intention to have called upon you and consulted as to the mutual
interests of our people. Sickness has put it out of my power to
travel, and those interests require immediate consideration, and
therefore I have determined to write, and make what I think a plain
statement of the case for your consideration, which I think stands
thus: If we succeed in the South--succeed in this controversy, and I
have no doubt of the fact, for we are daily gaining friends among the
powers of Europe, and our people are arming with unanimity scarcely
ever seen in the world before--then your lands, your slaves, and your
separate nationality are secured and made perpetual, and in addition
nearly all your debts are in Southern bonds, and these we will also
secure. If the North succeeds you will most certainly lose all. First
your slaves they will take from you; that is one object of the war, to
enable them to abolish slavery in such manner and at such time as they
choose. Another, and perhaps the chief cause, is to get upon your rich
lands and settle their squatters, who do not like to settle in slave
States. They will settle upon your lands as fast as they choose, and
the Northern people will force their Government to allow it. It is
true they will allow your people small reserves--they give chiefs
pretty large ones--but they will settle among you, overshadow you, and
totally destroy the power of your chiefs and your nationality, and
then trade your people out of the residue of their lands. Go North
among the once powerful tribes of that country and see if you can find
Indians living and enjoying power and property and liberty as do your
people and the neighboring tribes from the South. If you can, then say
I am a liar, and the Northern States have been better to the Indian
than the Southern States. If you are obliged to admit the truth of
what I say, then join us and preserve your people, their slaves, their
vast possessions in land, and their nationality.
Another consideration is your debts, annuities, &c., school funds due
you. Nearly all are in bonds of Southern States and held by the
Government at Washington, and these debts are nearly all forfeited
already by the act of war made upon the States by that Government.
These we will secure you beyond question if you join us. If you join
the North they are forever forfeited, and you will have no right to
believe that the Northern people would vote to pay you this forfeited
debt. Admit that there may be some danger take which side you may, I
think the danger tenfold greater to the Cherokee people if they take
sides against us than for us. Neutrality will scarcely be possible. As
long as your people retain their national character your country
cannot be abolitionized, and it is our interest therefore that you
should hold your possessions in perpetuity.[234]
The effect that such a communication as the foregoing might well have had
upon the Indians can scarcely be overestimated. Time out of number they
had been over-reached in dealings financial. Only the year before, bonds
in which Indian trust funds were invested had been abstracted[235] from
the vaults of the Interior Department; and, for this cause and other
causes, Indian money had not been readily forthcoming for the much needed
relief of Indian sufferers from the fearful drought that devastated Indian
Territory, Kansas, and other parts of the great American desert in 1860.
Comment upon Hubbard's letter from the standpoint of historical inaccuracy
seems hardly necessary here. Suffice it to say that the distortion of
facts and the shifting of responsibility for previous Indian wrongs from
the shoulders of Southern States to those of a federal government made up
entirely of northern states must have seemed preposterous in the extreme
to the Indians. One can not help wondering how Hubbard dared to say such
things to the Indian exiles from Southern States and particularly to John
Ross who like all of his tribe and of associated tribes was the victim of
southern aggression and not in any sense whatsoever of northern.
To Hubbard's gross amplification and even defiance of his instructions,
also to his extravagant utterances touching the repudiation of debts and
southern versus northern justice and generosity, Chief Ross replied,[236]
by way of strong contrast, in terms dignified and convincing:
It is not the province of the Cherokees to determine the character of
the conflict going on in the States. It is their duty to keep
themselves, if possible, disentangled, and afford no grounds to either
party to interfere with their rights. The obligations of every
character, pecuniary and otherwise, which existed prior to the present
state of affairs between the Cherokee Nation and the Government are
equally valid now as then. If the Government owe us, I do not believe
it will repudiate its debts. If States embraced in the Confederacy owe
us, I do not believe they will repudiate their debts. I consider our
annuity safe in any contingency.
