Emory's orders further comprehended a concentration of all the troops at

Fort Washita that were then at that place and at Forts Cobb and

Arbuckle;[140] but the orders were discretionary in their nature and

permitted his leaving a small force at the more northern posts should

circumstances warrant or demand it. On the nineteenth, General Scott had

had a conference with Senator Charles B. Mitchell of Arkansas and, in

deference to Mitchell's opinion, still further modified his orders to

Emory so that, while leaving him the bulk of his discretionary power, he

recommended that, if advisable, Emory retain one company at Fort

Cobb.[141] In any event, one company of infantry was to move in advance

from Fort Arbuckle to Fort Washita.[142]

Up to the twenty-fourth of March, at which time he left Memphis, Colonel

Emory made pretty good time in his attempt to reach his destination; but

from Memphis on his movements were unavoidably and considerably hampered.

Low water in the Arkansas detained him for several days so that he deemed

it prudent to send his orders on ahead to the commanding officer at Fort

Arbuckle "to commence the movement upon Fort Washita, and, in the event of

the latter place being threatened, to march to its support with his whole

force."[143] On reaching Fort Smith, Emory found that matters had come to

a crisis in Arkansas and, touching the disposition of his force and the

objects of his mission, allowed himself to be unduly influenced in his

judgment by men of local predilections.[144] It was upon their advice and

upon the urgent pleadings of Matthew Leeper,[145] Indian agent on the

Leased District, that he exercised his discretionary power as to the

disposal of troops, without listening to his military subordinates[146] or

having viewed the locality for himself. In the interests of these local

petitioners,[147] he even enlarged upon Mitchell's recommendation and

concluded to leave two companies at Fort Cobb as one was deemed altogether

inadequate to the protection of so isolated a post. It never seems to

have occurred to him that the attack would have to come from the south,

from the direction of Fort Washita, and that a force large enough to be

efficient at either Fort Washita or Fort Arbuckle would necessarily

protect Fort Cobb and the Indians of the Leased District.

The position of the Indians in the Leased District was serious in the

extreme. They lived in mortal terror of the Texans and their agent, the

man placed over them by the United States government, was now an avowed

secessionist. He was a Texan and declared, as so many another southerner

did from General Lee down, that honor and loyalty compelled him to go with

his state. In February, he had been in Washington City, settling his

accounts with the government and estimating for the next two quarters in

accordance with the rulings and established usage of the Indian Office. On

his way west and back to his agency, he was waylaid by a man of the name

of "Burrow," very probably Colonel N. B. Burrow, acting under authority

from the state of Arkansas, who despoiled him of part of his travelling

equipment and then suffered him to go on his way.[148] Leeper reached his

agency to find the Indians greatly excited. He endeavored to allay their

fears, assuring them that the Texans would do them no harm. Soon, however,

came his own defection and he thenceforward made use of every means,

either to make the way easy for the Texans or to induce the Indians to

side with them against the United States.

While Emory was dilly-dallying at Fort Smith, the Texans made their

preparations[149] for invading the Indian country and a regiment of

volunteers under William C. Young, once a planter of Braganza County and

now state regimental colonel, moved towards the Red River. There is

something to show that they came at the veiled invitation[150] of the

Indians. At any rate they seem to have felt pretty sure of a welcome[151]

and were close at hand when Colonel Emory reached Fort Washita. He reached

Fort Washita to find that the concentration of troops, even of such as his

ill-advised orders would permit, had not yet fully taken place, that his

supplies had been seized by the Texans, and that a general attack by them

upon the poorly fortified posts was to be hourly expected. Emory,

thereupon, resolved to withdraw from Fort Washita towards Arbuckle and

Cobb. The day after he did so, April 16, Young's troops entered in force.

Emory hurried forward to strengthen Fort Cobb and, indeed, to relieve it,

taking, in his progress, the open prairie road that his cavalry might be

more available. On the way,[152] he was joined by United States troops

from Fort Arbuckle, the Texans in close pursuit. Fort Arbuckle was

occupied by them in turn and then Fort Cobb, Emory never so much as

attempting to enter the place; for he found its garrison in flight to the

northeast. Fugitives all together, the Federal troops, piloted by a

Delaware Indian, Black Beaver,[153] hurried onwards towards Fort

Leavenworth. They seem to have made no lengthy stop until they were safe

across the Arkansas River[154] and their flight may well be said to have

been a precipitous one. Behind them, at Fort Arbuckle, Colonel Young took

possession of abandoned property and placed it in the care of the

Chickasaw Indians,[155] who had materially aided him in his attack. His

next move was to negotiate,[156] unauthoritatively, a treaty with the

Reserve Indians, gaining the promise of their alliance upon the

understanding that the Confederacy, in return, would feed and protect

them. Fort Cobb was rifled and the Indians made rich, in their own

estimation, with booty.[157] Colonel Young seems then to have drawn back

towards the Red River; but for several months he continued to occupy with

his forces,[158] under the authority of Texas and with the consent of the

Chickasaw Indians, the three frontier posts that Emory had been instructed

to guard; viz., Forts Washita, Arbuckle, and Cobb.

