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American Science Series
ETHICS
by
JOHN DEWEY
Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University
and
JAMES H. TUFTS
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago
[Illustration]
New York
Henry Holt and Company
London: George Bell and Sons
1909
Copyright, 1908,
by
Henry Holt and Company
PREFACE
The significance of this text in Ethics lies in its effort to awaken
a vital conviction of the genuine reality of moral problems and the
value of reflective thought in dealing with them. To this purpose
are subordinated the presentation in Part I. of historic material;
the discussion in Part II. of the different types of theoretical
interpretation, and the consideration, in Part III., of some typical
social and economic problems which characterize the present.
Experience shows that the student of morals has difficulty in getting
the field objectively and definitely before him so that its problems
strike him as real problems. Conduct is so intimate that it is not easy
to analyze. It is so important that to a large extent the perspective
for regarding it has been unconsciously fixed by early training. The
historical method of approach has proved in the classroom experience of
the authors an effective method of meeting these difficulties. To follow
the moral life through typical epochs of its development enables
students to realize what is involved in their own habitual standpoints;
it also presents a concrete body of subject-matter which serves as
material of analysis and discussion.
The classic conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable importance in
illuminating the obscure places of the moral life and in giving the
student clues which will enable him to explore it for himself. But there
is always danger of either dogmatism or a sense of unreality when
students are introduced abruptly to the theoretical ideas. Instead of
serving as tools for understanding the moral facts, the ideas are
likely to become substitutes for the facts. When they are proffered
ready-made, their theoretical acuteness and cleverness may be admired,
but their practical soundness and applicability are suspected. The
historical introduction permits the student to be present, as it were,
at the social situations in which the intellectual instruments were
forged. He appreciates their relevancy to the conditions which provoked
them, and he is encouraged to try them on simple problems before
attempting the complex problems of the present. By assisting in their
gradual development he gains confidence in the ideas and in his power to
use them.
In the second part, devoted more specifically to the analysis and
criticism of the leading conceptions of moral theory, the aim
accordingly has not been to instill the notions of a school nor to
inculcate a ready-made system, but to show the development of theories
out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest
how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies.
Aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly examined that it is
possible to present certain principles in the confidence that they will
meet general acceptance. Rationalism and hedonism, for example, have
contributed toward a scientific statement of the elements of conduct,
even though they have failed as self-inclosed and final systems. After
the discussions of Kant and Mill, Sidgwick and Green, Martineau and
Spencer, it is possible to affirm that there is a place in the moral
life for reason and a place for happiness,--a place for duty and a place
for valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems
which must be accepted or rejected _en bloc_, but as more or less
adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct. This mode of
approach facilitates the scientific estimation and determination of the
part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life. The
student is put in a position to judge the problems of conduct for
himself. This emancipation and enlightenment of individual judgment is
the chief aim of the theoretical portion.
In a considerable part of the field, particularly in the political and
economic portions of Part III., no definitive treatment is as yet
possible. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable to introduce the student
to the examination of these unsettled questions. When the whole
civilized world is giving its energies to the meaning and value of
justice and democracy, it is intolerably academic that those interested
in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out,
which therefore relate to what is least doubtful in conduct rather than
to questions now urgent. Moreover, the advantages of considering theory
and practice in direct relation to each other are mutual. On the one
hand, as against the _a priori_ claims of both individualism and
socialism, the need of the hour seems to us to be the application of
methods of more deliberate analysis and experiment. The extreme
conservative may deprecate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent
radical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly tardy processes
of the investigator; but those who have considered well the conquest
which man is making of the world of nature cannot forbear the conviction
that the cruder method of trial and error and the time-honored method of
prejudice and partisan controversy need not longer completely dominate
the regulation of the life of society. They hope for a larger
application of the scientific method to the problems of human welfare
and progress. Conversely, a science which takes part in the actual work
of promoting moral order and moral progress must receive a valuable
reflex influence of stimulus and of test. To consider morality in the
making as well as to dwell upon values already established should make
the science more vital. And whatever the effect upon the subject-matter,
the student can hardly appreciate the full force of his materials and
methods as long as they are kept aloof from the questions which are
occupying the minds of his contemporaries.
Teachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer to make their own
selections of material, but the following suggestions present one
possible line of choice. In Part I., of the three chapters dealing with
the Hebrew, Greek, and modern developments, any one may be taken as
furnishing an illustration of the method; and certain portions of
Chapter IX. may be found more detailed in analysis than is necessary for
the beginner. In Part II., Chapters XI.-XII. may be omitted without
losing the thread of the argument. In Part III., any one of the specific
topics--viz., the political state, the economic order, the family--may
be considered apart from the others. Some teachers may prefer to take
Parts in their entirety. In this case, any two may be chosen.
As to the respective shares of the work for which the authors are
severally responsible, while each has contributed suggestions and
criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the
book throughout a joint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts,
Part II. by Mr. Dewey, and in Part III., Chapters XX. and XXI. are by
Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.
It need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made in the
bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates of publication of the
work cited are given, the plan has been in general to give, in the case
of current literature, the date of the latest edition, and in the case
of some classical treatises the date of original publication.
In conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness to their
colleagues and friends Dr. Wright, Mr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who
have aided in the reading of the proof and with other suggestions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Sec. 1. _Definition and Method_:--Ethical and moral, specific
problem, 1; importance of genetic study, 3. Sec. 2. _Criterion
of the moral_:--The moral in cross section, the "what" and
the "how," 5; the moral as growth, 8. Sec. 3. _Divisions of the
treatment_, 13.
