly area east of Goritz some detachments

of Italian infantry pierced two wire entanglements and bombed the

Austrian lines, causing supports to be rushed up. These were

effectively shelled by batteries.

At the head of the Rio Felizon Valley, in the upper Bovi, during the

night of September 3, 1916, detachments of infantry, Alpini, and

volunteers succeeded by a daring surprise attack in capturing several

commanding positions on the Punta del Forane. A violent Austrian

counterattack was decisively repulsed.

On September 4, 1916, the usual artillery activity took place on the

Trentino front. The Austrian artillery fire was especially intense

against Italian positions on Mount Civaron in the Sugana Valley, and

on Mount Cauriol in the Fiemme Valley.

A more violent attack was attempted by the Austrians on the evening of

September 6, 1916, against the Italian lines on Monte Civarone in the

Sugana Valley. After brisk fighting the Austrians had to withdraw,

abandoning their arms and ammunition and leaving some dead on the

ground.

In the Vallarsa, Adige Valley, on the evening of September 7, 1916,

strong Austrian detachments after an intense bombardment attacked

Italian positions between Monte Spil and Monte Corno. They succeeded

in breaking through some trenches. A counterattack recaptured for the

Italians the greater part of the ground lost.

On September 8, 1916, in the Tofana zone Italian troops repulsed an

attack against the position in the Travenanzes Valley which their

troops had taken on September 7, 1916.

On the Trentino front the activity of the artillery was more

pronounced on September 9, 1916. Unimportant attacks on Italian

positions on Malga Sugna, in the Vallarsa, on the Asiago Plateau, and

on Monte Cauriol and Avisio, were repulsed. At Dolje, in the Tolmino

sector, after preparation with hand grenades, the Austrians attempted

to break through the Italian line, but were driven back immediately.

On the next day, September 10, 1916, between the Adige and Astico

Valleys the Italians developed increased activity. Austrian hill

positions in this sector were subjected to strong artillery and mine

fire. On the Monte Spil-Monte Testo sector the advance of several

Italian battalions was repulsed.

On the same day the coast front, the Carso Plateau, and the Tolmino

bridgehead were shelled strongly by Italian artillery. On some sectors

of the Tyrol front there was continued activity on the part of patrols

and the artillery. In the zone between Vallarsa and the head of the

Posina Valley Italian infantry captured a strong intrenchment at the

bottom of the Leno Valley. Between Monte Spil and Monte Corno they

completed capture of the trenches still left in Austrian hands after

the fighting of September 7, 1916. Progress was made by the Italians

on the ground north of Monte Pasubio and on the northern slopes of

Corno del Coston, in the upper Posina Valley. Italian batteries

destroyed military depots near St. Ilanio north of Rovereto. The

Austrians shelled Caprile, in Cordevole Valley, and Cortina d'Ampezzo.

On September 12, 1916, Italian Alpine troops, north of Falzarego

gained possession of a position which not only commanded Travenanzes

Pass, but also interrupted communications between the Travenanzes

Valley and the Lagazuoi district.

This success was extended on the next day, September 13, 1916, when

Italian detachments by a daring climb succeeded in taking some

positions in the Zara Valley in the Posina sector and on Monte

Lagazuoi in the Travenanzes-Boite Valley.

Once more, on September 14, 1916, the Italians opened a new offensive

in the region of the Carso Plateau. Artillery and mine fire increased

there with the greatest violence. In the afternoon strong infantry

forces in dense formation advanced to the attack. Along the whole

front between the Wippach River and the sea fierce fighting developed,

and the Italians in some places succeeded in penetrating the Austrian

first-line trenches and in maintaining themselves there. North of the

Wippach, as far as the region of Plava, artillery fire was very

lively, but no infantry engagements worth mentioning developed. In the

Fiemme Valley artillery duels continued. Several attacks delivered by

Italian detachments about a battalion strong against the Bassano ridge

were repulsed.

A second attack on the Carso Plateau in the evening of September 14,

1916, carried the Italian lines forward a few more miles and enabled

them to surround the height and village of San Grado. After bombarding

the Austrian positions for eight hours, this height and the village

were stormed on the following day, September 15, 1916.

During the balance of the month of September, 1916, only minor

engagements and artillery duels occurred in the various parts of the

Austro-Italian front. The only exception was a successful Austrian

attack against the summit of Monte Cimone on the Trentino front

southeast of Rovereto. Early in the morning of September 23, 1916, the

entire summit was blown up by an Austrian mine and the entire Italian

force of about 500 men was either killed or captured. Later that day

the Italians captured the summit of the Cardinal (8,000 feet) at the

northeast of Monte Cauriol south of the Avisio after overcoming the

most stubborn Austrian resistance.

During the first half of October, 1916, activities on the

Austro-Italian front presented much the same picture as during the

preceding month. Outside of artillery duels and local engagements

there happened little of interest or importance to the general

positions. However, there were of course a few exceptions. Thus on

October 2, 1916, Italian troops captured two high mountains, the Col

Bricon (7,800 feet), at the head of the Cismon-Brenta Valley, and an

unnamed peak more than 8,000 feet high, in Carnia between Monte

Cogliano and Pizzocollima.

Various other successes of a similar nature were gained by the

Italians during the next few days in this region, between the Avisio

and the Vayol Cismon Valleys.

In the meantime a heavy artillery bombardment had been started by the

Italians on the Carso Plateau. From day to day the intensity of the

artillery fire increased. At last on October 10, 1916, the Italians

launched their attack against the Austrian lines south of Goritz and

on the Carso. The battle lasted all day and night. After practically

all the intricate Austrian defenses had been destroyed Italian

infantry captured almost the whole of the line, composed of several

successive intrenchments between the Vippacco (Wippach) River and Hill

208, and advanced beyond it. Novavilla and the adjoining strong

position around the northern part of Hill 208 also fell into their

hands after brisk fighting. Prisoners to the number of 5,034,

including 164 officers, were taken and also a large quantity of arms

and ammunition.

These successes were considerably extended on the following day,

October 11, 1916. Strong Austrian counterattacks availed nothing.

The Italians maintained their new positions and continued to push

their advance on the Carso Plateau and southeast of Goritz, even if

slowly, throughout October 12 and 13, 1916. For the balance of the

month there was little activity on the Isonzo front beyond extremely

heavy artillery fire, most of which had its origin on the Italian

side. Occasional attempts on the part of the Italians to push their

lines still farther had little success. Equally unsuccessful were

Austrian endeavors to regain some of the lost ground.

On the balance of the Austro-Italian front there was a great deal of

local fighting in the various mountain ranges. The heaviest of this

was centered around Monte Pasubio (7,000 feet), where many attacks and

counterattacks were carried out during October 17, 18, 19, and 20,

1916, under the most difficult conditions and frequently during very

severe blizzards.

With the beginning of November, 1916, the Italians once more resumed

their drive against Trieste. On the last day of October, 1916, the

Italian artillery and mine fire had reached again great violence east

of Goritz and on the Carso Plateau. It became even more extensive and

vigorous early in the morning of November 1, 1916. A few hours later

the Italians began their infantry attacks against the Austrian lines,

many of which had been destroyed previously by the bombardment.

South of the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road the Austrian line was

occupied at several points and held against incessant counterattacks,

as were likewise trenches on the eastern slopes of Tivoli and San

Marco and heights east of Sober. On the Carso, the wooded hills of

Veliki, Kribach, and Hill 375 east and above Monte Pecinka, and the

Height 308 east of the latter, were stormed and occupied.

From Goritz to the sea heavy fighting which resulted in further

Italian successes along the northern brow of the Carso Plateau

continued on November 2, 1916. Here troops of the Eleventh Army Corps,

which repulsed violent counterattacks during the night, took strong

defenses on difficult ground east of Veliki, Kribach, and Monte

Pecinka.

On the next day, November 3, 1916, the offensive on the Carso was

prosecuted successfully by the Italian troops. In the direction of the

Vippacco (Wippach) Valley the heights of Monte Volkovnjak, Point 126,

and Point 123 a little east of San Grado were stormed. An advance of

almost a mile eastward brought Italian troops to Point 291 and along

the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road to within 650 feet of the latter

place. On the rest of the front to the sea the Austrians kept up a

bombardment of great intensity with artillery of all calibers. A

massed attack was directed against Point 208, but was broken up by

concentrated fire.

By November 4, 1916, the Austrian resistance had stiffened to such an

extent that a lull became noticeable in the Italian enterprises east

of Goritz and on the Carso Plateau. In spite of this, however, the

Italians had succeeded again in advancing their lines, inflicting at

the same time heavy losses to the Austrians and making almost 10,000

prisoners in four days' fighting. Their own losses were also very

heavy, and undoubtedly were partly responsible for the cessation of

this new drive against Trieste.

This was practically the last Italian effort during 1916 to reach

Trieste. Weather conditions now rapidly became so severe that any

actions beyond artillery bombardments and minor attacks by small

detachments had become impossible. During the balance of November,

1916, artillery duels were frequent and sometimes very severe on

various parts of the Isonzo front, especially on the Carso Plateau.

Beyond that neither side attempted anything of importance, though here

and there small engagements resulted in slight adjustments of the

respective lines. On the other parts of the Austro-Italian front much

the same condition prevailed during all of November, 1916; indeed even

artillery activity was frequently interrupted for days by the severity

of the weather.

CHAPTER XLVI

FIGHTING ON MOUNTAIN PEAKS

Much of the fighting on the Austro-Italian front which has been

narrated in the preceding pages has been going on in territory with

which comparatively few are acquainted. A great part of the front is

located in those parts of northern Italy and the Austrian Tyrol and

Trentino which for generations have been known and admired all over

the world for their scenic beauty and natural grandeur. People from

many countries of the world have used this ground which now is so

bitterly fought over as their playground, and have carried away from

it not only improved health, but also the most pleasant of memories.

Though much of its beauty undoubtedly will survive the ravages of even

this most destructive of wars, a great deal of damage has been

inflicted. For in order to achieve some military ends the sky line of

entire mountain ranges has been changed. Summits have been blown up,

and contours of mountains which have been landmarks for centuries have

been changed.

Pleasant though life is in these regions when peace reigns, they offer

particularly great and severe difficulties to the fighting men. The

dangers and hardships which these courageous soldiers of Italy and

Austria have been called upon to undergo are not easily appreciated

unless one has been on the very ground on which they do some of their

fighting. The following extracts from descriptive articles from the

pen of Lord Northcliffe, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, and some special

correspondents of the London "Times" give a most vivid picture of

actual conditions in the Austro-Italian mountains in war times.

Speaking of his visit to the Cadore front, Lord Northcliffe says in

part:

"In discussing the peculiarities of the hill fighting as contrasted

with the fighting on the road to Trieste his Majesty the King of

Italy, who has a fine sense of words, and who has spoken English from

childhood, said: 'Picture to yourself my men 9,000 feet up in the

clouds for seven months, in deep snow, so close to the Austrians that

at some points the men can see their enemies' eyes through the

observation holes. Imagine the difficulties of such a life with

continued sniping and bomb throwing!'

