BUCHAREST FALLS
On December 6, 1916, the German War Office announced the entry of
Teutonic troops into the Rumanian capital, and what was more important
still from a military point of view, the capture of Ploechti, an
important railroad junction thirty-five miles northwest of Bucharest,
famous for its oil wells and therefore of great value to the
Austro-Germans. As developed later, however, these wells were
destroyed by the retreating Rumanians, and for some time to come, at
least, rendered almost useless.
Whatever the value of Bucharest from a military point of view, there
can be no doubt that its capture was a heavy blow to the Allies. With
it went one-half of Rumania. The mightiest efforts of Russia had been
unable to save the kingdom from the hands of the invaders. Thereby she
had been forced to confess a certain degree of weakness. Nor had
Sarrail in Macedonia been able to divert the activities of the
Bulgarians from Dobrudja to any serious extent. This too constituted a
second confession of weakness.
Indeed the activities, or lack of activities, on the part of the
Allies in Macedonia, in spite of the capture of Monastir, had been
even more disappointing than the inability of the Russians to save
Rumania.
But the disaster to the cause of the Allies was more apparent than
real. As has been demonstrated on the Russian front more than once
during this war, the capture of territory alone has very little
influence on the final result of a campaign. It is not enough to
defeat an enemy; his forces must be destroyed, eliminated, wholly or
in part, and this can only be accomplished by the capture of his
forces. Though the Germans claimed that the Rumanians had lost 100,000
men to them as prisoners, an obvious exaggeration, the Rumanian
fighting forces remained comparatively intact after the fall of
Bucharest. The best of the Rumanian troops undoubtedly remained, for
by this time they were becoming seasoned veterans.
Having taken Bucharest, the German rush noticeably subsided; it lost
its force. This was in part due to the bad weather conditions which
now set in and lasted a week; rain fell in the plains in torrents and
made the passage of troops, and especially of artillery, very
difficult, even impossible. No doubt this also hindered the retreat of
the Rumanians, but the advantage was on their side.
On the 18th it was reported from Petrograd that the entire Rumanian
front was being held by Russian soldiers, the Rumanians having retired
to their rear beyond the Sereth River at Jassy and in Bessarabia,
where they were being reorganized for future operations. After the
Bucharest-Ploechti line had been lost, according to one unofficial
report, the Russians had sent some strong cavalry divisions to support
the Rumanian retreat. The Russians offered strong resistance in the
region of Buzeu so as to permit their engineers to construct a
defensive front between Rimnik Sarat and the marshes at the mouth of
the Danube. On that same date Berlin announced an advance of the
Teutonic forces in northern Dobrudja. It was in this latter section
that the Teutons now centered their activities. The Russo-Rumanians
still remained in Dobrudja, on the south side of the Danube. So long
as they had a footing here they remained a potential threat to the
Teutons, which might awaken into active danger at the first favorable
opportunity. To be ousted from this northern tip of Dobrudja would be
even more serious to the Russo-Rumanians than the loss of Wallachia.
From this point they might, at some future day, initiate an offensive
against Bulgaria which might become extremely dangerous. Once across
the river, however, it would be difficult for them to recross, for
reasons that have already been discussed: no line of fortifications,
no intrenched positions they might throw up, would be so effective a
defense to the Teutons as the mouth of the Danube.
In Rumania, west of the river, continuous and at times heavy fighting
continued, sometimes assuming almost the proportions of pitched
battles. During the last week of the month Mackensen apparently
realized the hopelessness, for the present at least, of driving the
enemy out of Dobrudja, and shifted some of his forces over to the west
bank of the river. The Russians had retired behind the Rimnik River, a
small stream which is about twenty-five miles north of the Buzeu and
parallel to it. On January 1, 1917, the Germans announced that the
Russians had been forced back against the bridgehead at Braila and
that in the Dobrudja they had advanced beyond Matchin. On the 5th,
Braila, the most important city left to the Rumanians, fell into the
hands of Mackensen, and at the same time the last of the Russians
retired from the northern tip of Dobrudja. This was the heaviest blow
that had fallen since the capture of Bucharest, and from a military
point of view was even more serious. Once driven across the broad
waters of the Danube mouth, the Russians and the Rumanians could not
recross in the future except in very strong force and with great
losses. At the same time it was now possible for Mackensen to reduce
his forces in Dobrudja to a minimum and reenforce the troops operating
over in Rumania proper.
During the rest of the month the fighting continued up and down the
line with unabated vigor, though without any sensational results. The
Germans were now hammering at the main line of the Russian defense and
could not expect any large gains. The defeat of the Rumanians had
been, after all, only the driving back of a salient. But in general
the fighting during the latter half of January, 1917, seemed to favor
the Teutons.