PART I
THE BEGINNINGS AND GROWTH OF MORALITY
II. EARLY GROUP LIFE 17
Sec. 1. _Typical facts of group life_:--Primitive unity and
solidarity, 17. Sec. 2. _Kinship and household groups_:--The
kinship group, 21; the family or household group, 23.
Sec. 3. _Kinship and family groups as economic and industrial
units_:--The land and the group, 24; movable goods, 25.
Sec. 4. _Kinship and family groups as political bodies_:--Their
control over the individual, 26; rights and responsibility, 27.
Sec. 5. _The kinship or household as a religious unit_:--Totem
groups, 30; ancestral religion, 31. Sec. 6. _Age and sex groups_,
32. Sec. 7. _Moral significance of the group_, 34.
III. THE RATIONALIZING AND SOCIALIZING AGENCIES IN EARLY SOCIETY 37
Sec. 1. _Three levels of conduct_:--Conduct as instinctive and
governed by primal needs, regulated by society's standards,
and by personal standards, 37. Sec. 2. _Rationalizing agencies_:
Work, 40; arts and crafts, 41; war, 42. Sec. 3. _Socializing
agencies_:--Cooperation, 42; art, 45. Sec. 4. _Family life
as idealizing and socializing agency_, 47. Sec. 5. _Moral
interpretation of this first level_, 49.
IV. GROUP MORALITY--CUSTOMS OR MORES 51
Sec. 1. _Meaning, authority, and origin of customs_, 51.
Sec. 2. _Means of enforcing custom_:--Public approval, taboos,
rituals, force, 54. Sec. 3. _Conditions which render group
control conscious_:--Educational customs, 57; law and
justice, 59; danger or crisis, 64. Sec. 4. _Values and defects
of customary morality_:--Standards, motives, content,
organization of character, 68.
V. FROM CUSTOM TO CONSCIENCE; FROM GROUP MORALITY TO PERSONAL
MORALITY 73
Sec. 1. _Contrast and collision_, 73. Sec. 2. _Sociological
agencies in the transition_:--Economic forces, 76; science
and the arts, 78; military forces, 80; religious forces,
81. Sec. 3. _Psychological agencies_:--Sex, 81; private
property, 83; struggles for mastery and liberty, 84; honor
and esteem, 85. Sec. 4. _Positive reconstruction_, 89.
VI. THE HEBREW MORAL DEVELOPMENT 91
Sec. 1. _General character and determining principles_:--The
Hebrew and the Greek, 91; Political and economic factors, 92.
Sec. 2. _Religious agencies_:--Covenant, 94; personal law-giver,
95; cultus, 97; prophets, 99; the kingdom, 100. Sec. 3. _Moral
conceptions attained_:--Righteousness and sin, 102;
responsibility, 104; purity of motive, 105; the ideal of
"life," 107; the social ideal, 108.
VII. THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEKS 111
Sec. 1. _The fundamental notes_:--Convention versus nature, 111;
measure, 112; good and just, 113. Sec. 2. _Intellectual forces of
individualism_:--The scientific spirit, 114. Sec. 3. _Commercial
and political individualism_:--Class interests, 119; why obey
laws? 122. Sec. 4. _Individualism and ethical theory_:--The
question formulated, 124; individualistic theories, 126. Sec. 5.
_The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individual and
the social order_:--Aristotle on the natural, 127; Plato's
ideal state, 129; passion or reason, 131; eudaemonism and the
mean, 134; man and the cosmos, 135. Sec. 6. _The conception of
the ideal_:--Contrast with the actual, 136; ethical
significance, 138. Sec. 7. _The conception of the self, of
character and responsibility_:--The poets, 138; Plato and the
Stoics, 140.
VIII. THE MODERN PERIOD 142
Sec. 1. _The mediaeval ideals_:--Groups and class ideals, 143;
the church ideal, 145. Sec. 2. _Main lines of modern
development_, 147. Sec. 3. _The old and new in the beginnings
of individualism_, 149. Sec. 4. _Individualism in the progress
of liberty and democracy_:--Rights, 151. Sec. 5. _Individualism
as affected by the development of industry, commerce, and
art_:--Increasing power and interests, 153; distribution of
goods, 157; industrial revolution raises new problems,
159. Sec. 6. _The individual and the development of
intelligence_:--The Renaissance, 163; the Enlightenment, 165;
the present significance of scientific method, 167.
IX. A GENERAL COMPARISON OF CUSTOMARY AND REFLECTIVE MORALITY 171
Sec. 1. _Elements of agreement and continuity_:--Regime
of custom, 172; persistence of group morality, 173;
origin of ethical terms, 175. Sec. 2. _Elements of
contrast_:--Differentiation of the moral, 177; observing
_versus_ reflecting, 178; the higher law, 181; deepening of
meaning, 182. Sec. 3. _Opposition between individual and social
aims and standards_:--Withdrawal from the social order, 184;
individual emancipation, 186. Sec. 4. _Effects upon the
individual character_:--Increased possibilities of evil as well
as of good, 187. Sec. 5. _Moral differentiation and the social
order_:--Effects on the family, 193; on industry and government,
194; on religion, 195; general relation of religion to morality,
197.
PART II
THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE
X. THE MORAL SITUATION 201
Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, 201; Traits of
voluntary activity, 202; The good and bad in non-voluntary
behavior, 203; Indifferent voluntary conduct, 205; The moral
is introduced when ends have conflicting values, 207;
Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature
of the self, 209.
XI. PROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY 212
Theory grows from practical problems, 212; Three typical
problems of reflective practice, 213; Corresponding problems
of theory, 214; Their historical sequence, 215; Growth of
individualism, 220; The two types of individualism, 221.
