IX

Behold a man with his wonderful body, and still more wonderful mind; try

to think of him as being fathered and mothered by the mere mechanical

and chemical forces that we see at work in the rocks and soil underfoot,

begotten by chemical affinity or the solar energy working as molecular

physic, and mothered by the warmth and moisture, by osmosis and the

colloid state--and all through the chance clashings and groupings of the

irrational physical forces. Nothing is added to them, nothing guides or

inspires them, nothing moves upon the face of the waters, nothing

breathes upon the insensate clay. The molecules or corpuscles of the

four principal elements--carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen--just

happened to come together in certain definite numbers, and in a certain

definite order, and invented or built up that most marvelous thing in

the universe, the cell. The cells put their heads, or bodies, together,

and built the tissues, the tissues formed the organs, the organs in

convention assembled organized themselves into the body, and behold! a

man, a bird, or a tree!--as chance a happening as the juxtaposition of

the grains of sand upon the shore, or the shape of the summer clouds in

the sky.

Aristotle dwells upon the internal necessity. The teeth of an animal

arise from necessity, he says; the animal must have them in order to

live. Yet it must have lived before it had them, else how would the

necessity arise? If the horns of an animal arise from the same

necessity, the changing conditions of its life begat the necessity; its

life problem became more and more complicated, till new tools arose to

meet new wants. But without some indwelling principle of development and

progress, how could the new wants arise? Spencer says this progress is

the result of the action and reaction between organisms and their

changing environment. But you must first get your organism before the

environment can work its effects, and you must have something in the

organism that organizes and reacts from the environment. We see the

agents he names astronomic, geologic, meteorologic, having their effects

upon inanimate objects as well, but they do not start the process of

development in them; they change a stone, but do not transform it into

an organism. The chemist can take the living body apart as surely as the

watchmaker can take a watch apart, but he cannot put the parts together

again so that life will reappear, as the watchmaker can restore the

time-keeping power of the watch. The watch is a mere mechanical

contrivance with parts fitted to parts externally, while the living body

is a mechanical and chemical contrivance, with parts blended with parts

internally, so to speak, and acting together through sympathy, and not

merely by mechanical adjustment. Do we not have to think of some

organizing agent embracing and controlling all the parts, and integral

in each of them, making a vital bond instead of a mechanical one?

There are degrees of vitality in living things, whereas there are only

degrees of complexity and delicacy and efficiency in mechanical

contrivances. One watch differs from another in the perfection of its

works, but not as two living bodies with precisely similar structure

differ from each other in their hold upon life, or in their measure of

vitality. No analysis possible to science could show any difference in

the chemistry and physics of two persons of whom one would withstand

hardships and diseases that would kill the other, or with whom one would

have the gift of long life and the other not. Machines differ from one

another quantitatively--more or less efficiency; a living body differs

from a machine qualitatively--its efficiency is of a different order;

its unity is of a different order; its complexity is of a different

order; the interdependence of its parts is of a different order. Yet

what a parallel there is between a machine and a living body! Both are

run by external forces or agents, solar energy in one applied

mechanically from without; in the other applied vitally from within;

both suffer from the wear and tear of time and from abuse, but one is

self-repaired and the other powerless in this respect--two machines with

the same treatment running the same number of years, but two men with

the same treatment running a very unequal number of years. Machines of

the same kind differ in durability, men differ in powers of endurance; a

man can "screw up his courage," but a machine has no courage to screw

up. Science may be unable to see any difference between vital mechanics,

vital chemistry, and the chemics and mechanics of inorganic bodies--its

analysis reveals no difference; but that there is a difference as

between two different orders, all men see and feel.

Science cannot deal with fundamental questions. Only philosophy can do

this. Science is only a tool or a key, and it can unlock only certain

material problems. It cannot appraise itself. It is not a judge but a

witness. Problems of mind, of character, moral, æsthetic, literary,

artistic problems, are not its sphere. It counts and weighs and measures

and analyzes, it traces relations, but it cannot appraise its own

results. Science and religion come in conflict only when the latter

seeks to deal with objective facts, and the former seeks to deal with

subjective ideas and emotions. On the question of miracle they clash,

because religion is then dealing with natural phenomena and challenges

science. Philosophy offends science when it puts its own interpretation

upon scientific facts. Science displeases literature when it dehumanizes

nature and shows us irrefragable laws when we had looked for humanistic

divinities.

The Breath of Life · 第 74 / 87 题