CHAPTER XIV

SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY

There have been many "short-cuts" proposed to the solution of social

problems. Among these the various schemes for reorganizing human society

and industry, brought together under the general name of "socialism,"

have attracted most attention and deserve most serious consideration.

In criticizing the most conspicuous of these schemes of social

reconstruction, the so-called "scientific socialism," it should be

understood at the outset that there is no intention of questioning the

general aims of the socialists. Those aims, as voiced by their best

representatives, are in entire accord with sound science, religion, and

ethics. That humanity should gain collective control over the conditions

of its existence is the ultimate and highest aim of all science, all

education, and all government. No student of sociology doubts that

human society has steadily moved, though with interruptions, toward a

larger control over its own processes; and no sane man doubts that such

collective control over the conditions of existence is desirable. These

general aims, which the socialists share with all workers for humanity,

are not in question. What is in question are the specific means or

methods by which the socialists propose to reconstruct human society--to

gain collective control over the means of existence. In order to

criticize socialism we must see a little more narrowly what socialism is

and what it proposes to do.

Socialism Defined.--As a recent socialist writer has declared,

socialism, like Christianity, is a term which has come to have no

definite meaning. It is used by all sorts of people to cover all sorts

of vague and indefinite schemes to improve or revolutionize society.

[Footnote: It has been said that the word "socialism," as currently

used, has four distinct meanings: (1) Utopian socialism, i.e., schemes

like More's Utopia; (2) the socialist party and its program, i.e., "the

socialization of the instruments of production;" (3) The Marxist

doctrine of social evolution, i.e., "the materialistic conception of

history;" (4) a vague body of beliefs of the working classes, more or

less derived from (2) and (3). It is of course only socialism in the

second and third senses which is discussed in this chapter.] Such a

vague conception would, of course, be impossible of scientific

criticism. But fortunately the word historically has come to have a

fairly clear and definite meaning. It has come to stand for the social

and political program of a party, the Social-Democratic party of Germany

and other European states. Karl Marx and his associates were the

founders of this party, hence historical socialism is synonymous with

Marxian socialism, and we shall so use the word. The cardinal tenet or

principle of the socialist party is the public ownership of all capital,

that is, of the means of production. Certain other things are, however,

involved in this, and we may define the full program of Marxian

socialism by saying that it proposes: (1) the common ownership of the

means of production (abolition of private property in capital); (2)

common management of the means of production (industry) by

democratically selected authorities; (3) distribution of the product by

these common authorities in accordance with some democratically approved

principle; (4) private property in incomes (consumption goods) to be

retained.

It is evident from this outline of "orthodox" or Marxian socialism that

it is primarily and dominantly an economic program. It is true that it

emphasizes democratic forms of government, but this is only incidental

to its main purpose of securing a just distribution of economic goods.

Strictly speaking, in a correct use of scientific terms, Marxian

socialism should be called "economic socialism."

The Theoretical Basis of Marxian Socialism.--Marx's socialism is

frequently called scientific socialism, because its followers believe

that it rests upon a scientific theory of social evolution. This theory

is best stated in Marx's own words, as he gives it in his _Critique of

Political Economy_, namely, that "the method of the production of

material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life

process in general." We find it stated in other words, though in

substance the same, by Engels, Marx's friend and coworker. Engels says,

"In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production

and exchange, and the social organization _necessarily_ following

from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can

be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." In

other words, according to Marx and his followers, the economic element

in human society determines all other elements; if the other elements

cannot be fully derived from the economic, their form and expression is

at least determined by the economic. This is the so-called

"materialistic conception of history" upon which Marxian socialists

believe their program to have a firm scientific foundation. [Footnote:

In several utterances of his later years Marx qualified considerably his

"materialistic conception of history," but the more radical or

revolutionary wing of his followers have always adhered to the extreme

form of the theory.] The followers of Marx, indeed, declare that with

this principle Marx explains social evolution quite as fully as Darwin

explained organic evolution through natural selection; and they do not

hesitate to compare Marx's work in the social sciences with Darwin's

work in the biological sciences.