XII. TYPES OF MORAL THEORY 224
Sec. 1. _Typical divisions of theories_:--Teleological and
jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and
intuitional, 226. Sec. 2. _Division of voluntary activity into
Inner and Outer_:--The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude
and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229;
bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and
of control, 231. Sec. 3. _General interpretation of these
theories_:--Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences,
232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234;
for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of
reconciliation of these theories, 237.
XIII. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER 240
Problem of their relation, 240. Sec. 1. _The good will of
Kant_:--Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without
consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action
required to prove motive, 245. Sec. 2. _The "Intention" of the
Utilitarians_:--Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction
of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical,
248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical
importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight
of consequences depends upon motive, 252. Sec. 3. _Conduct and
character_:--The nature of disposition, 254; partial and
complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. Sec. 4.
_Morality of acts and of agents_:--Subjective and objective
morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261.
XIV. HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE 263
Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the
good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in
conception of happiness, 266. Sec. 1. _The Object of
Desire_:--Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive
appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and
desire, 272; need for standard, 274. Sec. 2. _The Conception
of Happiness as a Standard_:--Utilitarian method, 275;
Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines
the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of
quality of pleasure, 279. Sec. 3. _The constitution of
happiness_:--Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are
qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness
as the moral good, 284.
XV. HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS 286
Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory
of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic
theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling
personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293;
sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral
interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral
democracy, 303.
XVI. THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE 306
Sec. 1. _Problem of reason and desire_:--Nature of a reasonable
act, 306; theories about moral knowledge, 307. Sec. 2. _Kant's
theory of practical reason_:--Traits of morality, 309; reason
as _a priori_ and formal, 310; true meaning of generalization,
313; the general and the social, 314. Sec. 3. _Moral sense
intuitionalism_:--Function of reason, 317; habit and sense,
319; invalid intuitions, 321; deliberation and intuition, 322;
the good man's judgment, 324. Sec. 4. _The place of general
rules_:--Their value, 325; casuistry, 326; and its dangers,
327; secondary ends of utilitarianism, 329; empirical rules
and customs, 330; distinction of rules and principles, 333;
sympathy and reasonableness, 334.
XVII. THE PLACE OF DUTY IN THE MORAL LIFE: SUBJECTION TO
AUTHORITY 337
Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, 337. Sec. 1.
_The subjection of desire to law_, 339; cause of conflict of
desire and thought, 342; demand for transformation of desire,
343; social character of duties, 345; the social self is the
"universal" self, 346. Sec. 2. _Kantian theory_:--Accord with
duty versus from duty, 346; the two-fold self of Kant, 347;
criticism of Kant, 348; emphasis falls practically on
political authority, 351; "Duty for duty's sake," 351.
Sec. 3. _The Utilitarian theory of duty_:--The hedonistic
problem, 353; Moral sanctions, 354; they are too external,
355; Bain's account, 356; Spencer's account, 358; such
views set up a fictitious non-social self, 361. Sec. 3. _Final
statement_:--Growth requires disagreeable readjustments, 362.
XVIII. THE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE 364
Problems regarding the self, 364. Sec. 1. _The doctrine of
self-denial_:--Explanation of its origin, 365; four objections
to doctrine, 366. Sec. 2. _Self-assertion_:--Ethical dualism,
369; "naturalistic" ethics, 369; false biological basis, 371;
misinterprets nature of efficiency, 373. Sec. 3. _Self-love
and benevolence; or egoism and altruism_:--The "crux"
of ethical speculation, 375; are all motives selfish? 376;
ambiguity of term selfish, 377; are results selfish? 379;
self-preservation, 380; rational regard for self, 382;
regard for others, 384; the existence of "other-regarding"
impulses, 385; altruism may be immoral, 387; social
justice necessary to moral altruism, 389. Sec. 4. _The
good as self-realization_:--Self-realization an ambiguous
idea, 391; true and false consideration of the self, 393;
equation of personal and general happiness, 395.
XIX. THE VIRTUES 399
Introductory--virtue defined, 399; natural ability and
virtue, 400; evolution of virtues, 401; responsibility
for moral judgment, 402; futility of cataloguing virtues,
402; their cardinal aspects, 403. Sec. 1. _Temperance_:--Greek,
Roman, and Christian conceptions, 405; negative and positive
aspects, 407; pleasure and excitement, 408. Sec. 2. _Courage
or persistent vigor_:--Dislike of the disagreeable, 410;
"dimensions" of courage, 411; optimism and pessimism, 412.
Sec. 3. _Justice_:--Three meanings of, 414; justice and
love, 415; justice and punishment, 416. Sec. 4. _Wisdom or
conscientiousness_:--Importance of intelligent interest, 418;
Greek and modern ideas of moral wisdom, 419; ideals and
thoughtfulness, 420; ideals and progress, 422.
PART III
THE WORLD OF ACTION
XX. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 427
Object of discussion, 427. Sec. 1. _Growth of individuality
through social organizations_:--Emancipation from custom,
428; double movement towards individuality and complex
associations, 429; morality and legality, 432; two-fold
contribution of social environment to individual morality,
433; moral value of the state, 434. Sec. 2. _Responsibility
and freedom_:--Liability, 436; freedom as exemption and as
power, 437; legal and moral freedom, 438. Sec. 3. _Rights and
obligations_:--Their definition, 439; they are correlative,
440; physical rights, 442; limitations put upon them by war
and punishment, 443; by poverty, 444; mental rights, 445;
limitations to freedom of thought and expression, 446;
education, 448.