A comparison of Northern and Southern philanthropy, as illustrated in
their dealings toward the Indians within their respective limits,
would not affect the merits of the question now under consideration,
which is simply one of duty under existing circumstances. I therefore
pass it over, merely remarking that the "settled policy" of former
years was a favorite policy with both sections when extended to the
acquisition of Indian lands, and that but few Indians now press their
feet upon the banks of either the Ohio or the Tennessee....
Judging from all the instructions that Secretary Walker sent out on Indian
matters in May of 1861, it would seem that he had very much at heart the
enlistment of the Indians and their actual participation in the war.
Mention has already been made of how General McCulloch was told by
Adjutant-general Cooper to add, if possible, two Indian regiments to his
brigade and of how Walker had written Hubbard urging him to persuade the
Indians to join forces and raising the number of Indian regiments desired
from two to three. In a similar strain Walker wrote[237] to Douglas H.
Cooper on the occasion of definitely asking him to give his services to
the South. In all these letters no special stress was laid upon an
intention to use the Indians as home guards exclusively. On the contrary,
one might easily draw, from the letters, a quite opposite inference and
conclude that the Indian troops, if raised, were to be used very generally
and exactly as any other volunteers might be used. This is important in
view of the stand, and a very positive one it was, that Albert Pike took
some time afterwards. In his own letter[238] to Johnson of May 11, 1861,
he does not specifically say that the Indian soldiers, whose mustering he
has in contemplation, are not to be used outside of the Indian country;
but he does insist that that country be occupied by them and by a certain
number of white regiments--another important point as subsequent events
will divulge.
General McCulloch took up his part of the task of securing the Indians in
his own characteristic way. He had great energy and great enthusiasm and
both qualities were displayed to the fullest extent on the present
occasion. He first laid his plans for taking possession forthwith of the
Indian country, it having come to his knowledge that Colonel Emory with
the Federal forces had abandoned it.[239] Apparently, it had never
occurred to McCulloch that the Indians themselves might be averse to such
a proceeding on his part but he was soon made aware of it; for when he
consulted[240] with John Ross, he found, to his discomfiture and deep
chagrin, that the desire and the determination of this greatest of all the
Indians was to remain strictly neutral. On the twelfth of June, McCulloch
still further communicated[241] with Ross and informed him that he would
respect his wishes in so far as expediency justified but that he would
have to insist upon the inherent right of the individual Cherokees to
organize themselves into a force of Home Guards should they feel so
inclined. Then he closed his letter by this note of warning:
Should a body of men march into your Territory from the North, or if I
have an intimation that a body is in line of march for the Territory
from that quarter, I must assure you that I will at once advance into
your country, if I deem it advisable.
Once again the forbearance of Chief Ross had been put to a severe test,
but he none the less replied to McCulloch with his customary dignity. Ross
was then at Park Hill, McCulloch at Fort Smith, where he had halted hoping
that the permission would be forthcoming for him to cross the line. Ross's
reply[242] came by return mail, so to speak, and was dated the
seventeenth. It was largely a reiteration of the reasons he had already
given for preserving neutrality, but it was also a positive refusal to
allow the individual Cherokees to organize a Home Guard. The concluding
paragraph gives the lie direct to those intriguing and self-interested
politicians who, in later years, endeavored to impugn Ross's sincerity:
Your demand that those people of the nation who are in favor of
joining the Confederacy be allowed to organize into military companies
as Home Guards, for the purpose of defending themselves in case of
invasion from the North, is most respectfully declined. I cannot give
my consent to any such organization for very obvious reasons: First,
it would be a palpable violation of my position as a neutral; second,
it would place in our midst organized companies not authorized by our
laws but in violation of treaty, and who would soon become efficient
instruments in stirring up domestic strife and creating internal
difficulties among the Cherokee people. As in this connection you have
misapprehended a remark made in conversation at our interview some
eight or ten days ago, I hope you will allow me to repeat what I did
say. I informed you that I had taken a neutral position, and would
maintain it honestly, but that in case of a foreign invasion, old as I
am, I would assist in repelling it....