"The illustrated newspapers have from time to time published

photographs of great cannon carried up into these Dolomite Alps, but I

confess to having never realized what it means. It never occurred to

me what happens to the wounded men or to the dead. How do supplies and

ammunition reach these lonely sentinels of our Allies?

"Here food for the men and food for the guns go first by giddy,

zigzag roads, especially built by the Italians for this war. They are

not mere tracks, but are as wide as the road that runs between Nice

and Mentone, or the Hog's Back between Guilford and Farnham. When

these have reached their utmost possible height, there comes a whole

series of 'wireways,' as the Italian soldiers call them. Steel cables

slung from hill to hill, from ridge to ridge, span yawning depths and

reach almost vertically into the clouds. Up these cables go guns and

food, as well as timber for the huts in which the men live, and

material for intrenchments. Down these come the wounded. The first

sensation of a transit down these seemingly fragile tight ropes is

much more curious than the first trip in a submarine or aeroplane, and

tries even the strongest nerves.

"Man is not fighting man at these heights, but both Italians and

Austrians have been fighting nature in some of her fiercest aspects.

The gales and snowstorms are excelled in horror by avalanches. Quite

lately the melting snow revealed the frozen bodies, looking horribly

lifelike, of a whole platoon which had been swept away nearly a year

ago.

"While there have been heavy casualties on both sides from sniping,

bombing, mountain and machine guns, and heavy artillery, there has

been little sickness among the Italians. The men know that doctors'

visits are practically impossible. Therefore they follow the advice of

their officers. Yet the men have all the comforts that it is humanly

possible to obtain. The cloud fighters are extremely well fed. Huts

are provided, fitted with stoves similar to those used in Arctic

expeditions.

"Higher yet than the mountain fighting line stand the vedettes,

sentinels and outposts whose work resembles that of expert Alpine

climbers. They carry portable telephones with which they can

communicate with their platoon. The platoon in turn telephones to the

local commander."

Of some of the fighting and of life in the Dolomites he says:

"Of the three peaks of the Colbricon only the third, known as the

Picolo Colbricon, remains to the enemy. The action which is now being

developed on the Colbricon is especially interesting from the fact

that the Italian advance there is not due to trained mountain troops,

but to the light arm of Bersaglieri, who have there proved themselves

equal to their best traditions. In the advance from the first to the

second summit of Colbricon the Bersaglieri had to climb a gully at an

angle of 70 degrees. At two points the wall rises perpendicularly, and

the enemy was able to defend his positions by simply rolling down

rocks, which carried in their train avalanches of pebbles.

"In no region of the Italian front is there greater difficulty in the

matter of supply, transport, and the care of the wounded. Every

stretcher bearer here finds himself continually exposed to the peril

of falling over a precipice together with his wounded.

"As the sun rose the great peaks of the Dolomites stood out like pink

pearls, set here and there in a soft white vapor. Coming through a

Canadian-looking pine forest, with log-house barracks, kitchens, and

canteens beneath one such peak, I was reminded of Dante's lines:

'Gazing above, I saw her shoulders, clothed already with the planet's

rays.' But poetic memories soon faded before a sniper's bullet from a

very near Austrian outlook.

"At one spot the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements were clearly

visible through glasses on a neighboring summit at a height of over

10,000 feet. A few yards below in an open cavern protected by an

overhanging rock the little gray tents of Italy's soldiers were

plainly seen. It may be a consolation to our men on the Somme and in

Flanders that the war is being waged here in equally dangerous

conditions as theirs.

"The Italians have driven back the Austrians foot by foot up the

almost vertical Dolomite rock with mountain, field, and heavy guns,

and especially in hand-to-hand and bomb fighting. Sniping never ceases

by day, but the actual battles are almost invariably fought by night.

"The only day fighting is when, as in the famous capture of Col di

Lana and more recently at Castelletto, the whole or part of a mountain

top has to be blown off, because it is impossible to turn or carry it

by direct assault. Then tunnels sometimes 800 yards long are drilled

by machinery through the solid rock beneath the Austrian strongholds,

which presently disappear under the smashing influence of thirty or

forty tons of dynamite. Then the Alpini swarm over the debris and

capture or kill the enemy survivors and rejoice in a well-earned

triumph.

"One needs to have scaled a mountainside to an Italian gun's

emplacement or lookout post to gauge fully the nature of this warfare.

Imagine a catacomb, hewn through the hard rock, with a central hall

and galleries leading to gun positions, 7,000 feet up. Reckon that

each gun emplacement represents three months' constant labor with

drill, hammer, and mine. Every requirement, as well as food and water,

must be carried up by men at night or under fire by day. Every soldier

employed at these heights needs another soldier to bring him food and

drink, unless as happens in some places the devoted wives of the

Alpini act nightly under organized rules as porters for their

husbands.

"The food supply is most efficiently organized. A young London Italian

private, speaking English perfectly, whom I met by chance, told me,

and I have since verified the information, that the men holding this

long line of the Alps receive a special food, particularly during the

seven months' winter. Besides the excellent soup which forms the

staple diet of the Italian as of the French soldiers, the men receive

a daily ration of two pounds of bread, half a pound of meat, half a

pint of red wine, macaroni of various kinds, rice, cheese, dried and

fresh fruit, chocolate, and thrice weekly small quantities of cognac

and Marsala.

"Members of the Alpine Club know that in the high Dolomites water is

in summer often as precious as on the Carso. Snow serves this purpose

in winter. Then three months' reserve supplies of oil fuel, alcohol,

and medicine must be stored in the catacomb mountain positions, lest,

as happened to an officer whom I met, the garrisons should be cut off

by snow for weeks and months at a time."

Mr. Hilaire Belloc vividly pictures some mountain positions and

observation posts in the high Dolomites as follows:

"There stands in the Dolomites a great group of precipitous rock

rising to a height of over 9,000 feet above the sea and perhaps 6,000

feet above the surrounding valleys, one summit of which is called the

Cristallo. It is the only point within the Italian lines from which

direct and permanent observations can be had of the railway line

running through the Pusterthal. In the mass of this mountain, up to

heights of over 8,000 feet, in crannies of the rock, up steep couloirs

and chimneys of snow, the batteries have been placed and hidden quite

secure from the fire of the enemy, commanding by the advantage of the

observation posts the enemy's line with their direct fire. One such

observation post I visited.

"A company of men divided into two half companies held, the one half

the base of the precipitous rock upon a sward of high valley, the

other the summit itself, perhaps 3,000 feet higher; end the

communication from one to the other was a double wire swung through

the air above the chasm, up and down which traveled shallow cradles of

steel carrying men and food, munitions, and instruments. Such a device

alone made possible the establishment of these posts in such

incredible places, and the perilous journey along the wire rope swung

from precipice to precipice and over intervening gulfs was the only

condition of their continued survival. The post itself clung to the

extreme summit of the mountain as a bird's nest clings to the cranny

of rock in which it is built; while huts, devised to the exact and

difficult contours of the last crags and hidden as best they might be

from direct observation and fire from the enemy below, stood here

perched in places the reaching of which during the old days of peace

was thought a triumph of skill by the mountaineers. And all this

ingenuity, effort, and strain stood, it must be remembered, under the

conditions of war. The snow in the neighborhood of this aerie was

pitted with the shell that had been aimed so often and had failed to

reach this spot, and the men thus perilously clinging to an extreme

peak of bare rock up in the skies were clinging there subject to all

the perils of war added to the common perils of the feat they had

accomplished.

"Marvelous as it was, I saw here but one example of I know not how

many of the same kind with which the Italians have made secure the

whole mountain wall from the Brenta to the Isonzo and from Lake Garda

to the Orther and the Swiss frontier. Every little gap in that wall is

held. You find small posts of men, that must have their food and water

daily brought to them thus, slung by the wire; you find them crouched

upon the little dip where a collar of deep snow between bare rocks

marks some almost impassable passage of the hills that must yet be

held. You see a gun of 6 inches or even of 8 inches emplaced where,

had you been climbing for your pleasure, you would hardly have dared

to pitch the smallest tent. You hear the story of how the piece was

hoisted there by machinery first established upon the rock; of the

blasting for emplacement; of the accidents after which it was finally

emplaced; of the ingenious thought which has allowed for the chance of

recoil or of displacement; you have perhaps a month's journeying from

point to point of this sort over a matter of 250 miles."

A special correspondent of the London "Times" describes the fighting

around Monte Pasubio in the Trentino, which has already been mentioned

in the preceding pages, as follows:

"When the tide of the Austrian invasion rolled back at the end of

June, 1916, its margin became fixed on the crest of the Pasubio, an

enormous and irregular group of mountains, of which the Italians

remained in possession of the highest peak, but all the northern

summits and the top of the whole central ridge called the Cosmagnon

Alps remained to the enemy. It was from this ridge that they dominated

the Vallarsa, and their first-line trenches were on its edge. Fifteen

yards below them the Italians had burrowed in somehow and had hung on

until now.

"With the oncoming of winter, however, and the avalanches their

hanging on became altogether too problematic. For weeks the weather

prevented action through some meteorological phenomenon. When it is

fair below in the plain Pasubio is crowned with dense fogs, and vice

versa. Finally, the summits revealed themselves clear against the sky.

The careful preparation had passed unobserved of the enemy, and during

the night of the 8th inst., with increased intensity at dawn of the

9th inst., the artillery attacked on the whole line for several miles.

"Bombs were employed in great number, and are found to be even more

effective here than on the Carso, the friable rock breaking into

millions of fragments under the explosion.

"In the afternoon a demonstrative attack in the Vallarsa carried the

line ahead some 400 yards, and at half past 3 the principal attack

carried the trenches of the crest (Cosmagnon Alps), together with the

summit called Lora. The arduous mountaineering feat of arriving on the

mountain's overhanging brow was accomplished on rope ladders by

infantry Alpini and Bersaglieri.

"The line once brought over the crest, the battle raged furiously on

the mountain top. The Austrians had constructed magnificent caverns

and dugouts, and made them as impregnable as their long residence

permitted. Their resistance was specially keen around the fearful

natural fortifications called the Tooth, consisting of spires and

slender ledges and abounding in caverns. The Tooth still remains in

part to the Austrians. From the first day, the Alpini have scaled part

of it and still stick there.

"One of the spectacular sights of the day was an Alpini perched on his

spire of the Tooth, who kept the Austrian machine gunners from their

task, pelting them with rocks every time they set to work.

"The fighting all took place on the rolling surface of the Cosmagnon

Alps--closed in by the barrage fire on both sides under the dazzling

sky, but with the world below completely shut off by Monte Pasubio's

crown of clouds. Shrapnel and shell disappeared in the ocean of

clouds."

More so than in any other war theater, fighting on the Austro-Italian

front was influenced by weather conditions during December, 1916, and

January, 1917. For practically its entire extent it was located in

mountainous territory, most of it indeed, as we have seen, being among

mountain peaks thousands of feet high.