XXI. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL STATE 451
Sec. 1. _Civil rights and obligations_:--Their definition, 451;
their classes, 452; significance of established remedies for
wrongs, 454. Sec. 2. _Development of civil rights_:--Contrast
with savage age justice, 456; social harm versus metaphysical
evil, 457; recognition of accident and intent, 459; of
character and circumstances, 460; of mental incapacity, 462;
significance of negligence and carelessness, 464; conflict of
substantial and technical justice, 465; relations of the legal
and moral, 467; reform of criminal procedure necessary, 468;
also of punitive methods, 470; and of civil administration,
471. Sec. 3. _Political rights and obligations_:--Significance
of the state, 473; distrust of government, 474; indifference to
politics, 476; political corruption, 477; reform of partisan
machinery, 478; of governmental machinery, 479; constructive
social legislation, 480; a federated humanity, 481. Sec. 4. _The
moral criterion of political activity_:--Its statement, 482;
the individualistic formula, 483; the collectivistic formula,
484.
XXII. THE ETHICS OF THE ECONOMIC LIFE 486
Sec. 1. _General analysis_:--The economic in relation to
happiness, 487; relation to character, 488; social aspects,
491. Sec. 2. _The problem set by the new economic
order_:--Collective and impersonal organizations, 495;
readjustments required, 496. Sec. 3. _The agencies for carrying
on commerce and industry_:--Early agencies, 497; the business
enterprise, 498; the labor union, 499; reversion to group
morality, 500; members and management, 500; employer and
employed, 501; relations to the public, 502; to the law, 503.
Sec. 4. _The methods of production, exchange, and
valuation_:--The machine, 507; basis of valuation, 508. Sec. 5.
_The factors which aid ethical reconstruction_:--Principles
more easily seen, 511.
XXIII. SOME PRINCIPLES IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER 514
1. Wealth subordinate to personality, 514. 2. Wealth and
activity, 514. 3. Wealth and public service, 515. 4. A change
demanded from individual to collective morality, 517. 5.
Personal responsibility, 519. 6. Publicity and legal control,
520. 7. Democracy and distribution, 521.
XXIV. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER 523
Sec. 1. _Individualism and socialism_:--General statement, 523;
equal opportunity, 526. Sec. 2. _Individualism or free contract
analyzed; its values_:--Efficiency, 527; initiative, 527;
regulation of production, 528. Sec. 3. _Criticisms upon
individualism_:--It does not secure real freedom, 528; nor
justice, 530; competition tends to destroy itself, 531;
position of the aristocratic individualists, 532.
XXV. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER (CONTINUED) 536
Sec. 4. _The theory of public agency and control_, 536. Sec.
5. _Society as agency of production_:--Charges against private
management, 537; corruption, 538; conditions of labor, 540;
collective agency not necessarily social, 544. Sec. 6.
_Theories of just distribution_:--Individualistic theory, 546;
equal division, 547; a working programme, 548. Sec. 7.
_Ownership and use of property_:--Defects in the present
system, 551. Sec. 8. _Present tendencies_:--Individualistic
character of the Constitution, 554; increased recognition of
public welfare, 555; social justice through economic, social,
and scientific progress, 557. Sec. 9. _Three special
problems_:--The open versus the closed shop, 559; the
capitalization of corporations, 561; the unearned increment,
564. Appendix: Prof. Seager's programme of social legislation,
566.
XXVI. THE FAMILY 571
Sec. 1. _Historical antecedents of the modern family_:--Maternal
type, 572; paternal type, 572; influence of the church, 576.
Sec. 2. _The psychological basis of the family_:--Emotional and
instinctive basis, 578; common will, 580; parenthood, 581;
social and religious factors, 582; the children, 582. Sec. 3.
_General elements of strain in family relations_:--Differences
between the sexes in temperament and occupation, 584; in
attitude toward the family, 587; differences between parents
and children, 589. Sec. 4. _Special conditions which give rise to
present problems_:--The economic factors, 590; cultural and
political factors, 593. Sec. 5. _Unsettled problems_:--Economic
problems, 594; the dilemma between the domestic life and
occupations outside the home, 595; the family as consumer,
598. Sec. 6. _Unsettled problems_:--Political problems, authority
within the family, 599; equality or inequality, 600; isolation
not the solution, 602; authority over the family, divorce,
603; general law of social health, 605; conclusion, 605.
* * * * *
ETHICS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Sec. 1. DEFINITION AND METHOD
=Provisional Definition.=--The place for an accurate definition of a
subject is at the end of an inquiry rather than at the beginning, but a
brief definition will serve to mark out the field. Ethics is the science
that deals with conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or
wrong, good or bad. A single term for conduct so considered is "moral
conduct," or the "moral life." Another way of stating the same thing is
to say that Ethics aims to give a systematic account of our judgments
about conduct, in so far as these estimate it from the standpoint of
right or wrong, good or bad.
=Ethical and Moral.=--The terms "ethics" and "ethical" are derived from
a Greek word _ethos_ which originally meant customs, usages, especially
those belonging to some group as distinguished from another, and later
came to mean disposition, character. They are thus like the Latin word
"moral," from _mores_, or the German _sittlich_, from _Sitten_. As we
shall see, it was in customs, "ethos," "mores," that the moral or
ethical began to appear. For customs were not merely habitual ways of
acting; they were ways approved by the group or society. To act contrary
to the customs of the group brought severe disapproval. This might not
be formulated in precisely our terms--right and wrong, good and
bad,--but the attitude was the same in essence. The terms ethical and
moral as applied to the conduct of to-day imply of course a far more
complex and advanced type of life than the old words "ethos" and
"mores," just as economics deals with a more complex problem than "the
management of a household," but the terms have a distinct value if they
suggest the way in which the moral life had its beginning.