It may certainly be agreed that this social philosophy which we have

already said is best characterized as "economic determinism," is the

logically necessary foundation of economic socialism. If the change of

the economic or industrial order of human society is going to work such

wonders as the socialists claim, then it must follow that the economic

element is the fundamental and determining element in the social life.

If what is wrong with human society is chiefly wrong economic

conditions, then the changing of those conditions should, of course,

change the whole social superstructure. It would seem, therefore, that

the dominantly economic program of Marxian socialists must stand or fall

with the economic interpretation of social organization and evolution

which Marx proposed. If it can be shown that Marx's philosophy of human

society is essentially unsound, then the proposition to regenerate human

society simply by economic reorganization is also unsound. Let us see

whether the positions of the economic socialists are tenable in the

light of the sociological principles which have been emphasized in the

previous chapters of this book.

Criticism of Marxian Socialism.--The student has already been told that

human society is a complex of living organisms, responding now this way,

now that, to external stimuli in the environment. These stimuli in the

environment we have roughly, but inaccurately, spoken of as causes,

though they are not causes in a mechanical sense. The responses which

are given to these stimuli by individuals and groups vary greatly

according to heredity, instincts, and habits,--the inner nature, in

other words, of the organisms composing society. Now, the stimuli in

the environment which give rise to the activities of individuals and

societies, though not in any mechanical way, may be classified into

several great groups, such as the economic, the reproductive, the

political, the religious, and so on. The economic stimuli would be

those that have to do with the processes of production, distribution,

and consumption of wealth; that is, the economic stimuli are those which

are concerned with economic values. Now, while the student has not been

even introduced to the psychological theory of human society, he perhaps

knows enough of individual human nature to see that there is no reason

in the nature of things why one's responses to economic stimuli, those

connected with economic values, should determine his response to all

other stimuli; and this is what scientific sociology and scientific

psychology exactly find; namely, that there is no reason for believing

that economic stimuli determine in any exact way or to any such extent,

as Marx thought, responses to other stimuli. It is true that our habits

of response to a certain class of stimuli affect to a certain extent our

habits of response to all other classes. Thus it follows that the

economic phase of human society affects to a very great degree all other

phases of human society. But this is simply the doctrine of the unity of

personality and the interdependence of all phases of the social life,

and it is very different from Marx's theory that the economic determines

all the other phases; for under the doctrine of social interdependence

we can see it is quite as reasonable to state that the religious and

political phases of the social life determine the economic as it is to

state that the economic determines the political and religious.

Let us bring the discussion down to more concrete terms. The student has

seen that in every social problem there are a multitude of factors or

stimuli (causes) at work, and that in no problem is the economic factor

so all important that it may be said that the other factors are simply

subsidiary. On the contrary, in such a problem as crime the methods of

production and distribution of material goods, while important factors

in the problem of crime, in no way determine that problem; and ideal

conditions of the production and distribution of wealth would in no way

solve the problem of crime. So, too, the negro problem is hardly touched

by the question of the forms of industry or the economic organization of

society. We might go on with a whole list of social problems and show

that in every case the economic factor is no more important than many

other factors, and that the economic reorganization of society would in

some cases scarcely affect these problems at all. _The social problem,

therefore,--the problem of the relations of men to one another,--is not

simply nor fundamentally an economic problem; rather it is fundamentally

a biological and psychological problem,_--if you please, a moral

problem.

This brings us to a second criticism of socialism, namely, that it

proposes to reorganize human society upon an economic basis, not upon a

biological basis. The program of the socialist looks forward to the

satisfaction of economic needs, but it has failed to take into account

the biological requirements for existence. It would be far more

scientific to reorganize society upon the basis of the needs of the

family than to reorganize it simply upon the basis of industry. The

reproductive process which the economic socialists ignore, or leave

unregulated almost entirely, is far more important for the continued

existence of human society than all its economic processes,--if by the

reproductive process we mean the rearing as well as the birth of

offspring; and if by the economic process we mean merely the forms and

methods of the production and distribution of material goods.

In other words, the socialistic program leaves the future out of

account, and aims simply to satisfy the present generation with a just

distribution of material goods. If it could be shown that a just

distribution of material goods would insure the future of the race and

of civilization, then, of course, the socialist plea would be made good.

But this is just what is doubtful. On the whole, it must be said that

the socialist program is based upon the wishes and desires of the adult,

not upon the needs of the child or of the race.