No wonder then that there was little to report at any time during

December, 1916, and January, 1917, except artillery activity of

varying frequency and violence. Occasionally engagements would take

place between small detachments. These, however, were hardly ever

little more than clashes between outposts or patrols. These and quite

frequently even artillery activity were stopped entirely for days at a

time by the severity of the blizzards and gales that prevailed

throughout most of December, 1916.

In January, 1917, much the same condition prevailed. Batteries

everywhere were shelling each other and whatever positions of the

enemy were within reach as often as the weather was clear enough to do

so. On January 1, 1917, Goritz was subjected to a particularly heavy

bombardment from the Austrian guns, which caused considerable material

damage.

On January 4, 1917, two attacks carried out by small Austrian

detachments--one between the Adige and Lake Garda and the other in the

Plava sector--were repulsed. An Italian attack on the Carso Plateau

resulted in an advance of about 600 feet along a narrow front. Similar

small advances were made in the same region by the Italians at various

times. In most instances they were maintained in the face of frequent

Austrian counterattacks, though some of the latter occasionally were

successful.

On January 18, 1917, the Austrians attempted, after especially violent

artillery preparation, an attack against the Italian positions between

Frigido and the Opacchiasella-Castagnievizza road on the Carso, south

of Goritz. Italian gun and rifle fire, however, stopped the Austrian

attack before it had fully developed. A few days later, on January 22,

1917, a similar Austrian attack, launched southeast of Goritz, was

somewhat more successful and resulted in the temporary penetration of

a few Italian positions. The same success accompanied a like

undertaking in the vicinity of Goritz near Kostanjeoica on January 30,

1917.

On practically every day through January, 1917, there was

considerable artillery activity in the various sectors of the entire

front. This increased in violence in accordance with weather

conditions, but generally speaking had little result on general

conditions, which at the end of January, 1917, were practically the

same as had been established after the fall of Goritz.

PART V--WAR IN THE AIR AND ON THE SEA

CHAPTER XLVII

AEROPLANE WARFARE

During the six months, covering the period from August 1, 1916, to

February 1, 1917, aeroplane warfare at the various fronts was as

extensive, varied, and continuous as at any time during the war, if

indeed not more so. The efficiency of machines and operators alike

became higher and higher developed. Atmospheric conditions became less

and less of a factor in flying. If in spite of these facts the number

of machines and flyers lost continued to be comparatively huge, this

was due to the fact that the development of flying made fairly equal

progress in the flying corps of the various belligerents, and that

increased efficiency and independence from atmospheric conditions

rather had the tendency of increasing the daring of aviators.

It is of course evident that it would be impossible within the limits

of these chapters to narrate every flying enterprise undertaken.

Hundred, perhaps thousands, of flights made, are never reported either

officially or unofficially. The largest number of these of course had

as their object chiefly the gathering of information or the more

accurate direction of artillery fire.

In the following pages, however, will be found an account of all the

more important independent aeroplane enterprises undertaken at the

various fronts, as well as aeroplane raids made into the interior of

some of the countries at war.

On August 1, 1916, an Italian aerial squadron attacked with

considerable success an Austro-Hungarian plant for making Whitehead

torpedoes and submarine works located west of Fiume on one of the

Croatian bays of the Adriatic.

Two German aeroplanes, coming from the Dardanelles, on August 4, 1916,

dropped bombs on the aerodrome of the Entente Allies, located on the

island of Lemnos in the AEgean Sea, but were promptly driven off by

gunfire from British ships.

On the same day, August 4, 1916, Turkish or German aeroplanes

attempted a bombardment of shipping on the Suez Canal. The attack was

carried out by two machines over Lake Timsah, forty-five miles south

of Port Said. The town of Ismailia, on the lake border, also was

bombarded. No damage was done.

Again on August 6, 1916, a bomb attack by aeroplanes over Port Said

and Suez inflicted little material damage and caused slight

casualties.

On the following day, August 7, 1916, an Austrian squadron made up of

twenty-one aeroplanes attacked Venice. They claimed to have dropped

three and one-half tons of explosives and to have caused great damage

and many fires; the Italian Government, however, stated that the

damage caused was comparatively small and that only two people were

killed.

On September 5, 1916, two British aeroplanes raided the Turkish

aerodrome and aeroplane repair section at El Arish, ninety miles east

of the Suez Canal, dropping twelve bombs with good results. Turkish

aeroplanes attacked the British machines but ultimately gave up the

fight, and the latter returned to camp undamaged.

Again on September 8, 1916, three British machines bombed El Mazaar

and the Turkish camp near by.

Early in the morning of September 13, 1916, a group of Austrian

seaplanes attacked Venice once more. Incendiary and explosive bombs

struck the church of San Giovanni Paola, the Home for the Aged, and a

number of other buildings, inflicting some damage, although no

casualties were reported. Chioggra also was attacked by the same

machines; but here, too, the damage was rather slight.

On the same day in the afternoon an Italian air squadron of eighteen

Capronis under the protection of three Nieuport antiaircraft

aeroplanes attacked Trieste. Six Italian torpedo boats and two motor

boats assisted them in the gulf. Numerous bombs were dropped, but

these caused only slight damage, and none of military importance. One

man was slightly wounded.

Austrian aeroplanes and antiaircraft batteries obtained hits on the

Italian torpedo boats. At the same time an Italian air squadron

appeared over Parenzo, dropping twenty bombs in a field. No damage was

done.

Still another attack was reported on this day, this time by the

Russians. A squadron of four Russian giant aeroplanes of the

Slyr-Murometz type bombarded the German seaplane station on Lake

Angern in the Gulf of Riga. The Russians claimed to have dropped about

seventy-five bombs and to have started a great conflagration. They

also claimed that eight German seaplanes counterattacked, but were

repulsed by machine-gun fire, and that as the result of the bombing

and the air fight not fewer than eight German machines were destroyed

or put out of action. None of the Russian machines were reported

either lost or damaged.

A German aerodrome, located at St. Denis-Westrem in Belgium, was

attacked on September 22, 1916, by British machines who claimed to

have killed forty Germans and to have burned two sheds and three

aeroplanes. On October 1, 1916, bombs were dropped by British

aeroplanes on the Turkish camp at Kut-el-Amara.

Three days later, on October 4, 1916, British aeroplanes carried out a

successful bombing attack on Turkish camps in the neighborhood of El

Arish. It was claimed then that recent aerial attacks on the Turkish

aerodrome at El Arish had had the effect of compelling the Turks to

move their machines and hangars from that place.

An Austro-German air squadron on October 12, 1916, was reported to

have dropped bombs on Constanza, the principal Rumanian Black Sea

port.

On October 20, 1916, a British naval aeroplane attacked and brought

down a German kite balloon near Ostend. A similar machine engaged a

large German double-engined tractor seaplane, shooting both the pilot

and the observer. The seaplane side-slipped and dived vertically into

the sea two miles off Ostend. The remains later were seen floating on

the water. Both the British machines were undamaged.

Two days later, October 21, 1916, a German aeroplane approached the

fortified seaport of Sheerness at the mouth of the Thames, flying very

high. Four bombs were dropped, three of which fell into the harbor.

The fourth fell in the vicinity of a railway station and damaged

several railway carriages. British aeroplanes went up and the raider

made off in a northeasterly direction. No casualties were reported.

A German seaplane was shot down and destroyed later that day by one of

the British naval aircraft. The German machine fell into the sea.

Judging by time, it was probably the seaplane which visited Sheerness.

Margate, a resort on the southeast coast of England, was attacked on

October 22, 1916, by a German aeroplane, which succeeded in inflicting

slight material damage and injuring two people before it was driven

off.

The French made a strong attack on the Metz region on the same day,

October 22, 1916, employing twenty-four machines. They claimed that

these dropped 4,200 kilograms of bombs on blast furnaces at Hagodange

and Pussings north of Metz, and also on the railway stations at

Thionville, Mezures-les-Betz, Longwy, and Metz-Sablons. On the same

day another French aerial squadron bombarded the ammunition depot at

Monsen road (Somme). German aeroplanes dropped several bombs on

Luneville. There were no victims and the material damage was

insignificant. On the Somme front two German aeroplanes were brought

down and three others were forced down in a damaged condition.

Finally, good results were achieved by a French bombing expedition

against factories of Rombach and the railway station at Mars-la-Tour.

The Germans, however, claimed that the French air raids did no damage

to Metz and other points, but that five civilians were killed and

seven made ill by inhaling poisonous gases from the bombs. They

further claimed that twenty-two French aviators had been shot down by

aerial attacks and antiaircraft fire and that eleven aeroplanes were

lying behind the German lines. Captain Boelke conquered his

thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth foes.

On October 27, 1916, French aeroplanes dropped forty bombs on the

railway station at Grand Pre, eight on the railway station at

Challerange, and thirty on enemy bivouacs at Fretoy-le-Chateau and

Avricourt, north of Lassigny, where two fires were seen to break out.

On the same night ten other French machines dropped 240 bombs on the

railway station at Conflans and thirty on the railway station at

Courcelles. Another French machine dropped six shells on the railway

line at Pagny-sur-Moselle.

The British report for the same day likewise announced that aerial

engagements took place between large numbers of machines on both

sides. It was reported that five machines fell during a fight, two of

which were British. On another occasion one British pilot encountered

a formation of ten German machines, attacked them single handed and

dispersed them far behind their own lines.

On October 28, 1916, it was announced that Captain Boelke, the famous

German aviator, had been killed in a collision, with another

aeroplane. He was credited with having brought down forty aeroplanes.

Not until almost the middle of November, 1916, did aeroplane warfare

develop its usual activity.

On the night of November 9-10, 1916, British aeroplanes dropped bombs

without success on Ostend and Zeebrugge. One British machine was

forced down and captured and the aviator, a British officer, made

prisoner.

On the morning of November 10, 1916, a German battleplane attacked

two British biplanes between Nieuport and Dunkirk. It shot down one

and forced the other to retreat. In the forenoon three German

battleplanes met a superior British aerial squadron off Ostend and

attacked it. After a combat the British were forced to withdraw. The

German machines returned to their base, having suffered insignificant

damages.

Between 10 and 11 o'clock on the morning of November 10, 1916, a group

of seventeen British aeroplanes bombarded the steel works at

Voelklingen, northwest of Saarbruecken. One thousand kilograms of

projectiles were dropped on the buildings, which were damaged

seriously. In the course of the operations British machines fought

several actions against German machines, three of which were felled.

On the following night between 8 and 9 o'clock eight British

aeroplanes executed a fresh bombardment of these works, dropping 1,800

kilograms of projectiles. Several fires were observed. All British

machines returned safely.

During the night of November 10-11, 1916, British squadrons drenched

with projectiles the stations of Ham, St. Quentin, Tergnier, and

Nesle, in the Somme region, and the aerodrome at Dreuze, the blast

furnaces of Ramsbach, the aeroplane sheds of Frescati (near Metz), and

the blast furnaces of Hagodange (north of Metz). These operations

caused great damage, and several explosions and fires were observed.