=Two Aspects of Conduct.=--To give a scientific account of judgments
about conduct, means to find the principles which are the basis of these
judgments. Conduct or the moral life has two obvious aspects. On the one
hand it is a life of purpose. It implies thought and feeling, ideals and
motives, valuation and choice. These are processes to be studied by
psychological methods. On the other hand, conduct has its outward side.
It has relations to nature, and especially to human society. Moral life
is called out or stimulated by certain necessities of individual and
social existence. As Protagoras put it, in mythical form, the gods gave
men a sense of justice and of reverence, in order to enable them to
unite for mutual preservation.[1] And in turn the moral life aims to
modify or transform both natural and social environments, to build a
"kingdom of man" which shall be also an ideal social order--a "kingdom
of God." These relations to nature and society are studied by the
biological and social sciences. Sociology, economics, politics, law, and
jurisprudence deal particularly with this aspect of conduct. Ethics must
employ their methods and results for this aspect of its problem, as it
employs psychology for the examination of conduct on its inner side.
=The Specific Problem of Ethics.=--But ethics is not merely the sum of
these various sciences. It has a problem of its own which is created by
just this twofold aspect of life and conduct. It has to relate these two
sides. It has to study the inner process _as determined by the outer
conditions or as changing these outer conditions_, and the outward
behavior or institution _as determined by the inner purpose, or as
affecting the inner life_. To study choice and purpose is psychology; to
study choice as affected by the rights of others and to judge it as
right or wrong by this standard is ethics. Or again, to study a
corporation may be economics, or sociology, or law; to study its
activities as resulting from the purposes of persons or as affecting the
welfare of persons, and to judge its acts as good or bad from such a
point of view, is ethics.
=Genetic Study.=--When we deal with any process of life it is found to
be a great aid for understanding the present conditions if we trace the
history of the process and see how present conditions have come about.
And in the case of morality there are four reasons in particular for
examining earlier stages. The first is that we may begin our study with
a simpler material. Moral life at present is extremely complex.
Professional, civic, domestic, philanthropic, ecclesiastical, and social
obligations claim adjustment. Interests in wealth, in knowledge, in
power, in friendship, in social welfare, make demand for recognition in
fixing upon what is good. It is desirable to consider first a simpler
problem. In the second place, this complex moral life is like the human
body in that it contains "rudiments" and "survivals." Some of our
present standards and ideals were formed at one period in the past, and
some at another. Some of these apply to present conditions and some do
not. Some are at variance with others. Many apparent conflicts in moral
judgments are explained when we discover how the judgments came to be
formed in the first instance. We cannot easily understand the moral life
of to-day except in the light of earlier morality. The third reason is
that we may get a more objective material for study. Our moral life is
so intimate a part of ourselves that it is hard to observe impartially.
Its characteristics escape notice because they are so familiar. When we
travel we find the customs, laws, and moral standards of other peoples
standing out as "peculiar." Until we have been led by some such means to
compare our own conduct with that of others it probably does not occur
to us that our own standards are also peculiar, and hence in need of
explanation. It is as difficult scientifically as it is personally "to
see ourselves as others see us." It is doubtless true that to see
ourselves merely as others see us would not be enough. Complete moral
analysis requires us to take into our reckoning motives and purposes
which may perhaps be undiscoverable by the "others." But it is a great
aid to this completer analysis if we can sharpen our vision and awaken
our attention by a comparative study. A fourth reason for a genetic
study is that it emphasizes the dynamic, progressive character of
morality. Merely to examine the present may easily give the impression
that the moral life is not a life, a moving process, something still in
the making--but a changeless structure. There is moral progress as well
as a moral order. This may be discovered by an analysis of the very
nature of moral conduct, but it stands out more clearly and impressively
if we trace the actual development in history. Before attempting our
analysis of the present moral consciousness and its judgments, we shall
therefore give an outline of the earlier stages and simpler phases.
=Theory and Practice.=--Finally, if we can discover ethical principles
these ought to give some guidance for the unsolved problems of life
which continually present themselves for decision. Whatever may be true
for other sciences it would seem that ethics at least ought to have some
practical value. "In this theater of man's life it is reserved for God
and the angels to be lookers on." Man must act; and he must act well or
ill, rightly or wrongly. If he has reflected, has considered his conduct
in the light of the general principles of human order and progress, he
ought to be able to act more intelligently and freely, to achieve the
satisfaction that always attends on scientific as compared with
uncritical or rule-of-thumb practice. Socrates gave the classic
statement for the study of conduct when he said, "A life unexamined,
uncriticized, is not worthy of man."
Sec. 2. CRITERION OF THE MORAL
It is not proposed to attempt at this point an accurate or minute
statement of what is implied in moral conduct, as this is the task of
Part II. But for the purposes of tracing in Part I. the beginnings of
morality, it is desirable to have a sort of rough chart to indicate to
the student what to look for in the earlier stages of his exploration,
and to enable him to keep his bearings on the way.
Certain of the characteristics of the moral may be seen in a
cross-section, a statement of the elements in moral conduct at a given
time. Other characteristics come out more clearly by comparing later
with earlier stages. We give first a cross-section.
=1. Characteristics of the Moral Life in Cross-section.=--In this
cross-section the first main division is suggested by the fact that we
sometimes give our attention to _what_ is done or intended, and
sometimes to _how_ or _why_ the act is done. These divisions may turn
out to be less absolute than they seem, but common life uses them and
moral theories have often selected the one or the other as the important
aspect. When we are told to seek peace, tell the truth, or aim at the
greatest happiness of the greatest number, we are charged to do or
intend some definite act. When we are urged to be conscientious or pure
in heart the emphasis is on a kind of attitude that might go with a
variety of acts. A newspaper advocates a good measure. So far, so good.