The extreme emphasis which Marxian socialism throws upon economic and

industrial conditions in human society is, therefore, not justified by

the scientific facts which we know about collective human life. Rather

it must be said that this is the vital weakness of Marxian

socialism,--that it over-emphasizes the economic element. Of course, we

are not saying that control over economic conditions is not necessary to

collective control over the general conditions of existence, which

society is undoubtedly aiming at, but it is saying that conceivably

collective control over the social life process might be upon some other

basis than the economic. It might emphasize, for example, the health

and continuity of the race, or individual moral character, far more than

the distribution of economic values. Modern economic socialism proposes

simply to carry a step further our already predominatingly economic

social organization by frankly recognizing the economic as the basis of

all things in the social life. Modern economic socialism is, therefore,

rightfully judged as materialistic. It is really an expression of the

industrial and commercial spirit of the present age. When the

perspective of life becomes shifted again to the more important

biological and spiritual elements in life, socialism will lose its

prevailingly economic character, or it will cease to exist.

It must be emphasized here that all the material and economic progress

of the modern world has not added greatly to the happiness or betterment

of man. It is true that material progress is important, yes, necessary

for spiritual progress. But material progress alone does not lead to

spiritual progress, and therefore mere material progress can never add

anything to the real happiness and social betterment of the race. On

the contrary, it is possible to conceive of a society in which every one

has an economic surplus,--a society rolling in wealth, approximately

equally divided, and yet one in which human misery in its worst forms of

vice and crime, pessimism and self-destruction, prevail. It is an old

truth that making men "better-off" does not necessarily make them

"better," and one which cannot be too often emphasized, but one which

the modern socialist gets angry at when it is mentioned to him. It is

therefore a matter of comparative indifference, from the standpoint of

the happiness and ultimate survival of the race, whether economic goods

are distributed relatively evenly in human society or not. We say

comparative indifference, because, of course, no one can be indifferent

to the material needs of life, inasmuch as they are the basis of its

higher development. But after a certain minimum is assured it is

extremely doubtful whether a surplus will be of benefit or not, and this

minimum necessary for the higher spiritual development of the social

life can be secured through the reform of present society without trying

the doubtful social revolution which the socialists advocate.

This brings us to a third criticism of Marxian socialism. Traditionally

Marxian socialism has been revolutionary socialism. The vast mass of the

socialist party to-day look forward to some revolution which will, as

they say, "socialize the instruments of production," that is, transfer

capital from private ownership and management to public ownership and

management. Probably rightly, many socialists hold that such a wholesale

transfer from private to public ownership would be the only way in which

a socialistic regime could be successfully inaugurated. But if this

revolution were accomplished it is evident that it is highly uncertain

whether its results would be permanent. For all that we have learned

concerning human society leads us to say that social organization at any

particular time is very largely a matter of habit. Now collective

habits are less easily changed than individual habits, because any

change in collective habits practically necessitates the consent of all

the individuals who make up the social group. We know also that even in

individual life old habits are not easily supplanted by new ones and

that there is always a tendency to revert to the old. All historical

evidence shows that revolutions are always followed by periods of

reaction, and that this reaction is usually proportionate to the extent

and suddenness of change in social organization.

Some modern socialists have argued from de Vries's mutation theory in

biology that in social evolution we must expect mutations also, and

that, therefore, the great changes in human society are normally

accomplished by means of revolution. But this argument rests wholly on

analogy, and arguments from analogy in science are practically

worthless. It may be asserted, on the other hand, that all the great

changes in human society which have been desirable have come about only

after prolonged preparation and after a series of gradual steps which

led up to the final change. The Greco-Roman world, for example, was

becoming ripe for Christianity before Christianity finally appeared and

became triumphant. The centuries from the fourteenth to the sixteenth

had prepared for the protestant reformation in the countries of modern

Europe before the reformation became an established fact.

Thus, radical reconstruction of the social life by means of revolution

is scarcely possible. The instincts and habits of individual human

nature upon which the social order rests cannot be easily changed by

revolutionary programs in legislation or in institutions. The only

probable result of such an attempt would be the collapse of the new

social order, because it would have insufficient foundations in

individual character upon which to rest. The idea of ushering in the

social millennium through some vast social revolution is therefore

chimerical.