A German aeroplane during the night of November 10-11, 1916, bombarded

several French towns. Nancy and Luneville received projectiles which

caused damage or casualties. Amiens was also bombarded on various

occasions during the same night. Nine persons of the civilian

population were killed and twenty-seven injured.

On November 11, 1916, five German machines were claimed to have been

brought down by the British.

The following day, November 12, 1916, a squadron of British naval

aeroplanes attacked the harbor of Ostend. A considerable number of

bombs was dropped on the dockyards and on the war vessels in the

harbor. On the same day it was also reported that two successful air

raids had been carried out by aircraft operating with the British

forces in Egypt. The points raided were Maghdaba and Birsaba. A ton

of high explosives was dropped. Two Fokker machines were brought down

by the raiding aeroplanes, all of which returned safely.

Near Saloniki two aeroplanes belonging to the Central Powers were

forced to descend behind their own lines. During the night of November

14, 1916, ten British machines at various points in France carried out

a series of successful raids on railway stations and rolling stock.

On the same day a Turkish aeroplane flying very high dropped several

bombs in and about Cairo, Egypt, killing and wounding a number of

civilians. No military damage was done and only one military casualty

was incurred.

On November 17, 1916, it was reported that a French aviator had

succeeded in flying across the Alps after dropping bombs upon the

station at Munich, the capital of Bavaria. He landed near Venice,

having flown 435 miles in one day.

London was again attacked on November 28, 1916. An aeroplane, flying

very high, dropped six bombs which injured nine people and did

considerable damage. A German machine, brought down a few hours later

near Dunkirk, was supposed to have been the one returning from the

attack on London.

On November 30, 1916, in Lorraine, three British aeroplanes fought an

engagement with several German machines. One German machine was

brought down in the forest of Gremecy.

On the same day on the Somme front French airmen fought about forty

engagements, in the course of which five German machines were brought

down.

Six French machines dropped fifteen bombs on Bruyeres. Another French

air squadron carried out a bombardment of the aerodrome of Grisolles

(north of Chateau-Thierry). Between 3.45 p. m. and 7 p. m. 171 bombs

of 120 mm. were dropped.

That night between 9.30 p. m. and 1.10 a. m. four French machines

bombarded the blast furnaces and factories of Voelklingen (northwest of

Saarbruecken).

On December 1, 1916, a group of aeroplanes of the British Naval Air

Service bombarded the blast furnaces of Dillingen, northwest of

Saarbruecken. During this expedition one ton of explosives was dropped.

A German aeroplane was brought down during the return journey.

During December 2, 1916, Italian aeroplanes bombed Austrian positions

at Dorimbergo (Fornberg) and Tabor, in the Frigido (Vippacco) Valley.

On the following day, December 3, 1916, another Italian air squadron

bombed the railway station for Dottogliano and Scoppo on the Carso

(seven and one-half miles northeast of Trieste). Notwithstanding bad

weather conditions and the violent fire of the Austrian artillery, the

aviators came down low to drop a ton and half of high explosives.

Numerous air flights took place and one Austrian machine was brought

down; one of the Italian machines was reported missing.

Austrian seaplanes dropped bombs at several points on the Carso

without causing casualties or damage. An Italian aeroplane dropped

five large bombs on the floating hangars at Trieste, with excellent

results.

On December 4, 1916, Austrian aircraft dropped a few bombs on Adria

and Monfalcone without doing any damage.

On the Tigris front, during the same day, December 4, 1916, Turkish

aeroplanes bombed successfully British camps. Six British machines

immediately made an equally successful counterattack.

On December 14, 1916, a British squadron of naval aeroplanes carried

out a bombardment of the Kuleli-Burges bridge, south of Adrianople.

Throughout the balance of December, 1916, there was a great deal of

local air activity at many points on all the fronts. Comparatively

speaking, however, no major actions occurred.

The same condition existed during the early part of January, 1917.

On January 11, 1917, an Austrian air squadron dropped a considerable

number of bombs in the neighborhood of Aquieleja, southwest of

Monfalcone. One Austrian seaplane was brought down by Italian

antiaircraft batteries. At the same time two aeroplanes bombarded the

aviation ground at Propecto and the seaplane base in the harbor of

Trieste.

The Russian front reported increased aerial activity on the following

day, January 12, 1917. A German aerial squadron, consisting of

thirteen airplanes, dropped about forty bombs on the station and town

of Radzivilov. Russian aeroplanes bombarded with machine-gun fire a

German battery near the village of Krukhov.

Similar exploits were reported from many different points on the

various fronts during the following week. Especially was this true of

the western front. However, there nowhere occurred any major actions.

CHAPTER XLVIII

ZEPPELIN RAIDS

During the night of July 31 to August 1, 1916, a squadron of

Zeppelins, reported to have numbered at least six, raided the eastern

and southeastern counties of England. Sixty bombs were dropped,

causing considerable material damage, but, as far as was ascertained,

no casualties.

Again the following day, August 2, 1916, six Zeppelins appeared over

the east coast of England. According to German claims, London, the

naval base at Harwich, and various industrial establishments in the

county of Norfolk were covered with a total of about eighty bombs,

which caused, of course, considerable loss. Although English

authorities claimed that antiaircraft guns registered a number of hits

against one, or possibly two, of the Zeppelins, and that another,

flying during its return trip over Dutch territory, was fired at and

hit, all of the six were later reported to have returned to their home

base undamaged.

Another squadron visited the east coast again one week later, August

9, 1916. There were reported to have been between seven and ten

machines which dropped about 160 bombs, caused extensive damage, and

killed twenty-three people. English batteries finally forced the

withdrawal of the Zeppelins.

About twenty-four hours after Rumania's entrance into the war on the

side of the Allies a Zeppelin, accompanied by an aeroplane, appeared

during the night of August 28, 1916, over Rumania's capital,

Bucharest. After a short bombardment, which caused but little damage,

they were both forced to withdraw by the fire of antiaircraft guns.

Before returning to their bases they bombarded three other unnamed

Rumanian cities without causing much damage.

Shortly after 11 o'clock in the evening of September 2, 1916, the

eastern coasts of England were again attacked, this time by a fleet of

thirteen airships, the most formidable attack that had so far been

launched against England.

The measures taken by the English authorities for the reduction or

obscuration of lights proved most efficacious, for the raiding

squadrons, instead of steering a steady course as to the raids of the

spring and of last autumn, groped about in darkness looking for a safe

avenue to approach their objectives.

Three airships only were able to approach the outskirts of London. One

of them, the _L-21_, appeared over the northern district about 2.15 in

the morning of September 3, 1916, where she was picked up by

searchlights and heavily engaged by antiaircraft guns and aeroplanes.

After a few minutes the airship was seen to burst into flames and fall

rapidly toward the earth.

The ship was destroyed, the wreckage, engines, and half-burned bodies

of the crew being found at Cuffley, near Enfield. The other two ships

which approached London were driven off by the defenses without being

able to approach the center of the city. A great number of bombs were

dropped promiscuously over the east Anglian and southeastern counties,

causing considerable but not very serious damage. Two people were

reported killed and thirteen injured.

The funeral of the sixteen members of the German Zeppelin took place

on September 6, 1916, at Potter's Bar Cemetery, and was carried out

under the direction of the British Royal Flying Corps. A young member

of the latter, Lieutenant William Robinson, who had been responsible

for the Zeppelin's destruction, received later the Victoria Cross as

well as a number of monetary rewards and civic honors. The site at

Cuffley, which had been the scene of the airship's destruction, was

presented to the English nation by its owner.

During the night of September 23, 1916, twelve Zeppelins again made

their appearance over the eastern counties of England and the

outskirts of London. Although the material damage was widespread, it

was borne chiefly by small homes and shops. The toll in human life was

greater than at any other raid, amounting to thirty-eight killed and

125 injured. However, two of the Zeppelins were forced down in Essex;

one of them was destroyed together with its crew; the other managed to

make a landing and its crew of twenty-one were made prisoners.

Two days later, during the night of September 25, 1916, a smaller

squadron of about six airships attacked the northeastern and southern

counties of England. Bombs did considerable damage, most of which,

however, was inflicted on privately owned property. Thirty-six people

were killed and twenty-seven more injured.

With the advance of autumn Zeppelin raids became less frequent. Only

once during October, 1916, on the night of October 1 to 2, did a

squadron of Zeppelins appear over English territory. At that time ten

airships attacked the eastern coast and London. The damage again was

principally to private property. Only one person was reported killed

and one injured. One of the Zeppelins, however, was brought down in

flames near Potter's Bar, and from its wreckage the bodies of nineteen

members of its crew were recovered.

Not until the end of November, 1916, was another Zeppelin attack

reported. At that time, during the night of November 27 to 28, 1916,

two airships raided Yorkshire and Durham. They did considerable

damage, killed one and injured sixteen persons. Both Zeppelins were

brought down and destroyed and the entire crews of both perished.

One airship was attacked by an aeroplane of the British Royal Flying

Corps and brought down in flames into the sea off the coast of Durham.

Another airship crossed the North Midland counties and dropped bombs

at various places. On her return journey she Was repeatedly attacked

by aeroplanes of the British Royal Flying Corps and by guns. She

appeared to have been damaged, for the last part of her journey was

made at very slow speed, and she was unable to reach the coast before

day was breaking.

Near the Norfolk coast she apparently succeeded in effecting repairs,

and, after passing through gunfire from the land defenses, which

claimed to have made a hit, proceeded east at high speed and at an

altitude of over 8,000 feet. She was attacked nine miles out at sea by

four machines of the British Royal Naval Air Service, while gunfire

was opened from an armed British trawler, and the airship was finally

brought down in flames.

During December, 1916, no Zeppelins were apparently used actively. As

far as it was possible to determine definitely, the number of German

airships wrecked from the outbreak of the war up to January 1, 1917,

was nineteen. Of these twelve were lost during 1916 as follows:

_L-19._ Wrecked in the North Sea on February 3.

_L-77._ Shot down by French guns near Brabant-le-Roi on February 21.

_L-15._ Shot down in raid on eastern counties, and sank off Thames

estuary on April 1.

_L-20._ Wrecked near Stavanger on May 3.

Unnamed airship. Destroyed by British warships off Schleswig on May 4.

Unnamed airship. Brought down by Allied warships at Saloniki on May 5.

_L-21._ Burned and wrecked near Enfield, September 3.

_L-32_ and _L-33_. Brought down in Essex, September 24.

Airship brought down at Potter's Bar, October 1.

Two airships brought down in flames off the east coast, November

27-28.

Another list, based on an article published in the "Journal of the

Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute," yields a total of

thirty-eight Zeppelins as having been destroyed since the outbreak of

the war. Of this number the loss of thirty was said to have been

authenticated.

Of the larger total (38) 5 were destroyed in 1914, 17 in 1915, and 16

in 1916. Of these 4 were lost in France, 6 in Russia, 7 in Belgium, 7

in England, 1 in Denmark, 1 in Norway, 1 in the Balkans, 5 in the

East, and 6 in Germany.