But people may ask, what is the motive in this? and if this is believed
to be merely selfish, they do not credit the newspaper with having
genuine interest in reform. On the other hand, sincerity alone is not
enough. If a man advocates frankly and sincerely a scheme for enriching
himself at the public expense we condemn him. We say his very frankness
shows his utter disregard for others. One of the great moral
philosophers has indeed said that to act rationally is all that is
necessary, but he at once goes on to claim that this implies treating
every man as an end and not merely a means, and this calls for a
particular kind of action. Hence we may assume for the present purpose a
general agreement that our moral judgments take into account both what
is done or intended, and how or why the act is done. These two aspects
are sometimes called the "matter" and the "form," or the "content" and
the attitude. We shall use the simpler terms, the What and the How.
=The "What" as a Criterion.=--If we neglect for the moment the How and
think of the What, we find two main standpoints employed in judging: one
is that of "higher" and "lower" within the man's own self; the other is
his treatment of others.
The distinction between a higher and lower self has many guises. We
speak of a man as "a slave to his appetites," of another as possessed by
greed for money, of another as insatiately ambitious. Over against these
passions we hear the praise of scientific pursuits, of culture, of art,
of friendship, of meditation, or of religion. We are bidden to think of
things [Greek: semna], nobly serious. A life of the spirit is set off
against the life of the flesh, the finer against the coarser, the nobler
against the baser. However misguided the forms in which this has been
interpreted, there is no doubt as to the reality of the conflicting
impulses which give rise to the dualism. The source is obvious. Man
would not be here if self-preservation and self-assertion and sex
instinct were not strongly rooted in his system. These may easily
become dominant passions. But just as certainly, man cannot be all that
he may be unless he controls these impulses and passions by other
motives. He has first to create for himself a new world of ideal
interests before he finds his best life. The appetites and instincts may
be "natural," in the sense that they are the beginning; the mental and
spiritual life is "natural," as Aristotle puts it, in the sense that
man's full nature is developed only in such a life.
The other aspect of the What, the treatment of others, need not detain
us. Justice, kindness, the conduct of the Golden Rule are the right and
good. Injustice, cruelty, selfishness are the wrong and the bad.
=Analysis of the How: the Right and the Good.=--We have used right and
good as though they might be used interchangeably in speaking of
conduct. Perhaps this may in the end prove to be true. If an act is
right, then the hero or the saint may believe that it is also good; if
an act is good in the fullest sense, then it will commend itself as
right. But right and good evidently approach conduct from two different
points of view. These might have been noted when speaking of the content
or the What, but they are more important in considering the How.
It is evident that when we speak of conduct as _right_ we think of it as
before a judge. We bring the act to a standard, and measure the act. We
think too of this standard as a "moral law" which we "ought" to obey. We
respect its authority and hold ourselves responsible. The standard is
conceived as a control over our impulses and desires. The man who
recognizes such a law and is anxious to find and to do his duty, we call
conscientious; as governing his impulses, he has self-control; as
squaring his conduct strictly by his standard, he is upright and
reliable.
If I think of "_good_," I am approaching conduct from the standpoint of
value. I am thinking of what is desirable. This too is a standard, but
it is a standard regarded as an end to be sought rather than as a law. I
am to "choose" it and identify myself with it, rather than to control
myself by it. It is an "ideal." The conscientious man, viewed from this
standpoint, would seek to discover the true good, to value his ends, to
form ideals, instead of following impulse or accepting any seeming good
without careful consideration. In so far as impulses are directed by
ideals the thoroughly good man will be straightforward, "sincere": that
is, he will not be moved to do the good act by fear of punishment, or by
bribery, just as the upright man will be "governed by a sense of duty,"
of "respect for principles."
=Summary of the Characteristics of the Moral.=--To sum up the main
characteristics of the moral life viewed in cross-section, or when in
full activity, we may state them as follows:
On the side of the "what," there are two aspects:
(a) The dominance of "higher," ideal interests of knowledge, art,
freedom, rights, and the "life of the spirit."
(b) Regard for others, under its various aspects of justice, sympathy,
and benevolence.
On the side of the "how" the important aspects are:
(a) The recognition of some standard, which may arise either as a
control in the guise of "right" and "law," or as measure of value in the
form of an ideal to be followed or good to be approved.
(b) A sense of duty and respect for the law; sincere love of the good.
(a) and (b) of this latter division are both included under the
"conscientious" attitude.
=2. The Moral as a Growth.=--The psychologists distinguish _three
stages_ in conduct: (a) Instinctive activity. (b) Attention; the stage
of conscious direction or control of action by imagery; of
deliberation, desire, and choice. (c) Habit; the stage of unconscious
activity along lines set by previous action. Consciousness thus
"occupies a curious middle ground between hereditary reflex and
automatic activities upon the one hand and acquired habitual activities
upon the other." Where the original equipment of instincts fails to meet
some new situation, when there are stimulations for which the system has
no ready-made response, consciousness appears. It selects from the
various responses those which suit the purpose, and when these responses
have become themselves automatic, habitual, consciousness "betakes
itself elsewhere to points where habitual accommodatory movements are as
yet wanting and needed."[2] To apply this to the moral development we
need only to add that this process repeats itself over and over. The
starting-point for each later repetition is not the hereditary instinct,
but the habits which have been formed. For the habits formed at one age
of the individual's life, or at one stage of race development, prove
inadequate for more complex situations. The child leaves home, the
savage tribe changes to agricultural life, and the old habits no longer
meet the need. Attention is again demanded. There is deliberation,
struggle, effort. If the result is successful new habits are formed, but
upon a higher level. For the new habits, the new character, embody more
intelligence. The first stage, purely instinctive action, we do not call
moral conduct. It is of course not _im_moral; it is merely _un_moral.