If Texas took time by the forelock in her anxiety to secure the Indian

country and its inhabitants, Arkansas most certainly did the same; and, in

the undertaking, various things told to her advantage, among which, not

the least important was the close family relationship existing between her

secessionist governor, Henry M. Rector, and the southern superintendent.

They were cousins and, to all appearances, the best of friends. It is

doubtful if in any state the executive authority thereof worked more

energetically for secession or with greater consistency and promptitude

than in Arkansas. Governor Rector had been elected, in the autumn of 1860,

by the Democrats and old-line Whigs. He belonged to a numerous and most

influential family, land-surveyors most of them, seemingly by inheritance,

and, although from northern or border states originally, strongly

committed to the doctrine of state sovereignty. The family connections

were also powerful socially and politically. The gubernatorial

inauguration came in November, 1860, and from that moment Henry M. Rector

and his host of relations and friends worked for secession.

At the outset, Governor Rector identified the Indian interests with those

of Arkansas. Even in his message[159] of December 11, 1860 he gave it as

his opinion that the two communities must together take measures to

prevent anti-slavery migration. It was rather late in the day, however, to

intimate that men of abolitionist sentiments must not be allowed to cross

the line, and a man of the political acumen of Henry M. Rector must have

known it. Immediately after the general election there were evidences of

great excitement in Arkansas and, when news[160] came that the disused

arsenal at Little Rock was to be occupied by artillery under Captain James

Totten from Fort Leavenworth, it broke out into expressions of public

dissent. Little Rock was scarcely less radical and secessionist in its

views than was Fort Smith and Fort Smith was regarded as a regular hot-bed

of sectionalism. The legislature, too, was filled with state-rights

advocates and some of the actions taken there were almost revolutionary in

their trend. With the new year came new alarms and false reports of what

was to be. Harrell records[161] that the first message over the newly

completed telegraph line between Memphis and Little Rock was a repetition

of the rumor, quite without foundation, that Major Emory had been ordered

from Fort Gibson to reinforce Totten at Little Rock, and that the effect

upon Helena was electrical. It is no wonder that the newspapers and

personal communications[162] of the time showed great intensity of

feeling and a tendency to ring the changes on a single theme.

The public indignation following the receipt of the unsubstantiated rumor

that Totten was to be reenforced seems to have compelled the action of

Governor Rector in taking possession,[163] on February eighth, in the name

of the state of Arkansas, of the United States arsenal at Little Rock;

but, as a matter of fact, Rector needed only an excuse, and a very slight

one at that, for doing more than he had already done to prove his

sectional bias. Nor had he forgotten or neglected the Indians. Indeed,

never at any time did he leave a single stone unturned in his search for

inside and outside support; and, notwithstanding the fact that the

Arkansas Ordinance of Secession was not passed until the sixth of May,

Governor Rector conducted himself, for months before that, as though the

state were a bona fide member of the Confederacy. In all his audacious

venturings, proposals, and acts, he had the full and unquestioning

support, not only of his cousin, Elias Rector,[164] in whose honor Albert

Pike had written the well-known parody[165] on "The Old Scottish

Gentlemen;"[166] but of the leading citizens of Fort Smith and Little

Rock, particularly of those whose previous occupations, residence,

inclinations, or interests had made them conversant with Indian affairs

and, therefore, unusually appreciative of the strategic value of the

Indian country. Under such circumstances, it is not at all surprising that

Governor Rector seized, as he did, the earliest[167] opportunity to

approach the Cherokees. Fort Smith at the junction of the Arkansas and

Poteau Rivers was only eighty miles from Fort Gibson.

Before taking up for special comment Governor Rector's negotiations with

the Cherokees through their principal chief, John Ross, it might be well

to retrace our steps a little in order to show how, in yet other ways,

Arkansas interested herself more than was natural in the concerns of the

Indians and made some of her citizens, in the long run, more than

ordinarily responsible for the development of secessionist sentiment among

the southern tribes.

When David Hubbard, journeying westward as special secessionist

commissioner[168] from Alabama to Arkansas, reached Little Rock--and that

was in the early winter of 1861--he soon discovered that many Arkansans

were not willing for their state to go out of the Union unless she could

take Indian Territory with her. Hubbard's letter,[169] descriptive of the

situation, is very elucidating. It is addressed to Andrew B. Moore,[170]

governor of Alabama, and bears date Kinloch, Alabama, January third.