No further activities of Zeppelins were reported during January, 1917,

except that it was announced unofficially on January 3, 1917, that two

Zeppelins had been destroyed at Tondern, Schleswig, by a fire due to

defective electric wiring in a recently constructed double shed.

To sum up the losses in aeroplanes incurred by the various

belligerents during the six months' period, August, 1916, to February,

1917, is practically impossible. Figures are available for a few

months only, and they are not only unofficial, but come from all kinds

of different sources, most of them very much biased.

Furthermore, there always is a wide discrepancy between figures

published by adherents of the Allies and those published by the

friends of the Central Powers.

As an example of this condition the following may well serve: At the

end of January, 1916, an unofficial statement claimed that the Germans

lost during 1916 on the western front a total of 221 aeroplanes. The

French authorities immediately claimed that they had knowledge of 417

German aeroplanes which had been shot down by their aviators, and that

195 more machines were brought down damaged, of which undoubtedly a

number finally were to be considered lost to the Germans. Neither

statement, however, is supported by sufficient data to allow any kind

of checking up. The truth, therefore, must be sought somewhere around

the average between these two figures.

Equally difficult is it to arrive at any definite figures regarding

the losses in man power incurred by the various aviation corps. No

official figures are available except the lists of casualties

published in aviation papers. These, however, cover only the French

and English organizations, and even in these two cases they contain a

large number of men who lost their lives not at the front, but in

aviation camps in England or France while being trained.

However, that section of the French Aviation Corps containing American

volunteers has been more liberal in publishing statistics. On November

3, 1916, it was announced that the flying unit of the French Corps,

consisting entirely of American volunteers, had brought down between

May and November a total of twenty-one German machines. At that time

it consisted of twelve American members. Unfortunately it had lost

previously to this date two of its members.

Kiffin Rockwell of Atlanta, Ga., had been killed in an air battle over

Thame in Alsace on September 23, 1916. He had joined the Foreign

Legion of the French army in May, 1915, had been severely wounded,

received the Military Medal, and after his recovery had been

transferred to the Flying Corps. He had participated in thirty-four

air battles, and a few hours before his death had been promoted to be

a second lieutenant.

Norman Prince, Harvard graduate and native of Hamilton, Mass., was

severely wounded early in October, 1916. He died a week later on

October 14, 1916, in a hospital after first having been decorated with

the cross of the Legion of Honor. He had also received some time

before the Military Medal.

On November 2, 1916, it was announced that Anthony H. Jannus, a young

Washington aviator, had been killed in Russia on October 12, 1916,

while flying for the Russian army.

Another young American, Ruskin Watts of Westfield, N. J., who was

serving in the English Aviation Corps on the western front, was on

November 2, 1916, reported as missing since September 22, 1916. No

further news of his fate was known.

This meant that, as far as was known definitely, four Americans had

lost their lives fighting for the Allies as members of their aviation

service.

CHAPTER XLIX

SUBMARINE WARFARE

The totals of the damage inflicted by submarines of the Central Powers

on the merchant fleets of the Entente Allies during July, 1916, was

not officially announced until August 16, 1916. On that day an

official statement was published in Berlin to the effect that German

and Austrian submarines and mines had destroyed during July, 1916, 74

merchantmen belonging to England and her allies. These ships had a

total tonnage of 103,000 tons.

The activity of German and Austrian submarines increased considerably

during August, 1916. According to an official German statement

submarines or mines sunk 126 merchant ships, belonging to England and

her allies, totaling 170,679 tons gross, as well as 35 neutral

merchant ships, totaling 38,568 tons. These figures, however, did not

agree with figures compiled in this country. The New York "Journal of

Commerce" records only 93 ships of a total tonnage of 123,397 as

having been sunk in August, 1916. The same authority also announced

that in the period from August 1, 1914, to September 1, 1916, there

had been destroyed, 1,584 merchant ships, aggregating 2,939,915 tons.

Among the ships sunk in August, 1916, was the Italian mail steamer

_Letimbro_. She went to the bottom of the Mediterranean on August 4,

1916, and it was claimed that many of her 1,100 passengers were lost.

Other ships of more than 2,000 tons which were lost in August, 1916,

were:

British: _Tottenham_, 3,106 tons; _Favonian_, 3,049 tons; _Mount

Coniston_, 3,018 tons; _Aaro_, 2,603 tons; _Trident_, 3,129 tons; _San

Bernardo_, 3,803 tons; _Antiope_, 2,793 tons; _Whitgift_, 4,397 tons;

_Britannic_, 3,487 tons; _Heighington_, 2,800 tons; and _Newburn_,

3,554 tons.

Italian: _Citta di Messina_, 2,464 tons; _Hermerberg_, 2,824 tons;

_Siena_, 4,372 tons; _Teti_, 2,868 tons; _Nereus_, 3,980 tons;

_Angelo_, 8,609 tons; _Sebastiano_, 3,995 tons; _Stampalia_, 9,000.

Other nations: _Ivar_, Danish, 2,139 tons; _Kohina Maru_, Japanese,

3,164 tons; _Tenmei Maru_, Japanese, 3,360 tons; _Tricoupis_, Greek,

2,387 tons; _Ganekogorta Mendi_, Spanish, 3,061 tons; _Pagasarri_,

Spanish, 3,287 tons.

Of vessels smaller than 2,000 tons the losses to the various nations

were as follows: Great Britain, 23; France, 6; Italy, 10; Russia, 4;

Norway, 9; Sweden, 6; Holland, 2; Denmark, 3; Greece, 3.

A large discrepancy regarding the total number and tonnage of Allied

and neutral merchantmen sunk by mines and submarines was again

noticeable in the figures published in the United States newspapers

and in official statements of the German admiralty.

The latter on October 26, 1916, announced that 180 ships with a total

tonnage of 254,600 had been sunk, of which 141 of 182,000 tons

belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 39 of 72,600 tons to

neutral nations. The New York "Journal of Commerce," on October 5,

1916, published a summary of merchantmen lost during September, 1916,

which accounted only for 70 vessels of 150,317 tons, of which 25 were

said to have belonged to Great Britain and 18 to neutral Norway, while

France lost 4, Italy 4, Sweden 5, Denmark 4, Spain, Greece, and

Holland each 2, and Belgium 1. Of all these the following were more

than 2,000 tons:

British: _Duart_, 3,108 tons; _Strathalian_, 4,404 tons; _Swift

Wings_, 4,465 tons; _Kelvinia_, 3,140 tons; _Torridge_, 5,036 tons;

_Strathtay_, 4,428 tons; _Heathdene_, 3,541 tons; _Llangorse_, 3,841

tons; _Butetown_, 2,466 tons; _Bronwen_, 4,250 tons; _Strathe_, 2,500

tons; _Newby_, 2,168 tons; _Counsellor_, 4,958 tons; _Lexie_, 3,778

tons; _Swedish Prince_, 3,712 tons; _Roddam_, 3,218 tons; _Lord

Tredegar_, 3,856 tons; _Dewa_, 3,802 tons.

Norwegian: _Elizabeth IV_, 4,182 tons; _Polynesia_, 4,064 tons;

_Bufjord_, 2,284 tons; _Qvindeggen_, 2,610 tons; _Furu_, 2,029 tons;

_Isdalen_, 2,275 tons.

Other nations: _Antwerpen_, Dutch, 11,000 tons; _Benpark_, Italian,

3,842 tons; _Gamen_, Swedish, 2,617 tons; _Luis Vives_, Spanish, 2,394

tons; _Assimacos_, Greek, 2,898 tons.

For the month of October, 1916, the New York "Journal of Commerce"

placed its total figures of Allied and neutral merchantmen sunk by

mines or submarines at 127 vessels of 227,116 tons, according to a

compilation published on November 3, 1916. No official figures of the

German Government for October, 1916, were available. Of the

above-mentioned 127 vessels, Great Britain lost 38; Norway, 56;

Sweden, 10; Denmark, 8; Greece, 5; Russia, 4; Holland, 3; France,

Belgium, and Rumania, each 1. Of these the following were of more than

2,000 tons:

British: Franconia, 18,150 tons; _Alaunia_, 13,405 tons; _Welsh

Prince_, 4,934 tons; _Rowanmore_, 10,320 tons; _Astoria_, 4,262 tons;

_Cabotia_, 4,309 tons; _Midland_, 4,247 tons; _Cluden_, 3,166 tons;

_Barbara_, 3,740 tons; _Framfield_, 2,510 tons; _Ethel Duncan_, 2,510

tons; _Sidmouth_, 4,045 tons; _Crosshill_, 5,002 tons; _Sebek_, 4,601

tons; _Renylan_, 3,875 tons; _Strathdene_, 4,321 tons; _West Point_,

3,847 tons; _Stephano_, 3,449 tons.

Norwegian: _Christian Knudsen_, 4,224 tons; _Risholm_, 2,155 tons;

_Snestadt_, 2,350 tons; _Edam_, 2,381 tons; _Sola_, 3,057 tons;

_Bygdo_, 2,345 tons.

Russian: _Tourgai_, 4,281 tons; _Mercator_, 2,827 tons.

Dutch: _Bloomersdijk_, 4,850 tons.

Greek: _George M. Embiricos_, 3,636 tons; _Massalia_, 2,186 tons;

_Germaine_, 2,573 tons.

Rumanian: _Bistritza_, 3,668 tons.

More interest than ever before in submarine warfare was aroused in

this country when the German war submarine _U-53_ unexpectedly made

its appearance in the harbor of Newport, R. I., during the afternoon

of October 7, 1916. About three hours afterward, without having taken

on any supplies, and after explaining her presence by the desire of

delivering a letter addressed to Count von Bernstorff, then German

Ambassador at Washington, the _U-53_ left as suddenly and mysteriously

as she had appeared.

This was the first appearance of a war submarine in an American port.

It was claimed that the _U-53_ had made the trip from Wilhelmshaven in

seventeen days. She was 213 feet long, equipped with two guns, four

torpedo tubes, and an exceptionally strong wireless outfit. Besides

her commander, Captain Rose, she was manned by three officers and

thirty-three men.

Early the next morning, October 8, 1916, it became evident what had

brought the _U-53_ to this side of the Atlantic. At the break of day

she made her reappearance southeast of Nantucket. The American steamer

_Kansan_ of the American Hawaiian Company bound from New York by way

of Boston to Genoa was stopped by her, but after proving her

nationality and neutral ownership was allowed to proceed. Five other

steamships, three of them British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian, were

less fortunate. The British freighter _Strathend_, of 4,321 tons, was

the first victim. Her crew were taken aboard the Nantucket Shoals

Lightship. Two other British freighters, _West Point_ and _Stephano_,

followed in short order to the bottom of the ocean. The crews of both

were saved by United States torpedo-boat destroyers which had come

from Newport as soon as news of the _U-53's_ activities had been

received there. This was also the case with the crews of the Dutch

ship _Bloomersdijk_ and the Norwegian tanker _Christian Knudsen_.