The second stage shows morality in the making. It includes the process
of transition from impulse, through desire to will. It involves the
stress of conflicting interests, the processes of deliberation and
valuation, and the final act of choice. It will be illustrated in our
treatment of race development by the change from early group life and
customs to the more conscious moral life of higher civilization. The
third stage, well-organized character, is the goal of the process. But
it is evidently only a relative point. A good man has built up a set of
habits; a good society has established certain laws and moral codes. But
unless the man or society is in a changeless world with no new
conditions there will be new problems. And this means that however good
the habit was for its time and purpose there must be new choices and new
valuations. A character that would run automatically in every case would
be pretty nearly a mechanism. It is therefore the second stage of this
process that is the stage of active moral consciousness. It is upon this
that we focus our attention.
Moral growth from the first on through the second stage may be described
as a process in which man becomes more _rational_, more _social_, and
finally more _moral_. We examine briefly each of these aspects.
=The Rationalizing or Idealizing Process.=--The first need of the
organism is to live and grow. The first instincts and impulses are
therefore for food, self-defence, and other immediate necessities.
Primitive men eat, sleep, fight, build shelters, and give food and
protection to their offspring. The "rationalizing" process will mean at
first greater use of intelligence to satisfy these same wants. It will
show itself in skilled occupations, in industry and trade, in the
utilizing of all resources to further man's power and happiness. But to
rationalize conduct is also to introduce new ends. It not only enables
man to get what he wants; it changes the kind of objects that he wants.
This shows itself externally in what man makes and in how he occupies
himself. He must of course have food and shelter. But he makes temples
and statues and poems. He makes myths and theories of the world. He
carries on great enterprises in commerce or government, not so much to
gratify desires for bodily wants as to experience the growth of power.
He creates a family life which is raised to a higher level by art and
religion. He does not live by bread only, but builds up gradually a
life of reason. Psychologically this means that whereas at the beginning
we want what our body calls for, we soon come to want things which the
mind takes an interest in. As we form by memory, imagination, and reason
a more continuous, permanent, highly-organized self, we require a far
more permanent and ideal kind of good to satisfy us. This gives rise to
the contrast between the material and ideal selves, or in another form,
between "the world" and "the spirit."
=The Socializing Process.=--The "socializing" side of the process of
development stands for an increased capacity to enter into relations
with other human beings. Like the growth of reason it is both a means
and an end. It has its roots in certain instincts--sex, gregariousness,
parental instincts--and in the necessities of mutual support and
protection. But the associations thus formed imply a great variety of
activities which call out new powers and set up new ends. Language is
one of the first of these activities and a first step toward more
complete socialization. Cooperation, in all kinds of enterprises,
interchange of services and goods, participation in social arts,
associations for various purposes, institutions of blood, family,
government, and religion, all add enormously to the individual's power.
On the other hand, as he enters into these relations and becomes a
"member" of all these bodies he inevitably undergoes a transformation in
his interests. Psychologically the process is one of building up a
"social" self. Imitation and suggestion, sympathy and affection, common
purpose and common interest, are the aids in building such a self. As
the various instincts, emotions, and purposes are more definitely
organized into such a unit, it becomes possible to set off the interests
of others against those interests that center in my more individual
good. Conscious egoism and altruism become possible. And in a way that
will be explained, the interests of self and others are raised to the
plane of rights and justice.
=What is Needed to Make Conduct Moral.=--All this is not yet moral
progress in the fullest sense. The progress to more rational and more
social conduct is the indispensable condition of the moral, but not the
whole story. What is needed is that the more rational and social conduct
should itself be valued as good, and so be chosen and sought; or in
terms of control, that the law which society or reason prescribes should
be consciously thought of as right, used as a standard, and respected as
binding. This gives the contrast between the higher and lower, as a
conscious aim, not merely as a matter of taste. It raises the collision
between self and others to the basis of personal rights and justice, of
deliberate selfishness or benevolence. Finally it gives the basis for
such organization of the social and rational choices that the progress
already gained may be permanently secured, while the attention, the
struggle between duty and inclination, the conscious choice, move
forward to a new issue. Aristotle made these points clear:
"But the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts. The
products of art have their excellence in themselves, and so it is
enough if when produced they are of a certain quality; but in the
case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly or
temperately (or like a just or temperate man) if what he does
merely be of a certain sort--he must also be in a certain state of
mind when he does it: i.e., first of all, he must know what he is
doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself; and,
thirdly, his act must be the expression of a formed and stable
character."
=Summary of the Characteristics of the Moral as Growth.=--The full cycle
has three stages:
(a) Instinctive or habitual action.
(b) Action under the stress of attention, with conscious intervention
and reconstruction.
(c) Organization of consciously directed conduct into habits and a self
of a higher order: Character.
The advance from (a) to and through (b) has three aspects.
(a) It is a rationalizing and idealizing process. Reason is both a means
to secure other ends, and an element in determining what shall be
sought.
(b) It is a socializing process. Society both strengthens and transforms
the individual.
(c) It is a process in which finally conduct itself is made the
conscious object of reflection, valuation, and criticism. In this the
definitely moral conceptions of right and duty, good and virtue appear.
Sec. 3. DIVISIONS OF THE TREATMENT
PART I., after a preliminary presentation of certain important aspects
of group life, will first trace the process of moral development in its
general outlines, and then give specific illustrations of the process
taken from the life of Israel, of Greece, and of modern civilization.