MY DEAR SIR: On receipt of your letter and appointment as commissioner

from Alabama to Arkansas, I repaired to Little Rock and presented my

credentials to the two houses, and also your letter to Governor

Rector, by all of whom I was politely received. The Governor of

Arkansas was every way disposed to further our views, and so were many

leading and influential members of each house of the Legislature, but

neither are yet ready for action, because they fear the people have

not yet made up their minds to go out. The counties bordering on the

Indian nations--Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws--would

hesitate greatly to vote for secession, and leave those tribes still

under the influence of the Government at Washington, from which they

receive such large stipends and annuities. These Indians are at a spot

very important, in my opinion, in this great sectional controversy,

and must be assured that the South will do as well as the North before

they could be induced to change their alliances and dependence. I have

much on this subject to say when I get to Montgomery, which cannot

well be written. The two houses passed resolutions inviting me to meet

them in representative hall and consult together as to what had best

be done in this matter. When I appeared men were anxious to know what

the seceding States intended to do in certain contingencies. My

appointment gave me no authority to speak as to what any State would

do, but I spoke freely of what, in my opinion, we ought to do. I took

the ground that no State which had seceded would ever go back without

full power being given to protect themselves by vote against

anti-slavery projects and schemes of every kind. I took the position

that the Northern people were honest and did fear the divine

displeasure, both in this world and the world to come, by reason of

what they considered the national sin of slavery, and that all who

agreed with me in a belief of their sincerity must see that we could

not remain quietly in the same Government with them. Secondly, if they

were dishonest hypocrites, and only lied to impose on others and make

them hate us, and used anti-slavery arguments as mere pretexts for the

purpose of uniting Northern sentiment against us, with a view to

obtain political power and sectional dominion, in that event we ought

not to live with them. I desired any Unionist present to controvert

either of these positions, which seemed to cover the whole ground. No

one attempted either, and I said but little more. I am satisfied, from

free conversations with members of all parties and with Governor

Rector, that Arkansas, when compelled to choose, will side with the

Southern States, but at present a majority would vote the Union

ticket. Public sentiment is but being formed, but must take that

direction....

What, in addition to that just cited, Hubbard had to say about the Indians

or about the profit accruing from close contact with them, we have no way

of knowing; but we have a right to be suspicious of the things that have

to be communicated by word of mouth only, especially in this instance,

when we remember that white men have always made the Indians subjects of

exploitation and that Hubbard was the man whom the southern Confederacy

chose for its first commissioner of Indian affairs, also that Hubbard's

first outline of work, as commissioner, in truth, his only outline,

comprehended an extended visit to the Indians before whom he proposed to

expatiate on the financial advantages of an adherence to the Confederacy

and the inevitable financial ruin that must come from continued loyalty to

the Union. All things considered, it would surely seem that in Hubbard's

mind the money question was always uppermost.

But there were others to whom the Indian income was a thing of interest.

At the earlier meeting of the Arkansas convention, a resolution[171] had

been passed, March 9, 1861, authorizing an inquiry to be made into the

annual cost to the United States government of the Indian service west of

Arkansas. The state administration had already seized[172] the Indian

funds on hand, an opportunity to do so having offered itself upon the

occasion of the death[173] of the United States disbursing officer, Major

P. T. Crutchfield. But, later, for fear that this might work prejudice

with the Indians a resolution[174] was passed providing that the money

should not be diverted from its proper uses. Because of such actions and

others of like direction, it is certainly safe to assume that pecuniary

considerations made the frontiersmen of 1861 vitally interested in Indian

affairs. The same influences that moved Hubbard to write his letter to

Governor Moore with special mention of the Indians unquestionably moved

the citizens of Boonsboro to try,[175] without much further ado, the

temper of the Cherokees.

Returning now to Governor Rector and to a recital of his endeavors with

the same Indian people, it is seen that his approach to the Cherokees was

made, as has been already intimated, through their principal chief, John

Ross, and by means of the following most excellently worded letter:

THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

Little Rock, January 29, 1861.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN ROSS,

Principal Chief Cherokee Nation:

SIR: It may now be regarded as almost certain that the States having

slave property within their borders will, in consequence of repeated

Northern aggressions, separate themselves and withdraw from the

Federal Government.

South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana

have already, by action of the people, assumed this attitude.

Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, and

Maryland will probably pursue the same course by the 4th of March

next. Your people, in their institutions, productions, latitude, and

natural sympathies, are allied to the common brotherhood of the

slaveholding States. Our people and yours are natural allies in war

and friends in peace. Your country is salubrious and fertile, and

possesses the highest capacity for future progress and development by

the application of slave labor. Besides this, the contiguity of our

territory with yours induces relations of so intimate a character as

to preclude the idea of discordant or separate action.