On December 20, 1916, the German admiralty announced that the total

losses inflicted on Allied and neutral merchantmen by submarines and

mines during November, 1916, amounted to 191 vessels of 408,500 tons.

Of these 138 ships of 314,500 belonged to Great Britain and her

allies, and 53 ships of 94,000 tons to neutral countries.

On November 13, 1916, the Norwegian steamship _Older_, on passage from

Newport to Gibraltar, was captured by a German submarine, which placed

a prize crew on board her. For a time the submarine remained in

company. Eventually, however, the _Older_ separated from the

submarine, apparently with the intention of making for a German port.

She was intercepted by a British ship of war, recaptured, and brought

into a British port, and the prize crew were made prisoners of war.

The losses of Allied and neutral merchantmen sunk by submarines and

mines during the month of December, 1916, according to the New York

"Journal of Commerce," totaled 134 vessels of 251,750 tons, of which

53 vessels of 157,217 tons belonged to Great Britain and her allies,

and 81 vessels of 84,533 tons to neutrals.

Among the largest of these were the following British boats: _King

Malcom_, 4,351 tons; _Reapwell_, 3,417 tons; _Luciston_, 2,948 tons;

_Moeraki_, 4,392 tons; _King Bleddyn_, 4,387 tons; _Couch_, 5,620

tons; _Tanfield_, 4,358 tons; _Avristan_, 3,818 tons; _Strathalbyn_,

4,331 tons; _Ursula_, 5,011 tons; _Bretwalda_, 4,037 tons;

_Westminster_, 4,342 tons.

The French merchant marine, in addition to a number of smaller boats,

lost: _Kangaroo_, 2,493 tons; _Emma Laurans_, 2,152 tons. One Belgian

steamer of 2,360 tons, the _Keltier_, also was sunk.

Of neutrals, the Dutch lost the _Kediri_, 3,781 tons; the Norwegians

the _Rakiura_, 3,569 tons; _Modum_, 2,942 tons; _Meteor_, 4,211 tons;

_Manpanger_, 3,354 tons; the Greeks, _Salamis_, 3,638 tons; and the

Danish, _Michail Ontchonkoff_, 2,118 tons.

The balance of the boats destroyed in December, 1916, was made up of

vessels of less than 2,000 tons, among which there were Russian,

Swedish, and Portuguese boats as well as ships belonging to the

nations already mentioned. One American-owned was also included, the

_John Lambert_, of 1,550 tons, owned by the Great Britain & St.

Lawrence Transportation Company.

On December 4, 1916, a German submarine sank in the Mediterranean the

former Anchor liner _Caledonia_, a steamer of 9,223 tons. The German

version of this occurrence was as follows:

"On December 4, 1916, in the Mediterranean, the British liner

_Caledonia_ attempted to ram one of our submarines without having

previously been attacked by the latter.

"Just before the submarine was struck by the steamer's bows it

succeeded in firing a torpedo, which hit and sank the _Caledonia_. The

submarine was only slightly damaged.

"The captain of the steamer, James Blaikie, was taken prisoner by the

submarine."

In January, 1917, the toll exacted by mines and submarines was

especially large. The New York "Journal of Commerce" gave on February

6, 1917, the following figures: 154 vessels of 336,997 tons. Of these

87, of 229,366 tons, belonged to Great Britain and her allies, and 67,

of 107,631 tons, to neutrals. No American boats were included.

On January 1, 1917, a German submarine sank the British transport

_Ivernia_ in the Mediterranean while carrying troops. Four officers

and 146 men as well as 33 members of the crew were reported missing.

The British battleship _Cornwallis_ was sunk on January 9, 1917,

likewise in the Mediterranean. Thirteen members of the crew were

reported missing. The _Cornwallis_, which was launched at Blackwell in

1901 and completed in 1904, had a displacement of 14,000 tons, length

of 405 feet, beam of 75-1/2 feet, and draft of 26-1/2 feet. Her

indicated horsepower was 18,238, developing a speed of 18.9 knots. She

carried four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch, ten 12-pounder, and two 3-pounder

guns, as well as four torpedo tubes. The complement of the

_Cornwallis_ was about 750.

Two days later, January 11, 1917, the British seaplane carrier

_Ben-Machree_ was sunk by gunfire in Kasteloxizo Harbor (Asia Minor).

There were no casualties.

Among the larger boats (above 2,000 tons) sunk during January, 1917,

were the following:

British: _Apsleyhall_, 3,882 tons; _Holly Branch_, 3,568 tons;

_Baycraig_, 3,761 tons; _Lesbian_, 2,555 tons; _Andoni_, 3,188 tons;

_Baynesk_, 3,286 tons; _Lynfield_, 3,023 tons; _Manchester Inventor_,

4,247 tons; _Wragby_, 3,641 tons; _Garfield_, 3,838 tons;

_Auchencrag_, 3,916 tons; _Port Nicholson_, 8,418 tons; _Matina_,

3,870 tons; _Toftwood_, 3,082 tons; _Mohacsfield_, 3,678 tons;

_Tremeadow_, 3,653 tons; _Neuquen_, 3,583 tons; _Tabasco_, 2,987 tons;

_Matheran_, 7,654 tons; _Jevington_, 2,747 tons.

French: _Tuskar_, 3,043 tons.

Japanese: _Taki Maru_, 3,208 tons; _Chinto Maru_, 2,592 tons;

_Misagatu Maru_, No. 3, 2,608 tons.

Russian: _Egret_, 3,185 tons.

Norwegian: _Britannic_, 2,289 tons; _Older_, 2,256 tons; _Fama_, 2,147

tons; _Esperanca_, 4,428 tons; _Bergenhus_, 3,606 tons; _Jotunfjell_,

2,492 tons; _Myrdal_, 2,631 tons.

Dutch: _Salland_, 3,657 tons; _Zeta_, 3,053 tons.

Greek: _Evangelos_, 3,773 tons; _Demetrios Goulandris_, 3,744 tons;

_Aristotelis C. Ioannow_, 2,868 tons; _Demetrios Inglessis_, 2,088

tons; Tsiropinas, 3,015 tons.

Spanish: _Valle_, 2,365 tons; _Manuel_, 2,419 tons; _Parahyba_, 2,537

tons.

Toward the end of January, 1917, the severity of submarine warfare was

noticeably increased. Day by day the number of vessels sunk grew

larger, and some of them were of especially large tonnage. On January

28, 1917, a French transport, carrying 950 soldiers to Saloniki, the

_Amiral Magon_, was sunk in the Mediterranean with a loss of about 150

men.

Then came on January 29, 1917, the official announcement that the

British Government had decided to lay new mine fields in the North Sea

in order to cope more successfully with the ever-growing submarine

menace. According to this announcement the British Government warned

all neutrals that from this date the following area in the North Sea

was to be considered dangerous to shipping:

The area comprising all the waters, except the Netherlands and Danish

territorial waters, lying southwestward and eastward of a line

commencing four miles from the coast of Jutland in latitude 56 degrees

N., longitude 8 degrees E.

As a result of this new policy it was announced by Lloyd's that eleven

vessels of about 15,000 tons were sunk on the first day of the

blockade. During the first week of the blockade, February 1 to 8,

1917, according to British figures, which, however, were claimed by

German officials to be much lower than the actual figures, there were

sunk 58 vessels of 112,043 tons, of which 1 was American, 20 belonged

to other neutrals, 32 to Great Britain, and 5 to the other

belligerents.

PART VI--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS

CHAPTER L

THE OLD MENACE

A welcome period of quiet in the submarine controversy with Germany

followed the settlement of the _Sussex_ case recorded in the previous

volume. But neither the Administration nor the country was deluded

into resting in any false security. The dragon was not throttled; it

merely slumbered by the application of a diplomatic opiate. While the

war lasted the menace of its awaking and jeopardizing German peace

with the United States was always present.

The achievements of the _Deutschland_, a peaceful commercial submarine

which inaugurated an undersea traffic between the United States and

Germany, provided an interesting diversion from the tension created by

the depredations of her armed sisters. After safely crossing the

Atlantic and finding a safe berth in an American port in the summer of

1916, she showed such hesitation in setting out on the return trip

that doubts were general as to whether the dangers of capture by alert

Allied cruisers were not too great to be risked. The attempt

nevertheless was finally made on August 2, 1916, when she darted under

water after passing out of the three-mile limit at the Virginia Capes

and was successful. She arrived at Bremen on August 23, 1916, with a

cargo of rubber and metal, and apparently found no difficulty in

eluding the foes supposedly in wait for her on the high seas. When she

left her Baltimore berth, so the story went, eight British warships

awaited her, attended by numerous fishing craft hired to spread nets

to entangle her. Near the English coast dense fogs aided by obscuring

the vision of her foes' naval lookouts, and in rounding Scotland to

reach the North Sea she had to evade a long line of warships and

innumerable auxiliary craft extended far north.

Germany found occasion for exultation in her return without mishap.

The blockade was broken. Berlin was bedecked with flags and the whole

country celebrated the event as though Marshal von Hindenburg had won

another victory. The _Deutschland_ again left Bremen on October 10,

1916, and found her way into New London, Conn., on November 1, 1916,

leaving for Germany three weeks later with a rubber and metal cargo

said to be worth $2,000,000 and a number of mail pouches. She was

reported to have arrived safely off the mouth of the Weser on December

10, 1916.

A repetition of the _Deutschland's_ exploits was looked for from her

sister undersea craft, the _Bremen_, about whose movements the widest

speculation was centered. She was reported to have left Germany for

the United States on September 1, 1916, but did not appear, nor was

any trace of her seen en route. She never arrived, and became a

mystery of the sea. A story circulated that she had been captured by a

British patrol boat in the Straits of Dover and thirty-three of her

crew of thirty-five made prisoners, the remaining two having been

killed when the boat was caught in a steel net. The British admiralty

preserved its customary silence as to the truth of this report. Her

German owners finally acknowledged their belief that she had been lost

probably through an accident to her machinery. At any rate a life

preserver bearing the name _Bremen_ was picked up off the Maine coast

about the end of September, 1916.

As the summer of 1916 advanced American contemplation of this

agreeable trade relation with blockaded Germany by means of a

commercial submarine service was abruptly switched to a review of the

manner in which that country was observing its undertaking not to sink

unresisting vessels without warning. A certain communication credited

to Admiral von Tirpitz was circulated in Germany urging a return to

his discarded sea policy. This was nothing more nor less than the

pursuit of unrestricted and ruthless submarine warfare, the espousal

of which by him as Minister of Marine, in conflict with the milder

methods favored by the German Chancellor, forced his resignation

earlier in the year. Of course such a change would mean an immediate

clash with the United States and the ending of diplomatic relations.

President Wilson had been watching Germany's behavior since May, 1916,

when she pledged her submarine commanders to safeguard the lives on

board doomed vessels. Three months' probation, according to American

reports, failed to show any evidence that she was not living up to her

promise; but British reports cited a number of instances pointing to

an absolute disregard of her undertaking with the United States. She

had hedged this promise with a condition reserving her liberty of

action should a "new situation" develop necessitating a change in her

sea policy, and the question arose whether she was not trying to

create a new situation to justify such a change. Concurrent with the

new Von Tirpitz propaganda, at any rate, came a recrudescence of

submarine destruction without warning, mainly in the Mediterranean.