PART II. will analyze conduct or the moral life on its inner, personal
side. After distinguishing more carefully what is meant by moral action,
and noting some typical ways in which the moral life has been viewed by
ethical theory, it will examine the meaning of right and good, of duty
and virtue, and seek to discover the principles underlying moral
judgments and moral conduct.
PART III. will study conduct as action in society. But instead of a
general survey, attention will be centered upon three phases of conduct
which are of especial interest and importance. Political rights and
duties, the production, distribution, and ownership of wealth, and
finally the relations of domestic and family life, all present unsettled
problems. These challenge the student to make a careful examination, for
he must take some attitude as citizen on the issues involved.
LITERATURE
The literature on specific topics will be found at the beginning of each
Part, and at the close of the several chapters. We indicate here some of
the more useful manuals and recent representative works, and add some
specific references on the scope and methods of ethics. Baldwin's
_Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_ has selected lists (see
especially articles, _Ethical Theories_, _Ethics_, _Worth_) and general
lists (Vol. III.). Runze, _Ethik_, 1891, has good bibliographies.
ELEMENTARY TEXTS: Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, 3rd ed., 1900;
Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, 1892; Seth, _A Study of Ethical
Principles_, 6th ed., 1902; Thilly, _Introduction to Ethics_, 1900.
REPRESENTATIVE BOOKS AND TREATISES IN ENGLISH: Green, _Prolegomena to
Ethics_, 1883 (Idealism); Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, 1885,
3rd ed., 1891 (Intuitionism); Sidgwick's _Methods of Ethics_, 1874, 6th
ed., 1901 (Union of Intuitionist and Utilitarian Positions with careful
analysis of common sense); Spencer, _The Principles of Ethics_, 1892-3
(Evolution); Stephen's _Science of Ethics_, 1882; The comprehensive work
of Paulsen (_System der Ethik_, 1889, 5th ed., 1900) has been translated
in part by Thilly, 1899; that of Wundt (_Ethik_, 1886, 3rd ed., 1903),
by Titchener, Gulliver, and Washburn, 1897-1901. Among the more recent
contributions, either to the whole field or to specific parts, may be
noted: Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_, 1889; 2nd ed., 1891;
Dewey, _Outlines of Ethics_, 1891, and _The Study of Ethics, A
Syllabus_, 1894; Fite, _An Introductory Study of Ethics_, 1903;
Hoeffding, _Ethik_ (German tr.), 1887; Janet, _The Theory of Morals_
(Eng. tr.), 1884; Ladd, _The Philosophy of Conduct_, 1902; Mezes,
_Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory_, 1900; Moore, _Principia Ethica_,
1903; Palmer, _The Field of Ethics_, 1902, _The Nature of Goodness_,
1903; Taylor, _The Problem of Conduct_, 1901; Rashdall, _The Theory of
Good and Evil_, 1907; Bowne, _The Principles of Ethics_, 1892; Rickaby,
_Moral Philosophy_, 1888.
HISTORIES OF ETHICS: Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_, 3rd ed., 1892;
Albee, _A History of English Utilitarianism_, 1902; Stephen, _The
Utilitarians_, 1900; Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_; Whewell,
_Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England_, 1852, 1862;
Koestlin, _Geschichte der Ethik_, 2 vols., 1881-92 (ancient theories);
Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik_, 2 vols., 1882-89 (modern); Wundt, _Ethik_,
Vol. II.; the histories of philosophy by Windelband, Hoeffding, Erdmann,
Ueberweg, Falckenberg.
SCOPE AND METHOD OF ETHICS: See the opening chapters in nearly all the
works cited above, especially Palmer (_Field of Ethics_), Moore,
Stephen, Spencer, Paulsen, and Wundt (_Facts of the Moral Life_); see
also Ritchie, _Philosophical Studies_, 1905, pp. 264-291; Wallace,
_Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics_, 1898, pp. 194 ff.;
Dewey, _Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality_
(_University of Chicago Decennial Publications_, 1903); Stuart, _The
Logic of Self-realization_, in University of California Publications:
_Philosophy_, I., 1904; Small, _The Significance of Sociology for
Ethics_, 1902; Hadley, Article _Economic Theory_ in Baldwin's _Dict._
RELATION OF THEORY TO LIFE: Green, _Prolegomena_, Book IV.; Dewey,
_International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. I., 1891, pp. 186-203; James,
same journal, Vol. I., 330-354; Mackenzie, same journal, Vol. IV., 1894,
pp. 160-173.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Plato, _Protagoras_, 320 ff.
[2] Angell, _Psychology_, p. 59.
* * * * *
PART I
THE BEGINNINGS AND GROWTH OF MORALITY
GENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART I
Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, 2 vols., 1906.
Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_, Vol. I., 1906.
Sutherland, _The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct_, 2 vols.,
1898.
Wundt, _Facts of the Moral Life_, 1902; also _Ethik_, 3rd ed., 1903,
Vol. I., pp. 280-523.
Paulsen, _A System of Ethics_, 1899, Book I.
Sumner, _Folkways_, 1907.
Bergmann, _Ethik als Kulturphilosophie_, 1904.
Mezes, _Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory_, Part I.
Dewey, _The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality_, Philos. Review,
XI., 1902, pp. 107-124, 353-371.
Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, 1759.
Baldwin, _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, 1902.
Taylor, _The Problem of Conduct_, 1901, chap. iii.
Spencer, _Data of Ethics_, 1879; _Psychology_, 1872, Part IX., chs.
v.-viii.
Ihering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, 3rd ed., 1893.
Steinthal, _Allgemeine Ethik_, 1885.