On the 15th Berlin reported that the Bulgarian artillery was
bombarding Galatz from across the Danube. On this date too the
Russians lost Vadeni, ten miles southwest of Galatz, their last
position south of the Sereth. On the other hand, Petrograd announced
on this same day that on the northern Rumanian front, in a violent
engagement on the Kasino River, the Rumanian troops forced the Germans
back, while the German attacks northeast of Fokshani were repulsed by
the Russians. By the following day these local attacks developed into
a general engagement, such as had not been fought since before
Bucharest had fallen. At Fundani, Berlin reported, the Russians hurled
one mass attack after another--waves of humanity as they were
termed--against the German lines and gained some temporary advantages.
On the 17th Petrograd announced the recapture of Vadeni. After a
prolonged artillery preparation the Russians rushed their infantry
against the position in the town and drove the Germans out. The
latter, after receiving reenforcements and assisted by an artillery
drumfire, made a powerful counterattack, but did not succeed in
driving the Russians back. Berlin admitted this defeat, incidentally
mentioning that Turkish troops were here engaged. Berlin also admitted
that "between the Kasino and Suchitza Valleys the Russians and
Rumanians made another mass attack and succeeded in regaining a height
recently taken from them." On the 20th, Mackensen's forces, as was
stated by Berlin and admitted by Petrograd, succeeded in taking
Nanesti and driving the Russians back to the Sereth.
On January 22, 1917, an Overseas News Agency dispatch stated that the
number of Rumanian prisoners taken during the entire campaign to date
now numbered 200,000. Describing the situation of the Rumanian army at
that time, the dispatch continued:
"The rest of the Rumanian army, part of which fought well, is
reorganizing in Moldavia and Bessarabia. The few Rumanian divisions
which still are engaged at the front are very much reduced in numbers.
According to the assertions of Rumanian prisoners, one division was
composed of only 2,800 men, while another numbered but 2,400. The
Rumanians suffered their heaviest losses from artillery fire. The
large number of dead in proportion to the wounded is remarkable. On
one square kilometer (about three-fifths of a square mile) of the
battle field of Campulung 6,000 Rumanian dead were counted. Some of
the Rumanian infantry regiments were composed of only four companies
of 150 men each. Because of the lack of sanitary organization, an
extraordinary large percentage of the wounded died in the hospitals,
which, however, afforded room only for the officers, while large
numbers of wounded soldiers were lodged in damp cellars, peasants'
huts, and barns, where they died miserably."
On January 20, 1917, the military critic of the Overseas News Agency
summed up the situation as follows:
"The Russo-Rumanian efforts to delay the advance of the Teutons
against the Sereth Plain are taking the form of fierce counterattacks,
launched to avert the danger that their position on the Putna and the
Sereth be outflanked. During the last few days especially violent
attacks have been directed against the position situated on the
Carpathian slopes north of the Suchitza. These developed no success
and cost the enemy heavy losses in casualties and prisoners.... On the
Carpathian front, in the Oituz district, the Teutonic forces have
pressed forward until they are in a position whence they can take the
circular valley of Ocna under their fire. As has been confirmed by the
Russian headquarters report, Bogdaneshti and Ocna were shelled. Ocna
is an important railroad station and a point of support for the
Russian defense in the upper Trotus Valley, while Bogdaneshti bars the
outlet to the great valley of the Trotus and Oituz. All the determined
attempts made by the Russians and Rumanians to extend the narrow
limits of their hold on the southern bank of the Sereth have been more
or less unsuccessful. The German troops, however, with their capture
of the village of Nanesti, tore the pillar from the wall of the
Russian defense. Nanesti forms the strategical center of the
bridgehead of Fundeni and covers the great iron bridge across the
Sereth, which is in the immediate vicinity of Nanesti. The entire
construction of the Nanesti-Fundeni bridgehead, which is a modern
field fortification, illustrates its importance as a central point of
support of the Sereth line. In the remaining sectors of the Sereth
snowstorms and mists have interfered with military activity."
During the middle of January, 1917, the French Admiral du Fournier of
the Entente fleet in Greek waters paid a visit to the Russo-Rumanian
front. On his return from this tour, which was taken on the way to
France, he wrote in the Paris "Matin":
"The Russian army was surprised by the rapid succession of Rumanian
reverses and had to suspend Brussilov's offensive in Galicia in order
to send large reenforcements to Rumania, but its position was such
that it could not cover its flank in Wallachia and its rear in
Dobrudja rapidly enough to stop the advance of the invaders. It was
only on the Sereth that it succeeded in forming with the first corps
that arrived from the army of General Sakharoff a front which was
lengthened by several good Rumanian divisions. A few weeks will
witness a change in the military situation. In my journey in a motor
car with the troops on the march I saw nothing but magnificent
soldiers, admirably equipped and in excellent form."