This activity lent weight to a fear that the kaiser and Von

Bethmann-Hollweg were yielding to the pressure exercised by the Von

Tirpitz party. Germany regarded her submarines as her chief weapons

for damaging the Allies; but she was embarrassed by the problem of how

to operate them without clashing with American interests. Her policy

at length shaped itself to a careful discrimination in raiding

Atlantic traffic and avoiding attacks on liners altogether.

The leader of the German National Liberals, Dr. Ernest Bassermann,

echoed the Von Tirpitz cry, in an address to his constituents at

Saarbruecken. The most ruthless employment of all weapons, he urged,

was imperative. Besides Von Tirpitz, High Admiral Koester, Count

Zeppelin, and Prince von Buelow shared this view. He told the world,

which he was really addressing, that the submarine campaign had not

been abandoned, but only suspended solely on account of the American

protest. It was not clear that there had really been any cessation of

submarine activity, though some abatement had undoubtedly followed the

undertaking with the United States.

The manifest unrest in Germany provoked by the curb placed upon her

submarines by President Wilson caused the eyes of Washington to be fixed

anxiously on the uncertain situation. It was solely a psychological and

mental condition, but of a character that seemed premonitory of an

outbreak on Germany's part. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, in a cryptic

remark to the Reichstag on September 28, 1916, succeeded in aggravating

American concern, though he may not have so intended. "A German

statesman," he said, "who would hesitate to use against Britain every

available instrument of battle that would really shorten this war should

be hanged."

There was no obvious reference to the United States in this utterance;

but the German press seized upon it as a pretext for an attack on

American neutrality. The connection was provided by the coincidental

death of an American aviator named Rockwell, who, with a number of

compatriots, had served the Allies on the French front. The point made

was that the active part American airmen were taking in the ranks of

the Allies, combined with the enormous supply of war materials

furnished by American firms, indicated the futility of abiding by

concessions made to the United States controlling the submarine war.

The United States was charged with taking advantage of restricted

submarine activity to cover the participation of American citizens as

aids to the Entente and to expand its war trade. Being simultaneous

and couched in the same key, the press outbursts bore every indication

of a common inspiration, probably official.

"Moderation in the use of Germany's undersea craft," said one group of

journals in effect, "merely serves to further American assistance to

the Entente Allies in men and munitions."

Another paper, the "Tageszeitung," characterized the American policy

as one in the pursuance of which President Wilson Was making a

threatened use of a "wooden sword," and called for a policy of the

utmost firmness against that country.

It was intimated from Washington that if any faction in Germany--in

this case the Pan-Germans--succeeded in reviving submarine methods

whereby ships were sunk without warning or without safeguards against

loss of American lives, the submarine crisis with Germany would be

reopened with all its possibilities. At the same time no serious

importance was attached by official Washington to the German clamor

for more frightfulness.

It was true that the Pan-Germans were making a powerful onslaught for

the overthrow of the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who

was the only obstacle to a return to ruthless submarine warfare.

Moreover, as perceived by the "Berliner Tageblatt," "tension in the

atmosphere of imperial politics has reached such a high point that a

discharge must follow if the empire is not to suffer lasting damage."

But Washington looked for development on the high seas, not in the

political arena of Berlin, where the sound and fury of words did not

afford a safe barometer of governmental action.

By the end of September, 1916, a "lull" in German submarine activity

was reported, due, according to Lord Robert Cecil, to a shortage in

submarines. But reports showed that between June 1, 1916, and

September 24, 1916, 277 vessels, sixty-six of which were neutral, had

been sunk by submarines, fifteen of them without warning, and with the

loss of eighty-four lives. The abatement really took place in June and

July, 1916, following the American agreement with Germany in May,

1916. The "lull" may therefore be measured by these figures: Vessels

sunk in June, 57; in July, 42; in August, 103; in September (to the

24th), 75.

The only real lull was a cessation in attacks on liners. The British

view, based on the allegation that fifteen vessels had been sunk

without warning causing a loss of eighty-four lives, was that German

frightfulness was already in full swing despite Berlin's promise to

the United States. The American attitude, however, was that so long as

American lives were not lost on ships sunk without warning the United

States had no ground for intervention. Hence Germany could apparently

sink vessels with impunity so long as the noncombatant victims

belonged to other nationalities.

The agitation in Germany to break the undertaking with the United

States was thrashed out between the adherents of Chancellor von

Bethmann-Hollweg and the Pan-Germanists without shaking the

Chancellor's strength. He had the support of Field Marshal von

Hindenburg and the navy chiefs, who, in frowning on an unbridled

submarine warfare, successfully imposed the weight of their authority

against any change. The subject divided the Budget Committee of the

Reichstag, the question being whether its discussion should be

permitted in open session. The outcome was that the committee decided,

by a vote of 24 to 4, to smother the agitation by refusing to permit

its ventilation in the open Reichstag.

CHAPTER LI

THE U-53'S EXPLOITS

While the German Budget Committee was thus occupied a new and

startling turn was given to the situation by the unheralded appearance

at Newport, R. I., on October 7, 1916, of a German submarine, the

_U-53_. Rising out of the water in the afternoon, it remained long

enough for its captain to deliver a missive for Count von Bernstorff,

the German Ambassador, pay a call on Admiral Knight, the American

commander there, ask for news of the missing _Bremen_, and obtain a

sheaf of New York newspapers for information regarding Allied

shipping. Then it left the port, whither it had been piloted, and

disappeared under the waves. The visit, standing by itself, was an

interesting episode; but it proved to be much more than a mere social

call.

The next day revealed the real object of the submarine's presence in

American waters. Off Nantucket it appeared in its true guise as a

raider of shipping and sank five vessels--three British, one Dutch,

and one Norwegian. Having thus brought the submarine war to the very

threshold of the United States, causing a reign of terror among

held-up shipping along the Atlantic seaboard--a state of mind which,

while it lasted, meant a virtual blockade of American ports--it

disappeared and was not again heard of.

There was no doubt that the exploits of the _U-53_ were intended as a

demonstration to test American feeling as to whether Germany could

attack on this side of the water munition and other vessels bound for

Allied ports. It appeared a bold attempt to create a new precedent by

overriding one laid down in 1870 by President Grant, who ruled that

American waters must not be used by other nations for belligerent

purposes. Outside the three-mile limit, however, German submarines

could operate with the same impunity as in the Arctic Ocean, so long

as they observed the requirement of giving warning and allowing people

on board the intercepted vessels time to save their lives. But the

manifest point was that the waters outside the three-mile limit were

contiguous to the American coast, and provided highways for American

shipping, coastwise and foreign. The proximity of German submarines,

even though they confined their attention to Allied shipping to and

from American ports, constituted too great a menace to the free

movement of the American mercantile marine.

A wolf at a man's door is none the less dangerous because the wolf is

lying in wait for the appearance of an inmate of the man's house and

not for the man himself. Informal intimations persuaded Germany that

she could not safely repeat the experiment of carrying the war to

America's door.

The innovation, even in its most innocuous form, was contrary to good

international usage. Great Britain had previously offended in this

respect by permitting her patrolling cruisers to intercept and examine

merchant vessels off the port of New York. She desisted at

Washington's request. But a waiting cruiser, plain to the eye,

interfering with shipping to prevent communication with Germany, was

a mild offender compared with an unseen submarine crossing the paths

of ships and liable to err in its indiscriminate destructiveness.

Fortunately, no American lives were lost. But this was not the fault

of the submarine. No question could be raised of its behavior in

sinking four of the five ships, namely, the _Strathdene_ (British

freighter), bound from New York to Bordeaux; the _West Point_ (British

freighter), bound from London to Newport News; the _Bloomersdijk_

(Dutch freighter), bound from New York to Rotterdam; and the

_Christian Knudsen_ (Norwegian freighter), bound from New York to

London. The danger, happily averted, to American-German relations lay

in the sinking of the fifth vessel, the _Stephano_, a British

passenger liner plying regularly between New York, Halifax, N. S., and

St. John's, Newfoundland. Among the _Stephano's_ passengers were a

number of Americans, who, like their companions in misfortune, had to

seek the doubtful safety of small boats miles offshore.

The situation was saved by the presence of American destroyers in the

vicinity. Their commanders and crews were actual witnesses of the

sinking, and afterward interposed as life savers of the shipwrecked

victims. The _Balch_ rescued the passengers and crew of the

_Stephano_, numbering 140, and other destroyers took on board the

crews of the four freighters. The American navy in saving Germany's

victims had saved Germany from facing the consequences of her behavior

in jeopardizing the lives of Americans on board the _Stephano_. German

diplomacy was even capable of pointing to the fact that the prompt

relief afforded the _Stephano's_ passengers by American destroyers was

proof that the submarine commander had safeguarded their lives by

relying upon the American navy as a rescuer. The irony of such a

contention lay in the implication that if American destroyers had not

been on the scene the vessels might have been spared.

It was a short-lived panic. The _U-53_ came and went in a flash; but

amid the scare created by its presence President Wilson found it

necessary to assure the country that "the German Government will be

held to the complete fulfillment of its promise to the Government of

the United States. I have no right now," he added, "to question its

willingness to fulfill them."

The Administration's deliberations on the subject produced the

decision that the _U-53_ had not ignored the German pledges. It came,

saw, and conquered according to formula. It had first warned the

vessels, gave enough time for the people on board to be "safely"

transferred to boats, and there were American naval eyewitnesses to

testify as to the regularity of its proceedings. The incident passed

as one on which no action could be taken by the United States. But

Germany saw that it could not well be repeated. American sensibilities

had to be respected as much as international proprieties. The reproof

conveyed to the British Ambassador by Secretary Lansing that "the

constant and menacing presence of cruisers on the high seas near the

ports of a neutral country may be regarded according to the canons of

international courtesy as a just ground for offense, although it may

be strictly legal," applied with double force to the presence of

German submarines because of their greater danger.

Tart comments on the incident came from Great Britain, though its

Government did not appear to have protested to the United States

against the view that the _U-53's_ proceedings were lawful and

regular.

Lord Robert Cecil, an official spokesman, saw a ruse in the

submarine's visit:

"German public opinion appears to be obsessed with the idea that the

way to deal with the Allied blockade is to have a succession of sudden

crises with neutrals, which may be used for striking diplomatic

bargains. These bargains, in the mind of Germany, always take one

form--that Germany is to refrain from violating international law and

humanity in return for the abandonment by Great Britain as toward

neutrals of the legitimate military and naval measures of the Allies."

In the House of Lords the United States was accused of a breach of

neutrality by Lords Beresford and Sydenham. Referring to "the

activities of the _U-53_ under the very eyes of the American navy"

and to President Wilson's ultimatum which resulted in the German

pledge, Lord Sydenham said:

"Even before the exploits of the _U-53_ that pledge was torn to

shreds. Yet the Government of the United States has made no sign

whatever that the sinking of neutral ships goes on almost every day.