[Illustration: JOHN ROSS, PRINCIPAL CHIEF OF THE CHEROKEES [_From

Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology_]]

It is well established that the Indian country west of Arkansas is

looked to by the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln as fruitful

fields, ripe for the harvest of abolitionism, free-soilers, and

Northern mountebanks.

We hope to find in your people friends willing to co-operate with the

South in defense of her institutions, her honor, and her firesides,

and with whom the slaveholding States are willing to share a common

future, and to afford protection commensurate with your exposed

condition and your subsisting monetary interests with the General

Government.

As a direct means of expressing to you these sentiments, I have

dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Col. J. J. Gaines, to confer with

you confidentially upon these subjects, and to report to me any

expressions of kindness and confidence that you may see proper to

communicate to the governor of Arkansas, who is your friend and the

friend of your people. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY M. RECTOR, Governor of Arkansas.[176]

Lieutenant Gaines duly started out upon his mission and upon reaching Fort

Smith interviewed Superintendent Rector and received from him a letter of

introduction[177] to John Ross, which was, in effect, a hearty endorsement

of the governor's project. An inkling of what Gaines was about soon came

to the ears of A. B. Greenwood, an Arkansan, a state-rights man, and

United States commissioner of Indian affairs. At the moment he was the

official, intent upon doing his duty, nothing more. It was then in his

official capacity that he straightway demanded of Agent Cowart an

explanation of Gaines's movements; but Cowart was privy to Governor

Rector's plans undoubtedly, a Georgian, a secessionist, and one of those

illiterate, disreputable, untrustworthy characters that frontier or

garrison towns seem always to produce or to attract, the kind,

unfortunately for its own reputation and for the Indian welfare, that the

United States government has so often seen fit to select for its Indian

agents. More than that, Cowart was a man of such base principles that he

could commercialize with impunity a great cause and calmly continue to

hold office under and to draw pay from one government while secretly

plotting against it in the interests of another. On this occasion he

attempted a denial[178] of the presence of Rector's commissioner at Fort

Smith; but the Indian Office had soon good proof[179] that a commissioner

had been there and that he had proceeded thence to the Cherokee country.

It was no other than Gaines, of course, who, when once he had delivered

the Rector letters to Ross, saw fit, in the further interests of his

mission, to attend the inter-tribal council at the Creek Agency.

John Ross did not reply to Governor Rector's communication until the

anniversary of George Washington's birthday and he then expressed the same

ideas of concern, of sympathy, but also those of positive neutrality that

had characterized his advice to the Indian conferees. He scouted, though,

the very idea of the incoming administration's planning to abolitionize

the Indian country while at the same time he manifested his utter

disapproval of it. This is what he said:

TAHLEQUAH, CHEROKEE NATION, February 22, 1861.

HIS EXCELLENCY HENRY M. RECTOR, Governor of Arkansas:

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's

communication of the 29th ultimo, per your aide-de-camp, Lieut. Col.

J. J. Gaines.

The Cherokees cannot but feel a deep regret and solicitude for the

unhappy differences which at present disturb the peace and quietude of

the several States, especially when it is understood that some of the

slave States have already separated themselves and withdrawn from the

Federal Government and that it is probable others will also pursue the

same course.

But may we not yet hope and trust in the dispensation of Divine power

to overrule the discordant elements for good, and that, by the counsel

of the wisdom, virtue, and patriotism of the land, measures may

happily be adopted for the restoration of peace and harmony among the

brotherhood of States within the Federal Union.

The relations which the Cherokee people sustain toward their white

brethren have been established by subsisting treaties with the United

States Government, and by them they have placed themselves under the

"protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatever."

They are bound to hold no treaty with any foreign power, or with any

individual State, nor with the citizens of any State. On the other

hand, the faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the

Cherokee Nation for the protection of the right and title in the

lands, conveyed to them by patent, within their territorial

boundaries, as also for the protection of all other of their national

and individual rights and interests of persons and property. Thus the

Cherokee people are inviolably allied with their white brethren of

the United States in war and friends in peace. Their institutions,

locality, and natural sympathies are unequivocally with the

slave-holding States. And the contiguity of our territory to your

State, in connection with the daily, social, and commercial

intercourse between our respective citizens, forbids the idea that

they should ever be otherwise than steadfast friends.

I am surprised to be informed by Your Excellency that "it is well

established that the Indian country west of Arkansas is looked to by

the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln as fruitful fields ripe for

the harvest of abolitionism, free-soilers, and Northern mountebanks."

As I am sure that the laborers will be greatly disappointed if they

shall expect in the Cherokee country "fruitful fields ripe for the

harvest of abolitionism," &c., you may rest assured that the Cherokee

people will never tolerate the propagation of any obnoxious fruit upon

their soil.

And in conclusion I have the honor to reciprocate the salutation of

friendship.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your Excellency's obedient servant,

JNO. ROSS, Principal Chief Cherokee Nation.[180]

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