It will develop later how Ross's wishes with respect to the enrollment of
Home Guards were successfully and adroitly circumvented, with the
connivance of General McCulloch, by men of the Ridge faction in Cherokee
politics. From the beginning, McCulloch seemed determined not to take Ross
seriously, yet he duly informed Secretary Walker of the turn events were
taking. On the twelfth of June, for instance, he wrote[243] to him and
gave an account of his recent interview with the Cherokee chief. It was
rather a misleading account, however; for it conveyed to Walker the idea
that Ross was only waiting for provocation from the North to throw in his
lot with the Confederacy. On the twenty-second of June, McCulloch
wrote[244] to Walker again and to the same effect as far as his belief
that Ross was not sincere in his professions of neutrality was concerned,
even though, in the interval between the two letters, he had been
carefully corrected by Ross himself and even though he was, at the very
time, sending on to Richmond, the correspondence that denied the truth of
his own statement. He did, however, add that his belief now was that Ross
was awaiting a favorable moment to join forces with the North.
Albert Pike, special commissioner from the State Department of the
Confederate States to the Indian tribes west of Arkansas, had accompanied
General McCulloch on his visit to Ross, the latter part of May, and had
been present at the resulting interview. He had told[245] Toombs that he
would leave Little Rock for Fort Smith the twenty-second and go at
once[246] to the Cherokee country. At Fort Smith, Pike met McCulloch and
the two, seeking the same object, agreed to go forward together,[247]
having already been approached by an anti-Ross element of the Cherokee
Nation.[248] Ross, as has been shown, insisted upon maintaining an
attitude of strict neutrality, which probably did not surprise his
interviewers, since, according to Pike's own testimony, he and McCulloch
had not gone to Park Hill expecting to be able to effect any arrangement
with Chief Ross.[249] Ross, however, did go so far as to promise[250]
that within a short while he would call a meeting of the Cherokee
Executive Council and confer with it further on the policy to be pursued.
Ross doubtless felt that it was a part of political wisdom to do this. His
was an exceedingly difficult position; for, within the nation, there was a
large element in favor of secession. It was a minority party, it is true;
but, none the less, it represented for the most part, the intelligence and
the property and the influence of the tribe. Opposed to it and in favor of
neutrality, was the large majority, not nearly so influential because made
up of the full-bloods and of those otherwise poverty-stricken and obscure.
In the light of previous tribal discords, the minority party was the old
Ridge, or Treaty, Party, now headed by Stand Watie and E. C. Boudinot,
while the majority party was the Ross, or Non-treaty Party. Ross himself,
his nephew, William P. Ross, and a few others were the great exceptions to
the foregoing characterization of their following. Of sturdy Scotch
extraction and honest to the core, they personally stood out in strong
contrast to the rank and file of the non-secessionists and it was they who
so guided public sentiment that John Ross had the nation back of him when,
on May 17, 1861, he issued his memorable Proclamation of Neutrality:[251]
_Proclamation to the Cherokee people_
Owing to the momentous state of affairs pending among the people of
the several States, I, John Ross, Principal Chief, hereby issue this
my proclamation to the people of the Cherokee Nation, reminding them
of the obligations arising under their treaties with the United
States, and urging them to the faithful observance of said treaties
by the maintenance of peace and friendship toward the people of all
the States.
The better to obtain these important ends, I earnestly impress upon
all my fellow-citizens the propriety of attending to their ordinary
avocations and abstaining from unprofitable discussions of events
transpiring in the States and from partisan demonstrations in regard
to the same.
They should not be alarmed by false reports thrown into circulation by
designing men, but cultivate harmony among themselves and observe in
good faith strict neutrality between the States threatening civil war.
By these means alone can the Cherokee people hope to maintain their
rights unimpaired and to have their own soil and firesides spared from
the baleful effects of a devastating war. There has been no
declaration of war between the opposing parties, and the conflict may
yet be averted by compromise or a peaceful separation.