What must small neutrals think of their powerful representative?"

No life, he said, was lost because of the presence of American

warships. Lord Sydenham took the position that the presence of

American warships actually enabled Germany to defy what President

Wilson had described as a sacred and indisputable rule of

international law.

Lord Beresford expressed a similar view:

"The United States are really aiding and abetting this rather serious

state of affairs. If the United States had not sent their ships, which

for some extraordinary reason happened to be on the spot, to save

life, the Germans would no doubt have broken the pledge to which their

attention had been called. I think we are bound to take notice of a

fact which does not appear to be quite within the bounds of neutrality

as far as the United States are concerned."

Lord Grey, Foreign Secretary, declined to commit the Government to

such an attitude. He held that the American-German undertaking was no

affair of Great Britain's.

It was left for the spectator to be truly prophetic, as the later

peace movement showed, in seeking a motive for the _U-53's_

proceedings. It considered that Germany sought to force the United

States to propose peace terms, regardless of whether the Entente

Allies were agreeable or not:

"Thus, with unrestricted submarine warfare as a settled policy,

Germany gives America warning of what is likely to happen unless the

United States is prepared to declare that the war has reached a point

where it is dangerous for neutrals. If the United States is willing to

play this role, the Germans will hold their hands from an extra dose

of unlimited submarine frightfulness."

The _U-53_ had no sooner gone when an exchange of communications

between the American and Allied governments regarding the status of

foreign submarines in neutral ports became public. The question

related to the hospitality accorded the _Deutschland_ in Baltimore and

New London; but as it arose in the midst of the hubbub occasioned by

the _U-53_, the American view appeared to determine that such craft

could call at an American port like any other armed vessel, so long as

it did not stay beyond the allotted time.

The Allied governments besought neutrals, the United States among

them, to forbid belligerent submarine vessels, "whatever the purpose

to which they are put," from making use of neutral waters, roadsteads,

and ports. Such craft could navigate and remain at sea submerged,

could escape control and observation, avoid identification and having

their national character established to determine whether they were

neutral or belligerent, combatant or noncombatant. The capacity for

harm inherent in the nature of such vessels therefore required, in the

view of the Allied governments, that they should be excluded from the

benefit of rules hitherto recognized by the laws of nations governing

the admission of war or merchant vessels to neutral waters and their

sojourn in them. Hence if any belligerent submarine entered a neutral

port it should be interned. The point was further made that grave

danger was incurred by neutral submarines in the navigation of regions

frequented by belligerent submarines.

The American answer was brusque, and resentful of the attempt of the

Allies to dictate the attitude neutrals should take toward submarines

which visited their harbors. The governments of France, Great Britain,

Russia, and Japan were informed that they had not "set forth any

circumstances, nor is the Government of the United States at present

aware of any circumstances, concerning the use of war or merchant

submarines which would render the existing rules of international law

inapplicable to them." Moreover, "so far as the treatment of either

war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned, the

Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action in all

respects and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the

action of a power which may be said to have taken the first steps

toward establishing the principles of neutrality."

Finally, as to the danger to neutral submarines in waters frequented

by belligerent submarines, it was the duty of belligerents to

distinguish between them, and responsibility for any conflict arising

from neglect to do so must rest upon the negligent power.

This caustic exchange of views on harboring submarines took place

before the appearance of the _U-53_. Had the Allies deferred

approaching the United States until after that event, the situation

favored the belief that the submarine's behavior would have dictated a

different reply from Washington. Indeed, there was a strong

presumption that if another German armed submarine had the temerity to

visit an American port it might have been promptly interned, not under

international law, but at the behest of public opinion.

CHAPTER LII

GATHERING CLOUDS

The conduct of the country's foreign policy became hampered by the

presidential campaign. President Wilson was frankly uncertain of

reelection and embarrassed by the feeling that any determination he

made of a policy toward Germany might be overturned by his successful

opponent. So American domestic politics perceptibly intruded at this

stage in the country's foreign policy.

In fact, that policy was practically in suspension. Germany eagerly

availed herself of the hiatus, and, satisfying herself that President

Wilson would be defeated, and that his successor would adopt a

different attitude to her (she had no real ground for this

supposition), embarked upon a submarine activity that was in strange

contrast to the moderation which the German Chancellor had stubbornly

fought for in its conduct.

The point to be remembered was that Germany's pledge to President

Wilson was the only curb on frightfulness. Germany rashly assumed that

the defeat of President Wilson would nullify it. At any rate, his

uncertain outlook in the preelection period opened the way for a

submarine outbreak which would be extended with impunity owing to the

Administration's hesitation in taking action that might not be

sustained by the President's presumed successor, on the theory that

Mr. Wilson's defeat would be tantamount to a popular repudiation of

his policies.

Light was thrown on the German submarine policy by a Berlin dispatch,

dated October 26, 1916, which indicated that the submarines were at

least placating the extremists:

"While the silence of the German press and public on the subject of

sharpened submarine warfare may be attributed in some measure to the

stand of Hindenburg and Ludendorff against it, much more significant

is the growing popular realization that sharpened submarine warfare is

actually in force. And the public is beginning to regard it as

efficient and highly satisfactory. The fact is that it is successful

as never before, for it is sharpened not qualitatively, but

quantitatively."

The British admiralty later reported that between May 4 (the date of

the German pledge) and November 8, 1916, thirty-three vessels had been

sunk by German submarines without warning, resulting in the loss of

140 lives. In the same period 107 ships, all of British registry, had

been sunk and "the lives of the crews and passengers imperiled through

their being forced to take to the sea in open boats while their ships

were a target for the enemy's guns."

President Wilson's success at the polls, which hung in the balance

several days after the election, was the signal for a change of

attitude on Germany's part. The Berlin Government realized that his

foreign policy had received the indorsement of a majority of American

citizens, and the assurance was communicated that the German admiralty

was again on its good behavior.

But many depredations had been committed which Germany would be hard

put to explain satisfactorily. No less than ten pressing American

inquiries regarding sunk ships were sent to the Berlin Foreign Office

as soon as the President, assured that his tenure of office was no

longer in doubt, returned to the consideration of foreign affairs. The

submarine outbreak showed an undoubted disposition on Germany's part

to violate her pledge, and if the Administration was satisfied that

she had done so, its expressed attitude was that no more protests

would be sent. The American answer to Germany's defiance could only be

the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff from Washington and the recall

of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin.

The outstanding cases on which the United States called for an

adequate defense from Germany were:

The _Rowanmore_, British freighter, bound from Baltimore to Liverpool,

sunk off Cape Clear on October 25, 1916. Two Americans and five

Filipinos were on board. No lives were lost.

The _Marina_, a British horse carrier, bound from Glasgow to Newport

News, sunk without warning off the southwest coast of Ireland on

October 29, 1916. She carried a mixed crew of British and Americans.

Six Americans lost their lives.

The _Arabia_, a Peninsular and Oriental passenger liner, sunk in the

Mediterranean without warning on November 6, 1916. One American was on

board. No lives were lost.

The _Columbian_, an American steamer, sunk off the Spanish coast on

November 8, 1916, after being held up for two days under surveillance

by the submarine during a storm.

Germany charged that the _Rowanmore_ attempted to escape on being

ordered to stop. Her steering gear was shot away after an hour's

chase, when the captain hove to and lifeboats were lowered. The crew

complained that the submarine shelled the boats after they had cleared

the ship. This the commander denied. The flight of the _Rowanmore_

appeared to deprive her of the consideration due to an unresisting

vessel under cruiser warfare.

The _Marina_ carried a defensive gun, as did the _Arabia_. This fact

alone, Germany contended, entitled her submarines to sink both vessels

without warning, in addition to the commander's belief in each case

that the vessel was a transport in the service of the British

admiralty. The American Government was satisfied that neither vessel

was engaged in transport service on the voyage in question. In the

_Arabia's_ case, 450 passengers were on board, including women and

children, who were only saved because the Administration had already

held that the gun's presence on a vessel did not deprive her of the

right to proper warning before being sunk. Germany admitted liability

for sinking the _Columbian_ and agreed to pay for the value of the

vessel and the contraband cargo she carried.

The _Marina_ case stood out, in the view of the State Department, as a

"clear-cut" violation of Germany's pledges to the United States. Her

gun was not used, and no opportunity was afforded for using it. The

"presumption" on the part of a German submarine commander that a

vessel was a transport was a favorite defense of Germany's and

disregarded the American ruling on armed merchantmen, which held that

"the determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon

presumption, but upon conclusive evidence."

Berlin was looking for trouble. A period of complications in

American-German relations was frankly predicted. The Administration

was plainly concerned by the situation; but no decision to take action

was forthcoming. Its hesitation appeared to be due to the apparent

need for a further note to dispose of new interpretations Germany had

ingeniously woven in her various excuses by way of evading the letter

and spirit of the _Sussex_ agreement. One view of her submarine

"rights" which Germany insisted on upholding was that armed

merchantmen were not legally immune from attack on sight.

Herr Zimmermann, the German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, defined

anew his Government's attitude:

"As the armament of several British ships has been used for attack,

and has therefore endangered the lives of crew and passengers, of

course armed ships cannot be considered as peaceful trade boats."

The cases of the _Marina_ and _Arabia_ put the German pledges to a

test. Neither vessel attempted to escape nor offered resistance,

though armed with a solitary gun. The issue therefore resolved itself

into these considerations:

First. Since the German submarine commanders have pleaded extenuating

circumstances on which they based their presumption that the _Marina_

and _Arabia_, were transports, and not passenger vessels, were these

circumstances sufficient to have justified the commanders in mistaking

the two steamers for transports?

Second. If there were such extenuating circumstances, were they such

as to warrant the commanders in departing from the general rule laid

down by the American Government in the _Sussex_ note, calling forth

the pledges given by Germany in May, 1916, in which it was guaranteed

that "in accordance with the general principles of visit and search

and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law,

such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war

zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human

lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance?"

Whatever intimation was made to Germany by the United States did not

become public. By December, 1916, the whole question appeared to have

been suddenly shelved by the peace proposals Germany hurled at the

Allies in loud tones of victory, coupled with an invitation to the

United States to interpose as a mediator. Peace, of course, would

dispose of further friction with the United States. While the

proposals were pending, moreover, American action on German violations

of her submarine agreement was suspended. What was the use of a

diplomatic rupture with Germany on the eve of peace? But Germany knew

that her official "peace kite" was making an abortive flight. Peace

she really did not expect, knowing it was not within reach; but she

was anxious to preserve friendly relations with the United States,

although daily flouting it in her conduct of the submarine war. Her

peace move was therefore shown to have had a double edge. It

postponed, but did not avert, a final crisis with the United States,

and that, indeed, might well have been its initial aim in view of the

foredoomed futility of its ostensible object. Certainly President

Wilson espoused the peace proposal for the same reason; but, as shown

in the following chapter, the efforts of both were in vain. The real

climax was to come after all.