It is not the place in this book to take up the practical objections to

economic socialism. These practical objections are for the most part of

a political and economic nature, and they accordingly can be better

dealt with in treatises on politics and economics than in one on

sociology. It is perhaps sufficient to say that the political and

economic objections to socialism are not less weighty than the

sociological objections. Government, for example, exists in human

society to regulate, and not to carry on directly, all social

activities. If the state were in its various forms called upon to own

and manage all productive wealth in society, it is extremely probable

that such an experiment would break down of its own weight, since the

state would be attempting that which, in the nature of things, as the

chief regulative institution of society, it is not fitted to do. But it

is not our purpose, as has just been said, to go into the political and

economic objections to economic or Marxian socialism. To understand

these the student must consult the leading works on economic and

political science.

Substitutes for Economic Socialism.--Certain steps sociology and all

social sciences already indicate as necessary for larger collective

control over the conditions of social existence. These steps, however,

aim not at instituting a new social order, but at removing certain

demonstrated causes of social maladjustment which exist in present

society; and as in the solution of special social problems we have seen

reason to reject "short-cuts" and "cure-alls," so in a scientific

reconstruction of human society we have good reason to reject the social

revolution which the followers of Marx advocate, and to offer as a

substitute in its stead some social reforms which will make more nearly

possible a normal social life.

Perhaps the necessary steps for bringing about such a normal social life

have never been better summed up than by Professor Devine in his book on

_Misery and its Causes_. Rather than offer a program of our own we

shall, therefore, give a brief resume of the conditions which Professor

Devine names as essential to normal social life, believing that these

offer a program upon which all sane social workers and reformers can

unite. Professor Devine names ten conditions essential to a normal

social life: (1) the securing of a sound physical heredity, that is, a

good birth for every child, by a rational system of eugenics; (2) the

securing of a protected childhood, which will assure the normal

development of the child, and of a protected motherhood, which will

assure the proper care of the child; (3) a system of education which

shall be adapted to social needs, inspired by the ideals of rational

living and social service; (4) the securing of freedom from preventable

disease; (5) the elimination of professional vice and crime; (6) the

securing of a prolonged working period for both men and women; (7) a

general system of insurance against the ordinary contingencies of life

which now cause poverty or dependence; (8) a liberal relief system which

will meet the material needs of those who become accidentally dependent;

(9) a standard of living sufficiently high to insure full nourishment,

reasonable recreation, proper housing, and the other elementary

necessities of life; (10) a social religion which shall make the service

of humanity the highest aim of all individuals.

It is sufficient to say, in closing this chapter, that if these ten

essentials of a normal social life could be realized--and there is no

reason why they cannot be--there would be no need to try the social

revolution which Marxian socialism advocates.

There can be no question that the ultimate aim of the social sciences is

to provide society with the knowledge necessary for collective control

over its own life processes. Sociology and the special social sciences

are aiming, therefore, in an indirect way to accomplish the same thing

which political socialism aims at accomplishing through economic

revolution. There would seem to be no danger in trusting science to

work out this problem of collective control over the conditions of

existence. There are no risks to run by the scientific method, for it

proceeds step by step, adequately testing theories by facts as it goes

along. The thing to do, therefore, for those who wish to see "a

humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence" is to encourage

scientific social research along all lines. With a fuller knowledge of

human nature and human society it will be possible to indicate sane and

safe reconstructions in the social order, so that ultimately humanity

will control its social environment and its own human nature even more

completely than it now controls the forces of physical nature. But the

ultimate reliance in all such reconstruction, as we will try to show in

the next chapter, must be, not revolution, nor even legislation, but

education.

SELECT REFERENCES

_For brief reading:_

ELY, _Socialism and Social Reform._

SPARGO, _Socialism._ Revised edition.

GILMAN, _Socialism and the American Spirit._

_For more extended reading_:

HUNTER, _Socialists at Work._

KIRKUP, _History of Socialism._

SCHAEFFLE, _Quintessence of Socialism._

WELLS, _New Worlds for Old._

Sociology and Modern Social Problems · 第 14 / 15 章