The peculiar circumstances of their condition admonish the Cherokees
to the exercise of prudence in regard to a state of affairs to the
existence of which they have in no way contributed; and they should
avoid the performance of any act or the adoption of any policy
calculated to destroy or endanger their territorial and civil rights.
By honest adherence to this course they can give no just cause for
aggression or invasion nor any pretext for making their country the
scene of military operations, and will be in a situation to claim and
retain all their rights in the final adjustment that will take place
between the several States. For these reasons I earnestly impress upon
the Cherokee people the importance of non-interference in the affairs
of the people of the States and the observance of unswerving
neutrality between them.
Trusting that God will not only keep from our own borders the
desolations of war, but that He will in infinite mercy and power stay
its ravages among the brotherhood of States.
Given under my hand at the executive office at Park Hill this 17th day
of May, 1861.
JNO. ROSS, Principal Chief Cherokee Nation.
The discretion of the Cherokees, their wily diplomacy if, under the
circumstances, you should please to call it such, was more than
counterbalanced by the indiscretion and the impetuosity of some of their
neighbors. It has already been noted how the Chickasaws expressed their
southern sympathies in the legislative resolves[252] of the twenty-fifth
of May, but not as yet how the Choctaws took an equally strong stand. Both
tribes were so very pronounced in their show of affection for the
Confederacy that they gave a secessionist color to the whole of the Indian
Territory, so much so, in fact, that Lieutenant-colonel Hyams could
report[253] to Governor Moore of Louisiana, on the twenty-eighth of May,
and upon information given him by some Indian agent.
... That the nations on the borders of this State (Arkansas) are
anxious and desirous to be armed; that they can and will muster into
the service 25,000 men; that they have immense supplies of beeves,
sufficient to supply the meat for the whole Confederate service. All
they ask is arms and enrollment. If within your power to forward their
views with the President, it would be a great step in the right
direction, and erect a more effectual barrier against the Kansas
marauders than any force that could be sent against them, and thereby
protect the northern boundary of both Arkansas and Louisiana. The
reasons why every effort should be made to arm these people (now heart
and soul with us) to defend themselves and us are so palpable, that I
do not attempt to urge them upon you, but do solicit your attention,
so far as is compatible with your high position, to this matter, to
impress its importance on the President, and use your well-known
influence to effect this much desirable result....
General McCulloch, in a letter[254] also of the twenty-eighth of May, more
particularly specified the tribes that were friendly to the South, but he
too mentioned some of them, the Choctaw and the Chickasaw, as "anxious to
join the Southern Confederacy." It should not be a matter of surprise then
to find that on the fourteenth of June, George Hudson, principal chief of
the Choctaw Nation, acting in accordance with the will of the General
Council, which had met four days before, publicly declared[255] the
Choctaw Nation, "free and _independent_." The chief's proclamation was, in
effect, a conscription act and provided for the enrollment, for military
service in the interests of the Confederacy, of all competent males
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. The General Council had
authorized this and had further arranged for the appointment of
commissioners "to negotiate a treaty of alliance and amity" with the
Confederate States.
Under such conditions, the work of Albert Pike must have seemed all plain
sailing when once he was safely beyond the Cherokee limits; but his
efforts,[256] vain though they were, to persuade that tribe into an
alliance did not end[257] with the first recorded interview with Ross. He
kept up his intercourse with the Ridge faction; but finally decided that
as far as Ross and the nation as a whole were concerned it would be best
to await the issue of events. It was only too apparent to all the southern
agents and commissioners that Ross would never yield his opinion unless
compelled thereto by one of three things or a combination of any or all of
them. The three things were, pressure from within the tribe; some
extraordinary display of Confederate strength that would presage ultimate
success for southern arms; and encroachment by the Federals. It was the
combination that eventually won the day. Pike, meanwhile, had passed on
to the Creek country.
At the North Fork Village, in the Creek country, the work of negotiating
Indian treaties in the interests of the Confederacy really began and it
did not end until a rather long series of them had been concluded. The
series consisted of nine main treaties[258] and the nine group themselves
into three distinct classes. The basis of classification is the relative
strength or power of the tribe, or better, the degree of concession which
the Confederacy, on account of that strength or that power or under stress
of its own dire needs, felt itself obliged to make. This is the list as
classified:
FIRST CLASS
1. Creek, negotiated at North Fork, Creek Nation, July[259] 10, 1861
2. Choctaw and Chickasaw, negotiated at North Fork, July 12, 1861
3. Seminole, negotiated at the Seminole Council House, August 1, 1861
4. Cherokee, negotiated at Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation, October 7, 1861
SECOND CLASS
1. Osage, negotiated at Park Hill, Cherokee Nation, October 2, 1861
2. Seneca and Shawnee, negotiated at Park Hill, October 4, 1861
3. Quapaw, negotiated at Park Hill, October 4, 1861
THIRD CLASS
1. Wichita, etc., negotiated at the Wichita Agency near the False
Washita River, August 12, 1861
2. Comanche, negotiated at the Wichita Agency, August 12, 1861
Although all the treaties, made in 1861 by Albert Pike, were negotiated
under authority[260] of the Act of the Provisional Congress of the
Confederate States, approved May 21, 1861, by which the Confederacy
offered and agreed to accept the protectorate of the Indian tribes west of
Arkansas and Missouri, only those made with the great tribes contained a
statement,[261] definitely showing that the protectorate had been formally
offered, formally accepted and formally assumed. Thus, in a very
unequivocal way, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, and Cherokees,
all signified[262] their willingness to transfer their allegiance from the
United to the Confederate States. The smaller tribes seem not to have been
asked to make the same concession and their nationality was, in no sense,
recognized. They acted more or less under duress or compulsion, and the
very negotiation of treaties with them was taken as a full compliance with
the confederate scheme.
The nationality of the great tribes, or more properly speaking, their
political importance, was still further recognized by clauses
guaranteeing territorial and political integrity,[263] representation by
delegates[264] in the Confederate Congress, and the prospect[265] of
ultimate statehood. The guarantee of territorial integrity was, of a
certainty, not new. It had been inserted into various removal treaties as
a safeguard against a repetition of the injustice that had been meted out
to the Indians by the Southern States in Jackson's day. It comprised, in
effect, a solemn promise that no state or territorial lines should ever
again circumscribe the particular domain of the Indian nation securing the
guarantee; and that state or territorial laws, as the case might be,
should have no operation within the Indian country. The idea of
congressional representation[266] was also not new, but where it had
previously been but a promise or a mere contingency, it was now an assured
fact, a thing definitely provided for. Ultimate statehood had, however,
attached to it the old time elements of uncertainty, which is not at all
surprising, considering that Walker, in his instructions[267] to Hubbard,
had positively spoken against it.
All the treaties, without distinction of class, recognized the land rights
of the Indians and their existing territorial limits, but with the usual
restriction upon alienation to foreign powers. A sale or cession to a
foreign state, without the consent of the Confederate States, was to
result in forfeiture and reversion to the Confederate States. By the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Treaty, the arrangement,[268] already satisfactorily
reached, for a Chickasaw country distinct from a Choctaw was continued,
the Indians of both tribes being given the privilege of having their
particular land surveyed and sectionized whenever they might so please,
provided it be done by regular legislative process.[269] The same treaty
transferred[270] the lease of the Wichita Reserve from the United to the
Confederate States and limited it to ninety-nine years. Practically the
same bands of Indians were to be accommodated in this Leased District as
before; namely, those whose permanent ranges were south of the Canadian or
between it and the Arkansas. The New Mexican Indians were still to be
absolutely excluded. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians reserved the right
to pass upon the accommodation of any other Indians than those
specifically mentioned in the treaty. The individual bands, so
accommodated in the Leased District, were to be settled upon reserves and
to hold the same in fee. Finally, the treaty placed,[271] for the time
being, the Wichitas and their fellow reservees exclusively under the
control of the Confederate States with a limited jurisdiction resting in
the Choctaw Nation and a full right of settlement in Choctaws and
Chickasaws.